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Abstract 
The notion of 'better regulation' indicates a desire on the part of policy makers to 
pursue improved policy design. The aim is to minimise the burden on both the 
regulated and the regulator whilst maximising the positive outcomes. The 
intensive evaluation of policy instruments forms an essential part of the cycle of 
improvement of policy design and implementation. However, existing evaluation 
techniques are often applied in an ad hoc and inconsistent manner. This reduces 
the opportunities to compare different policy instruments with a view to informing 
future instrument design. 
This research has led to the identification of six critical evaluation criteria which 
can be applied to policy instruments ex post in order to facilitate a robust and 
systematic comparative analysis of instruments. The purpose of this unique 
approach is to identify the instrument-specific lessons and the generic lessons 
regarding instrument design. The outcome of this research will be to improve 
future climate change policy design and hence to ameliorate the results that 
these policies deliver. 
The evaluation criteria were applied to four case studies that feature in the UK 
Climate Change Programme: the Pollution Prevention and Control (England and 
Wales) Regulations 2000; the Climate Change Agreements; United Kingdom 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme; and, the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme. 
This innovative approach to comparative analysis of case studies led to the 
identification of several critical recommendations for future design of policies 
targeted at industrial emissions control. These recommendations include: 
• More caution in the setting and measurement against performance 
baselines due to the inevitable risk of information asymmetries; 
• Improving the transparency of the negotiation of targets and performance 
reporting; 
• Greater emphasis and effort on the analysis of the costs and cost 
effectiveness of policies to Government (and by association, the tax 
payer); 
• Greater awareness among policy makers of the impact of industry 
lobbying on instrument design and performance targets. 
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1 Introduction 
When this research commenced, interest in climate change was generally 
reserved for limited sections of the academic community and environmental 
campaigners. Save for the occasional end of bulletin news item on television, 
public exposure to climate change issues was limited. By 2008, these 
circumstances could not have changed more. Public, industrial, commercial, 
academic and governmental interest in climate change has exploded to the point 
where it is seen as the most pressing environmental issue facing humanity. 
Demands for action from civil society are increasing. This has added impetus and 
much needed political support to calls from academia, selected national 
governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and supra-national 
organisations to change our behaviour in order to avert the consequences of 
dangerous climate change. 
It was a personal desire to make a positive and, hopefully, long-lasting 
contribution to this cause that prompted this research. I wanted to understand 
how we could possibly challenge the causes of climate change if we do not learn 
from our mistakes and develop efficient and effective policies and legislation. I 
wanted to learn how policy instruments could be refined to maximise the positive 
outcomes and minimise the negative. Moreover, I felt that the United Kingdom 
(UK), as one of the largest economies in the World, whose economic position was 
built on the strength of the industrial revolution largely to the detriment of the 
environment, should be leading the way. At the level of public discourse, the 
British Government has demonstrated admirable leadership addressing the 
massive challenges posed by climate change. However, closer inspection of the 
policies and politics of climate change in the UK reveal areas that warrant 
immediate attention. The approaches we take and the lessons we learn will have 
serious ramifications on our level of success in tackling the most pressing 
environmental issue of our time. 
18 
1.1 Rationale of the research 
In 2000, the European Union (EU) Lisbon Strategy first identified the role of 
"better regulation" in creating economic prosperity though sustainable growth and 
the creation of employment (European Commission, 2008a). The 2000 Strategy 
was refined and refocused in 2005 following disappointing progress during the 
first five of its ten-year life. The 2005 New Start for the Lisbon S/ys/egy identifies 
the crucial role "better regulation" plays in advancing the economic and 
competitive position of European businesses. Whilst the focus of the New Start 
shifted towards employment and growth, the importance of better regulation 
remained: 
'Better regulation has a significant positive impact on the framework 
conditions for economic growth, employment and productivity by improving 
quality of legislation, thereby creating the right incentives for business, 
cutting unnecessary costs and removing obstacles to adaptability and 
innovation.' 
(European Commission, 2005a: p.20) 
Furthermore, the Commission was keen to stress that the pursuit of better 
regulation should actively seek to ''remove unnecessary burdens and cut red tape 
unnecessary for reaching the underlying policy objective^' (European 
Commission, 2005a). A natural question arises over the extent to which the drive 
for better regulation is consistent with or enhances high standards of 
environmental protection but this matter is beyond the scope of this thesis. This 
thesis applies a more instrumental and functional approach to the Lisbon Strategy 
by evaluating climate change policy instruments against the instrumental goals 
that they set for themselves. 
In order to meet the ever-changing vision of 'better regulation' it is paramount that 
policy makers, of all levels, learn from previous experience. At this point the 
importance of ex yoos/policy evaluation becomes evident. Deficiencies in ex post 
analysis of policies, in the form of reviews of value of money, reporting of 
unintended impacts and identification of policy lessons to name but a few, were 
identified almost in parallel with the first Lisbon Strategy by the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) (EEA, 2001). This report set out to determine if 
existing practices of legislative analysis and reporting within EU Member States 
was being carried out effectively. One hundred pieces of domestic legislation 
implemented to comply with EU requirements were examined. In only 12% of 
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cases were Member States required to evaluate the effects of the legislation and 
the effectiveness of the legislation in meeting EU requirements. Furthermore, in 
instances where requirements were identified, the approaches were deemed to 
be highly variable, ranging from vague proposals for "programme review^' and 
''assessment of impact^' to more specific requirements to ''quantify effects of 
measures taken, indicate progress, economics impact and evaiuate 
effectiveness' (EEA, 2001). 
Transferring attention to the performance of the United Kingdom, the National 
Audit Office (NAO) has identified failings in the application of ex post policy 
evaluations in the form of post implementation reviews across numerous 
Government departments (NAO, 2007b). Taking this into account, and given the 
already extensive use of quantitative ex ante policy appraisals, a natural 
progression was to identify the need to apply rigorous, systematic and replicable 
qualitative techniques to evaluate existing policies. 
The second rationale behind the study is the comparative critique of the 
evaluation outcomes. In applying a rigorous and systematic methodology, the 
outcomes of the evaluations of individual case studies allow for the comparative 
assessment of instruments in order to identify the most effective elements of an 
instrument. With many authors advocating the use of instrument mixes, and the 
move away from pure regulatory regimes, the benefits of drawing on the positive 
aspects of instrument experience can thus be maximised. 
The final rationale of the research focuses on the application of policy 
instruments. As stated earlier, there has been a significant shift away from 
command and control regulation in recent years, but is this for good reason? Are 
the alternative instruments performing any better? 
1.2 Research overview 
The overall aim of this research is to explore how evaluation processes (where 
evaiuation refers to analysis of the outcomes of an instrument following 
implementation, ex post, in order to compare the actuai performance with the 
original policy objectives). The study area was selected as a result of the 
apparent failure of relevant authorities (such as governmental departments. 
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regulatory authorities and independent bodies) to undertake sa-pos/evaluations 
in a rigorous manner and systematic. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
The thesis comprises 10 Chapters. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Rationale of the study 
Structure of the thesis 
PART 1: METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
Methodological approaches to data collection, literature critique and data analysis 
Chapter 3: Literature review 
Presentation of comprehensive critique of existing literature relating to ex post 
policy instrument evaluation and climate change policy 
PART 2: ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
Each instrument was subject to a systematic evaluation based on a set of 
evaluation criteria designed to facilitate the identification of instrument-specific 
and generalisable policy lessons 
Chapter 4: Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations 
Chapter 5: Climate Change Agreements 
Chapter 6: United Kingdom Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme 
Chapter 7: European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
PART 3: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH OUTCOMES 
Chapter 8: Comparative analysis 
- 2 1 -
Comparative analysis of the case studies with particular reference to the 
evaluation criteria 
Chapter 9: Discussion 
Discussion of the l<ey policy lessons from each case study 
Critique of the methodological approach 
Identification of policy-specific recommendations 
Chapter 10: Conclusions 
Key conclusions of the study, identification of sources of originality, identification 
of areas for further work 
- 2 2 -
PART 1: METHODOLOGY AND 
BACKGROUND 
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Research methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this research is to develop and extend the use of ex post policy 
evaluation in the context of policy instrument design. The research draws on four 
case studies: 
• Climate Change Levy Agreements (CCA) 
• EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
• UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) 
• Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000 
(PPC Regulations) 
In doing so, the research required the development of a policy evaluation 
methodology. This methodology incorporates some selected design features of 
other commonly used evaluation and assessment techniques. In order to test the 
methodology, it was applied to the instruments above. These instruments are key 
components of the UK Climate Change Programme with the aim of reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from industry. 
In this Chapter, sections 2.2 to 2.12 present the methodological approach to 
identification of stakeholders, development of surveys, interviews, secondary 
data collection and analysis of findings. This Chapter continues by presenting the 
rationale for the selection of the evaluation criteria applied to the four case 
studies. The evaluation methodology applied in the course of this research has 
drawn on methods from two existing assessment methodologies: Regulatory 
Impact Assessment (RIA) and Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) (as a founding 
principle of RIA). This led to the selection of evaluation criteria based on 
quantitative and qualitative methods that take into account the economic costs 
and environmental outcomes of an instrument in addition to other aspects 
including equity to stakeholders, the ability of an instrument to promote 
technological innovation, the level of flexibility of an instrument and the degree of 
transparency of the policy design and operation process. The primary purpose of 
the criteria-based approach is to ensure as many facets of a policy and 
associated instruments as possible are evaluated adequately. 
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Patton (1987) identified two fundamental issues to be addressed in the process of 
developing a policy instrument evaluation framework: conceptual issues and 
technical issues. The elements of each issue that must be addressed prior to 
commencing a policy evaluation are presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Conceptual and technical issues in the development of a policy 
evaluation 
Conceptual issues to be identified Technical issues to be identified 
Relevant stakeholders Methods of enquiry 
Purpose of the evaluation Primary unit of analysis 
Approach, model or framework to be used 
to direct the evaluation 
Sampling strategy 
Primary evaluation questions/issues Comparisons (if any) to be made 
Any political considerations to be taken into 
account 
Type of data to be collected, from whom, 
when and how 
Standards and criteria against which the 
evaluation will be judged 
Level of accuracy required, how to ensure 
accuracy and quality of data 
Resources available for the evaluation Address concerns over validity and 
reliability 
Type of data analysis to conducted 
Type of statements and findings arising 
from analysis 
Source: Adapted from Patton (1987) 
The technical issues are addressed in the second part of this Chapter (sections 
2.2 to 2.12). The methodological approach to the conceptual issues identified in 
Table 2.1 is addressed in sections 2.13 of this Chapter. 
2.1.1 Definitions of terms used in this thesis 
The subject of this thesis and the discipline of policy instrument evaluation are not 
based on exact science as factors beyond the environmental performance (e.g. 
exact emission reductions) and the financial costs/benefits to industry or 
government of an instrument are not easily quantifiable. Stakeholder perceptions 
of other outcomes (whether intended or unintended) of the instrument, such as 
the degree of transparency, are subjective. However, this does not mean these 
factors are any less important. The drive towards holistic environmental 
protection (as seen with Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control) should be 
mirrored by holistic instrument assessment and evaluation. This indicates that 
non-quantifiable outcomes should always be considered. 
A host of terms are often used in reference to the same theory, particularly when 
dealing with policy instruments. In order to prevent confusion the following terms 
have been defined within the context of this thesis: 
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Table 2.2 Definition of terms used in the thesis 
Term Definition 
Policy evaluation Evpos/analysis of a policy based on evidence 
Policy assessment Eva/7te (pre-implementation) analysis of the predicted impacts 
of a policy 
Voluntary environmental 
agreement (VEA) 
Category consisting of all types of voluntary agreements 
including negotiated agreements and private agreements (see 
figure 3.3 for descriptive analysis of types of agreements) 
2.2 Research strategy 
This study contains three key facets: 
• the development a methodology to facilitate the ex post evaluation of 
environmental polices 
• the application of the evaluation methodology to four case studies 
• the cross-comparison of the case studies to with a particular focus on 
evaluating the role of different policy instruments within British 
environmental policy 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the procedure employed to execute this research. A 
literature review was conducted to include the key areas of the research: 
• The application of policy evaluation techniques 
• The development and implementation of policy instruments 
• The use of evaluation techniques and application of policy instruments to 
climate change policy 
The outcomes of this critical review were used to inform the development of the 
evaluation framework and its methodologies. The case study policies were 
selected according to criteria based on the scope of the instrument, industry 
coverage and its role within the UK Climate Change Programme (Department of 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 2000a, Defra, 2006d). 
The case study instruments were subsequently subjected to the evaluation 
framework based on multi-method qualitative and quantitative techniques, as 
specified in sections 2.9 to 2.11. The resulting data, both qualitative and 
quantitative, was analysed using the techniques identified in section 2.12. The 
final stage of the research required the comparative assessment of the case 
studies using the empirical and secondary data sou reed from government 
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emissions inventories, policy progress reports and company sourced information. 
This process enabled the identification of generalisable policy lessons and 
instrument-specific policy lessons, with particular focus paid to the often 
contentious issue of the application of non-mandatory policy instruments in future 
environmental policy decision making. 
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Figure 2.1 Research procedure 
Stage 1 
Literature review 
Policy evaluation 
mettiodologies 
Application of 
policy instruments 
Climate change 
policies 
Research subject 
- • Research problem 
Research questions 
Stage 2 Development of policy 
evaluation frameworit 
Stage 3 
Selection of case 
studies 
Stage 4 
Application of policy 
evaluation framework 
to individual case 
studies 
Qualitative data 
collection 
Interviews 
Questionnaires 
Focus group 
Quantitative data 
collection 
Questionnaires 
Secondary data 
(e.g. emissions 
inventories) 
Stage 5 
Data analysis 
1 r 
Comparative assessment 
of case studies 
r 
Stage 6 
Identification of outcomes 
» Conclusions 
» Recommendations for 
stat(eholders 
Source: Adapted from Flicl< (2002) 
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In light of the strategy employed for this research it is apparent that a 
predominately inductive research approach has been applied. Table 2.3 identifies 
the key differences between an inductive approach, predominately employed by 
social scientists, and a deductive approach to research, a predominately scientific 
approach. 
Table 2.3 Deductive and inductive research approaches 
Deductive approach Inductive approach 
Based on scientific principles Used to gain understanding of what 
meaning humans attach to specific events 
Seeks to explain tiie casual relationship 
between variables 
Closer understanding of the research 
context 
Quantitative data Qualitative data 
Application of controls to ensure data is 
valid 
Flexible structure to enable changes of 
focus as the research progresses 
Application of concepts to ensure clarity of 
definition 
Researcher is part of the research 
The researcher is often independent of 
what is being researched 
Less need to generalise findings 
Needs sufficient sample size to enable 
generalisation of conclusions 
Source: Saunders et ai. (2000) 
It should be highlighted that even though an inductive approach is the centre 
pillar for the research strategy, elements of the deductive approach were also 
applied in this research. The limitations of a purely inductive approach have been 
discussed by Silverman (2005) and focus on the risk of carrying out simple 
observations within a field. Inductive approaches can also be 'blind to the need to 
buiid cumulative bodies of knowledge' {S\V<jerrr\ar\, 2005: p.79). To avoid this risk 
in this research, elements of quantitative study have been incorporated. The 
comparative element of the evaluation ensures that the research goes beyond 
narration of the case studies. 
2.3 Research questions 
Following the examination of existing literature and policy documentation it 
became clear that there are some fundamental differences between the approach 
to policy assessment and policy evaluations. The UK has a strong history of 
policy assessment. Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA) are carried out prior to 
the implementation of all environmental policies as part of the Government's drive 
for "better regulation". The approach to policy evaluation is considerably less 
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rigorous. The absence of a systematic approach to evaluating polices led to 
identification of the following research problem: 
Ex post policy evaluation, with a view to improving instrument design, is 
not adeauatelv addressed in UK policv making 
From this research problem the following broad research question was 
developed: 
How could policy evaluation practices be improved to ensure maximum 
policy learning is achieved? 
In order to address this broad research question the following sub-questions were 
developed: 
1. What characteristics of policy existing evaluation and appraisal 
techniques could be employed effectively in the ex post evaluative 
situation? 
2. Can a systematic approach to policy evaluation enable the comparative 
evaluation of different policy instruments? 
3. In light of any comparative evaluation, what conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the role of different policy instruments in environmental policy 
making, specifically policies relating to climate change mitigation ?^ 
2.4 Literature review 
A literature review should enable the development of a solid understanding of the 
subject area (Saunders et al., 2000). It should also lead to the identification of 
trends within the subject and highlight gaps in the knowledge. In addition to this, a 
literature critique should help the researcher decide upon the most suitable 
methodological approach to the research. A review of existing research should 
also identify the specific weaknesses and contributions of different research 
designs in the subject (Hamkin, 1987). 
^ Of the four policies examined in this thesis three are applicable across the United 
Kingdom: CCA, UK ETS and EU ETS. Pollution Prevention and Control (England and 
Wales) Regulations 2000 do not apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have separated legislation and the Regulations are administered by 
separate regulatory authorities. For the purpose of this thesis the application of PPC in 
England and Wales will be the primary focus. 
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In this respect the review carried out for this research identified the following 
vacancies in the existing literature in three areas: 
• Application of eA-pos/evaluation techniques to environmental policies 
• Comparative assessment of differing policy instruments 
• Academic assessment of key instruments within the UK Climate Change 
Programme with particular interest in the role of non-mandatory policy 
instruments 
This enabled the identification of the research problem and the fundamental 
research questions to be addressed in the course of this thesis. The literature 
review has hence been structured to reflect these vacancies. 
The review of literature on ex post evaluation techniques required the 
assessment of previous academic work in this field. An examination of previous 
scholarship in the field of policy evaluation was followed by a review of the 
application of ex ante appraisal techniques in order to draw together the key 
elements to define the evaluation framework at the strategic and methodological 
levels. In particular, policy reviews carried out on behalf of the government by the 
National Audit Office and consultants were analysed to determine the scope and 
limitations of how the government reviews its own policies at present. This 
process was also used to identify theories of best-practice regarding ex post 
evaluations. EU and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) documentation concerning 'better regulation' and the 'simplification of the 
regulatory environment' were analysed to determine the influence of international 
activities on national practices. 
2.5 Development of the evaluation framework 
This section of the methodology Chapter focuses on one of the key empirical 
elements of this research: the development and application of an evaluation 
methodology to be applied ex post \o environmental policies. 
In recent years the British Government has shown a keen interest in improving 
the regulatory environment. The Better Regulation Executive (BRE) (within the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)) is charged 
with overseeing the government's drive to improve regulation by ensuring that: 
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regulation is only implemented where necessary; targets are set to ensure the 
cost of regulation to all parties is reduced; and, that enforcement and inspection 
arrangements for regulated sectors are rational (Better Regulation Executive, 
2007a). Key to the achievement of 'better regulation' is the application of RIA 
prior to the implementation of a policy. In the UK RIA is primarily used as a 
means to justify the financial cost of a policy (Radaelli, 2004). This comes as no 
surprise given that RIA focuses primarily on assessing the impacts prior to both 
the consultation phase and the implementation of a policy. Hov\/ever, as Radaelli 
also highlights, RIA should also be used as a means to demonstrate policy 
maker's commitment to ex yoos/evaluation and policy reviews (Radaelli, 2004). 
Herein lines the basis of the problem formulation of this research. RIA is 
conducted prior to policy proposals across all Government departments but the 
quality is "mixed" (NAO, 2008). In its 2007 annual report the NAO found that in 
previous years ''the establishment of robust evaluation arrangements was often 
handled poorly in RIAs. Our assessment of RiAs this year identified continuing 
weaknesses' (NAO, 2007b: p.22). 
The Government has specified that each RIA must include provisions for a post-
implementation review {P\R) (Better Regulation Executive, 2007b). In undertaking 
the PIR the factors identified in Table 2.4 should be considered. 
Table 2.4 Factors and methods of a Post-implementation review 
Factor Method 
RIA used as a starting point for the 
PIR 
Establish baselines and success criteria/success 
measures 
How and when the PIR will take 
place 
Recommended after three years of policy being in 
place 
Basis of review Whether it is statutory (of legal basis) or political 
requirement 
Modification of policy Establish criteria to modify or replace then policy if 
the objectives have not been met 
Regulatory simplification and 
deregulation 
The review should include scope to assess even if 
this triggers a nil return 
Determine if there have been any 
unintended consequences 
Stakeholder engagement to obtain information on 
any unintended consequences of the policy 
Source: Better Regulation Executive (2007b) 
The basis of PIR is sound. Legal provisions for reviews may be used to ensure 
the review is carried out. Credit should also be given for ensuring that 
modifications to policies are considered. The presence of regulatory simplification 
and effects on deregulation within the checklist are in keeping with the EU drive to 
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minimise the regulatory burden on government and business (European 
Commission, 2006a). However, tlie government lias made it clear that the role of 
PIR is to establish "whether implemented regulations are having the intended 
effect and whether they are implementing policy objective efficiently, it is not 
intended to review the effects of the policy itself or to determine whether the 
intended policy is still desirabid' (Better Regulation Executive, 2007c). 
The comparative evaluation of varying policy instrument types has been identified 
as a further stumbling block in the assessment of policy instrument efficiency in 
OECD countries (Borkey et al., 1998). This report stressed the need to drive 
forward research in this field to improve understanding of the costs associated 
with different policy instruments. 
By way of an overview, policy evaluations are an important stage in the policy 
development process. Rutman (1984) identified three key reasons for conducting 
policy instrument evaluations: 
• meaningful accountability - to ensure competent authorities are held to 
account over their policy decision making and implementation 
• improved programme delivery - facilitate the improvement of future policy 
decision making thought policy 'learning' 
• contributing to the knowledge of the social sciences - programme and 
policy evaluations may arise in greater knowledge and understanding of 
the process of decision making and its consequences 
For the above reasons the methodological approach to producing valid and 
reliable outcomes should be based according to the type of measurement to be 
applied, the type of research design to be employed and the format of the data 
analysis (Rutman, 1984). 
The development of the evaluation methodology for this research involved an 
extension of the literature review to establish current practices. The criteria 
employed in previous academic studies were collated. The criteria used in this 
research were selected based on two key criteria: 
• Prevalence in academic literature and official documentation 
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• Criteria of importance according to previous studies yet not generally 
considered in traditional policy evaluation practices 
This led to the identification of six key criteria (economic efficiency, environmental 
effectiveness, transparency, acceptance and equity, impact of innovation, and 
flexibility) to be applied in each policy evaluation based on the selection criteria 
above. In order to assess the policies against the criteria three methodologies 
were used: collection of quantitative data from surveys; collection of qualitative 
data from surveys and interviews; and, the analysis of existing reports and 
inventories relating to each policy. The detailed methodology for each criterion is 
presented in section 2.6. 
2.6 Application of evaluation criteria 
The section of this methodology Chapter presents the approaches of applying 
each evaluation criterion to the case studies. 
2.6.1 Economic efficiency 
In its purest form, this criterion deals with the cost encountered by three key 
groups in the development, implementation and continued operational costs. The 
three key groups are: 
• The public authority charged with developing, implementing and 
administering the policy 
• The target audience of the policy (e.g. industrial sectors, general public, 
commerce) 
• Other bodies involved in the development, implementation and operation 
of a policy such as the European Commission, government departments 
and agencies 
Policy reviews undertaken by the NAO and the Carbon Trust have been 
particularly useful in addressing this criterion (NAO, 2004, Carbon Trust, 2005, 
NAO, 2007a, Carbon Trust, 2008). Defra has also published limited data 
concerning the cost of policies to itself and to industry (Defra, 2007g). In addition 
to the quantitative data collected from these sources this research demanded the 
collection of qualitative data from government, industry and external stakeholders 
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on perceptions of the economic efficiency of each policy instrument. 
Questionnaire respondents were asked to rank the efficiency of the instrument 
and to compare the economic costs to both government and industry with the 
environmental outcomes of the policy instrument in question. 
2.6.2 Environmental effectiveness 
The environmental effectiveness of each policy instrument was assessed in a 
similar fashion to the economic efficiency, as detailed in section 2.6.1. Secondary 
sources of information were used to obtain emissions data and performance of 
each policy instrument against its targets. Sources of secondary data used in the 
analysis include progress reports published by Defra (Future Energy Solutions, 
2004, Future Energy Solutions, 2005, Defra, 2006h, Defra, 2006i, Defra, 2007a, 
Defra, 2007g, Defra, 2007h). The data obtained from these sources was 
enhanced with qualitative information obtained though the surveys. Views on the 
ability of each policy to deliver policy objectives were gathered. Respondents 
were also asked to rank their preferred policy instrument in terms of maximising 
environmental outcomes. This provided meaningful insight into the preferred 
policy option according to stakeholder group. 
2.6.3 Transparency 
There is general consensus on the importance of transparency within the process 
of policy instrument development, implementation and administration (Silvo et al., 
2002, Santos et al., 2006). Transparency in policy making can help to avoid 
undesirable side effects of policy and to maintain support for the policy from all 
stakeholders (Silvo et al., 2002). Transparency also facilitates the setting of 
credible and rigorous targets (Jimenez, 2007). In particular, previous studies of 
the case studies show no attempt to discuss or critique the level of transparency 
within the policy process (NAO, 2004, Future Energy Solutions, 2004, Future 
Energy Solutions, 2005, Defra, 2007a, Defra, 2007g). 
The questionnaires asked all respondent to rate the level of transparency of the 
instrument from the development through the implementation and subsequent 
administration. Respondents were subsequently asked to identify measures that 
could improve the situation if they believed the level of transparency was too low 
or too high. Further to this, all respondents were asked to rate the level of non-
industry stakeholder involvement in the policy process from the decision marking 
stages through to the implementation and functioning of the policy instrument. 
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2.6.4 Innovation 
Innovation and technological change can be difficult to attribute to a specific 
policy instrument. For this reason, ex post evaluation of policy instruments and 
their impacts on innovation and learning effects is a reasonably challenging task 
(OECD, 1997). This task can is made more complex if the instrument itself does 
not contain explicit provisions for innovation. 
Following a critical assessment of policy to identify any provisions directly related 
to the promotion of innovative behaviour the effect of a policy instrument upon 
innovative behaviour and learning effects was assessed though the survey of 
industry practitioners. The views of industry practitioners concerning whether a 
policy has promoted innovative behaviour amongst firms enabled the assessment 
of the degree to which a policy instrument has acted as an incentive or deterrent 
to innovation. Information concerning sharing of technical knowledge and specific 
technology changes was obtained though the survey to identify the specific 
innovative behaviour promoted by the instruments. 
2.6.5 Acceptance and equity 
Acceptance and equity rarely feature in policy assessments and evaluations. This 
may be a result of the difficulty in assessing an instrument against this criterion. 
The reliance upon qualitative data could have implications for the neutrality of the 
assessment as individuals/organisations may have a desire to protect their 
interests. Perceptions of what is politically, environmentally and socially 
acceptable may be biased according to the affiliation of survey respondents. 
Despite these concerns, the level of acceptance demonstrated for a policy 
instrument can prove to be invaluable. Acceptance has a direct link to the 
perceived credibility of an instrument. 
Hepburn (2006) identified the political economy as having major implications on 
the feasibility and acceptance of a policy by industry. Industry will generally show 
less preference for a policy that directs income away from itself compared with 
policy that directs income towards industry. This theory has been tested though 
the circulation of questionnaires to obtain information on preferred policy 
instrument types to promote energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emission 
reductions by relating the policies to impacts on income. 
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2.6.6 Flexibility 
The flexibility of a policy instrument is important when dealing with an issue such 
as climate change that requires a complex response involving technological 
innovation. It has been previously stated that flexibility within policy instrument 
design promotes the uptake of existing technologies and the development of new 
alternative technologies (Dupuy, 1997, Sunnevag, 2000, Wu, 2000). 
Furthermore, the EU drive to promote 'better regulation' requires a more 
consensus oriented approach to policy making, the consideration of economic 
implications of policy and greater flexibility to allow Member States and industry 
to meet policy objectives as they see fit (Hey et al., 2007). 
The level of flexibility of a policy lies not only within the policy documentation but 
also within the structure and working of the public authority. Flexibility can be 
determined in two manners: analysis of opinions of stakeholders using specific 
examples of how flexibility is manifested within a policy; and analysis of the policy 
text with specific focus on provisions for adapting and reviewing the policy in the 
face of changing conditions and knowledge. 
2.7 Selection of case studies 
The approach to the research was a multiple-case study to test the application of 
the evaluation methodology. The use of a multiple-case study enables the 
comparative analysis of outcomes (Yin, 2003). Patton (1987) asserted that the 
use of case studies is "particularly valuable when the evaluation aims to capture 
individual differences or unique variations from one program setting to another, or 
from one program experience to anothef. Furthermore, Patton states that 
regardless of the unit of analysis, a case study "seeks to describe that unit of 
analysis in depth, in detail, in context, andholisticall/ (Patton, 1987). 
Table 2.5 identifies the criteria for selecting the case studies and the rationale 
behind the application of each criterion. 
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Table 2.5 Criteria for seiecting case studies 
Criteria Definition Rationale 
Location of 
instrument in wider 
policy arena 
Part of the UK Climate Change 
Programme (DETR, 2000; 
Defra, 2006d) 
Indicates the British 
government views the policy as 
having a key purpose in 
addressing climate change 
Scope of the 
instrument 
Policy targeted at industry, in 
particular energy intensive 
industry 
To facilitate the comparative 
assessment due to continuity 
within the policy target 
audience 
Size of the 
instrument 
To involve number of sectors or 
individual firms that presents a 
sufficient sample size 
To facilitate the comparative 
assessment due to similarity in 
sample sizes 
The application of these criteria led to the identification of four policies from the 
UK Climate Change Programme: 
• Climate Change Agreements 
• Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000 
• European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
• United Kingdom Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme 
2.8 Identification of stakeholders 
In order to conduct a comprehensive survey that produces meaningful data the 
relevant stakeholders were identified. Purposive sampling is often used in case 
study research given the small sample sizes (Saunders et al., 2000). This type of 
sampling allows a researcher to use their own judgment to identify the 
stakeholders with sufficient knowledge to contribute to answering the research 
question. This was considered the optimal approach for this research given the 
highly complex nature of the instruments involved and the level of technical 
knowledge required from respondents to the questionnaires and interviews. 
Three of the four case studies (CCAs, PPC Regulations and EU ETS) are applied 
to numerous industrial sectors. In order to obtain representative data from as 
many sectors as possible the sector associations^ were identified as the primary 
contacts for the survey. The fourth case study, the UK ETS, was a pilot policy 
instrument with 34 participating companies from various sectors. Due to the small 
number of companies involved and the spread of companies across sectors it 
^ A sector association is a trade organisation representing the interests of its members, 
who are individual companies operating within a specific industrial field. The size, form 
and function of a sector association varies from sector to sector. In general sector 
associations provide guidance to their members on issues relating to legislation and 
technical best practice and provide lobbying services. 
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was determined tine most suitable approach in this instance would be to survey all 
individual companies directly. 
Governmental stakeholders included departments charged with administering the 
policies (in all instances this was the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra)), regulatory agencies (the Environment Agency) and 
government-employed consultants. 
NGOs with specific interests in climate change policy were identified from a 
survey of websites. Policy think-tanks, policy institutes and academics with 
research interests in the policies were identified via the literature review. This 
group of stakeholders will henceforth be referred to collectively as 'external 
stakeholders'. 
2.9 Questionnaire design 
Questionnaires were sent to all identified stakeholders via email. An example 
questionnaire is located at Appendix 1. For each case study three types of 
questionnaire were developed: 
• Industry questionnaire 
This format contained the standardised questions posed to all stakeholders. 
Further questions were included to obtain information on changes within technical 
processes, management and operations within each industry. 
• External stakeholder questionnaire 
The external stakeholder format led to questionnaires that were shorter than the 
industry questionnaire to reflect the level of interaction with the instruments and in 
order to attract participation. 
• Policy maker/implementer questionnaire 
This questionnaire was based on the external stakeholder questionnaire. 
Additional space was provided to enable the policy makers/implementer to 
provide comments on every question. This was a result of request from Defra 
during the first survey on the UK ETS. This style of questionnaire was not thought 
to be suitable for other stakeholders as the overall aim was to minimise the length 
of the questionnaires and reduce the time required to complete the 
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questionnaires to maximise tine response rate. Care was taken to ensure tine 
questionnaire was not so short so as to appear less useful or important (Dillman, 
2000). 
The policy instruments were dealt with the in following order: UK ETS, CCA, PRC 
and EU ETS. The rationale for this approach was to deal with the UK ETS before 
the scheme ended in late 2006. The CCAs were the next policy initiative and the 
timing coincided with the publication of the National Audit Office report into the 
effectiveness of the CCAs and the Climate Change Levy (CCL). PRC and the EU 
ETS were dealt with simultaneously as all EU ETS participants are subject to 
PPC Regulations, thus enabling both issues to be dealt with in one questionnaire 
to avoid surveying the same sector association more than necessary. These two 
instruments were dealt with after the UK ETS and CCAs as full implementation of 
both instruments did not occur until 2005 for EU ETS and 2007 for the PPC 
Regulations (although in the case of the latter staggered implementation had 
been occurring since 2001 (transition dates are located at Appendix 5)). This 
ensured stakeholders had the maximum allowable experience of the instruments 
within the time constraints of this research. 
After developing the initial questionnaires relating to the UK ETS the 
questionnaires were sent to a selection of stakeholders as a pilot study. 
Feedback from the respondents was used to modify the content, style and format 
of the questionnaires. 
Questions were grouped according to the evaluation criteria. The majority of 
questions were in a multiple choice format, with options presented in a ranking 
scale. Several questions were open ended. At the end of each questionnaire 
respondents were invited to provide further comments on the policy instrument 
and to provide feedback on the questionnaire itself. Responses to open ended 
questions were used to illustrate the resulting analysis of each case study. Patton 
(1987) identified the primary strengths of open ended questions over closed 
questions: it enables the respondent to 'let their thoughts roam freely, ideas are 
expressed in their own language and respondents are not restricted to the 
predefined choice of responses provided with closed questions. However, 
researchers must be aware that the use of open ended questions often results in 
the respondent articulating their immediate thoughts and this may not be truly 
representative of the respondents' sentiments (Patton, 1987). 
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A full breakdown of the number of organisations within each stakeholder group 
surveyed is presented in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Breakdown of surveyed stakeholders 
PPC CCA UKETS EU ETS 
Industry 65 50 37 50 
Government (including 2 4 2 2 
Environment Agency) 
External Consultants 1 7 13 6 
stakeholders Think tanks/policy studies 0 3 2 1 
institutes 
NGOs 4 4 4 4 
Academics 6 5 7 11 
Other 0 0 3 0 
Total number of surveyed 78 73 68 74 
organisations 
All respondents, with the exception of government departments, were given 
written notice of the confidentiality of responses. In essence, the responses from 
both the questionnaires and the subsequent interviews would not be viewed by 
any third party, individuals and organisations would not be named, and no 
information would be published that would lead to the identification of any 
participants and their organisations in relation to their comments (Oppenheim, 
1992). Government departments were not guaranteed confidentiality in the 
interest of transparency. The response rates to each survey are presented in 
Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 Survey response rates 
PPC CCA UKETS EU ETS 
Industry 17% 36% 35% 14% 
Government (including 50% 25% 50% 50% 
Environment Agency) 
External Consultants 0% 42% 0% 83% 
stakeholders Think tanks/policy studies 0% 0% 50% 0% 
institutes 
NGOs 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Academics 0% 60% 14% 45% 
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total response rate 15% 32% 36% 21% 
Response rates for this type of business-oriented survey have been previously 
reported as low as 15-20% (Saunders et al., 2000). Another study of response 
rates found that surveys of people in senior-managerial roles can be much lower 
than other groups, with an average response rate of 36.1% (Baruch, 1999). 
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Response rates between 20% and 36% were deemed to be acceptable based on 
the evidence from Saunders et al. and Baruch. 
2.10 Focus groups 
It was initially thought that focus groups may be a more suitable format for follow-
up questioning of respondents. A focus group on the UK ETS was conducted in 
November 2006. The focus group participants were a representative from Defra, 
a NGO, a UK ETS participating company and an academic with expertise in the 
field of emissions trading. Krueger (1994) identified six key advantages to 
conducting focus groups over other interview methods: 
• Participants are often more relaxed in a group setting compared with a 
one-on-one interview. This promotes "increased candor by respondent^'. 
• The group format allows the moderator to probe for further information in 
the event of unanticipated issues being raised 
• The ''high face vaiidit/ of focus groups means the method is easily 
understood and complex statistical analysis of the outcomes is avoided 
• Focus groups can be relatively low cost to arrange and operate compared 
with the use of questionnaires 
• Results can be obtained quickly compared with one-on-one interviews 
and questionnaires 
• Focus groups can allow the researcher to increase the sample size in 
qualitative studies as the number of participants increases without a 
correlating increase in time and cost to the researcher 
Despite these noted advantages of focus group research, following the first focus 
group it became clear that this approach was not particularly effective in the 
context of this research. The majority of survey participants held high-ranking 
positions within their organisations. As a result many ware subject to severe time 
constraints. It was difficult to arrange a convenient time for participants. It was 
significantly easier to arrange one-on-one interviews as the interviewee could 
state their preferred time, date and place without the need to achieve consensus 
with other participants. Further to this limitation, analysis has shown that focus 
group participants articulate only 60% to 70% of the ideas they may voice in a 
one-on-one interview (Morgan, 1996). Experience of focus groups in relation to 
this research indicates that much of the discussion between participants centres 
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on conflict avoidance with the outcome of less information than one might expect 
from an active discussion. Consideration of these factors led to the conclusion 
that one-on-one interviews would be the most appropriate method to pursue. 
2.11 Interviews 
All questionnaire respondents were asked if they would participate in a follow-up 
interview. All consenting respondents were contacted by telephone or email to 
arrange a follow-up interview. Of the respondents approached concerning a 
follow-up interview ten were no longer v /^illing to be interviewed. A detailed list of 
interviewees is located at Appendix 3. A brief breakdown of interview participants 
is provided in Table 2.8 
Table 2.8 Categories and number of interview participants 
Stakeholder group CCA PPC EU ETS UK ETS 
industry 6 6 4 3-" 
Government (including 
Environment Agency) 
1 1 1 
External stakeholders 3 0 2 3" 
Total number of interviewed 
organisations 
10 7 7 7 
The interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. Approximately half of the 
interviews were carried out in person. The remaining interviews were conducted 
by telephone if participants were located outside of the London area. All 
interviews were recorded and notes were taken during the interviews to facilitate 
impromptu questioning. The recordings were subsequently transcribed to enable 
completeness of the analysis. 
Interviews were semi-structured. An interview schedule containing questions to 
be posed to all interviewees was developed. An example interview schedule is 
located at Appendix 2. The schedule was subsequently tailored to individual 
respondents based on their questionnaire responses. Where questionnaire 
respondents had expressed particular dissatisfaction or support for any aspect of 
the policies further questions were posed during the interview to obtain 
information on how and why these sentiments were formed. 
One of the three respondents from the industry group participated in a focus group 
^ The government respondent participated in a focus group 
® Two of the respondents from the external stakeholder group participated in a focus 
group 
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2.12 Interpretation of findings from the survey 
The findings from the survey and interviews were analysed using quantitative 
techniques were applicable (i.e. for questions with ranked responses). Open 
ended questions from the questionnaire and interviews were used to enhance the 
data through the exploration of rationales behind trends. 
The policy recommendations arising from the research were circulated to relevant 
stakeholders (I.e. questionnaire respondents and interview participants) to obtain 
levels of agreement with the recommendations and supporting rationales. The 
purpose of this exercise was to obtain stakeholder validation for the outcomes of 
the research. 
2.13 Criteria forjudging the quality of research design 
The validity of the research design and execution can be assessed against four 
criteria identified by Yin (2003): 
• validity of the research construction/design; 
• internal validity arising from analysis of events and data (for example 
ensuring that the researcher does not simply infer a relationship between 
two events but presents evidence of the link); 
• external validity whereby the analysis can be generalised beyond the 
case study in question; 
• and, reliability of the research methods where reliability means that if one 
investigator were to employ identical research methods to a previous 
investigator of a case study the former would arrive at exactly the same 
conclusions as the latter. 
The sources of information for the four criteria are identified in Table 2.9. 
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Table 2.9 Research validity, methodologies and sources 
Tests Case study methodology Sources/phases of research 
providing validity 
Construction Use multiple sources of evidence Data collection 
validity Establisii chain of evidence Data collection 
Have key informants review draft of Data collection 
case study report 
Internal Pattern-matching Data analysis 
validity Explanation-building Data analysis 
Address rival explanations Data analysis 
Use logic models Data analysis 
External Use theory in single-case studies Research design 
validity Use replication logic in multiple-case 
studies 
Research design 
Reliability Case study protocol Data collection 
Develop case study database Data collection 
Source: Yin (2003) 
2.13.1 Construction validity 
The construction validity of this research has been approached using 
triangulation®. Multiple sources of evidence were used in each case study. 
Questionnaire and corresponding interview responses from each participant were 
analysed for evidence of conflicting statements and opinions. Previous analysis, 
policy documentation and stakeholder feedback on the research outcomes were 
used to provide further validity of the research. 
An evidence chain based on the following format was applied to the research: 
' Saunders et al. (2000) define triangulation as: 
" The use of different data collection methods within one study in order to ensure 
that the data are telling you what you think they are telling you." (p.99) 
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Figure 2.2 Case study chain of evidence 
Case study report 
> 
> 
I 
f 
Case study database 
> 
> 
f 
Citations to specific evidentiary sources 
in the case study database 
A 
Case study protocol 
(linliing questions to protocol topics) 
A 
\f 
Case study questions 
Source: Yin (2003) 
2.13.2 Internal validity 
The internal validity of this research was addressed through the explorat ion of 
al ternat ive explanat ions for results. The interface between one event and another 
is a key concern in obtaining internal validity. The complex relat ionship between 
the four case studies, including areas of policy overlap, was analysed to minimise 
the risk of incorrectly attr ibuting the ou tcomes of each case study. 
2.13.3 External validity 
The external validity of case study research indicates how the outcomes of the 
study can be appl ied to other si tuations; in effect the general isat ion of the 
research. The comparat ive e lement of this research inherently verif ies the 
appl icat ion of the evaluat ion criteria. Conduct ing evaluat ions of the dif ferent 
categor ies of policy instruments demonst ra tes the transferabil i ty of the 
methodologica l approach. However, to a degree general isabi l i ty is context 
specif ic. Therefore the f indings of this research should not be general ised to non-
cl imate change policy areas wi thout consider ing the dif ferent policy features, 
procedures and c i rcumstances for policy making in other fields. 
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2.13.4 Reliability 
Referring to Table 2.9, tine sources of reliability within case study research are 
found in the use of a case study protocol and the development of a case study 
database. Flick (2002) describes how "the quality of recording and documenting 
data becomes a central basis for assessing their [the previous criteria] reliability 
and that of succeeding interpretation^' (p.369). The case study chain of evidence 
provides (Figure 2.2) provides the framework for to ensure the reliability of the 
research in question. 
2.14 Chapter summary 
This Chapter has presented the methodological approach to the research project 
and provided justifications for the choice of approach. Chapter 3 presents a 
comprehensive critique of existing literature in the fields of policy evaluation, 
instrument design and climate change policy. 
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3 Evaluation, application of policy instruments and 
climate change policy 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce the themes of the research. It also 
provides a critique of existing literature on the four key elements of the thesis as 
follows; 
• The theory and application of sA'pos/policy evaluation techniques 
• The optimal application of policy instruments to address environmental 
problems 
• The development of climate change policy in the UK 
The first section analyses existing theoretical and academic arguments on policy 
evaluation. In order to develop policy valuation techniques identified in the theory, 
and in the absence of sufficient real-life application of the theory, the second 
section of this chapter identifies the application of ex ante appraisal techniques. 
This section pays particular attention to how ex ante assessment informs and 
shapes GA'/JOS/evaluations. This critique provides the justification of the chosen 
approach in developing a new methodological model. The second section gives 
an overview of the application of policy instruments according to the three main 
categories: regulatory, economic and voluntary. The purpose of this is to facilitate 
to the comparative element of the empirical research. The third and final section 
of this Chapter analyses climate change policy development in the UK to provide 
the context for the case studies. 
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Section 1: Policy assessment practices 
'Economic efficiency is not the only standard by which to judge 
environmental policies, although it is an important one. Using other 
criteria, such as equity or environmental justice or the extent of public 
participation, analysts, policymakers, and citizens often ask which 
programs have proven to be the most successful and which the least.' 
(Kraft, 2007) 
3.2 Concepts of policy evaluation 
There are two key stages in the policy life cycle that require thorough and 
rigorous appraisal: ex ante (prior to implementation), and ex post (some time 
following implementation when evidence is available to judge how the policy is 
performing). Evpos/evaluation has been defined as entailing the use of scientific 
methods to measure the outcomes of policies in order to aid future decision 
making (Rutman, 1984). 
This first part of the literature review chapter is intended to provide an overview of 
academic progress with ex post evaluation theory and to provide background 
analysis upon which the rationale of this thesis is based. The exposf evaluation 
of policy instruments has been explored by many theorists since the early 1970s. 
However, as ex ante assessment became increasingly popular with policy 
makers, policy evaluation remained a largely 'academic' area of investigation. 
In recent years several organisations have begun to develop the practical 
application of instrument evaluations, including the European Environment 
Agency (1997) and the OECD (1999). The British Government has also been 
pursing evaluation techniques via its Green Book, although the guidance remains 
limited to cost-benefit analysis and there is little consideration of other 
approaches to evaluate instruments (i.e. through the evaluation of the 
transparency of an instrument). 
The history of evaluation is rooted in academic theory and early developments in 
evaluation studies often focused on the rationality of decision making (e.g. 
Schwartz, 1970). Other early examples sought to evaluate the quality of decisions 
made by policy makers through comparison of the real life situation with the 
theoretical situation of alternative instruments (Hartle, 1973). Some years later as 
policy valuation theory developed, albeit slowly, Nagel (1987) identified six 
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common areas of that was often a result of an evaluation leaning too much in one 
direction without showing sufficient consideration of the other: 
Based on out of date material or evidence 
Theoretical or practical 
Multi-disciplinary or embedded in political science 
Quantitative or qualitative/subjective 
Under utilised or over utilised 
Too liberal or too conservative 
These difficulties associated with evaluations can often be linked to the evaluator 
and the risk of bias influencing the methodological approach, the analysis of 
findings and the development of conclusions and recommendations (Weiss, 
1998). These issues can be addressed in various ways, such as the development 
of a rigorous methodological framework to ensure all evaluations are carried out 
to an acceptable standard and the involvement of stakeholders in the 
development of conclusions and recommendations to ensure the evaluator has 
not misinterpreted the available evidence. 
The critical importance of evaluation was identified by Weiss in not only the 
instrument-specific context but in informing future policy design (Weiss, 1999) 
Unfortunately, in the real life setting policy makers rarely refer to evaluations of 
earlier policies to help inform present and future policy design. Weiss attributes 
this to competing interests, differing ideologies and institutional constraints. It is 
particularly interesting to note that Weiss asserts that evaluators (and this case 
the evaluator is typically academic not policy maker) often assume their work 
should inform future policy design. However, there is fundamental gap in the 
process that means this rarely happens: policy makers may be reluctant to use 
evaluations to inform decision and therefore may show reluctance to fund 
evaluations and utilise available analysis. 
More recently, the theory of evaluation has developed to include the benefits of 
systematic reviews and the need to include both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods to ensure that criteria defined by the researcher are 
investigated in sufficient depth (Oliver eta!., 2005). 
Scholars have also been showing increasing interest in the role of actors and 
institutions in evaluations. Soederbaum (1994) identified the importance of 
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including stakeholders beyond the policy maker, such as businesses and groups 
representing civil society, in evaluations as policy often starts at the level of the 
individual, not government. The inclusion of stakeholder is particularly important If 
an evaluation is intended to determine the extent to which a policy met the 
objectives and aspirations of stakeholders (Gysen et al, 2006). The inclusion of a 
wider range of stakeholders is of immense value if an evaluator wishes to identify 
the disproportionate role of certain actors in the policy process (e.g. lobbying by 
business sectors). 
In recent years various organisations and academics have developed 
assessment criteria to determine the environmental effectiveness of instruments 
(such as OECD (1999), Carraro and Leveque (1999). Alberini & Segerson (2002) 
and Mickwitz, (2003)). Each of these approaches has advanced the use of criteria 
to evaluate the effectiveness of instruments, but have been limited in their 
application to only one type of instrument (e.g. Mickwitz only applied the criteria 
to voluntary agreements). Furthermore, in none of the instances of recent 
evaluations or evaluations carried out some time ago was evidence of 
comparative analysis of evaluations located. This could in part be due to the 
inherent difficulty in comparing different categories of instruments. Arguments 
that favour one type of instrument over another are often based on assumptions 
surrounding its superior effectiveness over the alternative (for example 
Cunningham (1998) makes some interesting assertions on the application of 
instruments in various settings). By carrying out a thorough comparative analysis 
of evaluative outcomes meaningful conclusions relating to instrument design are 
possible. 
3.3 Purpose and application of policy evaluations 
Policy evaluation should form part of the continuous cycle of policy improvement. 
The evaluation should be used to provide feedback on the performance of the 
policy in order to inform amendments to the existing policy or to inform the 
development of new policies, as depicted in Figure 3.1. Evaluation in turn leads 
to policy learning' and is essential to allow responsive amendments to policy 
instruments to mitigate or redress the unintended consequences of a policy 
(Foxon et al., 2005). 
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Figure 3.1 Role of policy appraisal and evaluation in the policy cycle 
Feedback Rationale 
Evaluation (expose; 
Cycle of policy 
appraisal and 
evaluation 
Objectives 
Monitoring Appraisal 
(ex ante) 
Source: Adapted from HM Treasury (2003) 
The object ive of the evaluat ion stage of the cycle of policy appraisal can take one 
of seven routes, as identif ied by Weiss (1972); 
To decide whether to cont inue or d iscont inue a policy 
To improve pract ices and procedures 
To add or remove techniques and strategies within a policy instrument 
To faci l i tate the implementat ion of similar policy instrument e lsewhere 
To enable the eff icient al location of resources among compet ing 
instruments 
To enable policy makers to accept or reject a specif ic approach or theory 
in policy making 
Once the purpose of the evaluat ion has been determined the appropr iate 
f ramework for analysis must be selected. The f rameworks are identif ied in Table 
3.1. Descr ipt ive evaluat ions are l imited to the identif ication of what happened in a 
given si tuat ion fo l lowing the implementat ion of a policy instrument. A casual 
approach extends the descript ion approach by at tempt ing to identify what 
inf luence a policy instrument has had in a specif ic situation. In reference to this 
thesis this approach would lead to the identif ication and determinat ion of the 
effects of the cl imate change policies on the greenhouse gas emiss ions within the 
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target sectors within the four case studies. However, this research extends the 
use of the casual framework and takes a normative approach by evaluating, inter 
alia, the effectiveness of the policies in question against pre-established criteria, 
such as the efficiency of the policies in economic terms and the unintended 
consequences of the instruments. 
Table 3.1 Evaluation frameworks 
Framework Purpose Questions 
Descriptive Simply observe and 
measure change 
What happened after the measure was 
put in place? 
Causal Analyse what has occurred 
in terms of cause and effect 
Assessment of projected 
and actual effects of policy 
enables development of 
models/scenarios on future 
trends 
To what extent are the observed changes 
attributable to the measure? 
Why did measure have those 
particular effects In //70se particular 
circumstances? 
Normative To provide a judgement on 
whether the policy 
outcomes are satisfactory 
Judgement made against 
explicit objective or 
benchmark 
Effectiveness: has the policy met Its 
Intended objectives in relation to 
outcomes and/or Impacts? 
Relevance: to what extent does the policy 
meet the needs of the issue/problem? 
Efficiency: Have the objectives been met 
at lowest cost? 
Utility: Have the Intended and unintended 
effects of the policy resulted/contributed to 
a net Increase in social welfare? 
Source: Adapted from European Environment Agency (1999) 
Another important question when conducting a policy evaluation, in addition to 
selecting the most suitable framework for an evaluation, is v\/ho should conduct 
the evaluation. Generally there are two options: in-house (e.g. government 
carries out the evaluation of its own policies) or outside/third party (e.g. 
independent researchers/think tanks/NGOs/consultants conduct the evaluation) 
(Weiss, 1972). In-house evaluators may have the benefit of superior knowledge 
of the mechanics of policy development in any given instance through "inside" 
knowledge and role in negotiating policy outcomes. They may also be able to 
save time and resources by having data readily available, such as contact details, 
performance data and access to previous work undertaken. These positive 
aspects are balanced by the possibly large risk of a biased evaluation. Policy 
makers evaluating their own policies may not wish to identify and draw attention 
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to any failings of their work. This may even lead to the more serious situation of 
ineffective policy remaining in place because the shortcomings have not been 
identified. 
Evaluations conducted by third parties have the benefit of increased impartiality. 
The evaluators may be able to provide a more complete picture of the policy as 
the remit of the evaluation has not been defined by the authorities charged with 
developing and implementing the policy. But this kind of evaluation can have 
limitations, namely resource constraints and knowledge uncertainty (Weiss, 
1972). Consultants undertaking evaluations may also have conflict of interests if 
they are employed by both the government to evaluate a policy and private sector 
firms for other work. 
To clarify these issues in relation to this study financial resource constraints have 
not been an issue due to independent, external funding. Knowledge uncertainty 
of the researcher has been minimised though the extensive study of both policy 
documentation and existing literature and though continuous communication and 
consultation with stakeholders. There is no conflict of interest as the research is 
funded independently and the researcher has no previous links to any of the 
organisations involved in any of the four policy instruments. It may be that 
selected independent academics are best placed to undertake ex post 
evaluations in order to avoid the difficulties associated with other evaluators. 
3.4 Approach to policy evaluation in the United Kingdom 
There have been limited attempts to pursue systematic and comparative 
evaluations of greenhouse gas policies across the British government. In 2006 
the Inter-departmental Analysts Group (lAG) published a guidance document 
(Defra, 2006f) to be read in conjunction with the Treasury Green Book and 
government guidance on RIA (HM Treasury, 2003). 
The Treasury Green Book aims to 'promote efficient policy development and 
resource allocation across government it does this by informing decision-making, 
and by improving the alignment of departmental and agency policies, 
programmes and projects with government priorities and the expectations of the 
public. The guidance emphasises the need to take account of the wider social 
costs and benefits of proposals, and the need to ensure the proper use of public 
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resource". Further to this aim the Green Book 'describes how the economic, 
financial, social and environmental assessments of a policy, programme or 
project should be combined. However, two points are particularly striking about 
the Green Book. Firstly, there is an apparent dominance of quantitative 
techniques within the guidance. Furthermore, the economic valuation of policy is 
a central pillar of the guidance. Valuation techniques of choice include the 
transferral of benefits and costs into prices determined by market data. If this is 
not possible, the techniques of preference (in order of priority) are: 
• Willingness to pay 
• Revealed preference 
• Hedonistic pricing 
• Stated preference 
• Willingness to accept 
Economic valuation rightly has a key role to play in policy evaluation. However, 
this should not be to the detriment of qualitative techniques as regardless of the 
problem being investigated it is likely quantitative techniques will not be suitable 
to address all issues (Quade, 1975). Quade furthers the argument for the use of 
qualitative techniques alongside quantitative methods as the recommendations 
arising from the quantitative analysis are not necessarily more robust or useful 
which is often a result of poor quality inputs and/or analysis The abundance of 
quantitative evaluative research further supports qualitative approach of this 
research as a method of academic enquiry (Herrick, 2004, Anger and 
Oberndorfer, 2008, Brizio and Genon, 2006, Bohringer etal, 2007). 
In general, the approach to policy evaluation in the UK has been rather ad hoc. 
The timing, frequency and depth of evaluations are largely dependent on the 
Government department in question. An investigation by a Cabinet Office official 
in 2004 found that commonly used methods included the systematic review of 
existing evidence, ex ante and post hoc evaluations of specific interventions, 
programmes or policies, strategic audits and performance management 
mechanisms (Davies, 2004). This report used the term 'evaluation' for all types of 
policy analysis, ex ante and ex post The strengths of the British approach to ex 
ante assessment are clear - the systematic use of RIA being the jewel in the 
crown. However, the report also identifies the pressing need to implement a 
rigorous system of ex post po\\c)/ evaluation: 
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'A recent review of the evidence on effective implementation, however, has 
described the field as 'imperfect and often inconclusive....Successful 
implementation and successful impacts are clearly closely linked, and both 
require a combination of experimental/quasi-experimental methods of 
evaluation methods.' 
(Davies, 2004: p. 14) 
The Government has stressed the need to measure the success of a policy 
through the comparison of the outcomes with the intended effects (HM Treasury, 
2003). These projections, along with provisions for evaluations of the policy, 
should be incorporated into the RIA. Yet analysis conducted by the NAO and a 
review of RIAs for this research project found provisions for S A ' a s s e s s m e n t 
severely lacking (this will be developed further in section 3.5). Herein lies a key 
problem of existing approaches to evaluation; the reluctance to compare intended 
impacts with actual impacts with a view to implementing mitigation strategies 
when the unintended impacts are undesirable. 
3.5 Regulatory Impact Assessment 
In light of the desired link between RIA and ex post evaluation the following 
sections will provide analysis of RIA practices. The application of some form of 
pre-implementation appraisal of regulations in the UK commenced in the mid-
1980s with the launch of the Deregulation Initiative (Italian, Irish and Dutch 
Presidencies of the Council of the European Union, 2004). Whilst this early form 
of RIA attempted to deal with the assessment of compliance costs, it did not seek 
to address the comparison of predicted costs and benefits. 1996 saw the 
introduction of "regulatory appraisal", which embedded the use of systematic 
assessment of the costs and benefits of proposed regulations. By 1998 the 
practice of RIA was firmly embedded within the policy making cycle (Italian, Irish 
and Dutch Presidencies of the Council of the European Union, 2004). 
In the UK in early 2007, the term Regulatory Impact Assessment was replaced 
with Impact Assessment (IA) following the publication of new guidance for 
completing an lA (formerly RIA) (BERR, 2007b). The purpose of the 2007 review 
was to improve the level of transparency within RIA though the application of 
Impact Assessments. The review sought to make the RIA process simpler and to 
ensure policy assessments are carried out earlier in the policy process. Given the 
short space of time between the launch of the lA guidance and the writing of this 
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thesis it is difficult to analyse the impact of the revised approach to impact 
assessment. It is worth noting that the review resulted in the publication of an lA 
template containing a section dedicated to post-implementation review. The 
purpose of this section within the lA is to specify the date for evaluation of the 
policy to enable the identification of the actual costs and benefits. Given the 
infancy of lA and the lack of interaction between the case studies and lA the 
remaining analysis will focus on the approach to RIA prior to the guidance 
revisions and the re-branding of the framework as 'Impact Assessment'. 
Figure 3.2 Elements to be included in a Regulatory Impact Assessment relating to 
post-implementation review 
Once you have implemented a change of policy, it is important to review 
subsequently how well it is meeting the policy objectives and whether government 
action is still needed 
Good planning for review during policy development will make clear what will be 
reviewed and reduce uncertainty for those affected by the policy 
Use the RIA as the starting point for the review. The review should establish a 
baseline and include the success criteria against which you will assess the 
effectiveness of the policy in delivering the obiective. You should also have success 
measures included in the implementation and delivery plan 
Describe how and when the review will take place. It is often a good idea to review a 
policy change after three years but this will depend on the policy. Key issues for 
review include whether: 
o the policy obiective has been met 
o impacts have been as expected, including the costs and benefits 
o there have been any unforeseen unintended conseguences 
o government intervention is still reguired 
o compliance levels indicate that the enforcement regime is effective -
perhaps it could now be lighter touch or more risk based 
Say which elements of the policy will be reviewed 
Set out the basis of the review - it could be statutory (forming part of the legislation) 
or there could be a political commitment to review 
Think about criteria for modifying or replacing the policy if it does not achieve its 
objectives 
The review should consider the scope for simplification or deregulation and produce 
a statement for the departmental Simplification Plan. Even if there is nothing to 
input, the review should trigger a nil return 
During the review you will need to consult stakeholders for their views on the 
implementation of the policy and whether there have been any unintended 
consequences. Include any feedback on unintended consequences in the Review 
Where possible you should make a specific person responsible for conducting the 
review 
Source: BERR (2007) 
The guidance is clear on the need to ensure sufficient provisions within the RIA 
for post-implementation review. The focus of the PIR should extend beyond 
assessing whether the policy met its objectives to the consideration of unintended 
consequences, compliance levels and whether the policy intervention is still 
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required. As Chapters 4-7 will demonstrate, there is little evidence of this being 
carried out in reality. 
The UK, along with Denmark and the Netherlands, has been considered to be 
leading the way in the field of ex ante impact assessments (Italian, Irish and 
Dutch Presidencies of the Council of the European Union, 2004) In 2004, a 
comparative assessment of RIA application practices across EU Member States 
found that in the UK RIA is 'compulsory for all regulatory measures with some 
impact (defined according to general pre-established criteria) and is actually and 
systematically applied' (p.5). At a domestic level, the NAO is charged with 
producing annual reviews of how government is approaching RIA. The reviews 
commenced in 2003 and are yet to tackle RIAs carried out by Defra. However, 
the annual reports serve a useful purpose as they have identified a persistent 
failure within Government to maximise the utility of RIAs. The 2006 review^ was 
critical of the approach to RIA across departments: 
'RIAs are often not used in the right way. The purpose of RIAs is not 
always understood; there is a lack of clarity in the presentation of the 
analysis; and persistent weaknesses in the assessments. As a result, 
RIAs are only occasionally used to challenge the need for regulation and 
influence policy decisions - although they can still serve a valuable 
communications role, improving the transparency of departmental 
decision-making' 
(NAO, 2006: p.2) 
By the following year, 2007®, the use of RIA in the decision making process was 
still found to be lacking in strength. The NAO stated that: 
'RIAs should be the cornerstone of evidence-based policy making but our 
results indicate that they were not always being used effectively....RIAs 
were not an integral part of the policy making process as they were not 
used to inform and facilitate all stages of policy formation - from initial 
development through to implementation and review.' 
(NAO, 2007b: p.5) 
7 The 2005-06 review of RIAs examined the work of the Department of Trade and 
Industry, Department for Transport, Home Office, and the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport. 
® The 2006-07 review dealt with the Department of Health and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government 
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Beyond these criticisms of British RIA, Persson (2003) found that the 
quantification of costs of government was, in general, poorly addressed®. 
Furthermore, problems are thought to arise when policy makers experience 
difficulty in defining the scope of the RIA and executing an RIA that is 
proportionate to the problem the proposed policy seeks to address (Persson, 
2003). Despite these limitations of the approach the UK demonstrates one of the 
highest levels of support and enthusiasm^" for RIA in the EU (Radaelli, 2004). 
This notion is supported by the work of the NAO and the abundance of explicit 
government guidance on RIA. 
At this point it is useful to introduce cost-benefit analysis as a founding principle 
of RIA (and lA). Particular focus will be given to its application in the UK and the 
perceived strengths and limitations of the technique, given the central role it plays 
in RIA. 
3.6 Cost-benefit analysis 
lA, and its predecessor RIA, are based on the application of CBA to identify the 
predicted outcomes of a policy instrument, both negative and positive, in 
monetary terms. The application of CBA, in the context of RIA/IA and in other 
applications, has been the subject of lively debate in recent years and deserves a 
brief critique in this thesis. 
A succinct history of the development of CBA was presented by Pearce (1998). A 
detailed analysis of the historical context of CBA is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, a few interesting facts appear in Pearce's work that deserve to 
be noted by way of providing a brief background on the development and 
application of the technique. The earliest form of CBA was seen in the mid-1800s. 
French engineer, Jules Dupuit, developed a method to measure the "marginal 
analysis" of public spending, indicating that the costs should not exceed the 
benefits. By 1936 the United States of American (USA) had instigated a policy to 
® Persson compared 23 British RIAs witli 22 Swedish RIAs to analyse the rationality 
behind environmental decision making in the two countries. 
Radaelli (2004) analyses the spread and application of RIA across the EU. The 
European Commission (DG Enterprise) asked Member States to rate the level of 
importance of RIA on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being highest level of importance). The UK was 
one of only 4 of the pre-2004 EU-15 to rate RIA as 5. Radaelli states that "accordingly, the 
enthusiasm for RiA should be quantified. 
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ensure that the benefits and costs of projects linked the Flood Control Act were 
considered. The theory of CBA was all but developed by the 1960s save for some 
difficulties in dealing with the socio-economic distribution of the costs and 
benefits. With human health and accidents being the focus of CBA at this time the 
costs and benefits of projects on the environment were rarely considered. This 
changed in the 1970s as environmental awareness gained momentum. By the 
1980s a CBA had to be performed prior to all US regulations (Pearce, 1998). 
The uptake of CBA in the UK was more lethargic than in the USA. The first 
example of ex ante CBA was carried out prior to the construction of the Ml 
motorway in 1958 (BarrelI and Hills, 1972). This first application of CBA has been 
described as experimentar and even if the outcome was that costs outweighed 
the benefits the motorway would still have been constructed (Pearce, 2000). 
These early applications of CBA bear little resemblance to the CBA used today. 
As discussed earlier, all major policy proposals require an RIA, the basis of which 
is an analysis of the associated costs and benefits. It is at this point that a 
discussion of the strengths and limitations of an approach based on CBA is 
useful. Table 3.2 is provided to give a brief overview of some of the common 
points of discussion of CBA practices. 
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Table 3.2 Common strengths and weaknesses of CBA 
Strength Limitations 
Test for economic efficiency to allocate 
scarce resources - identification of policies 
that might entail 'excessive' costs 
CBA can be a time consuming and costly 
exercise 
Helps to identify all the costs and benefits 
associated with a policy 
Difficulty in dealing with cumulative and 
indirect effects of policies - should certain 
policies be tackled individually or as part of 
a portfolio of investments/decisions? 
Allows inclusion of social values in 
decision making based on stated 
preferences for a policy 
Uncertainty surrounding policy outcomes 
based on scientific uncertainty of the 
problem 
Placing a monetary value on 
environmental goods may elevate the 
importance of the environment in decision 
making 
Doubts remain over benefits estimation due 
to the nature of environmental economics 
and valuation research 
Works best when the goal is economically 
efficient policy 
Transparency issues - especially when 
costs or benefits are presented as a 
number without explanation of the process 
of arriving at that figure 
CBA can be 'cut and dried' with benefits 
either exceeding or not exceeding costs, 
but little regard paid to other factors that 
may be beneficial such as flexibility of a 
policy 
Other goals, beyond economically efficient 
policy making, are difficult to account for 
(such as employment creation, maintaining 
competitiveness) 
The pace of change within field of valuation 
techniques means that policy makers 
undertaking CBAs may have difficulty in 
maintaining knowledge 
There are huge differences in the quality 
and 'sophistication' of CBAs - the quality of 
analysis is severely compromised when 
previous CBAs are used as the basis for 
new analyses 
Difficulty in quantifying the monetary value 
of environmental resources beyond 
willingness to pay 
Source: Adapted from Pearce (1998) and Han ley (2001) 
Despite any concerns linked to the use of CBA raised in some literature and the 
reservations often exhibited by regulatory agencies (Pearce, 1998), the UK 
Government has favoured the technique since the mid-1980s for new 
policy/project appraisals (OECD, 2002). In 1991 the Government launched the 
Policy Appraisal and the Environment document (PAE) in response to its earlier 
environmental protection document This Common Inheritance. Aimed at 
improving policy assessment across departments the guidance failed to really 
improve ex ante assessment - only 6 proposals during 1995/96 were subject to 
the methodology described in the guidance and appraisals were found to be 
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informal and non-quantitative (Hanley, 2001). By 1995 the desire of the 
Government to reduce the regulatory burden on British businesses led to the 
publication of the Deregulatory Task Force guidance (Pearce, 1998). This 
guidance required all government departments to undertake compliance cost 
assessments prior to the implementation of all new regulations. The focus on 
compliance costs to business, as a means to support policy proposals, has been 
identified by the OECD as the primary justification for regulatory analysis in the 
UK (OECD, 2002). Analysis appears to only seek to support policy proposals 
based on the cost to business. The costs and benefits to society as a whole may 
be overlooked. However, it is encouraging that the former Department for Trade 
and Industry (DTI) was renamed and redefined as the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) in July 2007 (BERR, 2007a). This 
indicates that the government is keener than ever to improve the regulatory 
environment and gives further purpose and encouragement for the outcomes of 
this research. 
This contrasts with the primary purpose of this task in countries such as Australia, 
Canada, Scandinavian states, Netherlands and New Zealand - to //7^ o/777 decision 
making (OECD, 2002). Even if appraisal techniques are applied in the correct 
manner they are often only done so to support a policy proposal, not challenge or 
change the proposals. Addressing this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
3.7 Drivers and barriers to expost^o\\cy evaluations 
In the Green Book the Treasury made it clear that all policies should be subject to 
rigorous evaluation post-implementation. It states that: 
'When any policy, programme, or project is completed or has advanced 
to a pre-determined degree, it should undergo a comprehensive 
evaluation. Major or on-going programmes, involving a series of smaller 
capital projects, must also be subject to e x e v a l u a t i o n s . ' 
(HM Treasury, 2003) 
The protocol for conducting an ex post evaluation is also described within the 
document. All evaluations should be based on "robust analysis' and should be 
"conducted in the same manner as an economic appraisaf. The evaluation 
should take the shape of a cost benefit analysis based on verified data and 
evidence rather than predicted outcomes. 
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Policies relating to greenhouse gas emissions are subject to further discussion in 
the Defra publication ''Greenhouse Gas Policy Evaluations and Appraisal in 
Government Department^' (Defra, 2006f). This guidance was designed to 
complement the Green Book by providing further specific requirements for GHG 
policies. The purpose of the guidance is to produce evaluation-based cost benefit 
analysis and cost effectiveness analysis. The impact of a policy on the following 
outputs should be included in an evaluation: 
Net costs and benefits 
Total cost 
Cost effectiveness per tonne of carbon 
Sectoral impacts for the Exchequer, firms and households 
Impact of the policy on: 
- public spending 
- security of energy supply 
- air quality 
- energy prices 
- competitiveness 
- fuel poverty 
The evaluation guidance is dominated by the use of cost benefit analysis as a 
methodology. Further to this cost effectiveness analysis is promoted as a means 
to assess and compare the impacts of policies. Due to the economic nature of 
these methodologies the common unit of analysis is financial. In the Government 
publications on policy evaluation there is little reference to the use and 
application of qualitative evaluation methodologies. These techniques include the 
collection of information regarding the impacts of a policy instrument on 
behavioural changes within industry or domestic energy users, impacts of a 
policy instrument on technological innovation, the involvement of stakeholders in 
the policy design process and the level of transparency in reporting. Nor do the 
guidance documents provide scope for the comparative assessment of policy 
instruments beyond the monetary value of carbon saved. It is intended that the 
approach taken in this research will provide a framework to complete the picture 
in terms of policy evaluation by giving sufficient weight to policy outcomes that 
cannot be transformed into a monetary value. 
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Although the Defra guidance seeks to provide a clear framework on ex post 
evaluation within government the impact of the guidance and degree of 
implementation is questionable. In 2007 the NAO concluded that the majority of 
Government departments are not making sufficient provisions for ex post 
evaluations and when they are carried out it is often to a low standard (NAO, 
2007b). This situation is somewhat surprising given the requirement that all ex 
ante RIAs include provisions and timescales for post-implementation reviews. 
The quality and rigour of the RIAs carried out in relation to the four case studies 
is highly variable (see individual case study Chapters 4-7) in terms addressing 
the costs to stakeholders other than business (including Government), provisions 
for post implementation reviews and considerations of uncertainty. A detailed 
review of the RIAs undertaken in relation to the four case studies and the CCL 
(as this RIA has direct ramifications on the CCAs) can be found at Appendix 4. 
The PRC RIA deals with the cost to businesses in an adequate manner by 
specifying approximate costs of payments, compliance costs and one-off costs. 
Conversely, the RIA for the CCL only specifies the estimated overall income to 
the Exchequer from the Levy. It is made clear that the Levy is revenue neutral for 
the Exchequer and it is to be achieved though the recycling of revenue via grants 
and the reduction in employers' National Insurance Contributions. However, the 
distribution of the grants is not specified pointing to an equity issue - can any 
company paying the CCL apply for and receive a grant? Despite these concerns, 
it is the CCA RIA that causes particular concern. The scope of the RIA is 
restricted to dealing with the eligibility criteria for entering into an Agreement. This 
approach led to the exclusion of other important factors for consideration in an 
RIA, such as the level of fairness of the proposed policy and issues relating to 
competition. The RIA also fails to specify the policy outcomes in terms of 
emission reductions or energy savings. It is difficult to understand how these 
elements were excluded from the analysis given that they are the fundamental 
aims of the policy instrument Further to the issues described above, provisions 
for policy reviews and evaluations were also dealt with in an unsatisfactory 
manner as these requirements were usually overlooked. 
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Section 2: Application of policy instruments 
3.8 Historical approach to environmental protection in the UK 
The use and application of regulatory approaches to managing the environment 
in the UK can be traced back to 1228 when the use of coal in London became 
regulated (Tindale and Hewett, 1998). The application of specific environmental 
and health related legislation arose from the industrial revolution some six 
hundred years later. The introduction of the Alkali Act 1863 and the resulting 
Alkali Inspectorate was one of the first examples of the introduction of legislation 
and the creation of a public body tasked with dealing with a specific 
environmental and human health issue (Bell and McGillivray, 2000, Bell and 
McGillivray, 2006). The Act dealt specifically with the control of certain noxious 
fumes from alkali works in the UK. The Act specified targets for individual 
installations to reduce their acidic emissions by set percentages. However, as the 
number of installations increased so did the overall concentration of noxious 
fumes (Bell and McGillivray, 2006). A decade later saw the introduction of the 
Public Health Act 1875 and the Rivers Pollution Act 1876. The Rivers Pollution 
Act prohibited the introduction of all pollution into rivers. However, it proved 
difficult to enforce for several reasons. The specifics relating to the agencies with 
the power to bring about enforcement action; the requirement placed on the 
regulator to consider the needs of industry when granting effluent consents; and, 
provisions within the Act protecting industry from fines or legal action that may 
have a detrimental effect upon its activities (Bell and McGillivray, 2006). 
Nevertheless, these pieces of early legislation proved to be pivotal in the 
development of health and environmental quality-related legislation. In fact, the 
Alkali Act was functional, following several amendments, until its repeal in 1996, 
some 130 years after its introduction (Jordan, 1998). 
It was during the 19"^  century that a key concept underpinning British, and now 
European Union, legislation was developed: the concept of best practicable 
means (BPM) (Gilpin, 2000). BPM was not specified within the Alkali Act until 
1956 and was never interpreted by a higher court (Jordan, 1998). However, the 
origins of modern-day environmental regulation and the application of Best 
Available Technique (BAT) can be traced to the use of BPM and subsequent Best 
Available Technique Not Entailing Excessive Cost (BATNEEC) as a foundation 
for applying technology standards to industrial activities. BATNEEC guided the 
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regulation of industrial pollution across the EU from 1984 following the inclusion 
of the concept in the 1984 Air Framework Directive (Sorrell, 2002). The Air 
Framework Directive was replaced in 1996 by the Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control (IPPC) Directive (Directive 96/61/EC) and the concept of BATNEEC 
was subsequently replaced with BAT. 
Until the latter part of the twentieth century the development of environmental 
laws was based on the traditional British system of common law. Environmental 
problems were often ignored at worst (Hahn, 1993) and at best legislation was 
developed in an ad hoc fashion and was executed in a largely uncoordinated 
manner (Macrory, 1991). The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP) highlighted the flaws of this approach. The 1976 RECP report 
concentrated on the performance of the Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate (lAPI) 
(Jordan, 1993). Whilst the lAPI was broad in its approach to environmental 
regulation its remit of dealing with atmospheric pollution was so specific that 
companies were widely able to shift their pollution and waste from one media to 
another with regulatory bodies paying little notice and without formal 
requirements to reduce or render the effluents harmless. The 1976 RCEP report 
also described the development of British environmental regulation as 
"discretionary", "collaboratory" and "secretive" (O'Riordan and Wynne, 1987). 
Furthermore, this regulatory atmosphere left little room for third party involvement 
in decision making (Jordan, 1993). 
The preference for regulatory approaches continued until the mid-1980s when 
economists started to promote the use of market based instruments (MBIs) as 
alternatives for or complementary to existing regulatory approaches. This 
movement was fuelled largely by dissatisfaction with existing models of 
environmental protection (Bailey and Rupp, 2004) and the desire to bring about 
greater environmental improvements (Smith, 1995). The American Regan 
Administration and the British Thatcher government also proved to be key forces 
behind the drive towards 'deregulation'. However, in the early days of MBIs, 
policy makers, regulators and environmentalists were not as confident as 
economists in the potential benefits of MBIs. Many stakeholders continued to 
favour regulation over MBIs for some time and policy makers were often reluctant 
to apply economic tools to environmental problems (Helm, 2000). The first large, 
well-respected organisation to pursue the theory of economic instruments as 
effective tools for environmental protection and pollution control was the OECD 
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(OECD, 1989). During tine 1980s the organisation began researching the area, 
prompting governments to take an interest in these "new" policy instruments. 
The theory and application of economic instruments has since developed into 
what has been described as "the hottest growth industry in environmental law" 
(Orts, 1995). The onset of budgetary constraints within regulatory authorities in 
the UK was another contributing factor to the increased interest in applying 
environmental taxes to generate income and reduce administrative costs (Helm, 
1993). The 1990 White Paper This Common Inheritance a\so prompted increased 
interest in MBIs. The White Paper supported the principle of 'the polluter pays' by 
advocating the use of MBIs such as environmental taxes and tradable permits 
(Helm, 1998). This stance has been maintained to this day by both Conservative 
and Labour governments (HM Treasury, 2002). The White Paper proved to be of 
limited use with the initiative described as "the shallowest responsd' to the 
improvement of environmental standards (Doyle and McEachern, 1998). 
Following the publication of the White Paper, the government committed to 
providing annual updates on progress towards the goals set in the paper. 
However, this practice ceased in 1996 following criticism that the paper and 
subsequent annual reports were not being used to influence government policy 
as planned (Doyle and McEachern, 1998). The final component of the policy 'tool 
kit', voluntary measures, arrived on the scene with force circa 1988 with the 
introduction of the Chemical Industry's Responsible Care programme (Givel, 
2007). Since the first days of Responsible Care in the USA the programme has 
developed into a world-wide scheme operating in more than 52 countries and 
providing coverage of 90% of global chemical production (Responsible Care, 
2008). There are currently more than 300 examples of voluntary measures within 
the EU (Borkey and Leveque, 2000). 
3.9 Regulatory Instruments 
Regulatory instruments are often referred to as 'command and control' 
approaches. They have long played a central role in environmental policy. These 
instruments can take the form of environmental standards and licences (Abbot, 
2006), the application of 'best available technology' and other forms of 
technology-based requirements (Cunningham and Sinclair, 1998). 
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The problematic issues of regulatory instruments are well documented and have 
been discussed frequently in academic circles. Helm (1993) identified the pursuit 
of self interest on the part of the regulator (rent-seeking) and regulatory capture 
as two principal concerns that can lead to regulatory failure. Rent-seeking, when 
regulators attempt to increase their powers and associated budgets or when 
industry attempts to increase its property rights in the belief that higher emissions 
now will result in higher property rights in the future, is usually associated with 
regulatory and economic regimes that are poorly defined (Helm, 1993). If the 
remit of the regulator is not specified accurately the risk of regulator rent-seeking 
develops. Regulatory capture - when industry has too much influence over 
regulators - creates different problems and has implications on the credibility and 
reliability of regulatory regimes. Rooted in part in information asymmetries, the 
reliance of regulatory bodies on industry sourced information, often not subject to 
independent verification (Helm, 1993, Helm, 2006), can fuel doubts over the 
ability of policy to maximise the social good. The economic inefficiency of many 
regimes, the lack of flexibility for both the regulator and the regulated, the 
difficulty in applying regulatory approaches to transboundary pollution and the 
risk of placing a heavier regulatory burden on new market entrants have all been 
cited as drawbacks of regulatory approaches (Aim, 1992, Dean and Brown, 1995, 
Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998, Makuch, 2003, O'Doherty et al., 2003). 
Regulatory approaches may also struggle to maintain pace with increasingly 
complex environmental problems (Orts, 1995). Even more complexity and 
information asymmetry can be found at the EU level, particularly when Member 
States compete to shape EU policy (Lowe and Ward, 1998). 
Despite these documented limitations, regulatory approaches are still the 
instrument of choice in many jurisdictions due to the level of dependability they 
provide (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998). This is particularly noticeable in 
situations when requirements of the regulated are specified exactly. Providing 
little room for manoeuvre can offer some degree of assurance of the policy 
outcomes contributing to a greater overall sense of transparency. Despite claims 
that regulation may stifle innovation and new market entrants some authors 
believe that regulation can, in fact, result in the opposite: regulation can inspire 
firms to obtain 'first mover' advantage (Dean and Brown, 1995). Regulation may 
even promote innovative behaviour and increase the level of competition within a 
sector (Sharma, 2001). However, reasons for employing regulatory tools for 
improving environmental conditions are becoming increasingly overshadowed by 
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new and emerging techniques. As policy makers, regulators and society are 
faced with increasingly complex environmental problems the desire to find more 
"economically efficient" solutions has increased. 
3.10 Market Based Instruments 
As discussed in section 3.8 MBIs, in the form of environmental taxes, charges, 
tradable permits and subsidies, had a modest impact in British environmental 
policy until 1990 (Hahn, 2000). Since the publication of This Common Inheritance 
the academic case in favour of MBIs has grown rapidly. Rajah and Smith (1993) 
argue in favour of environmental taxes on the basis of efficiency gains" and 
revenue generation. The effectiveness of MBIs in environmental protection is 
directly related to the ability of the instrument to harness market forces in favour 
of environmental protection (Galoub, 1998). In terms of the practical 
implementation level MBIs may be perceived to be a more cost-effective tool for 
dealing with pollution control. In 1999 United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (US EPA) estimated that the adoption of MBIs for most pollution control in 
the USA at federal, state and regional levels would cost only $50 million to the 
national coffers. This compares with an estimated $200 billion for a regime based 
purely on command and control regulation (Anderson, 1999). 
However, the advantages of employing MBIs over regulatory approaches are 
balanced by some critical weaknesses. The level of uncertainty surrounding the 
environmental outcome is higher, especially following the application of a tax, as 
it is the polluter, not the government or regulator, who decides how much 
abatement to undertake (Rajah and Smith, 1993). Information asymmetry and the 
high level of information disclosure (for example, concerning the quality and 
quantity of effluents) can be problematic for MBIs. Policy makers must 
subsequently be prepared to refrain from implementing an MBI if the level of 
information asymmetry is so high as to endanger the ability of the instrument to 
achieve policy targets. In these situations a regulatory approach may well be 
" Rajah and Smith (1993) state that the use of environmental taxes increases static 
efficiency^Nhere marginal abatement costs of polluting firms vary. A tax on pollution 
should, in theory, lead to polluters with the lowest abatement costs choosing to abate 
emissions. These polluters should also abate the most, leaving polluters with higher 
abatement costs to undertake less abatement. Polluters with abatement costs that are 
higher per unit than the tax would not find it in their interest to undertake pollution 
abatement. Environmental taxes may also lead to increases in dynamic efficiency as 
polluters will seek further abatement measures beyond the cost (tax) minimisation level to 
make further cost savings. This potentially provides an incentive for innovation and 
research and development. 
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more appropriate (Gunningiiam and Sinclair, 1998). The practical implementation 
of MBIs can be more difficult that the theory allows. The European Commission, 
for one, has acknowledged that despite a marked increase in the application of 
MBIs across the ED, these instruments have proven to be more difficult to 
implement and use than first anticipated in the S''" Environmental Action 
Programme (European Environment Bureau, 2004, Hare, 2004). Some Member 
States have successfully implemented environmental taxes aimed at changing 
behaviour of businesses and the public at low administrative costs. Some have 
experienced resistance from many sectors of society due to the degree of 
transparency required by MBIs which can draw undesired attention to polluters. 
In addition to environmental taxes, tradable permit schemes are becoming 
increasingly popular. The success of the US sulphur dioxide trading scheme and 
the high profile of the EU ETS has led to a rapid growth in the study of tradable 
permits^^. The balance of literature appears to be in favour of the application of 
trading mechanisms compared with environmental taxes. Sterner (2003) believes 
emissions trading to be the most logical approach to deal with aggregate level of 
pollution. Furthermore, emissions trading may help policy makers to achieve 
policy goals with greater speed and with more confidence of the outcome 
compared to command and control approaches (Ellerman et al., 2003). Yet recent 
experience of emissions trading has identified two elements that, if not properly 
addressed, threaten to undermine the economic balance and the environmental 
outcome of a trading scheme. A tradable permit scheme requires 3 key activities 
to be undertaken by the regulatory body (Swanson, 1995): 
• Decide the total allowable use of a resource/level of pollution/cap setting 
• Creation of property rights (i.e. level of pollution or use of resource 
allowed) via certificates/permits 
• Allocation of permits amongst uses/polluters 
However, Phase 1 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme failed to address the 
cap and allocation of allowances in a way that would prevent over-allocation to 
participating firms. This eventually led to the collapse of Phase I allowance prices 
(trading at €0.05 per tonne carbon dioxide (tC02) in late 2007) and questions 
See Pesters (2003), Hansjurgens (2005), Pring (2006), Soleille (2006), Tietenberg 
(2006), Hepburn (2007) as some examples for recent studies relating to the performance 
of the EU ETS and the US S02 program 
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were raised over tine environmental benefits. Beyond this illustration, further 
detailed analysis of the EU ETS is presented in Chapter 7. 
3.11 Voluntary approaches to environmental policy 
The category of voluntary approaches (hereafter referred to as 'VA') contains 
numerous instruments including voluntary environmental agreements (VEAs), 
self-regulation, co-regulation, environmental covenants and environmental 
management systems (EMS) (Borkey and Leveque, 2000). The complexity of the 
field is increased by the variation of terminology, levels of 'voluntarianism' of each 
instrument and the level of legal 'bindingness' of each instrument, as depicted in 
Figure 3.3. Within the broad spectrum of voluntary approaches some possess a 
greater degree of certainty. The more legally binding an instrument is the higher 
the environmental outcome. Despite this, one crucial weakness in relation to the 
targets of voluntary approaches has been identified by the OECD. A survey of 
VAs employed across OECD countries found that whilst the targets were 
generally met there is evidence that much of the improvements (emission 
reductions or otherwise) were carried out in the time between target negotiation 
and the setting of baselines and full implementation of the policy (OECD, 2003). 
Voluntary policy instruments divide the academic and policy communities. 
Numerous studies have been published advocating the use of VAs on the basis 
of economic efficiency gains (European Commission, 1996, Makuch, 2003, 
Jimenez, 2007). It has been argued that voluntary approaches can address some 
environmental problems far quicker than more traditional routes because they 
require less preparation to implement compared to regulatory instruments 
(OECD, 2003). However, the environmental effectiveness of such an approach is 
often dependent on the level of initial preparation (for example in setting 
baselines) verification of emissions data and preparation of legal documentation 
(OECD, 2003). 
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Figure 3.3 Voluntary approaches to environmental policy and the level of legal 
'bindingness' of each approach 
Level of legal "bindingness" 
Target based agreements, may contain legal sanctions/regulatory backdrop for failure to 
meet negotiated targets within specified timescale 
Co-regulatiorr. establishment of environmental agreement within a legislative act 
Negotiated agreements, contract between government and industry. Government commits to 
not introducing new legislation unless agreement targets are not met 
Industry covenants, an agreement between authorities and companies under private 
law. Aimed at increasing flexibility in improving environmental performance 
Performance based agreements, negotiated goals that are not legally 
binding nor do they pre-empt legislation 
Self-regulation, schemes such as EMAS, ISO 14001 and other 
environmental management systems 
Public voiuntarvprogrammes. Energy Star, Green Lights, 
33/50 
Unilateral commitments, company-specific programmes to 
improve performance. Hewlett-Packard's Stewardship 
programme. Responsible Care also falls into this category 
Eco-labellina. German packaging agreement requires 
participating firms to display commitment to 
agreement on products 
Private agreements, initiatives involving NGOs, industry 
associations and standards organisations. 
Higher Lower 
Source: Adapted from OECD (1997a), OECD (1997b), OECD (1999a), OECD 
(1999b) and Lehmann (2004) 
Resting on the notion of economic savings, it has been argued that VAs may 
present opportunities to save transaction costs within involved sectors. Glachant 
(1999) believes that a VA can be more economically efficient compared with 
command and control or MBIs as the VA can provide the impetus to promote 
communication amongst firms thus reducing information costs. This is particularly 
beneficial in instances where knowledge about suitable abatement technologies 
is limited. However, the transaction costs do not remain at a lower level in sectors 
where there is localised knowledge of abatement technologies (where some firms 
have good knowledge and others have inferior knowledge) and in sectors that 
are less than homogenous in terms of size, turnover and scope of activities 
(Enevoldsen, 2005). As discussed in section 3.9 regulatory approaches can lack 
the ability to promote innovation and development of individual solutions to 
environmental problems. Conversely, VAs may present better atmosphere for 
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innovative behaviour in allowing firms to develop strategies that meet their 
individual needs and potentially without compromising the achievement of an 
environmental goal (Delmas and Terlaak, 2000). 
The OECD, the EEA and the European Commission have been principal sources 
of analysis of voluntary approaches in environmental policy^^ at the supranational 
level. However, Enevoldsen (2005) argues that these types of analyses often 
raise more questions than they manage to answer. This is in part due to the 
difficulty drawing concrete conclusions on the effectiveness of different case 
studies. Nevertheless, the 1997 EEA report identified some key features that can 
significantly influence the effectiveness of a VA: 
Clear targets set during negotiations 
Specification of the baseline against which the targets will be measured 
Specific reliable and credible monitoring and reporting mechanisms 
Availability of technical solutions to meet the targets 
Limited compliance costs 
Compliance costs similar across firms 
Involvement of third parties in development and implementation 
It can be argued that these seven qualities are required in the development of all 
policies, irrespective of the type of instrument in use. The Aarhus Convention, 
established via the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
aims to ensure public participation in all environmental decision making, thus 
meaning that regulatory, economic and voluntary policy approaches should all 
include adequate third party participation in development and implementation 
(UNECE, 1998). It is true that VAs may require more third party involvement in 
order to obtain sufficient support for the measure than other policy instruments, 
especially as NGOs and other external organisations are often wary of voluntary 
policy instruments. The presence of credible and stringent legal sanctions should 
also contribute towards achieving external support for voluntary measures, as 
advocated by the European Commission (European Commission, 1996). In 
personal communication relating to the subject matter of this thesis the UK 
" See European Environment Agency (1997), OECD (1997a), OECD (1998), OECD 
(1999a), OECD (1999b) European Commission (2002) and OECD (2003) for examples of 
assessments of voluntary approaches. 
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branch of Greenpeace highlighted this issue by stating in personal 
correspondence: 
"We place very little importance on voluntary agreements. We believe 
they rarely if ever lead to the necessary environmental results and are 
more often used as a strategy by industry to head off much needed 
regulation." 
(Strutt, 2006). 
In addition to the difficulty in recruiting external support for VAs, policy makers 
wishing to apply this approach to environmental problems must also deal with a 
problem that in many respects is unique to VAs: the free rider. Free riding is one 
of the most commonly debated issues relating to VAs (Ten Brink, 2002). This is 
not without due cause. The presence of free-riders can severely undermine the 
effectiveness of a VA. There is no better example of free riding than the case of 
climate change and the Kyoto Protocol - with particular reference to the initial 
refusal of the USA and Australia to ratify the treaty. Shogren (2004) asserts, in 
relation to global action on climate change, that: 
'By free riding, some nations can be better off refusing an agreement. 
The greater the global net benefits of cooperation, the stronger the 
incentive to free ride: therefore, self-enforcing agreement is harder to 
maintain.' 
(Shogren, 2004: p.60) 
VAs dealing with climate change are particularly susceptible to the negative 
effects of free riding for multiple reasons (Viguier, 2004): 
• Non-participants can not be excluded from enjoying the benefits of action 
as carbon dioxide (CO2) accumulation does not have negative local 
effects - the effects are global irrespective of source location 
• Units of emissions reductions are perfectly substitutable (e.g. a reduction 
of 10 tonnes of CO2 has the same effect upon the climate irrespective of 
the location and nature of the polluter) 
• Benefits of individual action can be eroded by the inaction of other 
individuals. 
• Number of actors involved 
• Difficulty in verification of emission reductions 
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In light of these issues relating to climate change policy it is an opportune time to 
commence the critique of climate change policy in the UK, the founding pillar of 
which is the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Section 3: Climate Change Policy 
'An overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that 
climate change is a serious and urgent issue. The Earth's climate is 
rapidly changing, mainly as a result of increases in greenhouse gases 
caused by human activities.' 
(Stern, 2006: p.2) 
3.12 International climate policy: the United Nations, IPCC and Kyoto 
With few exceptions, the global scientific and political communities agree that 
climate change exists and the causes are primarily anthropogenic (Oreskes, 
2004) '^*. In response to increasing concern over global warming, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 at 
the 40^ Session of World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Executive Council. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) officially endorsed the 
creation of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2004). The 
aim of the IPCC was to provide independent and scientifically robust information 
on the emerging issue of global warming and climate change. Further details on 
the remit and objectives of the IPCC are presented in Figure 3.4. The IPCC 
formulated the report that was to found the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the back-bone of modern climate 
policy in many countries including the UK. 
IPCC relies on the global scientific community to provide expertise on all scientific 
aspects of climate change, thus allowing the IPCC to present scientifically robust 
and well-founded assessments of the potential impacts of climate change and the 
possible steps that can be taken by national, regional and supranational 
organisations to avert the consequences of climate change. In keeping with the 
trend of considering socio-economic impacts of policies demonstrated in many 
jurisdictions over recent years, in 2004 the Chairman of IPCC, Rajendra 
Pachauri, made calls for greater involvement of social scientists in the debate on 
climate change, stating: 
A survey of 928 peer-reviewed paper published between 1993 and 2003 found that 
75% of papers endorsed the theory of climate change, proposed mitigation measures or 
evaluated the impacts of climate changes. The remaining 25% assessed methods or 
dealt with paleoclimate science. None of the papers disagreed with the consensus 
position of climate change and its anthropogenic causes (Oreskes, 2004). 
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There is, however, still a greater need for social scientists to get involved 
in the work related to climate change, so that the biophysical aspects of 
climate change can be converted and interpreted effectively in socio-
economic terms. It is only then that society would fully appreciate the 
implications of climate change for the human race as well as for other 
species on this planet.' 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2004: p.1) 
Figure 3.4 Aims and objectives of iPCC 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: initial objectives 
Identification of gaps and uncertainties in current knowledge on climate change 
and its potential impacts 
Identification of information required to evaluate the impacts of policies formulated 
in response to climate change 
Review current and proposed national policies concerning climate 
change/greenhouse gas emissions 
Scientific and environmental assessment of all aspects of greenhouse gas 
emissions issue, this information to be transferred to national governments and 
intergovernmental organisations 
To meet these objectives, the IPCC established three working groups: 
I. The Physical Basis of Climate Change 
II. Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and vulnerability 
III. Mitigation of Climate Change 
Since its inception in Rio in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), UNFCCC has endured repeated 
assaults on its integrity and ability to drive much needed greenhouse gas 
emission reductions as detailed in Art. 2 of UNFCCC; 
T h e ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instrument 
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse 
has concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems 
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.' 
(UNFCCC, 1992: p.4) 
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In March 1994 the UNFCCC entered into force (UNFCCC, 2004). Yet by the time of 
the first Conference of the Parties (COP) took place in Berlin in 1995 it was clear 
that the vague commitments from Annex 1^^ parties were insufficient to being about 
real change. The Second Convention of the Parties (COP-2) took place in 1996, 
and proved to be a somewhat monumental point in the climate change debate. At 
this meeting the participating parties officially announced that climate change was 
a result of human activities. Until this point there was much contention over 
whether human activities were indeed to blame for climate change or not (Areas, 
2001). COP-3 took place a year later in Kyoto (UNFCCC, 1997). A total of 159 
countries were present and consensus was reached on two key issues that were to 
form the backbone of the Kyoto Protocol: the Protocol would be legally binding; and 
targets would be more ambitious than previously anticipated requiring Annex I 
countries to make reductions on their 1990 emissions, not merely stabilise their 
emissions to 1990 levels (Areas, 2001). Article 2 of the Protocol identifies the 
approaches Annex I countries can take in order to meet their commitments, as 
shown in Figure 3.5. 
Annex I countries are all members of the OECD plus countries of the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe (referred to as economies in transition). There are 40 Annex I 
countries. The remaining countries, developing and least developed countries are classed 
as Annex II countries. Ali countries share a responsibility to address climate change 
through the implementation of national climate change strategies, technology transfer, 
research cooperation and education. However, only Annex I formally committed to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions although this commitment is not legally binding 
(Depiedge, 2004). 
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Figure 3.5 Article 2 of Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC 
Article 2 of the Protocol states that by achieving quantified emissions limitations and 
reductions in order to promote sustainable development, Parties included in Annex I (shall 
implement policies and measures such as: 
i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national 
economy: 
ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments 
under relevant international environmental agreements; promotion of 
sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and reforestation; 
iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of climate change 
considerations; 
iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, new and 
renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and 
of advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies; 
v) Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal 
incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse 
gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention and 
application of market instruments; 
vi) Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors aimed at promoting 
policies and measures which limit or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol; 
vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector; 
viii) Limitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through recovery and use in 
waste management, as well as in the production, transport and distribution of 
energy. 
Source: Adapted from UNFCCC (1997) 
3.13 The flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
Beyond these measures the Kyoto Protocol contained three key mechanisms that 
have been subject a significant amount of controversy since their inception 
(Hepburn, 2007): Joint Implementation (Jl), the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), and emissions trading. The Joint Implementation mechanism, the theory 
of a Party implementing an emission mitigation scheme or project in another 
country and then claiming credit against their target emission reduction for doing 
so, has been criticised by some, predominately by developing countries, on 
equity grounds (Depledge, 2004). Jl projects can be implemented bebween Annex 
I countries, but the widely criticised element refers to provisions for Annex I 
countries to implement projects in Annex II countries (developing countries). It 
has been argued that allov /^ing industrialised nations to gain credit for action 
abroad simply allows richer nations to benefit from emission reductions in 
developing countries, where the reductions are far cheaper than at home 
(Depledge, 2004). Annex I to Annex I Jl is slightly less controversial as the 
difference in cost of emission reductions across Annex I countries should not be 
as significant compared with Annex II countries. This reduces the assumption that 
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Annex I countries are taking advantage of cheaper emission reductions in 
developing countries. The investments are private but must be of benefit, in 
emission terms, to the countries involved and all investments must be authorised 
by both governments and the industries involved (Grubb, 2004). 
The Clean Development Mechanism has similar characteristics to Jl. However 
CDM projects must also demonstrate that they are contributing towards 
sustainable development in the host country (Ellis, 2004). Again, Annex I 
countries are permitted to undertake projects in developing countries. The 
resulting certified emissions reductions (CER) may then be credited to the 
developed country. In the case of EU Member States CERs may be used towards 
meeting EU ETS requirements in Phase II which coincides with the Kyoto 
Commitment period (2008-2012). The purpose of the CDM is to provide options 
for global emissions abatement in the absence of a global trading scheme^®. This 
mechanism has resulted in some noteworthy achievements. Ellis et al. (2007) 
identify increased implementation of climate-friendly projects, increased 
awareness of climate change and improved institutional capacity to develop 
climate mitigation projects as some of the key beneficial outcomes of the CDM. 
Furthermore, reductions from some 325 planned CDM projects across 51 
countries are expected to be in the region of 79 million tonnes carbon dioxide 
equivalent (MtC02e) during the first Kyoto commitment period from 2008 to 2012 
(Ellis etal., 2007). 
Markandya and Halsnaes (2004) argue, however, that the involvement of 
governments in authorising and rejecting projects mean the CDM is far from 
efficient in achieving emission reductions. The approach to implementing CDM 
projects has been described as "cumbersome and unrewarding" and "tangled in 
red tape"^^. The ability of CDM to promote and advance sustainable development 
has also been questioned. CDM project do not appear to be facilitating the 
transition of developing country energy sectors towards renewable energy 
(Pearson, 2007). The most problematic aspects of CDM thus far are: 
Annex II countries cannot participate in emissions trading as they do not have emission 
reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol: "As they have no target they will never 
be buyers of emission rights and they cannot be suppliers as they do not have a target 
against which the supplies can be accounted' (Markandya and Halsnaes, 2004). 
^ Comments of the Secretary of the Indian Ministry for Non-conventional Energy Sources 
and the Chief Executive of BP, Lord Browne, respectively. Comments cited by Pearson 
(2007). 
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• The geographic concentration of projects and the types of GHG involved 
(largely in China and India, most projects are related to non-C02 gases 
which have higher global warming potential. As a consequence these 
projects generate huge quantities of CERs) (Hepburn, 2007). While these 
emissions reductions^® are valuable, the existing projects are doing little to 
reduce direct CO2 emissions from energy generation - the largest source 
of climate altering gases (Energy Information Administration, 2004). 
• Proving the 'additionality' of projects. Donors and host have to 
demonstrate how the project ahs resulted in emission reductions that 
would not have necessarily occurred. This is incredibly difficult to assess. 
• The link between the EU emissions registry (the Community Independent 
Transaction Log (CITL)) and the Kyoto credit registry (the International 
Transaction Log (ITL)) has been fraught with difficulties. By September 
2008 the link had still not been established meaning the CERs could not 
be used by EU ETS participants. 
Despite the concerns of CDM and Jl, it is the third flexible mechanism that is of 
most interest to this thesis. Provisions for emissions trading are set out in Art. 17 
of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC stating that: 
The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting 
and accountability for emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B 
may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their 
commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to 
domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under that Article.' 
(UNFCCC, 1997: p.15) 
With Art. 17 in mind the EU Emissions Trading Scheme was developed. Further 
detailed analysis of the EU ETS is presented in Chapter 7. However, this section 
of the literature review will conclude with a critique of literature on Kyoto's 
provisions for emissions trading. It was initially predicated that emissions trading 
between Annex I countries could reduce the marginal costs of meeting Kyoto 
targets from anywhere between 45% and 72% (Barrett, 2000). However, Barrett 
Hepburn (2007) states that the majority of projects deal with HFC-23 from refrigerant 
manufacturing. Reducing one tonne of HFC-23 equates to 11,700 tonnes CO2. 
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stressed that achieving this figure would depend on how emissions trading was 
developed. In the absence of any modelling it is difficult assess whether marginal 
costs have been lower than in the absence of emissions trading. Two factors 
indicate that these predictions may have been over-ambitious: Phase I of the EU 
ETS has been plagued by difficulties arising from over-allocation of allowances 
(leading to the collapse of the carbon prices); and the initial refusal of the USA to 
ratify Kyoto and actively engage in global climate mitigation action. 
3.14 Post-2012 Kyoto; the Bali Roadmap 
The annual COP meetings following Kyoto in 1997 were plagued by 
disagreement and conflicting interests. At COP-4 in The Hague in November 
2000 it became clear that global agreement on ratification of Kyoto could not be 
achieved due to the polarised positions of the EU and the USA (Pallemaerts and 
Williams, 2006), Pallemaerts and Williams describe the refusal of President Bush 
to put the Kyoto Protocol forward for ratification by the Senate in 2001 and the 
COP-6 meeting of 2001 as 'a crucial test of a multilateral approach to solving 
global environmental problems within the framework of the UN (p.42). As more 
and more countries ratified the Protocol and following the relative success of 
COP-7 with the 'Marrakesh Accords'^ ®, it was emerging that the drive of the EU 
and its developing country allies could keep the Kyoto Protocol alive. 
Subsequent COP meetings passed with minor achievements and set backs, but 
most attention was focused on COP-13 in Bali. In December 2007 leaders from 
more than 180 countries assembled in Bali to discuss five issues (Witoelar, 
2007): 
• a framework for new negotiation proceedings for post-Kyoto/2012; 
• the launch of the Adaptation Fund; 
• defining the scope for review of Article 9^° of the Kyoto Protocol; 
19 At COP-7, 172 governments met in Marrakesh to thrash out the finer details of 
implementing and meeting the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol. The stance of the USA 
and developed country allies (namely Australia, New Zealand, Ukraine, Russia and 
Nonway) barely changed (Dessai and Schipper, 2003), demanding maximum flexibility in 
meeting their Kyoto targets. The Marrakesh Accord is a document containing 23 detailed 
actions to implement the Kyoto Protocol. These actions relate to, inter alia, capacity 
building, technology transfer, principles and provisions for the flexible mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol, issues relating to land use, land use change and forestry, and 'good 
practices' within policy making for Annex I countries. 
° Article 9 to the Kyoto Protocol concerns the review of the Protocol in light of the best 
available scientific, environmental, economic and social data regarding climate change. 
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• the definition of a course to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation; 
• and, strategies to promote technology transfer. 
In this respect the Bali COP was a success. Developed, developing and least 
developed countries reached consensus on the need to pursue urgent action on 
climate change (The Economist, 2007). Reaching agreement on post-2012 action 
will depend greatly on how countries view their "common but differentiated 
responsibility". Simply reaching agreement on starting negotiations has been 
hailed as a major success (Witoelar, 2007), although many non-governmental 
observers of the Bali negotiations left bitterly disappointed by the lack of real 
progress towards firm commitments for the Copenhagen round of negotiations in 
November 2009 (COP-15) (The Economist, 2007). The outcome of the 2009 
negotiations remain to be seen. One thing is certain: it is going to be a difficult 
task to reach consensus on who should do how much. 
3.15 Approach to climate policy In the UK 
Having examined the influence of the UN on global action on climate change one 
should now consider how this filters down to domestic level activities. In the UK 
this takes the form of the publication of two national climate change programmes, 
the Stem Review on the Economics of Climate Change, the Energy White Paper 
(2007) and the draft Climate Change Bill. These actions, on the surface, indicate 
the UK is leading the way in domestic level responses. But is the action producing 
real benefits? Or are the reports, reviews and Bill indicating anything more than 
lip-service? To begin addressing these questions, an overview of the four key 
Government responses will be discussed in conclusion to this Chapter. The 
analysis of the four case studies, followed by the comparative assessment, will 
draw the arguments together to complete the picture. 
The initial response of the British government to the Kyoto Protocol is seen in the 
Climate Change Programme 2000. The plan was revised and updated in 2006 in 
Climate Change: The UK Programme 2006. These reports, whilst important in 
their own right have since been dramatically overshadowed by the Stern Review 
published in 2006 amidst much international furore. Following on from the Stern 
Review, the British Government published its draft Climate Change Bill. At the 
The Protocol should be revised accordingly. However, beyond specifying the first review 
at COP-2, the text is vague and does not specify when or how often reviews should take 
place. 
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time of writing the Climate Change Bill was still on its lengthy journey through 
Parliament. 
3.16 Climate Change Programme 2000 and Climate Change: The UK 
Programme 2006 
The UK's Climate Change Programme (CCP) was published in 2000; six years 
after the publication of the first attempt by the government to develop a 
comprehensive strategy for tackling climate change the Government revised its 
programme (see Table 3.4). Although the British Government was one of the first 
governments to produce such a plan (Penman, 1996), it believed that the case for 
tackling the challenge of climate change was clear: 
'Climate change is one of the most serious tlireats facing the world's 
environment, economy and society. But if we all act, the world can avoid its 
worst effects. The devastating floods, droughts and storms we have seen 
in the UK and across the world in recent years show all too clearly how 
vulnerable we are to climate extremes and how devastating they can be. 
And we have been warned that things will get worse. We have to take 
practical action to deal with flooding and severe weather. But we also need 
to tackle climate change by cutting the greenhouse gas emissions that 
cause it.' 
(DETR, 2000a: p.2) 
The 2000 Programme contained novel and innovative policy responses. The UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme, as analysed in Chapter 6, was the first emissions 
trading scheme in the world open to all sectors of the economy. The inclusion of 
all six greenhouse gases further added to the novelty of the scheme. However, a 
comparison of the 2000 Programme with the updated version published in 2006 
shows that some of the early predictions for this and other policy instruments 
were over-ambitious. In particular, the European Union voluntary agreement with 
car manufacturers^^ was predicted to yield substantial CO2 emission reductions 
The car manufacturers' agreement is a Community-wide voluntary agreement is that 
aimed to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars. This agreement, referred to as the 
Commitment in EU documents, requires that manufacturers of passenger cars sold within 
the EU reduce the CO2 emissions from vehicles to a fleet average of 140 grams/C02 per 
kilometre by 2008. The Commitment was signed by the European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (ACEA) in 1999, with the Korea Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (KAMA) and the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) joining 
the Commitment in April 2000. The Commitment was based on voluntary subscription by 
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yet led to a hugely disappointing outcome (Environmental Data Service (ENDS), 
2007c). 
The instruments of interest to this thesis have been highlighted in Table 3.3. The 
most noticeable difference between the two Programmes is the UK ETS with the 
2000 Programme carbon saving figures being much higher than the 2006 
Programme. 
automobile manufacturers, but should the participants fail to meet target emissions the 
Commission is likely to adopt formal regulations to reduce the CO2 emissions from 
passenger cars (Sustainable Asset Management Group, 2005). Progress against the 
interim targets was consistently poor (ENDS, 2007a). By late 2007 it was evident that the 
target would not be achieved by 2008, paving the way for the adoption of formal 
legislation to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger vehicles (ENDS, 2007b). 
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Table 3.3 Changes in predicted carbon savings from measures identified in ttie 
2000 and2006 Ciimate Change Programmes 
Measure Inclusion in 
2000 CCP 
2000 CCP estimated 
saving in 2010 (MtC) 
2006 CCP estimated 
saving in 2010 ((MtC) 
1 Enemy 
Renewables Obligation / 2,5 2.5 
! Business 
Climate Change Levy y 2 3.7 
UK Emissions Trading Sciieme y Minimum 2 0.3 
Carbon Trust y 0.5 1.1 
Building Regulations 2002 / 1.3 (only one reform 0.4 
Building Regulations 2005 noted in 2000) 0.2 
Climate Change Agreements and 
IPPC 
•/ 2,5 
-
Climate Change Agreements alone - 2.9 
i Transport 
Voluntary Agreements package, 
including reform of company car 
taxation and graduated VED 
y 4 2.3 
Wider transport measures X - 0.8 
Sustainable distribution in Scotland 
and Wales 
V 0,1 0.1 
Fuel duty escalator •/ 1-2.5 (until 1999) 1.9 
' Domestic 
Energy Efficiency Commitment 
(EEC) (2002-05) 
/ 2.6-3.7 (only one 
EEC noted in 2000) 
0.4 
Energy Efficiency Commitment 
(EEC) (2005-08) 
/ 0.6 
Energy Efficiency Commitment 
(EEC) (2008-11) 
/ 0.6 
Building Regulations 2002 / Included in Building 0.7 
Building Regulations 2006 including 
2005 condensing boilers update 
y Regulations above 0.8 
Warm Front and fuel poverty 
programmes 
X 
-
0.4 
Market Transformation including 
appliance standards and labelling 
y 0.2-0.4 0.2 
Upgrading district heating systems y 0.9 Not included in 2006 
CCP 
1 Agriculture 
Woodlands Grants Scheme 
(England) 
X 
-
0.2 
Woodland planting since 1990 
(Scotland) 
X 
-
0.5 
Public Sector 
Central Government, NHS, UK 
universities and English schools 
including Carbon Trust activities 
y 0.5 0.2 
Proposed changes to building 
regulations, new central estate target 
and NHS services (Scotland only) 
y 0.1 Not included in 2006 
CCP 
TOTAL 21.8-24.6 20.8 
Source: Adapted from DETR (2000a) and Defra (2006d) 
By the t ime of the publ icat ion of the rev ised P r o g r a m m e in 2006 the deg ree of 
scient i f ic cer ta in ty of the causes and impl icat ions of c l imate c h a n g e has improved 
s igni f icant ly (Defra, 2006d) . The 2006 P r o g r a m m e crucial ly con ta ined a 
c o m m i t m e n t for the g o v e r n m e n t to publ ish annua l repor ts on nat ional p rogress 
tov\/ards the targets wi th in the P r o g r a m m e (see Tab le 3.4). Prov is ions for publ ic 
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reporting of progress against targets was not a feature of the first Climate Change 
Programme meaning that progress could only be assessed by examining 
individual policy reviews published by the responsible Government departments. 
The 2006 Programme also contained additional measures that may result in a 
further 7 - 1 2 MtC saving per year by 2010 (Table 3.4). This would raise the total 
target of the 2006 Programme to 27.8 to 32.8 million tonnes of carbon (MtC) 
savings per year by 2010, an admirable figure if predictions are realised. 
Table 3.4 Additional measures specified in the 2006 Climate Change Programme 
Measure 
Estimate carbon saving in 2010 
(MtC) 
Energy supply 
Subsidy for biomass heat 0.1 
Second phase of EU emissions trading scheme 3.0-8.0 
Business 
Carbon Trust support for investment in energy efficiency in Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
0.1 
Measures to encourage or assist SMEs to take up energy saving 
opportunities 
0.1 
Transport 
Renevirable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) 1.6 
Future voluntary agreement with car manufacturers to reduce CO2 
emissions from new cars 
0.1 
Domestic 
Increased activity in Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) (2008-11) 0.5 
Provision of advice to stimulate early replacement of inefficient 
boilers and implementation of the Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive 
0.2 
Package of measures to improve energy efficiency in buildings 0.1 
Better billing and metering 0.2 
Products Policy: consumer information and standards for lights and 0.2 
other energy-using products (EUPs) 
Agriculture 
Strategy for non-food crops 0.1 
Public Sector 
Additional effort by local authorities 0.2 
Revolving loan fund for the public sector 0.1 
Actions by devolved administrations 0.3 
Other measures 0.1 
TOTAL 7.0-12.0 
IPPC is a noticeable absence from the 2006 Programme. Whilst the 2006 
Programme makes reference to the regulatory regime, any quantitative 
predictions concerning the impact of the PPC Regulations are omitted in contrast 
with the 2000 Programme. This absence of quantitative predictions for the PPC 
Regulations may have arisen for two reasons; 
• the difficulty in differentiating between emissions/energy savings from this 
policy when it is so closely linked to other policies (such as ED ETS and 
CCL/CCA); 
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and, the failure to implement a regulatory regime that properly addresses 
energy efficiency and reduction in non-COg greenhouse gases. 
3.17 Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change 
The Stern Review, published in the same year as the 2006 Climate Change 
Programme, added further credibility to somewhat political stance of climate 
change by dismissing any possibility of climate change not being of 
anthropogenic cause. The Review was published amidst a furore of global 
publicity not least because it was the only economic study of climate change 
(based on CBA) that called for immediate and drastic action (Neumayer, 2007). 
Examining the estimated costs of climate change cited in the Review, it is easy to 
see why immediate and drastic action was called for. With marginal damage 
costs of $312 per tonne of carbon emitted today and the total cost of climate 
change in the order of a permanent loss of 5 - 20% of average global per capita 
consumption it is impossible to contradict calls for urgent action (Dietz et al., 
2007). The body of literature analysing the claims made within the Stern Review 
is still relatively small, as to be expected with a report of this size published 
relatively recently. However, the widespread acclaim was coupled with concerns 
from some corners over the methodologies used within the Review to quantify the 
impacts and costs of climate change mitigation. Full analysis of this issues is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to present both sides of 
the argument concerning the Review. In particular, the discount rate caused a 
great deal of concern within some academic circles, as demonstrated by 
Nordhaus (2006). The central argument presented by Nordhaus is that the 
discounting rate applied of nearly zero magnifies the impact of climate change in 
the future to justify deep cuts in emissions and consumption now. Furthermore, a 
higher discounting rate would lead to the present climate policy ramp of modest 
emissions cuts now and greater cuts in the medium to long term. 
Pieike (2007) notes another concerning aspect of the Review: the cost of extreme 
weather events. Stern states that there has been an annual 2% increase in 
economic losses due to extreme weather since 1970. However, the source of this 
information, a conference proceedings published by Muir-Wood et al. (2006) 
states that when viewed in the context of a longer time-frame (e.g. from 1950 to 
2005) there is no apparent trend in losses over time. Furthermore, the 
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devastating hurricanes experienced in the USA in 2004-05 (including Katrina) 
account for much of the reported increase in costs. 
In the face of any concerns raised over the approach or findings of the Stern 
Review, it is important to remember that there is no such thing as the 'correct' 
discount rate (Neumayer, 2007). Furthermore, arguments over the cost of 
extreme weather and the 'right' level of mitigation will be difficult to resolve. But 
one thing remains clear, the Stern Review added much needed kudos to the 
argument for immediate deep cuts in emissions. 
3.18 Energy White Paper 
The White Paper on Energy was published in May 2007 by the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) (DTI, 2007a). This White Paper identified the need to 
ensure the UK has an energy supply system that is both secure and considers 
the effect of energy generation on climate change. The Paper was controversial 
for two reasons: the consideration of nuclear and coal energy generation. The 
White Paper stated that a decision on nuclear power generation had not been 
finalised and was to be subject to stakeholder consultation. However, this move 
only came following a High Court^^ ruling on a previous "consultation" on nuclear 
power. In early 2007 the High Court ruled that the DTI consultation on nuclear 
power that led the Government to support a new generation of nuclear power 
stations was "seriously flawed", "misleading" and "procedurally unfair" (The 
Independent, 2007). 
Following a revised consultation process the White Paper on Nuclear Power was 
published in January 2008 (BERR, 2008c). This White Paper gave the go-ahead 
to the construction of the first nuclear power stations in the UK for more than 20 
years (ENDS, 2008a). The rationale behind the move towards nuclear power 
included the need to ensure energy security and the benefits of nuclear energy in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to the controversial promotion of 
nuclear power, the government also advocated the construction and use of 
"clean" coal power stations with the potential to apply carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technology once the technology reaches maturity. Again, the requirement 
for a secure energy supply is cited as a driving force behind this move (ENDS, 
2008d). However, coal-fired power stations, albeit "clean" coal, seems to be at 
^ The legal challenge was brought about by Greenpeace in 2006 following an 
announcement that the government would pursue the construction of a new generation of 
nuclear capacity in the UK. 
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odds with the Climate Change Bill as the construction of new coal capability will 
no doubt have serious implications on the ability of the UK to meet the domestic 
emission targets set out in the Climate Change Bill (ENDS, 2008d). 
3.19 Climate Change Bill 
Defra claims that the adoption of a legislative tool such as the Climate Change 
Bill would make the UK the first country to implement a long-term legal framework 
for addressing the causes of climate change (Defra, 20071). The Bill is intended to 
have four central pillars: 
• to create a system to implement a "credible" emission reduction pathway 
to 2050 in order to meet the UK target of 60% GHG reduction; 
• to implement a strong institutions framework to manage the transition to a 
low carbon economy; 
• to provide powers to implement addition measures to achieve further 
emission reductions; 
• and, to develop a clear framework of accountability to ensure Government 
reporting to Parliament (HM Government, 2007). 
Following the consultation process the Government announced its intention to 
include annual, not 5-yearly, emission reduction targets (ENDS, 2008b). The final 
details of the Bill were unknown at the time of writing. 
3.20 Chapter summary 
This Chapter sought to address the three pillars of this thesis as follows: 
• The theory of policy evaluation 
• Approaches in policy evaluation, with particular interest in how ex ante 
assessment can inform eA-yCos/evaluation 
• Application of policy instruments in various settings 
• The challenges and approaches to climate change policy in the 
international and domestic settings 
The critique of policy evaluation and analysis of the current governmental 
approach to evaluation has demonstrated that methods currently employed in the 
UK need attention. In particular, the qualitative aspects of policy evaluations are 
often over looked in favour of quantitative methods despite the numerous 
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advantages of applying both methodological techniques. Support for this 
approach from the IPCC indicates that the nature of research in the spheres of 
climate change policy evaluation is required and can bring great benefits. 
The application of policy instruments and how effective different categories 
perform are dependent upon numerous factors. Each approach has strengths and 
limitations that must be considered when developing policy and importantly when 
evaluating policy instruments ex post. Analysis of policy instrument application 
does not preclude the application of any of the three categories of policy 
instruments provided prudent design in an appropriate ex anteiex post 
assessment framework 
Climate change policy is, without a doubt, one of the most complex issues to face 
modern society. The approach in the UK, whilst admirable in many respects, 
requires closer examination to determine what policies are actually performing 
and which are not. In particular, the sizable conflict between the White Papers on 
energy and nuclear power and the Climate Change Bill presents a serious and 
real risk to undermine any progress made in other sectors towards reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
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PART 2: ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
- 9 2 -
4 Pollution Prevention and Control (England and 
Wales) Regulations 2000 
4.1 Introduction 
The transposition of the European Union Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 
September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control 
(hereafter referred to as "the IPPC Directive" or "IPPC") into domestic law via 
the Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations was one of the most 
important events in the development of British environmental law. The IPPC 
Directive has shaped the way we approach environmental regulation and as 
such has provided the central pillar of industrial environmental performance 
across the EU. In the UK, the PPC Regulations have been used to set 
thresholds for participation in other policies. It is for this reason that the PPC 
Regulations is the first case study Chapter of this thesis. 
This Chapter provides detailed analysis of IPPC as an EU-level Directive. The 
practical application of the IPPC Directive, via the Pollution Prevention and 
Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000 (hereafter referred to as "PPC" 
or "PPC Regulations") is addressed in more depth to provide a base for the 
application of the evaluation framework detailed in Chapter 2. The Chapter 
progresses to present the findings of the evidence-based evaluation following a 
survey of stakeholders and the analysis of pre-existing evidence (including 
emissions data, where available). 
4.2 Description and characterisation of the IPPC Directive and the PPC 
Regulations: origins of IPPC in British environmental law 
The foundations of the IPPC Directive can be clearly seen in the earlier approach 
to environmental regulation in the UK. Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) was 
formed under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (hereafter referred to as the 
EPA 1990) has had significant influence upon the development of IPPC (Skea 
and Smith, 1998). IPC was administered by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Pollution (HMIP)^^ until 1996 when the Environment Agency was created under 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution was formed in April 1987 and took over the 
responsibilities of four previous regulatory agencies (Castle and Harrison, 1996): 
• Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate 
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the Environment Act 1995^ ^^ . In addition to HMIP, the Environment Agency also 
took over the responsibilities of the National Rivers Authority (NRA) (Castle and 
Harrison, 1996). 
IPC had two key objectives (Castle and Harrison, 1996): 
• To prevent or minimise the release or render harmless certain 
substances; 
• To develop an approach to industrial pollution control that controls the 
release of all polluting substances into all media whilst viewing the 
environment in its entirety. 
These objectives were to be met by the issuance of authorisations to industrial 
installations. Under the EPA 1990 operators were obliged to use BATNEEC to 
prevent the release of prescribed substances. Where this was not possible the 
operator had to apply BATNEEC to minimise releases of prescribed substances 
or as a last resort render them harmless. In applying BATNEEC operators were 
also required to consider the best practicable environmental option (BEPO) when 
considering the environment as a whole. However, specific details of what were 
considered "excessive" costs to the environment and industry were not included 
in the EPA Act. This difficult task was left to the judgement of HMIP (Anderson, 
1994). 
Despite the novelty and innovation of some elements of the IPC approach, three 
weaknesses of varying severity have been identified by Murphy and Gouldson 
(2000). Firstly the resources allocated by central government to implement the 
regime were insufficient and the number of pollution inspectors was insufficient to 
allow for effective monitoring of the regime. Secondly, industry was concerned 
that IPC was expensive to implement. Murphy and Gouldson argue that the 
required experience of inspectors and permit cost recovery made IPC an 
expensive regulatory regime. 
# 
24 
Radiochemical Inspectorate 
Hazardous Waste Inspectorate 
Water Pollution Inspectorate 
The Environment Act 1995 also led to the creation of the Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA). With regards to IPPC, the functions of SEPA mirror those of 
the Environment Agency in England and Wales. 
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The third criticism, possibly the most serious, concerns the degree of regulatory 
capture due to the industrial backgrounds of inspectors (Murphy and Gouldson, 
2000). Regulatory capture had been a significant problem under the earlier 
approach of the Alkali Inspectorate in its attempts to implement a regime of "best 
practicable means" to control emissions. BPM was not based on statutory limits, 
rather it was left to individual inspectors to reach agreement with operators 
concerning the degree of pollution control to be employed (Skea and Smith, 
1998). However, many inspectors were previous employees of the industries they 
were intended to regulate. This coupled with the approach of reaching agreement 
with industry concerning its emissions limits naturally led to an unacceptable 
degree of regulatory capture. The implementation of IPC was intended to address 
this issue by taking an "arm's length" approach to industry through the application 
of centrally set criteria. Industry was to be dealt with at the sector level, no longer 
taking a site-by-site approach, thus removing the need to base decisions on the 
judgement of inspectors (Skea and Smith, 1998). However, the lack of a reliable 
information base for the application of BATNEEC meant that the approach quickly 
returned to it pre-IPC ways, with HMIP relying largely on industry-supplied 
information to make decisions. The relationship between inspectors and industry, 
and the information asymmetries weakened as industry was driving the pace and 
direction of the environmental improvements arising from IPC (Murphy and 
Gouldson, 2000). 
Despite the many limitations of IPC, some of the lessons learned appear to have 
influenced the IPPC Directive and the PPC Regulations. For the most polluting 
processes PPC is administered centrally and the technical requirements of 
permits are determined at EU level. This significantly reduces the risk of localised 
industrial influence in the regulatory process. While IPC was primarily concerned 
with emissions, PPC extends this by seeking to address the wider environmental 
impacts of industrial activities (Bell and McGillivray, 2006). 
Despite the "integrated" approach pursued under IPC, the EPA 1990 in fact 
created two systems of pollution control: IPC; and Local Authority Air Pollution 
and Control (LAAPC), for which local authorities assumed responsibility. The 
rationale behind the two-tiered approach was based on the seriousness of the 
pollution in question. Under IPC, the EA regulated the most seriously polluting 
industrial processes, whereas LAAPC was designed to regulate less serious 
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processes that did not necessarily require control from one central organisation. 
This format continued with the implementation of the PRC Regulations in 2000. 
4.2.1 Rationale of the IPPC Directive 
The concept of developing a Community-wide Directive to deal with 
environmental pollution in an integrated approach was first raised in September 
1993 (Faure and Lefevere, 1998). The 1996 IPPC Directive represented a 
movement within the EU to pursue a holistic approach to environmental 
protection and the control of industrial environmental impacts. Member States 
were given three years to transpose IPPC into domestic legislation. As of 1999 all 
new Annex 1 installations and all significant changes to existing Annex 1 
installations were legally obliged to apply for and obtain the relevant domestic 
licence. All other existing installations that did not undertake significant changes 
to activities were required to obtain licences sector by sector over an eight year 
period. The IPPC Directive had to be fully implemented in all Member States by 
2007. 
IPPC is intended to meet the objectives and principles of the Community 
environmental policy, as set out in art. 130(r) of the Treaty of Rome^^ in the form 
of preventing, reducing and, as far as possible, eliminating pollution whilst 
adhering to the Community principles of 'the polluter pays' and the prevention of 
pollution (recital 1) (EU Council Directive 96/61/EC). Significantly, the recital 4 of 
the IPPC Directive states an aim to provide protection of the soil, a media that 
had previously been neglected in terms of environmental legislation(EU Council 
Directive 96/61/EC). 
Recital 7 further emphasises the need for a holistic approach to environmental 
regulation as regulating media individually often results in the pollution being 
shifted to anther media (EU Council Directive 96/61/EC). Furthermore, the 
Art. 130(r) of the Treaty Establishing the European Union, signed in Rome on March 
25* 1957, sets out the Community principles with regard to the environment. The key, 
specific principles are: 
preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment; 
protecting human health; 
prudent and rational utilization of natural resources; 
promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems 
Source; Treaty Establishing the European Union (1957) 
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Directive aims to take waste management into account, witli a view to minimising 
waste generation and thus providing further protection of the environment. 
The IPPC Directive has been amended twice. The first amendment followed the 
Aarhus Convention^®, and ensured that public participation and access to justice 
are represented within the Directive. In particular, recital 7 of the IPPC Directive 
amendments states that the Aarhus convention should ensure that members of 
the public have a right to participate in decision making concerning all Annex I 
activities and any other activity deemed to have a significant effect on the 
environment. Crucially, article 6 of the IPPC Directive was amended to ensure 
that when a Member State makes a decision should be made public and the 
permit available to the public. As discussed in section 4.10, the implementation of 
this requirement in England and Wales is questionable. 
The second amendment of the Directive arose from the Directive 2003/87/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community 
and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (hereafter referred to as 'the ET 
Directive'). 
The IPPC Directive covers six main industrial activities: energy; production and 
processing of metals; mineral industry; chemical industry; waste management; 
and other industries (including pulp, timber, textile treatment, tanning, poultry 
rearing, pig rearing, and various other activities allied to agriculture). Threshold 
limits, in production or capacity terms, exist within each sector, with the exception 
of the chemical industry as all chemical plants are included in the Directive 
regardless of size or output. 
4.2.2 Development and consultation of IPPC 
During the initial stages in its development, the definition of BAT and its 
application within the proposed directive met with some criticism, mainly from 
Germany. The proposed directive followed the British IPC approach, allowing for 
environmental quality standards to be set at a local level (or in the case of IPPC, 
Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 
providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and 
programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation 
and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC 
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at a Member State level). It was argued that the absence a mechanism to set 
environmental quality standards centrally v^ould result in competitive distortions 
and would fail to harmonise environmental standards across the Community. The 
final Directive, however, made an effort to compromise. Article 18 reserves the 
right for the Council to set Community-wide environmental standards to address 
certain problems should the need arise (Bell and McGillivray, 2006). 
4.2.3 Best Available Technique within IPPC 
A key element of the Directive is the theory of 'Best Available Technique' (BAT), 
defined in the Directive as: 
The most effective and advanced stage in the development of activities 
and their methods of operation which indicate the practical suitability of 
particular techniques for providing in principle the basis for emission limit 
values designed to prevent and, where that is not practicable, generally 
to reduce emission and the impact on the environment as a whole.' 
(Directive 96/61/EC: Article 2) 
The theory of BAT represents a move from the former use of emissions-based 
and technology-based standards. BAT should enable the competent authority to 
analyse the available technology to determine the most suitable emission limit for 
a particular sector. 'Pure' technology standards often fail to achieve the maximum 
environmental gain as there can be very little focus on emissions, with competent 
authorities being more concerned with ensuring sectors are installing specified 
kit. On the other hand, determining emissions standards without considering the 
technology available to industry can also be problematic as this can lead to the 
setting of emissions targets that are too high (due to the unavailability of 
technology or the excessive cost of available technology) or too easy to attain. 
However, the Directive does provide for the introduction of environmental quality 
standards that are stricter than BAT, should the need arise, in art. 10. In order to 
implement the theory of BAT and in adherence with Article 16 (2) of the IPPC 
Directive, the Commission, in consultation with Member States and industry, has 
developed guidance notes for each sector covered by the Directive. These 
documents, BAT reference documents (or 'BREF' documents), are available to 
the public and form the basis of IPPC permits across the Community. 
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4.2.4 Reporting at EU level: EPER and E-PRTR 
In 2000 the Commission published a decision relating to implement the European 
pollutant emission register (EPER) (European Commission, 2000). IPPC Annex 1 
activities producing emissions exceeding prescribed thresholds are required to 
submit data to the EPER every three years from 2001. EPER is a joint initiative 
bewteen the Commission and the EEA (Dooley, 2004). EPER currently covers 
42% of EU CO2 emissions and 15% of methane (CH4) emissions (European 
Pollutant Emission Register, 2007). Data published in late 2006 for the reporting 
year 2004 covered more than 12,000 industrial installations across the expanded 
EU (including all new Member States) (European Commission, 2007c). However, 
these 12,000 installations represent under 25% of the total 52,000 installations 
covered by IPPC across the EU (European Commission, 2008b). 
Whilst EPER represents a useful addition to environmental data sources it suffers 
from a lack of enforcement capabilities of the EEA. The Council Decision of 17 
July 2000 is a minimal document that presents a simplistic approach to EPER. 
Issues such as enforcement, sanctions and reliability of data are not sufficiently 
tackled. EPER exists purely as a database to enable citizens to access 
environmental data from across the EU. However, EPER is soon to be replaced 
by Regulation (EC) No 166/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 18 January 2006 concerning the establishment of a European Pollutant 
Release and Transfer Register and amending Council Directive 91/689/EEC and 
96/61/EC (hereafter know as 'E-PRTR'). 
E-PRTR represents a significant step forward in terms of coverage of emissions, 
penalisation of failure to adhere to the rules of the regime, public participation and 
data quality assurance (European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, 2006). The following paragraphs present some of the key elements of E-
PRTR. 
Recital 6 of E-PRTR identifies how "the Protocol builds on the same principles as 
EPER, but goes beyond, by including reporting on more pollutants, more 
activities, releases to land, releases from diffuse sources and off-site transfer^'. A 
comparison of Annex I of E-PRTR and Annexes A1 and A3 of EPER highlights 
the degree to which the boundaries have been expanded. Under EPER only 
installations exceeding the threshold have to report their emissions, and these 
installations only have to report their emissions that exceed a threshold, not all 
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emissions. Under E-PRTR many categories of installations, for example chemical 
industries, have to report all emissions irrespective of installation size, quantity of 
emissions and type of emissions. The implications of this change will be 
significant. For example, in 2004 only 6 organic chemical installations in the UK 
reported CO2 emissions, although one can be reasonably certain that most 
chemical installations, if not all, produce CO2 emissions to some degree. 
Increasing the quantity and quality of data available to all stakeholders represents 
a clear move towards meeting the requirements of the Aarhus Convention. 
4.3 Transposition of IPPC Into UK legislation 
The vast number of installations - approximately 52,000 across the EU - covered 
by the IPPC Directive led to a substantial transition period being granted between 
1999 and 2007. Installations in existence prior to 30^ October 1999 were to be 
covered by a permit by the 2007 deadline, but new installations were required to 
obtain a permit immediately. The Directive requires installations to provide the 
information in stated in Figure 4.1, to the relevant competent authority. 
Figure 4.1 Permit application information requirements 
Detailed description of the following must be provided by a permit applicant to the 
relevant competent authority: 
the installation and its activities 
substances used or generated 
energy used or generated 
emission sources 
conditions on the site 
nature and quantities of foreseeable emissions and the likely environmental 
impacts of these emissions 
proposed abatement techniques 
waste prevention and/or recovery measures 
planned measures to monitor emissions 
Source: O'Maiiey (1999) 
The legal framework for the implementation of IPPC in the UK was established in 
the Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999. The Act led to several sets of 
regulations dealing with specific geographic locations: the Pollution Prevention 
and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000; the Pollution Prevention and 
Control (Scotland) Regulations 2000; and the Pollution Prevention and Control 
(Northern Ireland) Regulations 2003 (Environment Agency, 2007, Environment 
and Heritage Service, 2007, Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, 2007). 
- 1 0 0 -
The Offshore Combustion Installations (Prevention and Control of Pollution) 
Regulations 2001 were also introduced to deal specifically with the application of 
the Directive to offshore installations (i.e. oil rigs, gas rigs). Finally, the Pollution 
Prevention and Control Ordinance 2001 was introduced to implement the 
Directive in Gibraltar (Defra, 2003b). The Directive was one of the first pieces of 
European legislation to be transposed into UK law following devolution. 
There are two competent authorities within England and Wales responsible for 
issuing permits. The Environment Agency claims responsibility for regulating the 
majority of sites (approximately 85% of installations) (Defra, 2003b). The 
remaining 15% of installations are regulated by local authorities (LA) (at either 
London, metropolitan or district council level). The installations regulated by LAs 
are viewed as presenting a lower pollution potential, and therefore deemed 
suitable to be monitored and regulated at the LA level. 
4.3.1 Consultation and RIA of the PRC Regulations 
The proposed PPC Regulations were subject to several rounds of consultation 
between 1997 and 1999". According to the RIA carried out by the DETR 200 
responses were received following each consultation exercise. A final 
consultation was carried out on the final content of the Regulations in April 2000 
(DETR, 2000b). 
The DETR also attempted to analyse the impact of the PPC Regulations on small 
businesses. Unfortunately the consultants employed by the government were 
unable to quantify the impacts accurately. However, it was thought that the 
impacts would not be significant. In fact feedback from some small businesses 
identified the business sense of waste minimisation and energy efficiency as 
areas to make cost savings if dealt with in a "common sense" manner by the 
regulator. 
The RIA specifically assessed the changes IPPC would make to the existing IPC 
regime operated in the UK. These changes included the handling of applications, 
frequency of permit reviews, requirements for site remediation, the inclusion of 
energy efficiency measures and installations that were previously covered by IPC 
but were not included in IPPC. However, the 440 installations that do not fall with 
Consultations took place in July 1997, January 1998, January 1999 and August 1999. 
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the IPPC Directive but were covered by IPC were incorporated into the domestic 
PPC Regulations. This led the prediction that 7000 installations would be covered 
by PPC. By 2005 1800 PPC permits had been issued across the UK (Defra, 
2007f). By the end of October 2007 - the EL) deadline for transposition of the 
Directive - 3974 permits had been issued throughout the UK, with a further 215 
permits application requiring processing (Defra, 2008d) (refer to Appendix 5 for a 
list of activities and implementation dates). 
A further crucial element of the RIA was the calculation of application and 
compliance costs. DETR estimated that costs associated with a PPC application 
may be in the region of £20,000 to £60,000, depending on how prepared the 
applicant is. A mid-term review commissioned by Defra and conducted by Atkins 
consultants found that the mean one-off application costs were in the region of 
£48,000, including in-house staff costs, consulting costs and other associated 
costs^ ® (Defra, 2007g; Saarinen, 2003), well within the region predicted in the 
RIA. The lowest stated cost was £500, in contrast to the highest at £317,000. 
The RIA did not make specific predictions relating to compliance costs as "costs 
of compliance with permit conditions are both potentially the most significant and 
also the hardest to estimatd' (DETR 2000b: p.6). Compliance with permit 
conditions could result in actual cost savings, arising from energy efficiency 
measures and waste reduction for example, or could run to hundreds of 
thousands of pounds, as stated in the RIA. 
4.3.2 Best Available Technique within the PPC Regulations 
The basic fundament of BAT is that sources of pollution should adopt the most 
effective technology in terms of protecting the environment from the polluting 
effects of an industrial activity. 
Paragraph 3 of the Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2000 define each component of BAT as follows: 
(a) "available techniques" means those techniques which have been 
developed on a scale which allows implementation in the relevant 
industrial sector, under economically and technically viable conditions, 
'Other costs' refers to administration costs, advertising, site surveys and environmental 
surveys. 
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taking into consideration the cost and advantages, whether or not the 
techniques are used or produced inside the United Kingdom, as long 
as they are reasonably accessible to the operator; 
(b) "best" means, in relation to techniques, the most effective in achieving 
a high general level of protection of the environment as a whole; 
(c) "techniques" includes both the technology used and the way in which 
the installation is designed, built, maintained, operated and 
decommissioned. 
These definitions result in the exclusion of experimental techniques from 
consideration and techniques that have been proven to work in the specific 
conditions of other countries but not in the UK (Bell and McGillivray, 2006). 
As with much terminology found within environmental policy the definition of BAT 
within the PPC regulations is sufficiently vague to allow the regulatory authorities 
a certain degree of discretion when attaching BAT conditions to permits. The 
discretionary approach to BAT implementation should be considered against the 
desire of regulatory agencies to improve environmental performance over time. 
The flexibility of the approach means that the concept of BAT should elicit 
maximum environmental performance from industry though on-going negotiation 
of the best available technology to ensure the interpretation of BAT for any given 
sector is as advanced as possible. 
4.4 Implementation of the PPC Regulations in England and Wales 
Industrial activities covered by the PPC Regulations are detailed in Schedule 1 to 
the Regulations. Within Schedule 1 activities are segregated into three sub-
categories according to the perceived scale of environmental impact. Part A(1) 
activities are regulated and administered by the Environment Agency in England 
and Wales, as specified in paragraph 8(2). In regulating these installations, 
whether permanent or mobile plants, the Environment Agency is required to 
ensure that installations achieve "a high ievei of protection of the environment 
tal<en as a wfhote by, in particular, preventing or, vi/here that is not practicable, 
reducing emissions into the air, water and land' (The Pollution Prevention and 
Control (England and Wales) Regulations, 2006). Part A(2) activities are 
controlled by the local authorities according to location. Despite the difference in 
regulating authority, these activities also produce emissions into air, land and 
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water regulated by PPC permits. However, these activities are deemed to be less 
environmentally harmful thus placed under the control of local authorities instead 
of the centrally administered Environment Agency. The final category of activity 
referred to in Schedule 1 is Part B installations. These activities have the least 
damaging environmental impact. As with Part A(2) activities, local authorities are 
the relevant regulatory authority. However, only emissions into air are subject to 
PPC permit requirements. These activities were once controlled by via Local 
Authority Air Pollution Control. 
4.5 Interaction between IPPC and the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
By its very nature, the IPPC Directive tackles all forms of environmental impacts 
arising from a wide array of industrial activities. This includes greenhouse gas 
emissions. Oxides of nitrogen are referred to in Annex III but all other GHGs are 
referred to implicitly. Article 1 provides for the coverage of all emissions into air 
from the activities covered by the permitting system (Olsen, 2006), although 
coverage of GHG emissions are restricted if these emissions are covered by the 
EU ETS or another comparable policy instrument, and these emissions are 
unlikely to cause any significant local pollution (art.9(3)). 
Therefore, emissions of greenhouse gases from installations covered by the ET 
Directive are not subject to BAT. However, at the time of writing, only CO2 
emissions are included in the EU ETS, with the remaining five GHGs covered by 
the permitting regime of the IPPC Directive. 
Further differences between the IPPC Directive and the ET Directive also 
deserve discussion at this point. The IPPC Directive does not require the 
imposition of specific pollutant levels or the installation of specific technology. A 
fundamental aspect of the Directive is BAT, enabling competent authorities to 
assess the technology available to individual sectors, and then factor in the 
geographic and environmental issues when determining the maximum permitted 
values of each pollutant into each media. Cap-and-trade systems, on the other 
hand, operate by establishing the maximum allowable emissions across the 
entire scheme (or within a certain region within the scheme), and then allowing 
participants to decide whether to reduce emissions below the allocation and bank 
or sell excess allowances, meet the cap, or exceed the cap and purchase extra 
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allowances. In this sense, the EU ETS offers a 'guarantee' of the minimum 
expected emissions reductions (Olsen, 2006). Conversely, BAT may not provide 
financial incentives to encourage organisations to reduce their emissions below 
the limit specified within the permit. 
The allocation of EU ETS tradable allowances is also dependant upon the 
granting of a permit. The GHG permit, requirements found in art. 5 of the ET 
Directive^®, mirrors the requirements for an IPPC permit, is a pre-requisite for 
installations receiving GHG allowances. As a result, an installation operating 
within the remit of the EU ETS would have two permits. Article 8 of the ET 
Directive and art. 9(3) the IPPC Directive make provisions to avoid the risk of 
duplication by ensuring GHGs covered by an EU ETS permit and subsequent 
inclusion in the EU ETS are not included in the integrated permitting under the 
IPPC directive. 
Whilst both approaches include a permitting regime, the differences between the 
two systems have been identified by Olsen (2006) as potentially signalling a 
change in direction for European environmental law. The IPPC Directive is 
explicit in allocating responsibility to Member States and competent authorities for 
assessing and taking into account local conditions and the application of BAT. 
Conversely, the ET Directive does not leave much to the discretion of Member 
States and their competent authorities, therefore "diminishing the regulatory role 
of the Member Stated' (Olsen, 2006: p.159). It is with this in mind that Olsen 
continues "this [diminishing roie of l\/lember States] is not unusual in an EU 
context, but it is unusual in the context of environmental law and may be seen as 
an indication of what could be a change of approach to environmental reguiatiorf 
(p. 159). 
The allocation of powers to Member States to determine the costs and benefits 
within their specific geographic and environmental areas will play a significant 
^ An application to the competent authority for a greenhouse gas emissions permit shall 
include a description of: (a) the installation and its activities including the technology used; 
(b) the raw and auxiliary materials, the use of which is likely to lead to emissions of gases 
listed in Annex I; (c) the sources of emissions of gases listed in Annex I from the 
installation; and (d) the measures planned to monitor and report emissions in accordance 
with the guidelines adopted pursuant to art. 14 (Guidelines for monitoring and reporting of 
emissions). 
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role in this, but the introduction of the BAT Reference^® document should go 
some way to combating this situation (O'Malley, 1999). 
In addition to the differences highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, the two 
Directives have contrasting applications of public participation and provisions of 
information to the public. The IPPC Directive was amended in 2003^ to account 
for the provisions of the Aarhus Convention. This resulted in the introduction of 
art. 15 on access to information and public participation in the permit procedure 
and the corresponding Annex V. Article 5 prescribes the participatory 
opportunities Member States must grant the public, specifically when; issuing a 
permit for a new installation; issuing a permit for any substantial change in the 
operation of an installation; and the updating of a permit or permit conditions for 
an installation in accordance with art. 13, paragraph 2, first indent 1^ .^ Annex V 
provides further details of the role of public participation, including possible 
methods of communication (i.e. publication within local press, bill posting) and the 
methods for public consultation (i.e. written submissions, public inquiry). 
Importantly, Annex V also makes provisions to ensure the results of public 
consultation are taken into account during the decision making process. 
However, the degree to which public participation can influence the decision 
making process remains unclear from the Directive itself. 
The permitting regime within the ET Directive takes a different approach to the 
inclusion of public participation. The Directive makes reference to access to 
information in several articles, although stops short of including an article 
dedicated to public participation. Article 17 deals with access to information, but 
contrary to the art. 15(5) of the IPPC Directive specifies that the competent 
authority will provide information to the public should it be requested and in 
accordance with art. 3(3) and art. 4 of Directive 2003/4/EC^^. However, despite 
^ BAT Reference document (BREF) is an information exchange mechanism that includes 
information concerning best practice for all of the activities covered by the IPPC Directive. 
Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 
providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and 
programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation 
and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC 
Art. 13(2) indent 1 states: pollution caused by the installation is of such significance that 
the existing emission limit values of the permit need to be revised or new such values 
need to be included in the permit 
Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 
on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 
90/313/EEC. Art. 3(3) relates to the conduct of competent authorities if the request for 
information is too vague. Article 4 relates to exceptions and permitted refusals to requests 
for information. 
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the lack of an article dealing explicitly with public participation and access to 
information, MacDonald and Makuch (2006) highlight the availability of alternative 
legal instruments that can enhance public participation and access to information 
with regards to the EU ETS. Of specific importance here is the link between the 
IPPC Directive and the ET Directive, which in effect signifies that installations 
covered by IPPC and requiring a GHG permit are subject to the more rigorous 
public participation and access to information provisions of the IPPC Directive. 
4.6 Overview of performance to date 
Article 16(3) of the IPPC Directive places responsibility upon Member States to 
submit reports on progress with implementation every three years. The United 
Kingdom submitted reports in 2003 and 2006 (Defra, 2003b; Defra, 2006g). 
These reports cover areas of generic interest with regards to implementation, 
inter alia, provisions for transposition into domestic law, number of installations 
covered by the Directive, identification of relevant competent authorities, and 
provisions within domestic legislation to meet the key objectives of the Directive 
such as efficient use of energy, monitoring requirements, waste management and 
limit values for emissions to air and water. 
A considerably more detailed review of the implementation of the PPC 
Regulations was published by Defra in 2007 (Defra, 2007f). This review sought to 
investigate three issues: 
• to calculate the capital and operating costs for industry and the 
administration costs for the regulators; 
• to assess the benefits of the Regulations; 
• and, to identify other issues relating to the implementation of the PPC 
Regulations such as the regulatory burden, the impact on SMEs and the 
development of environmental industries 
The Review identified that the PPC Regulations have been the vehicle for 
implementing other EU Directives beyond IPPC including the waste incineration 
Directive (WID) and the large combustion plant Directive (LCP)^ '^ . 
^ Directive 2000/76/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 December 2000 
on the incineration of waste, Directive 2001/80/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 23 October 2001 on the limitation of certain pollutants into the air from large 
combustion plants 
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Further to this Review, in April 2008 the Defra and the Environment Agency 
launched a new permitting regime for industrial installations in England and 
Wales following a lengthy process of consultation with industry. The 
Environmental Permitting Programme (EPP) was first developed in 2005 and was 
intended to reduce the regulatory burden placed on industry by implementing a 
system requiring one single environmental permit arising from a common 
approach to application, administration, monitoring and enforcement (Defra, 
2007k). EPP was implemented to combine the permitting processes of the PPC 
Regulations and waste management licensing^^ with the overall aim of 
streamlining the permitting processes (Defra, 2008f). The Environmental 
Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2007 came into force on 6"^  April 
2008. Defra states the primary objectives of EPP are (Defra, 2008a): 
• to protect the environment; 
• deliver permitting and compliance effectively and efficiently in a way that 
provides increased clarity and minimises the administrative burden on 
both the regulator and the operators of facilities; 
• encourage regulators to promote best practice in the operation of 
regulated facilities; 
• and, continue to fully implement European legislation. 
It is too early to provide any insights and analysis of the EPP. However, should 
streamlining the administration of PPC and waste management licensing be 
achieved there may be significant financial and environmental benefits, as 
detailed in the RIA published in 2007 (Defra, 2007b). 
^ The precise directives and regulations included in the streamlining process (and the 
relevant coverage) include: 
Part A installations and Part A mobile plant (the Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control Directive)5 - Schedule 7 
Domestic Part B installations and Part B mobile plant - Schedule 8 
Waste Framework Directive - Schedule 9 
Landfill Directive - Schedule 10 
Waste motor vehicles (the End of Life Vehicles Directive) - Schedule 11 
Waste Electronic Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive - Schedule 12 
Waste Incineration Directive - Schedule 13 
Solvents Emission Directive - Schedule 14 
Large Combustion Plants Directive - Schedule 15 
Asbestos Directive - Schedule 16 
Titanium Dioxide Directive - Schedule 17 
Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive - Schedule 18 
- 108 
4.7 Overview of evidence-based analysis 
The PRC Regulations survey was circulated to 65 sector associations 
representing all PPC activities in October 2007. A total of 11 responses were 
received (response rate: 17%). A further 13 questionnaires were sent to external 
stakeholders. Only one response was received (from the Environment Agency) 
despite significant effort to increase this response rate through email and 
telephone contact to stakeholders. 55% (n=6) of sector association respondents 
stated they would be willing to participate in an interview. All of these respondents 
were subsequently contacted. Interviews were carried out with 6 questionnaire 
respondents. One further sector association was interviewed who had not 
completed the questionnaire but was willing to participate in the research through 
an interview. The PPC Policy Manager from the Environment Agency was also 
interviewed. 
4.7.1 Sector associations 
Each sector association was asked to give a brief overview of their organisation 
and their members, as detailed in Table 4.1. Two respondents did not provide this 
information: 
Table 4.1 Size of responding organisations 
Size % respondents 
1-10 members 44% 
11-20 members 22% 
21-30 members 22% 
31-40 members 0% 
41-50 members 0% 
More than 51 members 11% 
Given the ranges presented above the minimum and maximum numbers of 
companies represented by the responding sector association are 119 and 191 
respectively. 56% of sector associations reported representing companies with 
installations operating in EU ETS. A total of 53 installations operated in Phase I of 
the scheme. A further 33% stated that they represented companies operating in 
Phase II when a further 156 installations will be operating in this Phase. 
4.7.2 Emissions/environmental data collection 
Specific environmental performance data has been sou reed from EPER. 
However this data is limited by the scope and frequency of data submission. At 
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the time of writing, data had only been submitted for years 2001 and 2004 and 
the next available data set would be located on E-PRTR. Moreover, only 
installations exceeding threshold values have to submit data to EPER. Although 
this accounts for 90% of all emissions from IPPC activities the remaining 10% of 
emissions are not reported. This shortfall in the data needs to be considered 
when analysing emissions data obtained from EPER. 
4.8 Economic efficiency 
Sector associations were asked to identify their perceptions of the costs and 
benefits of the PPC Regulations to both industry and the Government, where the 
benefits are identified as energy efficiency improvements and GHG emission 
reductions. As Figure 4.2 depicts, more than half of sector association 
respondents believe the costs associated with the PPC Regulations are 
significantly outweighed by the benefits associated with energy efficiency and 
GHG emissions. Conversely, the attitude towards the costs incurred by 
government shows that the climate change related benefits are slightly higher 
than the costs. 
Figure 4.2 Comparison of costs and benefits incurred by ttie go vernment and 
industry 
Industry 
Government 
Costs Costs Costs equal Benefits Benefits 
significantly slightly to benefits slightly significantly 
outweigh outweigh outweigh outweigh 
benefits benefits costs cost 
The 2007 review conducted by Defra found that the average one-off application 
cost was approximately £48,000, including own staff time and consultancy 
services. Some companies reported consultancy costs of £200,000, highlighting 
the significant variation in applications costs due mainly to variations in the 
complexity of the installations involved. In addition to the one-off application 
costs, companies spent an average of £307,000 on capital investment (CAPEX) 
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to meet PPC requirements, aKhough the expenditure ranged from zero to £5 
million (Defra, 2007f). In addition, the average on-going annual compliance costs 
of management time, monitoring, reporting and other costs are in the region of 
£43,000. The Defra review analysed various other costs including the difference 
in cost to companies formerly regulated by IPC and costs incurred due to the BAT 
element of the application process. Without wishing to replicate all the 
information, the average cost of every element of the Review has been calculated 
to give an indication of the potential costs involved for industry. Details of average 
reported costs are presented in Table 4,2 and Table 4.3, 
Table 4.2 Average one-off costs of the PPC Regulations 
Average one-off cost Average (£) 
A One-off application costs 48,119 
B One-off compliance costs 351,942 
C BAT element of application - own staff 8,577 
D BAT element of application - 3rd party consultants 8,578 
E BAT element of application - other 3,042 
F One-off cost to apply BAT 12,898 
G One-off cost to monitor BAT 6,948 
H One-off cost of reporting BAT 913 
1 Cost of reassessment of BAT 1,986 
J TOTAL 430,105 
The 'one-off application costs' (row A) were categorised in the Review as: 
• own staff costs (mean £17,170) 
• third party costs including employment of consultancy services (mean 
£21,429) 
• other costs identified by survey respondents including permit application 
fees charged by the Environment Agency (mean £9,521) 
Row B presents the average total one-off compliance costs. This category is 
broken into five sub-categories: capital investment, management time, 
monitoring, reporting and 'other' costs. Unfortunately, the Review did not 
investigate the precise costs charged by the Environment Agency in relating to 
application fees and on-going permit fees. However, a rough estimate from the 
figures provided from the 56 respondents who provided 'other' cost data indicates 
that Environment Agency revenue from these organisations alone may have been 
in the region of £533,000. Capital investment represents the largest one-off 
compliance cost with the average expenditure in the region of £300,000. The 
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inclusion of BAT in the application process adds a further £20,197 to the cost of a 
PPC permit application (rows C-E). The costs arising from employing 
consultations and own-staff time are straight forward. Interestingly 'other' costs 
average £15,204 yet these costs were not specified by any of the respondents to 
the Review. The absence of any clarification or justification for this figure raises 
questions over the credibility of the data provided. It is concerning that these data 
were included in the final Review without further investigation by either Defra or 
the consultants employed on their behalf to undertake the study. 
Table 4.3 A verage annua! costs of the PPC Regulations 
Average annual cost Average (£) 
A Annual compliance costs 43432 
B Other annual costs - internal 3455 
C Other annual costs - 3rd part consultants 16945 
D Average annual change in cost of operation to apply BAT 10104 
E Average annual change in cost of monitoring to apply BAT 2388 
F Average annual change in cost of reporting to apply BAT 1306 
G CAPEX to modify design of installation to apply BAT 7086 
H TOTAL 84716 
The annual compliance costs (row A of Table 4.3) include management time of 
staff, monitoring, reporting and again 'other' costs. These costs were placed in 
two categories: internal costs and third party consultant. Within each sub-
category there were various named costs. Internal costs were identified as 
administration fees, membership fees, responding to schedule, sub-contractors, 
advertising and training (row B). Third party consultant costs include 
environmental consultancy services, site surveys, administration, sub-
contractors, advertising, training and responding to consultants (row C). The 
CAPEX figures (row G) relate to the spending required to upgrade or acquire 
physical assets in order to meet BAT requirements. 
Whilst it is difficult to define an 'average' installation subject to the PPC 
Regulations, it is clear that the average figures provided by industry for 
compliance costs are considerable. However, it should be borne in mind that not 
all installations will incur every cost identified above. For example, an installation 
may already be operating BAT, thus avoiding this as a directly incurred cost of the 
PPC Regulations. Furthermore, industry provided data should be viewed with 
some caution, not least because of the failure of organisations to provide 
verifiable details of 'other' costs in some instances. 
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Crucially, the Review also included estimated costs to regulators. This 
information is presented in Table 4.4. The costs to regulators have continually 
increased as more activities passed through the transition to I PRC regulation. 
Whilst the PRC Regulations have saved the government over £18 million 
compared with IPC and waste management licensing costs, the cost of 
administering PRC applications and the subsistence costs of administering PRC 
on a day-to-day basis are significantly higher and cancel out any savings in this 
respect. 
Table 4.4 Estimated costs of IPPC to regulatory authorities in the UK 
Income/ 
expenditure 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
(2001-
2005) 
A Income from 
IPPC application 
charges 
£4.3m £3.6m £9.8m £11.7m £10.9m £40.4m 
B Annual IPPC 
subsistence 
costs (annual 
charges) 
£266,000 £1.5m £3.1m £6.0m £13.5m £24.3m 
C A2 local authority 
income from 
permit 
application 
charges 
£0 £0 £524,961 £572,531 n/a £1.1m 
D Total income 
from application 
and subsistence 
charges 
£4.6m £5.1m £13.5m £18.3m £24.4m £65.9m 
E Avoided income 
from 1 PC/waste 
management 
licence charges 
£0 £605,000 £2 1m £5.5m £10,5m £18.8m 
F Net total 
regulatory 
Income 
£4.6 £4.5m £11.3m £12.8m £13.9m £47.1 m 
Source: Defra (2007g) 
The data presented in Table 4.4 represents the income for all UK regulators; the 
Environment Agency in England and Wales, the Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency (SERA) and the Northern Ireland Environment and Heritage 
Service (NIEHS). The Review published by Defra contains a further breakdown of 
charges for the three authorities. 
According to the Review, approximately 1800 permits had been issued in the UK 
between 2001 and 2005. Using the data provided in row A of Table 4.4, this 
translates to £22,444 in Environment Agency charges per application. Assuming 
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each application costs on average £22,444 the annual subsistence cost per 
permit has been calculated (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Annua! subsistence charges per permit2001-2005 
Year Total number of permits Average permit subsistence charges 
2001 191 £1388 
2002 351 £4268 
2003 788 £3933 
2004 1309 £4582 
2005 1794 £7520 
It stands to reason that some permits will be subject to subsistence charges much 
lower and much higher than the mean figures in Table 4.5. The cost to the 
installation operator is directly proportional to the level of complexity of the 
operation, the complexity of the permit, the environmental risk posed by the 
activity and compliance rating of the operator (Environment Agency, 2006). 
The fact that the costs to the tax payer have been calculated is significant. This is 
rarely done in such a seemingly rigorous manner. As the remaining three case 
studies will show calculations of this nature are not commonplace in policy 
evaluation in the UK. The Review undertaken by Defra has a further benefit in 
addition to assisting the evaluation of the economic efficiency of the Regulations -
an increased level of transparency and accountability to the tax payer. 
One sector association representing more than 200 firms of both Part A(1) and 
Part A(2) stated that: 
"Whenever the [Environment] Agency gets involved to start with, they 
have to recover their costs. For A2 processes with Local Authorities, 
some of the costs that are involved [are] in submission of an application 
then the annual cost every year. I just think the cost is too high." 
This statement, from a sector with a large number of small companies, reflects 
the sentiments made by several other sector associations (see Table 4.17) who 
feel that the Regulations are not always applied in a proportionate manner with 
many small organisations incurring disproportionately large costs (i.e. application 
and subsistence fees) compared with larger organisations. 
However, the funding for all Environment Agency PPC-related activities comes 
directly and solely from charging application and subsistence fees to permit 
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holders. The Environment Agency claims this method allows them to carry out all 
the activities it needs to in order to effectively implement, monitor and enforce the 
Regulations: 
"The PPC is a funded public regime. There is no money that comes directly 
from Government. It all comes out of charges. The amount we recover from 
charges is enough to cover what we want to do. So, we're not restricted by 
the charges not being high enough. They're not too high either [for industry], 
but they do provide resources we need to do the work that we feel is worth 
doing. It doesn't mean that there couldn't be more available money." 
It stands to reason that the regulated parties should be responsible for funding 
the administration of the regime given that the only other source of funding would 
be provided directly from public taxation income. This is properly in keeping with 
the notion of the polluter-pays. 
Despite the concerns raised by some sector associations relating to the 
proportionality of the charging system, one sector association identified how the 
clarity and certainty of the approach mean that companies can factor in long term 
costs into decision making: 
"It's an approach that we're all used to now, I know our members think 
that we know what we've got in place now, we know the cost of it, we 
know the cost going forward, we can plan with that and that gives us 
some sort of comfort. A leap into another system that will take another 
ten years to get used to, that just causes unrest and discomfort." 
Only one sector association, representing 10 companies (assuming maximum 
permit application charges of £224,440 based on figures discussed in section 4.8) 
identified the cost effectiveness of permit charges for government, stating that: 
"PPC regulation is based on a charging regime designed to recover admin 
costs which should make it quite cost effective for Government" 
Furthermore, one respondent representing 9 large firms stated that, in 
consideration of non-GHG emissions, the PPC Regulations are an efficient 
means of pollution control: 
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"The costs are for control of these non-GHG pollutants. Such pollutants 
need a degree of site-specific control. PPC is economically efficient." 
Further to this evidence, in mid-2007 one sector association circulated a 
questionnaire to its members to obtain detailed information relating to members 
experiences of the implementation of the PPC Regulations. The implementation 
of the Regulations for this sector occurred in 2002. The information arises from 5 
years experience of dealing with PPC from seven companies regulated under 
Part A (1) or Part A(2), thus providing a snap-shot of the impact at the sector 
level. A summary of the financial implications of PPC for this sector are provided 
in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 Mini-case study 
Sector A 
One sector association sent a questionnaire to all its members who are Part A(1) and (2) 
regulated. The questionnaire was designed to elicit information relating to precise costs to 
date of the PPC Regulations in terms of capital investment, management costs and Of 
200 association members, 38 are Part A(1) regulated and a further 2 Part A (2) regulated. 
Responses were received from seven companies. 
Company Installation of 
equipment to meet 
BAT (total) 
Cost to date of 
3''^  party 
consultants 
Internal costs to 
date 
Total cost 
per 
company 
A £9,360 £30,000 £10,000 + > 
5,000 hours 
management 
time £42,340 
B £1211,238 £67,562 £205,933 £1,484,793 
C £0 £26,025 £2,000 £28,025 
D £4,000 £15,000 £20,000 £39,000 
E £200,000 £0 £5,000 + 1 full 
time staff £205,000 
F £45,000 £15,000 / £60,000 
G £968,500 £10,000 £12,000 £980,510 
Total 
cost 
£2,438,098 £163,587 £254,933 
£2,839,668 
Mean £348,300 £23,370 £36,426 £405,666 
This sector was integrated into the PPC regulatory regime in 2002. In addition to the costs 
identified above the companies were subject to the Environment Agency application fee 
(mean across all sectors £22444). Further to the costs identified above the annual fees to 
the Environment Agency from 2002 until 2005 may have been in the region of £20303 
(based on the calculations in Table 4.5). 
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Compared to the other three case study instruments, the availability of financial 
data for the PPC Regulations is significantly superior. The evaluation carried out 
by Atkins on behalf of Defra has proved to be an extremely valuable source of 
information. This report was limited to the economic costs and benefits of PPC for 
industry and the Government, and lacked in depth analysis of any qualitative 
elements of the Regulations. Inclusion of environmental data for example as a 
means to compare the costs incurred with the social benefits arising from 
emissions abatement would have led to possibly the most detailed and 
comprehensive report of its kind. Furthermore, the scope and size of the IPPC 
Directive in shaping domestic environmental policies mean that the Commission 
is keen to undertake reviews and obtain data concerning progress with 
implementation. The PPC Regulations are the oldest of the four case studies 
perhaps explaining the quality of Government-led reviews. One only hopes that 
other pivotal policies, such as EU ETS, are subject to such rigorous financial 
assessment in due course. However, as section 4.9 will show, the collation of 
environmental data relating to PPC is problematic. 
4.9 Environmental effectiveness 
As a brief introduction, Figure 4.4 presents the global warming impact of various 
sectors in the UK between 1990 and 2006. 'Global warming impact' refers to the 
contribution of each sector towards total United Kingdom GHG emissions as a 
proportion of the total (where the total - 1). The group 'Environment Agency 
regulated' comprises all installations and industries that are subject to regulations 
administered by the Environment Agency. As further categorisation is not 
provided by the Environment Agency it would be correct to assume that some of 
the emissions in this group come from industries or installations that are not 
subject to the PPC Regulations. However, this data is useful to present an 
overview of the trends in the contribution of industrial sectors to GHG emissions 
since 1990. 
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Figure 4.4 Global warming Impact of four sectors In the UK between 1990 and 
Environment Agency regulated 
Other UK sources 
UK Transport 
UK domest ic sources 
0.35 -
0.05 
0 .00 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
year 
2002 2004 2006 
Source: Adapted from Environment Agency (2008b) 
It is interesting to note that the global warming impact of Environment Agency 
regulated sectors decreased between 2001 and 2002 by approximately 3%. This 
coincides with the decrease in output from the steel sector and the 
implementation of the CCAs. As section 5.6 shows the steel sector is a key 
emitter of GHG emissions. The knock-on effect of decreased output was 
noticeable within the CCA programme and it is likely to have contributed to the 
decrease shown in this figure. 
4.9.1 Data limitations 
Two factors make the evaluation of the environmental performance difficult: the 
brevity of the RIA and the absence of detailed emissions data. The RIA did not 
contain detailed analysis of the predicted environmental outcomes, including 
GHG emissions or energy efficiency improvements. In this respect one cannot 
determine whether the PPC Regulations have met their initial objectives in the 
UK, Even if the RIA had included environmental quality targets it would be almost 
impossible to assess progress against them as detailed data sorted according to 
PPC (or I PPC) activity does not exist. The most useful data is to be found on 
EPER, despite the severe limitations relating to the timeframe and coverage of 
reporting. 
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The database only contains emissions data from installations that have exceeded 
the relevant threshold values. Therefore the database is not a comprehensive 
emissions inventory. It is claimed that the threshold values are set at a level that 
results in approximately 90% of EU emissions being reported (Environment 
Agency, 2008c). Table 4.6 presents the threshold values for emissions of the six 
greenhouse gasesr. 
Table 4.6 EPER reporting threshold values 
Pollutant Threshold value 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 10,000 tonnes/year 
Methane (CH4) 100 tonnes/year 
Nitrous oxide (NOx (as NO2)) 100 tonnes/year 
Hydroflurocarbons (HFC) 0.1 tonnes/year 
Perfluorocarbons (RFC) 0.1 tonnes/year 
Sulphur hexafluoride (SFe) 0.05 tonnes/year 
Source: European Commission (2000) 
At a domestic level, the National Environmental Technology Centre compiles 
annual greenhouse gas emissions data reports on behalf of Defra. This data is 
available on-line via the UK National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory (UK 
National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory, 2008). The Environment Agency also 
maintains a web based database of pollution from businesses (Environment 
Agency, 2008d). However, the format of these data is not compatible with IPPC. 
Data is not categorised according to IPPC sector and takes the form of "energy 
generation" or "chemicals" without differentiation of sub-sectors (e.g. organic and 
inorganic chemicals). These factors led to the conclusion that EPER is the only 
source of emissions data that would meet the requirements of this research. The 
activity codes used by EPER vary slightly to the codes used within the PPC 
Regulations (attached at Appendix 5). 
The Environment Agency, in collaboration with SEPA and the NIEHS, published a 
range of guidance documents to facilitate the implementation of the PPC 
Regulations. One such document is the Horizontal Guidance Note IPPC H2 on 
energy efficiency (Environment Agency, 2002). This guidance note provided 
information to installations regarding energy efficiency requirement of the PPC 
Regulations. It also states that installations participating in a Climate Change 
Agreement or Direct Participants in the UK Emissions Trading Scheme do not 
have to undertake energy efficiency measures as part of their PPC permit 
compliance as energy efficiency is already covered by these instruments. 
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However, installations not participating in either CCAs or UK ETS must adhere to 
additional energy efficiency requirements specified within the PPC permit. 
Installations participating in the EU ETS are also exempt from most of the energy 
efficiency requirements of the PPC Regulations (ENDS, 2008c). However, full 
exemption from PPC requirements would need action at the EU level to amend 
the IPPC Directive. 
The following subsections of Chapter 4 analyse the emissions of the basket of six 
GHGs from UK installations in 2001 and 2004. 
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4.9.2 Carbon dioxide 
Figure 4.5 depicts the carbon dioxide emissions from all I PPC sectors exceeding 
the threshold limits in 2001 and 2004. There was little change between the two 
reporting years in combustion installations and refineries. Coke ovens (1.3) on 
the other hand increased CO2 emissions by 89% during this time. Installations 
dealing with hazardous and municipal waste (5.1/5.2) by 45%. Several other 
sectors witnessed increased CO2 emissions, but several also reported reduced 
emissions, notably installations for the disposal of non hazardous waste to landfill 
(-192%) (5.3/5.4). 
Figure 4.5 Change in reported CO2 emissions and emissions from PPC regulated 
sectors in 2001 and 2004 above the threshold value (transformed to Log data to 
facilitate graphical depiction) 
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4.9.3 Nitrous oxides 
Emissions of NOx did not vary greatly between 2001 and 2004, although 
emissions from coke ovens and slaughterhouses were significantly higher in 2004 
than in 2001. 
Figure 4.6 Changes in reported NOx emissions and emissions from PPC 
regulated sectors in 2001 and 2004 above the threshold value (transformed to 
Log data to facilitate graphical depiction 
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4.9.4 Methane 
Landfill, slaughterhouses, milk production and other animal by product 
processing are the primary sources of methane in the UK. However, reported 
emissions of CH4 were significantly lower in 2004 than in 2001 from 
slaughterhouses, milk production and other animal materials showing a reduction 
of more than 31,000%. Landfill CH4 emissions also decreased by a less dramatic 
39%, a side effect of the landfill tax. 
Figure 4.7 Change in reported C/% emissions and emissions from PPC regulated 
sectors in 2001 and 2004 above the threshold value (transformed to Log data to 
facilitate graphical depiction 
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4.9.5 Hydroflurocarbons 
The key source of MFCs reported in both 2001 and 2004 was the production of 
basic inorganic chemicals and fertilisers. Emissions from these sectors reduced 
significantly by nearly 200%. However, this was not the most notable source of 
emission reductions. Between 2001 and 2004 the emissions of HFC from metal 
production and processing sectors fell by more than 6000%. Furthermore, 
emissions from waste incineration plants decreased by 3500%. These emission 
reductions coincide with the implementation of the waste incineration directive in 
2002/03. 
Figure 4.8 Change in reported l-iFC emissions and emissions from PPC reguiated 
sectors in 2001 and2004 above the threshold value 
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4.9.6 Perfluorocarbons 
The key sources of PFC emissions in the UK are the production and processing 
of metals, production of basic organic chemicals and the production of basic 
inorganic chemicals and fertilisers. Reported emissions increased by more than 
34% between 2001 and 2004, largely a result of emission increases in the metals 
and organic chemicals sectors. 
Figure 4.9 Ctiange in reported PFC emissions and emissions from PPC reguiated 
sectors in 2001 and2004 above tiie thresiioid value 
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4.9.7 Sulphur hexafluoride 
In 2004 combustion installations reported no emissions of SFg. The contribution 
of this sector to the overall reported emissions in 2001 was small indicating that 
the each installation had managed to reduce its SFg emissions below the 
reporting threshold. Reported emissions from metal production and processing 
industries fell by more than 120% leading to an overall decrease in the reported 
emissions between 2001 and 2004. 
Figure 4.10 Change in reported SFg emissions and emissions from PPC 
regulated sectors in 2001 and2004 above the threshold value 
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4.9.8 Total emissions of greenhouse gases as carbon 
Table 4.7 presents emissions of each GHG, as reported on EPER, in million 
tonnes/COg equivalent to enable comparison with the outcomes of the other case 
studies. 
Table 4.7 EPER reported GHG emissions from PPC sectors in 2001 and2004 
expressed as MtCOse 
2001 (Mt) 
Quantity as 
MtC02e 2004 (Mt) Quantity as MtC02e 
C 0 2 256528 256528 265625 265625 
N20 535.2 165901 539.9 167377.3 
CH4 687.5 4436,4 557.2 1702.3 
HFC 0.000227 0.002663 0.000092 0.001078 
PFC 0.0000304 0.000198 0.000047 0.000303 
SFs 0.0000333 0.000797 0.000014 0.000357 
Total 
(C02e) 426870 43470.6 
% change between 2001-2004 +2.9% 
Source: EPER (2008) 
Reported C02e emissions from PPC activities increased by nearly 3% between 
2001 and 2004. Comparison of the costs to date of IPPC with the environmental 
outcomes in terms of GHG emissions reveals some areas of serious concern. 
The PPC Regulations began staggered transposition in 2001. By the end of 2004, 
17 of 29 industrial activities were covered by the Regulations. It would be fair to 
expect that the implementation of BAT based requirements are be reflected in 
decreasing emissions. However, reported emissions of CO2, NOx and PFCs 
increased between 2001 and 2004. Furthermore, evidence collected through the 
survey of sector associations shows that the PPC Regulations do not provide any 
incentive to reduce GHG emissions and improve energy efficiency beyond permit 
requirements (see Figure 4.11). Although the Regulations are not primarily 
intended to reduce GHG emissions, the integrated nature of the IPPC Directive 
means that greenhouse gases that are not covered by alternative policy 
instruments should be dealt with by the PPC regulations. At present only 
emissions of carbon dioxide are covered by alternative policy instruments 
indicating that the PPC regulations should be working to reduce emissions of any 
remaining greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Figure 4.11 Impact of PPC Regulations on effort to reduce GHG emissions and 
energy efficiency improvements beyond permit requirements 
G H G emissions 
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The aggregate cost to industry of the PPC Regulations is high due to the vast 
number of installations covered by the regime and the scope of coverage. Yet the 
environmental returns, in terms of GHG emissions and energy efficiency, have 
been disappointing. In light of the data presented within this section, it is 
reasonable to assert that the UK is not taking full advantage of the opportunities 
presented by I PPC, as a form of technology based standards, in the use of BAT to 
encourage industry improve industrial performance beyond permit requirement. 
Even in the presence of other polices that target GHG emissions and energy 
efficiency one must query the benefit of shifting the responsibility away from the 
'holistic' IPPC approach to other polices (such as EU ETS, CCL and CCAs). 
4.10 Transparency 
The survey found that 64% of sector association respondents ranked the overall 
level of transparency of the PPC Regulations as 'slightly transparent'. The 
remaining 36% of respondents ranked the level of transparency as 'completely 
transparent'. This compares favourably with the other three case studies. The 
majority of industry stakeholders ranked the CCAs as having a greater degree of 
confidentiality, owing largely to the publication of sector-level compliance results 
without detailing installation-level results. 
When asked to rate the level of transparency of the PPC Regulations the 
overwhelming majority (91%) stated it was acceptable. This is comparable with 
the other case studies, which returned between 83% and 94%. It is regrettable 
that external stakeholders were unable to provide further insights on this issue as 
the results from this stakeholder group in relation to the CCAs and EU ETS are 
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particularly revealing (for example 50% of CCA respondents and 67% of EU ETS 
respondents stated that they found the existing level of transparency of those 
instruments to be unacceptable). Given that provisions for transparency within 
CCAs and EU ETS are seemingly higher than the PPC Regulations it is possible 
that external stakeholders may have similar concerns relating the PPC 
Regulations. Only one sector association questionnaire respondent stated they 
believed the transparency of the PPC Regulations has areas that need 
improvement. This was echoed during an interview with a sector association 
representative, who did not provide a questionnaire response, when asked about 
the transparency of the permitting process: 
"It isn't. It's one of the bugbears of all industries. Most of the companies 
don't see anything wrong with environmental legislation. The 
bureaucracy it entails is mind-boggling. We were one of the first 
industries. The [Environment] Agency had two different ways of 
permitting at that point. You either had it though as local officer, but then 
halfway through the process, they set up a central permitting unit. And 
the two different approaches gave two entirely different results as to what 
your permit was going to be." 
However, the Environment Agency introduced centralised permitting in an 
attempt to maximise quality control and minimise regional disparities based on 
the performance of individual members of staff. 
From a legal perspective, provisions for transparency are made in Part V, Articles 
28 to 31 of the PPC Regulations. Article 28 deals specifically with requests from 
the Secretary of State or regulatory authorities for information from an operator. 
Time restrictions are not specified allowing the regulatory authorities to determine 
an exact time frame on a case-by-case basis. Provisions for public access to 
information pertaining to PPC permits made in Art. 29. Paragraph 6 states that it 
is the duty of the regulator, either the Environment Agency or Local Authority, to 
maintain public records on every PPC permit, specifically: 
• to secure that the registers maintained by them under this regulation are 
available, at all reasonable times, for inspection by the public free of 
charge: 
• and, to afford to members of the public facilities for obtaining copies of 
entries, on payment of reasonable charges. 
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This is supported by an Environment Agency representative who stated that: 
"Permits go on the public register, they [the public] can go and inspect 
them, not only the permits but also the decision document, which is a text 
document that explains why we've issued the permit the way we have. 
Any follow-up legal documents associated with that, inspection reports 
and enforcement action, and so forth. That might be associated with that 
side will be recorded in that public register." 
However, information concerning enforcement action in the case of breaches of 
permit conditions is not communicated actively to the public as a matter of course 
beyond inclusion on the public register in the relevant Environment Agency office: 
"It tends to get into by the media, but, in general, we don't make a point 
of communicating actively enforcement action, which contains everything 
from routes of prosecution, but it's all recorded on the public register and 
the public can access that if they want. Of course, the next time they 
apply for either a new permit or a variation of their existing permit, all that 
information is drawn out again and re-examined, so that's another 
opportunity for it to come back in to the public domain as well." 
There is no question that the public participation requirements of the PPC 
Regulations meet the minimum requirements of Art. 15 of the IPPC Directive. PPC 
meets the need to ensure "the public concerned are given early and effective 
opportunities to participate in the procedurd' (IPPC Art. 15, para.1) and making 
available "the content of the decision, including a copy of the permit and of any 
conditions and any subsequent updated' (IPPC Art. 15, para. 5(b)). However, 
upon comparison with another Member State it becomes clear that access to 
PPC permitting information in England and Wales is lacking In some areas, 
notably the ease of access to Information. Public registers and permit Information 
are located in various Environment Agency offices according to geographic 
region. This makes access the country-wide information difficult without visiting 
numerous regional offices. In contrast, the Republic of Ireland operates an 
internet based system for access to all permit applications, granted permits and 
any associated documentation, making access to environmental Information 
significantly easier than the system employed in England and Wales 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2007). 
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As a further illustration to this point during the course of this research the 
Environment Agency was contacted in an attempt to obtain copies of every PRC 
permit relating to non-hazardous waste incineration plants in England and Wales. 
There are 18 such facilities. The Environment Agency was unable to provide 
copies of all permits directly, instead advising that regional public registers would 
have to be visited in order to obtain the documents. There are eight regional 
offices throughout England and Wales. The inability of the Agency to provide 
information electronically and without a personal visit by members of the public to 
regional offices is a cause for concern and is in direct contradiction with the 
centralised approach to issuing permits. Whilst the public registers meet Aarhus 
standards for access to environmental information, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that regulatory authorities across the EU should be actively pursuing 
better practices relating to communication with the public and information 
accessibility. If an entirely on-line based system works effectively in the Republic 
of Ireland, the regulatory authorities in the UK should be making efforts to follow 
suit. 
As discussed earlier in this Chapter, work undertaken by Defra regarding the 
costs of implementation and long-term costs of administering the Regulations 
greatly enhances the level of transparency. Despite the difficulties in obtaining 
information on permit applications and site-specific information, the provision of 
detailed financial costs of the Regulations improve the transparency of the PRC 
process to a degree. 
4.11 Flexibility 
The perceived level of flexibility appears to mirror the differences in opinions on 
the key strengths of the Regulations (see section 4.14.2). Whilst many 
respondents believe the PPC Regulations give industry a moderate amount of 
flexibility in how it chooses to manage investment decisions and optimisation of 
emission reduction, a sizeable minority are of an opposing view (Table 4.8 and 
Table 4.9). 
Table 4.8 Rating flexibility of PPC regulations with regard to management of 
investment decisions 
No flexibility Very little flexibility Moderate flexibility High flexibility 
0% 36% 55% 0% 
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Table 4.9 Rating of fiexibiiity with regard to aiiowing companies to optimise 
emission reductions via financial assessment of the most practical means to do 
so 
No flexibility Very little flexibility Moderate flexibility High flexibility 
9% 45% 36% 9% 
The application of site-specific BAT should lead to a greater degree of flexibility 
compared with other regulatory approaches in terms of accounting for site-
specific conditions. Outcome based emissions standards, whilst allowing 
companies to implement any technology they wish in order to meet the 
requirements, may not consider such local conditions. These conditions may 
include variations in the process input (e.g. the type of clay used In the 
manufacture of ceramic products has an impact upon the emissions from the 
process as certain clays require higher kiln temperatures). The nature of BAT 
leads to these conditions being taken Into account. 
However, technology-based standards remove the ability of firms to decide what 
technology to employ and at what cost. This restriction is reflected In Table 4.8 as 
56% of respondents stated that the PPC Regulations offer little or no flexibility In 
terms of technology decision-making. For this criterion the CCAs and UK ETS 
were both ranked as moderately flexible (38% and 43% respectively although 
25% of CCA respondents ranked the policy as offering very little flexibility). 
Conversely, the EL) ETS was the strongest instrument in this sense with 50% of 
respondents ranking the flexibility as high and the remaining 50% as moderate. 
These findings do not offer any surprises given the widely-held belief that MBIs, 
in particular emissions trading, offer a greater level of flexibility to industry In 
allowing the market to decide where emissions abatement occurs based on 
rational assessment of marginal abatement costs. 
A considerable advantage of the technology-based approach of PPC Is that it 
should, In theory, lead to a level playing field across industries as all firms are 
required to meet the same technological standards. This could be particularly 
beneficial when dealing with standards across many countries, as seen with the 
IPPC Directive. The advantage of reducing the flexibility given to firms to create 
equal minimum standards is challenged by the removal of incentives to innovate. 
A lack of flexibility in the selection of technology does not provide the conditions 
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under which firms will investigate new technologies as provided a firm meets the 
standards set out within the permit penalties are not incurred by operators. 
4.12 Innovation 
The importance of technological innovation in improving industrial energy 
efficiency has been highlighted by Smith and Sorrell (2001) In this paper the 
authors identify two types of energy efficiency improvements. The first group of 
improvements relate directly to energy efficiency including the collection of 'low 
hanging fruits' (general housekeeping issues, low-cost engineering/operation 
improvements) through to high cost solutions involving investment in new 
equipment and fundamental changes to basic technology. The second category 
of improvements arises as by-products of investment in processes that are not 
directly intended to lead to energy efficiency improvements. Determining the 
prevalence of activities in the first category is relatively straightforward and relied 
on sector associations stating what behavioural and activity changes have 
occurred within each sector. It is considerably more difficult to determine what 
activities, if any, which have resulted in energy efficiency improvements as a by-
product. 
Research undertaken by Canon-de-Franca et al. (Canon-De-Francia etai, 2007) 
indicates that innovative firms may benefit not only from a competitive 
advantages over rivals but innovative firms are also quicker to adapt to the 
demands of new environmental legislation. Figure 4.12 depicts the routes that 
can be taken by firms in response to environmental regulations. Firms need to 
have sufficient technical knowledge and the ability to respond efficiently to new 
requirements in order to maintain a competitive position in the market place. 
Failure to do so leads to a loss of competitive advantage. 
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Figure 4.12 Technical knowledge and adaptation to new environmental 
requirements 
Sufficient technical 
knowledge 
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technical 
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New environmental requirements 
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Technological 
investment 
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Inefficient 
response 
Diseconomies 
Source: Cahon-De-Francia et ai. (2007) 
(Note: in the context of this diagram "diseconomies" refers to loss of competitive 
advantage of a firm over market rivals) 
None of the sector association respondents ranked the PPC Regulations as 
discouraging technological innovation. However, further information provided by 
one respondent indicated that across one sector the PPC Regulations have in 
some cases discouraged innovation as new technology is often required to be 
implemented consequently across the sector with negative financial implications 
for some less innovative companies: 
"The 'no impact' answer represents a split between those who see some 
encouragement but the majority who see discouragement, the latter 
because innovation soon becomes promoted as BAT, rigorously applied 
despite being inappropriate for some sites." 
The vast majority (64%) of PPC sector association believe the regulations do not 
actively promote innovation. 27% believe PPC encourages a small degree of 
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technological innovation while only one respondent stated the regulations 
encourage a significant amount of innovation. Furthermore, most sector 
associations believe that the PPC Regulations do not provide any incentive to 
reduce GHG emissions and energy consumption beyond the permit requirements 
(55% and 64% respectively). This indicates that the PPC Regulations are 
performing in the manner commonly associated with output-based standards as 
little regard paid to innovative behaviour, a crucial factor in the application of 
technology-based standards. Without innovative behaviour and the incentive to 
reduce emissions beyond permit requirements the commonly accepted level of 
BAT will not improve at the maximum possible rate. 
The apparent failure of PPC to promote additional abatement and incentivise 
innovation contrasts with the positive response to the remaining three case 
studies in this regard. The CCAs, UK ETS and EU ETS all received positive 
feedback in relation to the impact of the policy on innovation with 63%, 57% and 
40%, respectively, stating the policy had a slightly positive impact on innovation. 
A further 40% of EU ETS respondents believe the policy has a very strong impact 
on innovative strategies within firms. The market mechanisms of these three 
policies (including the trading provisions within CCAs) greatly increase the 
propensity of firms to seek new abatement opportunities as the benefits of doing 
so directly translates into financial rewards. 
Referring once again to PPC, comments made regarding the impact of the PPC 
Regulations on innovative behaviour indicate that despite being a regulatory 
regime based on the implementation of best available technology the prescriptive 
nature of the BREF documents does not provide incentives to implement 
technology beyond the recognised "best" option. Furthermore, three respondents 
identified that other instruments exist to drive forward improvements in energy 
efficiency and GHG emission reductions: 
"This is an interesting question. The BREF document identifies best 
technology but unlike the EU ETS or CCAs does not reward additional 
actions and may actually stifle adoption of unproven (i.e. not in BREF) 
technology. Additionally, companies covered under CCAs are deemed to 
have satisfied PPC energy efficiency improvement obligations, so the 
regulations do not operate independently." 
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"Companies must demonstrate a willingness to improve performance but 
as levels are achieved they may not be amended to drive improvement. 
This will come from CCA or EU ETS." 
"The aim of PPC is to provide holistic protection of the environment at a 
cost society is willing to bear. Other instruments are available to 
"encourage innovation" or to combat climate change." 
Whilst it is true that the CCL, CCAs and the EU ETS exist with the sole purpose 
of tackling GHG emissions, key objectives of the I PPC Directive include 
achieving efficient processes (Annex IV (9)), efficient use of resources (in 
particular energy) (Art. 3(d)) and the minimisation of atmospheric emissions (Art. 
3 (a)). It therefore stands to reason that the PPC Regulations should be a driving 
force in industrial resource efficiency and reductions of all atmospheric 
emissions. 
Despite the inability of the PPC Regulations in their current state to sufficiently 
promote technological innovation within industry, nearly three quarters of sector 
associations stated that environmental reporting within their sector had improved 
as a direct consequence of the PPC Regulations (Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10 Stated changes within company activities arising directly from the 
implementation of the PPC Regulations 
Change directly related to PPC Regulations % respondents 
Introduction of BAT specified within PPC permit 73 
Improved environmental reporting 73 
Process changes 36 
Increased awareness of GHG reduction opportunities within senior 
management 27 
Increased awareness of energy saving opportunities within senior 
management 18 
Introduction of equipment of higher efficiency rating/lower emissions 
rating than specified within PPC permit 18 
Inclusion of cost of carbon in new project appraisals 18 
Improved supply chain management 9 
Three quarters of sector associations reported that their members had to install 
new equipment in order to meet the BAT requirements of their permits. This 
evidence supports the notion that the PPC Regulations do not promote innovation 
and industrial changes beyond the requirements of individual permits. Only one 
third reported process changes to improve efficiency. Moreover, only 18% of 
sector associations reported that their members had installed equipment of a 
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higher efficiency rating or lower emissions rating than the BAT specified within 
permits. 
There is hope that the revision of the BREF documents in 2008 will result in 
improvements in bringing technological change dealt with; 
"At present there is little encouragement, but the revision of our sector 
BREF is expected to introduce more energy savings requirements." 
"The BAT documents are being updated (for the first time) with the aim to 
better identify and promote the best performance." 
The Environment Agency also acknowledged that the PRC Regulations do not 
promote as much innovation as possible. However, the current situation was 
attributed to the need to get all industrial activities, and all companies operating 
within each industry, to a common baseline: 
"They [the PRC Regulations] allow it [innovation] very freely. What they 
don't do, currently, as well as they should, or as well as, perhaps, they 
could, is encourage it, and, in a sense, the reason for that is, mainly, 
because the vast thrust of PRC, over the last six years, has been about 
getting to a baseline, getting to a point where everybody's starting from 
the same place. As we now move forward, they can be, now, used to 
encourage innovation and drive, but that hasn't really happened because 
we were trying to bring everybody up to the same baseline standard. 
Therefore, we couldn't actually put the effort into "how can we stretch this 
further?" Now we can, and that's what we [the Environment Agency] 
propose to do." 
In addition to the BREF revisions the implementation of the Environmental 
Permitting Programme (EPP) could provide the much needed encouragement for 
innovation However, the lengthy process of BREF revisions (and subsequent 
transition into national-level guidance documents) and the novelty of the EPP 
mean it will be some time before the level of success can be assessed. 
4.13 Acceptance and equity 
An analysis of the level of acceptance for the PPC Regulations should ideally 
have input from external stakeholders to balance the debate. However, the 
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absence of external stakeholder responses to the survey means this criterion can 
only present the views of industry. 
Nevertheless, the opinions of industry have proven to be very insightful. Table 
4.11, Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 summarise the ranking provided by sector 
associations regarding equity and acceptance of the PRC Regulations. 
Table 4.11 Level of acceptance of sector association members 
Full rejection Qualified Indifference Qualified Full 
rejection acceptance acceptance 
9% 9% 18% 55% 18% 
Table 4.12 Rating of overall fairness of PPC Regulations^^ 
Very unfair Unfair Fair Very fair 
0% 56% 33% 11% 
Table 4.13 Overall experience of members 
Completely More negative than More positive than Completely positive 
negative positive negative 
9% 36% 55% 0% 
It should be pleasing for the Environment Agency to note that the majority of 
installations regulated generally rate their experience as positive. However, the 
remaining 45% who do not cause some concern especially in light of 56% of 
respondents rating the PRC Regulations as 'unfair'. Many of the respondents 
who were critical of the fairness and equity of the Regulations cite a lack of 
proportionality in the application of the Regulations (i.e. the cost implications for 
small firms or the inclusion of emissions that are perceived to have little 
environmental impact). One sector association highlighted the cost implications 
for firms that are at the borderline of the scope of the regulations as a major factor 
in the perception of equity and fairness. The perception of fairness of the PRC 
Regulations is on a par with the EU ETS, for which 40% of respondents ranked 
Phase I as unfair, with this figure increasing to 60% in Phase II. Conversely, the 
CCAs and the UK ETS are generally perceived to be fair to industry (69% and 
64% respectively), largely due to the provision of financial benefits for 
In reference to the "overall fairness" of the PRC Regulations, sector associations were 
asked to consider four factors prior to stating their opinion: 
Costs incurred by industry 
Administrative requirements for the regulatory authorities and the government 
Changes in environmental quality arising from the Regulations 
Overall distribution of costs and benefits 
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participation in what are essentially voluntary policy instruments. Furthermore, 
the voluntary nature of these two instruments gives industry a choice regarding 
participation. 
Concerns were raised over the ability of local authorities to deal with the complexity 
of the PPC Regulations, particularly in areas where there are few installations. It 
may not make economic sense for the local authority to spend scarce resources on 
training of staff and ensuring the correct controls are in place. In light of this, it 
would appear that the existing system is not the most effective, a view supported 
by the Environment Agency: 
"[It's] an incredible waste of resources - the amount of time and effort 
tliat's spent arguing about whether activities are A1 or A2, whether they 
should be local authority or Environment Agency I don't think it 
makes a difference to the environmental outcome, as to whether you 
have one group or two groups. It's just been a lot of extra regulatory 
effort, which, effectively, ends up as cost to operators in one way or 
another." 
Approximately 400 installations are currently Part A(2) regulated. It would make 
sense in terms of equity - by reducing regional disparities in the interpretation and 
application of the Regulations - if the Regulations were to be administered centrally 
for all A(1) and A(2) installations. Given the reduced environment risk of Part B 
installations there may be a case for keeping these installations under the control 
of local authorities, not least because these installations are only regulated 
according to their atmospheric emissions. 
Interestingly one sector association, whose members are all Part A(2) or Part B 
regulated, stated that local authorities have been the stakeholders who have lost 
out in the equity stakes adding further weight to the argument against the existing 
two-tiered administrative approach. 
"I think the local authorities would say they've had it quite rough over the 
last few years. They've struggled." 
The Environment Agency operates a system of charging that attempts to take into 
account the differences in environmental impacts of processes and local 
conditions. The charging system also considers the risk of breaching permit 
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requirements and previous performance wiien calculating the administrative and 
subsistence charges. This system, in the eyes of some industry stakeholders, 
may be flawed but it is difficult to suggest an alternative method of charging that 
could be more equitable. Furthermore, the failure of external stakeholders 
(beyond the Environment Agency) to participate in the research makes it difficult 
to assess how the Regulations are perceived by civil society representatives. 
4.14 Other issues 
The final section of analysis contains other key issues identified in the 
questionnaire responses and interviews 
4.14.1 Interaction between PPC and other climate change policy instruments 
The interaction between PPC and other instruments was identified as an area 
that needs attention at both the domestic and EU level. At the UK level, more 
than half of respondents stated that there is room for improvement with regards to 
the interaction between PPC and other UK environmental policies. Respondents 
were asked to cite the policies of concern. However, none of the respondents 
cited specific UK policies that caused a regulatory burden for their members 
enabling the dismissal of this as a significant issue. 
Table 4.14 Rating of the interaction between PPC and other UK climate change 
polices 
Interaction between 
PPC and other policies 
creates a significant 
regulatory burden 
Room for improvement. 
Some problems with 
cohesion between PPC 
and some policies -
slight regulatory burden 
Minor problems with 
interaction between 
PPC and other policies 
but nothing too serious 
PPC and other polices 
operate in a 
complementary 
manners - excellent 
level of cohesion 
22% 56% 22% 0% 
Interestingly, the fewer respondents stated there is a regulatory burden caused by 
the interaction of PPC and other EU-level policies, yet most respondents 
identified policies of concern. 
Table 4.15 Rating of the interaction between PPC and EU environmental polices 
Interaction between 
PPC and other policies 
creates a significant 
regulatory burden 
Room for improvement. 
Some problems with 
cohesion between PPC 
and some policies -
slight regulatory burden 
Minor problems with 
interaction between 
PPC and other policies 
but nothing too serious 
PPC and other polices 
operate in a 
complementary 
manners - excellent 
level of cohesion 
22% 33% 44% 0% 
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In particular, the following EU-level issues were identified as creating a some 
degree of additional regulatory burden, through duplication of administrative 
requirements, direct administrative costs and conflicts of regulatory interest, for 
UK companies: 
• Large Combustion Plant Directive 2001/80/EC 
• Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC 
• Air Quality Framework Directive 96/62/EC 
• European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (established through 
Directive 2003/87/EC) 
• Landfill Directive 1999/31/EC 
• Asymmetric transposition of IPPC Directive across Member States 
meaning sectors in one Member State were regulated from an earlier date 
than counter parts in other Member States 
• Perception of more stringent interpretation of EU Directives in the UK 
compared with other Member States 
One comment made by a sector association during the interviews also identified 
issues with waste and the PPC Regulations: 
"[PRC] interacts oddly with the EU ETS. In terms of waste incineration 
there has been a problem with the application of those particular 
regulations. We do have some problems in respect of the definitions of 
waste." 
The issue of waste was supported by another sector association respondent who 
stated there is a conflict between waste treatment and energy usage. This is a 
particular issue for sectors carrying out process related to animals and animal 
products due to the interpretation of what constitutes waste or products suitable 
for human consumption. Treating waste to render it harmless often requires 
energy intensive processes. The only other option is to landfill the waste but this 
leads to a conflict with the Landfill Directive and the overall aim in the UK of 
reducing the amount of waste sent to landfill. Furthermore the Environment 
Agency identified the performance-based approach of the Landfill Directive and 
the technology-based approach of PPC as a source of conflict: 
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"Under PPC, the requirements are to deliver the available techniques. 
But, under Landfill, the requirement is to deliver fixed emissions, pre-set 
outcomes, and those two are relatively incompatible. Unfortunately, 
governments have never sat down and worked out how to bring those 
two things together. We spend a lot of time arguing in court with people 
about what those things mean, where do they apply and where don't they 
apply. It's, really, an unclear and unhappy mix between those two, and 
we spend a lot of resources arguing that very point. We, obviously, know 
what we feel it means, but other people try to give a different argument." 
4.14.2 Perceptions of strengths and weaknesses of the PPC Regulations 
As a means to determine the overall attitude towards the PPC Regulations 
respondents were asked to identify the key strengths and weaknesses of the 
Regulat ions. Tab le 4.16 and Table 4 .17 identify the responses. 
Table 4.16 Key strengths of the PPC Regulations 
Strength % respondents 
Administrative flexibility/site-specific approach 40% 
Sector level focus 10% 
Integrated approach facilitates communication 10% 
An attempt to reduce pollution 10% 
On-going improvement though BAT 10% 
Table 4.17 Key weaknesses of the PPC Regulations 
Weakness % respondents 
Lack of proportionality (including inclusion of low risk 
activities and too much emphasis on areas of low risk 
according to activity) 
40% 
Differences in application of IPPC across EU 20% 
Cohesion with other policies 10% 
Pressure to increase monitoring requirements to account 
for 'flexibility' 
10% 
Lack of incentive/encouragement for additional abatement 
effort 
10% 
Less efficient environmental improvement compared with 
MBIs 
10% 
Do not achieve aim 10% 
Confidentiality concerns 10% 
High resource requirements 10% 
Over-prescriptive/not risk-based 10% 
The flexibility of the PPC Regulations is by far the most commonly perceived 
strength though this is at directly contradicts the responses received in relation to 
the flexibility of PPC to allow industry to determine how permit conditions are met. 
However, comments in support of the flexible approach are based on the sector-
- 1 4 2 -
level focus of technology standards, the site-level approach to agreeing permit 
conditions (including the consideration of local environmental conditions) and the 
flexibility of administration. Whilst other strengths were identified there was little 
consistency among the responses indicating that the opinions of stakeholders are 
highly dependent upon individual circumstances and personal experiences of the 
Regulations. 
The predominant identified weakness is in direct contrast, if not a direct 
contradiction, to the key strength. The lack of proportionality (which may 
inherently lead to greater flexibility) centres on three key concerns; 
• Too much focus on low-risk factors for some sectors (e.g. aquatic pollution 
from industries with low risk of polluting waterways) 
• Questions surrounding the inclusion of activities/installations with 
generally low environmental impact 
• Lack of proportionality in the interpretation of the Regulations by the 
Environment Agency 
The two-tiered administrative approach may add to the sentiments of 
disproportionality. If all PRC regulated activities were administered by the 
Environment Agency there would be reduced differentiation between the 
environmental impacts of activities in administrative terms. 
The second most common concern referred to the differences in the application 
of the IPPC Directive across the EU. The 2007 Defra Review of IPPC 
implementation found that most companies believe the PRC Regulations have a 
largely negative effect upon the ability of companies to compete at both the EU 
and wider international levels. One sector representative stated that: 
"There's a European report on how an IPPC was implemented, across the 
EU. Basically, it shows that we and Germany were doing everything that we 
were supposed to do, efficiently. And basically, the rest of the EU had done 
absolutely nothing." 
The "rest of the EU had done absolutely nothing' is over-stating the problem, but 
this point is indeed supported by implementation progress reports. The 2005 
Commission report on implementation found that the majority of Member States 
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had shortcomings in their implementation of the Directive (European 
Commission, 2005c), with the exception of the UK and Germany as rightly 
asserted by this industry stakeholder. 
Hov\/ever, perceptions from other industries are very different. Two sector 
associations indicated that even in the presence of different implementation 
approaches, the real effects are unlikely to be as severe as some industry 
stakeholders claim: 
"Implementation across the EL) - it's a different rate of application and 
therefore you have competitive distortions. I couldn't actually say that it has 
caused specific damage. But obviously there are occasional concerns if you 
find yourself governed by a stricter regime than another country in the EU." 
Further to this point, the long transposition period obviously led to some countries 
implementing the Directive prior to others for some activities. Since the 2007 all 
activities have to be regulated by IPPC, thus reducing any of the competitive 
issues during the transposition phase. 
4.15 Chapter summary 
This Chapter has approached the following key issues relating to the application 
of the IPPC Directive in the UK: 
• An analysis of the development of the IPPC Directive at EU-level 
• The transposition of IPPC into the British legislative system 
• The implementation of the PPC Regulations in England and Wales 
• Evidence-based analysis of the performance of the PPC Regulations to 
date based on evidence gathered during a survey of industrial sector 
associations and interviews with stakeholders including the Environment 
Agency 
Evidence gathered during the survey of sector associations indicates that the 
PPC Regulations provide little or no impetus to consume energy efficiently and 
reduce GHG emissions beyond permit requirements for these installations. This 
is particularly concerning given the central place of energy efficiency within the 
IPPC Directive. A key feature of the IPPC Directive, and the subsequent PPC 
Regulations, is the improvement of energy efficiency. Installations participating in 
- 144 -
CCAs or the EU ETS are required to improve energy efficiency as part of these 
programmes. However, as Chapters 5-7 will demonstrate, the shortcomings of 
these policies mean that these crucial issues for addressing climate change may 
not be addressed adequately. Furthermore, installations outside of these policies 
have to meet energy efficiency requirements as part of the PPC permit 
requirement yet PPC does not provide a suitable means to reduce GHG 
emissions and manage energy efficiently. 
Further outcomes of the analysis in this Chapter indicate that the perception of 
industry is generally negative towards the BAT-based approach. However, PPC 
has only been in operation for 7 years. By implementing a technology-based, 
holistic permit-based approach to environmental protection the European 
Commission was clearly adopting a long-term strategy to deal with emissions into 
air, water and soil. The benefits of such an approach may not be immediately 
apparent to the regulated. It is unfortunate that external stakeholder participation 
in this element of the research was not forthcoming as this group of respondents 
would certainly have provided some invaluable insights, particularly given the 
intention to compare this regulatory approach with the voluntary CCAs and UK 
ETS. 
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5 Climate Change Agreements 
5.1 Introduction 
In the 1 9 9 9 Budget the Chancel lor of the Exchequer a n n o u n c e d the introduction 
of an e n e r g y tax for non-domes t i c c o n s u m e r s - the Climate C h a n g e Levy. T h e 
CCL w a s s u b s e q u e n t l y codified in law through the Finance Act 2 0 0 0 (c .17) . To 
'soften' the financial blow of the CCL, industrial s e c t o r s w e r e p r e s e n t e d with the 
opportunity to enter into voluntary a g r e e m e n t s with the Government (HM 
Treasury, 1999) . This w a s s u p p l e m e n t e d with a £ 1 5 0 million fund to support 
energy eff ic iency improvements within firms in 2 0 0 0 / 0 1 . In return for adhering to 
the rules of the CCAs, by reducing e n e r g y consumpt ion and carbon e m i s s i o n s , 
c o m p a n i e s rece ive an 8 0 % rebate on the CCL. 
The Government initially c la imed that the CCL would g e n e r a t e 2 MtC s a v i n g s per 
year by 2 0 1 0 . T h e Government s u b s e q u e n t l y revised the impact of the CCL 
upwards to 3 . 5 MtC per year by 2 0 1 0 . However , a review undertaken by the NAO 
in 2 0 0 7 found that the impact of the CCL on industry had b e e n significantly 
watered down in the p r e s e n c e of rapidly increasing energy prices d u e to other 
c a u s e s (e .g . EU ETS c o s t p a s s through from the power sec tor and rocketing oil 
and g a s prices). At the t ime of CCA negotiation, it w a s bel ieved the C C A s would 
deliver s a v i n g s of 2 . 5 MtC per year in 2 0 1 0 (NAO, 2 0 0 7 a ) . This figure h a s s i n c e 
d e c r e a s e d to 1.9 MtC per year in 2 0 1 0 . With five y e a r s remaining until the current 
A g r e e m e n t s expire in 2 0 1 3 , the Government h a s dec ided to ex tend the CCA 
programme until 2 0 1 7 . 
5.2 Description and characterisation of the Climate Change Levy and Climate 
Change Agreements 
The CCL c a m e into force in April 2 0 0 1 (Defra, 2 0 0 1 ) and is applied to the 
consumption of g a s , coal, electricity, petrol and hydrocarbon in liquid s ta tes , 
lignite, coke , s e m i - c o k e of coal/lignite and petroleum c o k e by non-domes t i c 
users^^(HM C u s t o m s and Excise , 2002 ) . Commodi t i e s not taxed under the Levy 
include oil, road fuel g a s , heat, s t e a m , low va lue solid fuel (e .g . coal tailings with 
^'Non-domestic users includes; industry, commerce, agriculture, public administration and 
other services. 
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a market v a l u e of l e s s than £ 1 5 ) and w a s t e s de f ined In the Statute . T h e Levy Is 
applied o n c e In the supply chain directly to the e n d user . 
Early e x p e c t a t i o n s of the g o v e r n m e n t w e r e that the "revenue neutral" CCL would 
a m o u n t to approximate ly £1 billion r e v e n u e per year. This £1 billion would then 
be recyc led by m e a n s of reducing e m p l o y e r National Insurance Contributions 
(NIC) by 0 .3% and through the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the E n h a n c e d Capital 
A l l o w a n c e s (ECA)®® with a £ 5 0 million fund to promote e n e r g y ef f ic iency in 
b u s i n e s s e s (Carbon Trust, 2 0 0 2 ) . By 2 0 0 6 the CCL had not m a n a g e d to m e e t t h e 
i n c o m e e x p e c t a t i o n s . I n c o m e p e a k e d in 2 0 0 3 / 0 4 at £ 8 3 2 million (UK Trade Info, 
2 0 0 4 ) ( s e e Table 5 .1) . C o n v e r s e l y , the NIC rebate h a s gradually i n c r e a s e d o v e r 
the life of the Levy. 
Table 5.1 CCL income and approximate National insurance Contribution rebate 
2001-2006 
Financial year CCL income (£ million) Approx. NIC rebate (£ million) 
2001 /02 555 1,035 
2002/03 829 1,125 
2003/04 832 1,185 
2004 /05 764 1,215 
2005/06 744 1,275 
Source: NAG (2007a) 
In order to qualify for the r e d u c e d CCL rate (table 5 .2 ) b u s i n e s s e s would h a v e to 
enter into a voluntary C C A with the Secre tary of S t a t e for the Environment, 
Transport a n d the R e g i o n s ( n o w Secre tary of S t a t e for the Environment, F o o d 
and Rural Affairs, henceforth both t erms are in terchangeab le and will b e referred 
to a s the 'Secretary of State') . 
Table 5.2 CCL rates per tonne CO2 at the 2001-2007rates 
CCL equivalent price per CCL discounted price per 
tonne of CO2 (£/tC02) tonne CO2 (£/tC02) 
Levy on electricity (0.43p £10.30 £2.06 
/kWh) 
Levy on natural gas (0.15 £8.05 £1.61 
p/kWh) 
Levy on coal (0.15 p/kWh) £5 £1 
38 EGA reward businesses that invest in energy saving equipment. These businesses also 
pay less tax on profits arising from energy saving equipment. 
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5.2.1 Regulatory Impact Assessment and the consultation process 
A full RIA of the C C A s h a s never b e e n carried out. A s detailed Appendix 4, a 
partial RIA of the rules relating to e n e r g y u s e at CCA s i t e s w a s carried out in 
2001(Defra , 2 0 0 1 a ) . According to this partial RIA s o m e s takeholder consultation 
activities w e r e carried out in 2 0 0 0 - 0 1 . The list of consul ted organisat ions d o e s not 
extend b e y o n d s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n s with the notable a b s e n c e of external 
s takeholders (in the form of NGOs , a c a d e m i c experts , consul tants etc.). 
N e w regulations w e r e introduced in 2 0 0 6 to account for the ex tens ion of the 
eligibility criteria on an e n e r g y intensity bas i s (The Climate C h a n g e A g r e e m e n t s 
(Eligible Facilities) Regulat ions , 2006 ) . In this ins tance not e v e n a partial RIA w a s 
carried out. T h e explanatory note to the Regulat ions s ta tes : 
'A full regulatory impact assessment has not been prepared for this 
instrument as it has no impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies.' 
Given that the C C A s apply to industry there is clearly an impact on b u s i n e s s . 
Furthermore, the voluntary nature of the A g r e e m e n t s m e a n s , a s s tated earlier in 
this thes is , external consultation is important in ensuring a voluntary instrument 
a c h i e v e s w i d e s p r e a d support. 
5.3 Operation of the Agreements 
The Secretary of S ta te originally negot iated A g r e e m e n t s with 4 4 sec tor 
assoc ia t ions , representing more than 5 0 0 0 c o m p a n i e s and 1 2 , 0 0 0 target units^® 
(ENDS, 2 0 0 5 b ) . T h e number of A g r e e m e n t s and the target units they represent 
has c h a n g e d continuously s i n c e their introduction in 2 0 0 1 . Energy u s a g e targets 
were negot iated using four poss ib le units: relative energy; relative carbon; 
abso lute energy; and abso lute carbon. 'Relative' targets terms refer to the energy 
u s e or carbon e m i s s i o n s produced per tonne of unit of output. 'Absolute' targets 
refer to the total quantity of carbon e m i s s i o n s or energy used , irrespective of 
produced output. T h e majority of C C A s w e r e negot iated using relative e n e r g y 
use . Only four s e c t o r s negot iated abso lute e n e r g y targets and a further two 
negotiated relative carbon targets (a list of all sec tors , type of target, base l ine 
years and performance to da te is located at Appendix 6). S e c t o r s w e r e able to 
c h o o s e their preferred target type and the sec tor target w a s b a s e d on the s u m of 
A target unit refers to an individual site or parts of a site that is included in an 
Agreement 
1 4 8 -
the target s within underlying A g r e e m e n t s - the s e c o n d tier of A g r e e m e n t s s i g n e d 
by operators of target units and the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e (NAO, 2 0 0 7 a ) . 
Eligibility to enter into an A g r e e m e n t w a s initially b a s e d o n IPPC c o v e r a g e . 
However , the thresho lds for inclusion in P P C R e g u l a t i o n s are d i sregarded and all 
IPPC activities ( a s i m p l e m e n t e d through the P P C Regula t ions ) irrespect ive of 
s i z e are el igible to enter into a C C A (Defra, 2 0 0 1 b ) . In 2 0 0 6 , an e x t e n s i o n of the 
eligibility criteria resulted in 12 n e w s e c t o r s s igning umbrella a g r e e m e n t s . T h e s e 
s e c t o r s are all relatively small in t e r m s of the n u m b e r of target units and e n e r g y 
u s e c o m p a r e d with the original C C A participating s e c t o r s . T h e Treasury 
e s t i m a t e d that t h e s e s e c t o r s will m a k e carbon e m i s s i o n s s a v i n g s of 
approximate ly 0 . 3 MtC/year by 2 0 1 0 (Defra, 2 0 0 6 c ) . T h e s e participating target 
units are a l s o eligible to rece ive the 8 0 % di scount on CCL p a y m e n t s provided the 
terms a n d condi t ions of the C C A are met . C o m p a n i e s that m e e t the IPPC criteria 
for participation must d o s o under the IPPC a r r a n g e m e n t s . Units are not 
permitted to enter an a g r e e m e n t under the e x t e n d e d Energy Intensive criteria 
u n l e s s they fail to m e e t the IPPC eligibility criteria. However , in c a s e s w h e r e a 
s ing le s i te c o m p r i s e s s e p a r a t e facilities that are el igible under both criteria the 
s ite c a n s h a r e a s ing le target (Defra, 2 0 0 6 c ) , thus reducing the administrative 
burden on the operator, the s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n and Defra. 
P e r f o r m a n c e of target units and s e c t o r s is m e a s u r e d bi-annually at interim target 
periods ( 2 0 0 4 , 2 0 0 6 , 2 0 0 8 and 2 0 1 0 ) . At e a c h interim target point, individual 
target units h a v e to presen t data concern ing e n e r g y u s e and production l eve l s to 
the s e c t o r a s soc ia t ion . Defra s u b s e q u e n t l y c h e c k s the data to de termine w h e t h e r 
both the s e c t o r and the target units are el igible for recertification and the resulting 
80% CCL d i scount during the next 2 - y e a r interim target period (de Muizon and 
Glachant , 2 0 0 4 ) . During the original negot iat ion of CCAs , provis ions w e r e 
installed to al low the rev iew of the final three interim targets ( 2 0 0 6 , 2 0 0 8 and 
2 0 1 0 ) in 2 0 0 4 to e n s u r e that the targets for e a c h s e c t o r still r epresent the b e s t 
option in t e r m s of c o s t - e f f e c t i v e e n e r g y s a v i n g s . This rev iew p r o c e s s w a s a l s o 
u s e d a s a m e a n s to a s s e s s w h e t h e r targets s e t in the original A g r e e m e n t s w e r e 
too stringent or t o o lenient (Future Energy Solut ions , 2 0 0 5 ) . 
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5.4 Performance of CCAs to date 
In abso lute terms (i.e. total e n e r g y consumpt ion or CO2 e m i s s i o n s reductions) the 
CCAs h a v e overach ieved in e a c h target period by nearly double the initial targets 
within the umbrella a g r e e m e n t s w h e n translated in to abso lute carbon sav ings . 
Table 5 . 3 p r e s e n t s the performance of C C A s in the first three target periods. It is 
important to note that this 'overachievement ' is largely attributed to a significant 
downturn in s tee l production ( s e e Table 5.3, rows l-K). The s tee l s ec tor a c c o u n t s 
for approximately a quarter of the e n e r g y consumption within all CCA sectors . 
This i s s u e is a n a l y s e d in more detail in sect ion 5.6. The number of target units 
that w e r e not re-certified following the interim target period a s s e s s m e n t h a s 
d e c r e a s e d from 12% after the first target period to 10% in the third target period 
( s e e Table 5.3, row H). 
Table 5.3 Results of target periods 1-3 
Target period 
1 (2002) 
Target period 
2 (2004) 
Target period 
3 (2006) 
A Total number of umbrella agreements 44 42 49 
B Number of sectors meeting targets 24 21 32 (41)*" 
C Total number of target units 5742 4675 4885 
D Target units re-certlfled (either meeting 
individual target or whole sector target) 
5042 4420 4401 
E Target units withdrawing from an 
agreement 
164 228 345 
F Target units not re-certified (i.e. failing 
to meet underlying agreement target If 
sector as whole falls to meet umbrella 
target) 
219 23 23 
G Target units not submitting data at end 
of target period''^  319 4 116 
H % of Target units re-certified 88% 95% 90% 
1 Absolute annual carbon saving (MtC) 4.5 3.9 4.5 
J Absolute annual carbon saving 
(excluding steel sector) (MtC) 
1.9 
(steel = 2,6) 
1.9 
(steel - 2) 
2.5 
(steel = 2) 
K Proportion of annual savings arising 
directly from CCAs (MtC) 
1.9 1.9 2.5 
Source: Future Energy Solutions (2004), Future Energy Solutions (2005), NAO 
The 2 0 0 7 NAO a s s e s s m e n t of C C A s highlighted severa l fundamental i s s u e s with 
the calculation of performance and difficulties in modell ing the impacts of the 
A g r e e m e n t s during the negotiation period. Prior to the negotiat ions, the Global 
Defra uses both of these figures in Results of the Third Target Period Assessment 
stating "overall 32 out of the 49 sectors have met their targets after taking the emissions 
trading by operators into account. However one of these sectors, whilst meeting their 
CCA target, did not meet their European Union Emissions Trading Scheme corrected 
target, and a single target unit within the sector was decertified, in effect, however, 41 of 
the 49 sectors met their targets as all target units have been re-certified". 
Failure to submit data at the end of a target period results In termination of the 
agreement with the Individual target unit. 
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and Atmospheric Division (GAD) of Defra model led the potential carbon s a v i n g s 
from 14 of the CCA sec tors . Extrapolated to the original 4 4 s e c t o r s the modelling 
s u g g e s t e d that the C C A s could s a v e 4 . 5 MtC per year be low b u s i n e s s a s usual 
(BAD) projections by 2 0 1 0 (ETSU - AEA Environment, 2001 ) . In the event , Defra 
negotiated a g r e e m e n t s that should h a v e produced carbon s a v i n g s of 2 .5 MtC in 
2 0 1 0 desp i t e the e v i d e n c e of the GAD modell ing (NAO, 2 0 0 7 a ) . Furthermore, 
e v e n the 2 .5 MtC saving negot iated with the original 4 4 s e c t o r s is unlikely to 
occur. T h e current prediction for carbon s a v i n g s below the BAU scenar io is 1 .9 
MtC in 2 0 1 0 (NAO, 2 0 0 7 a ) . 
Econometric modell ing by Ekins and Etheridge (2006) led to s o m e critical 
observat ions of the approach taken to negot iate and apply targets within s o m e of 
the participating sec tors . In s o m e sectors , s u c h a s minerals and chemical 
production, the d e c r e a s e in e n e r g y consumpt ion would h a v e occurred in the 
a b s e n c e of the CCAs. Ekins and Etheridge attribute this to the impact of 
information a s y m m e t r i e s b e t w e e n industry and government , and the often 
"compelling arguments" of industry that any proposed m e a s u r e will c o s t more to 
industry than the reality. 
Contrary to the industry positioning on the CCL, further analys i s undertaken by 
Ekins and Etheridge led to the conclus ion that the CCL is, in fact, beneficial to the 
e c o n o m y d u e to the NIC rebates and resulting small i n c r e a s e s in G D P and 
employment levels . Furthermore, in terms of e c o n o m i c eff ic iency it is posi ted that 
a uniform environmental tax applied a c r o s s s e c t o r s can result in c h e a p e r 
emiss ion reductions c o m p a r e d to the situation w e find with the addition of CCA-
type instruments w h e r e s o m e c o m p a n i e s rece ive a reduced tax rate a s 
c o m p a n i e s not in receipt of a discount are often subject to a higher tax rate. 
5.5 Operation of CCA participants within the UK ETS 
Operators of target units are permitted to purchase a l l o w a n c e s from the UK ETS 
e m i s s i o n s trading registry (ETR)"^ in the e v e n t of a target unit not meet ing the 
targets spec i f i ed in the underlying a g r e e m e n t . The impact of CCA operators on 
the trading price of UK ETS a l l o w a n c e s h a s b e e n significant. Al lowance prices 
peaked in autumn 2 0 0 2 at around £ 1 2 . 5 0 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(COge). This peak is linked to the rush from CCA s ignatories to purchase 
The ETR was established as the trading registry for the UK ETS. 
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a l l o w a n c e s prior to the e n d of the 1®' target period in order to m e e t their targets 
(NAO, 2 0 0 7 a ) . S i n c e then the a l l o w a n c e price h a s d e c r e a s e d dramatically with 
the o c c a s i o n a l e levat ion to around £ 5 . In July 2 0 0 7 N a t s o u r c e Transact ion 
S e r v i c e s w e r e trading a l l o w a n c e s for C C A participants b e l o w £ 2 per t o n n e of 
C 0 2 e (Natsource , 2 0 0 7 ) . 
Figure 5.1 UKETS allowance price trends (March 2002 - November2005) 
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Source; Natsource (2007) 
Target unit operators and s e c t o r s are a l s o permitted to 'ring-fence' e m i s s i o n 
reductions. This m e a n s the operator / sector m a y p r e s e r v e any o v e r a c h i e v e m e n t 
for u s e a g a i n s t future interim targets (Defra, 2 0 0 2 d ) . This provision is c o m m o n l y 
referred to a s 'banking' in the context of e m i s s i o n s trading. S t u d i e s s h o w that 
banking c a n prevent price volatility within trading s c h e m e s and s u b s e q u e n t l y 
i n c r e a s e s certainty within the market (Ellerman, 2 0 0 5 , C a s o n and G a n d a g h a r a n , 
2 0 0 6 , S c h l e i c h et al., 2 0 0 6 , Tietenberg, 2 0 0 6 ) . Furthermore Sch le i ch et al. ( 2 0 0 6 ) 
argue that banking c a n r e d u c e overall c o m p l i a n c e c o s t s a s c o s t s a v i n g s c a n b e 
traded o v e r time. 
A brief c o m p a r i s o n of two trading s c h e m e s in the United S t a t e s : the sulphur 
dioxide (SO2) trading s c h e m e and the Regional Clean Air Incent ives Market 
(RECLAIM) d e m o n s t r a t e s the potential impact of banking. T h e RECLAIM 
p r o g r a m m e is particularly rigid in t erms of banking (specif ical ly inter-temporal 
banking w h e r e inter-temporal banking refers to the banking of e m i s s i o n s 
a l l o w a n c e s for u s e in future c o m m i t m e n t / c o m p l i a n c e periods) . A s a result, the 
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price f luctuations h a v e b e e n particularly s e v e r e (Ellerman, 2005) . On the other 
hand, the more lenient approach to banking within the SO2 programme h a s led to 
a significantly higher d e g r e e of price stability (Ellerman, 2005 ) . In the c a s e of 
CCAs, o v e r - a c h i e v e m e n t that is ring-fenced may be u s e d in the ins tance of an 
operator or sec tor not meet ing their interim targets. At the end of the third target 
period the majority of sec tors , 41 out of 49 , w e r e able to r ing-fence a l l o w a n c e s for 
future u s e (Defra, 2 0 0 7 a ) . Ring- fenced a l l o w a n c e s are available for s u b s e q u e n t 
s a l e via the UK ETS or u s e during the e m i s s i o n s / e n e r g y accounting prior to the 
s u b s e q u e n t interim target reconciliation. 
Ev idence from the U S A s u g g e s t s that banking may h a v e had a negat ive impact 
on the o u t c o m e of the CCAs. Scarcity of a l l o w a n c e s would h a v e led to higher 
a l lowance prices and a more fluid market. However , the perceived 
o v e r a c h i e v e m e n t aga ins t unambitious targets led to high v o l u m e s of a l l o w a n c e s 
entering the market and f e w being purchased . Problems a s s o c i a t e d with banking 
are neatly s u m m a r i s e d by Carson and Gandagharan (2006) w h o s tate that: 
'Price stability comes at a cost, however, since noncompliance and 
emissions are significantly greater when banking is allowed' 
(Carson & Gandagharan, 2006: p.199) 
This i s s u e w a s of particular concern during the period 2 0 0 2 - 2 0 0 6 , w h e n severa l 
key Direct Participants'^^ in the UK ETS over-performed, generat ing an additional 
surplus of 3 .5 million a l l o w a n c e s (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007 ) . 
5.6 Impact of industrial changes within CCA sectors 
British industry h a s exper i enced a period of rapid and dramatic c h a n g e during the 
last 6 0 years . Production in real terms (using 2 0 0 3 a s the benchmark of 100 
units) h a s increased steadily s i n c e the late 1 9 4 0 s (Figure 5.2) . This d e v e l o p m e n t 
has b e e n character ised by periodic, dramatic d e c r e a s e s in productivity in the late 
1970s , m i d - 1 9 8 0 s and early 1 9 9 0 s (Office of National Statistics, 2007) . Of 
particular interest to this thes i s is the d e c r e a s e in productivity exper i enced in 
There were 32 Direct Participants in the UK Emissions Trading Scheme. These 
companies voluntarily agreed to reduce their GHG emissions below a baseline (1998-
2000) in return for a share of £215 million incentive fund supplied by HM Treasury. The 
UK ETS operated for Direct Participants from 2002 until the end of 2006. After the end of 
2006, the ETS remained open to allow trading by CCA participants. 
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2 0 0 2 (Figure 5.3) . Tliis mirrors the reduction in output from the s t e e l sector , which 
h a p p e n s to b e o n e of the largest and m o s t e n e r g y intens ive s e c t o r s within the 
CCAs . 
Figure 5.2 Annual manufacturing productivity in reai terms since 1948 (using 
2003 as baseiine year - 100 units) 
Note: decrease in 
productivity in 
2002-03. 
Productivity 
returns to 2001 
levels in 2004 
Year 
Source: Adapted from Office of National Statistics (2007) 
Figure 5.3 Annual increase on previous year in manufacturing productivity in real 
terms since 1949 
12.00 
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Source: Adapted from Office of National Statistics (2007) 
The initial o v e r a c h i e v e m e n t in the first two target per iods h a s mainly b e e n 
attributed to t h e s e dramatic c h a n g e s within the s t ee l sec tor . Output from the s t e e l 
industry in 2 0 0 2 w a s 13 .3% b e l o w 2 0 0 1 l eve l s (Iron and S t e e l Stat ist ics Bureau, 
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2 0 0 6 ) . This w a s fo l lowed by an i n c r e a s e in output of 15% b e t w e e n 2 0 0 2 and 
2 0 0 4 , whilst e n e r g y u s e i n c r e a s e d by 10%, indicating that the s t e e l industry is 
making s o m e signif icant i m p r o v e m e n t s in its e n e r g y e f f i c i ency (Stern, 2 0 0 6 ) . 
It should b e noted that the s t e e l industry is not the s o l e c a u s e for the over-
a c h i e v e m e n t in the first two target periods. T h e calculation of the b a s e l i n e s for 
s o m e of the C C A s m a y h a v e had a n e g a t i v e impact on overall per formance . 
S e v e r a l s e c t o r targets w e r e ca lculated according to 1 9 9 0 e n e r g y u s e b a s e l i n e s . 
Defra justified the u s e of s u c h historical b a s e l i n e s o n the b a s i s of al lowing "credit 
for early action", e s p e c i a l l y in industries w h e r e s ignif icant i m p r o v e m e n t s w e r e 
m a d e in t h e early 1 9 9 0 s with little p r o s p e c t of n e w t e c h n o l o g i e s or a d v a n c e m e n t s 
in e n e r g y e f f i c i ency during the life of the CCAs . This m e t h o d o l o g y h a s similarities 
to the calculation of b a s e l i n e s in the UK ETS which h a s a l s o b e e n s u b j e c t e d to 
criticism (NAO, 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e u s e of early b a s e l i n e s , whi le giving credit for early 
action, m a y m e a n that the targets s e t aga ins t t h e s e b a s e l i n e s are not sufficiently 
chal lenging d e s p i t e the 'early action'. Difficulties in def ining early action and the 
impact on p e r f o r m a n c e targets undermined the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of both the C C A s 
and the UK E T S to varying d e g r e e s . 
A third explanat ion for the e a s e with which the first three target period targets 
h a v e b e e n met c e n t r e s on the theory p r e s e n t e d by Ekins and Etheridge ( 2 0 0 6 ) of 
b u s i n e s s e s k n o w l e d g e and inf luence in the negot iat ions . Helm ( 2 0 0 6 ) identified 
factors that in f luence the d e g r e e or this type of regulatory capture; staff turnover 
and s o u r c e of staff, sa lar i e s and "overwhelmingly, s trateg ic information 
revelation". In interview Defra a c k n o w l e d g e d that continuity of staff within its CCA 
t e a m and the l o s s of corporate k n o w l e d g e m a y b e of c o n c e r n to s o m e CCA 
participants. However , there are p r o c e d u r e s and pol ic ies in p l a c e in an at tempt to 
e n s u r e that n e w staff are a d e q u a t e l y trained and k n o w l e d g e a b l e through the u s e 
of checkl is ts , d a t a b a s e s and protocols . 
The revision of interim targets in 2 0 0 4 l e a d s to q u e s t i o n s o v e r the ability of Defra 
to nego t ia t e chal lenging targets e v e n in the p r e s e n c e of reliable data is 
ques t ionab le . Following the r e l e a s e of per formance data in 2 0 0 4 it b e c a m e 
apparent that the C C A s e c t o r s had o v e r a c h i e v e d aga ins t targets by an a g g r e g a t e 
of 5%. Defra had the right to t ighten targets that w e r e p e r c e i v e d to b e t o o lenient. 
Desp i t e the availability of initial c o m p l i a n c e data indicating a 5% a g g r e g a t e 
tightening w a s required (NAO, 2 0 0 7 a ) , Defra negot ia ted an a g g r e g a t e tightening 
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of 3 .2% of 2 0 0 6 targets, 2 .7% for 2 0 0 8 targets and 3 .0% for 2 0 1 0 targets. In 
interview, Defra stated that it did not be l ieve it w a s in a position to force tougher 
targets on sectors , desp i te the availability of e v i d e n c e to the contrary, indicating 
the p r e s e n c e of regulatory capture. Furthermore, the t imesca l e of the r e l e a s e of 
verified performance data from Defra's consul tants w a s uncoordinated with the 
negot iat ions a s the verified data w a s r e l e a s e d following the negotiation s t a g e 
(NAO, 2 0 0 7 a ) . 
It is interesting to note that a recent study on voluntary a g r e e m e n t s in Chile found 
that e v e n in the p r e s e n c e of s o m e d e g r e e of regulatory capture, significant 
environmental improvements c a n be m a d e (J imenez , 2007) . This s tudy s u g g e s t s 
that regulatory capture may not be s o s e v e r e a s to n e g a t e any possibility of 
improvement in the environmental performance of c o m p a n i e s . Thus , the impact 
of regulatory capture on the environmental o u t c o m e s of policy instruments is a 
matter of d e g r e e . In this regard, it should be noted that capture of this nature is 
not restricted to voluntary m e a s u r e s , but all forms of environmental governance . 
This will cont inue to b e the c a s e while g o v e r n m e n t s and regulatory bodies rely 
upon industry for information. 
This t e a c h e s us a valuable l e s son . Industry m a y h a v e a better understanding of 
what it c a n a c h i e v e but the n e e d remains to push industry to a c h i e v e more, 
despi te its protestations about the negat ive impacts of environmental policy. 
Where there is information asymmetry the justification for increased spot 
monitoring and tougher compl iance s y s t e m s a l so increase . 
5.7 Evyoos/evaluation within Parliament 
Following the publication of the NAO review of the CCL and C C A s in 2 0 0 7 , the 
H o u s e of C o m m o n s Environmental Audit Commit tee (EAC) c o m m e n c e d an 
investigation into the role of the CCL and C C A s in reducing g r e e n h o u s e g a s 
e m i s s i o n s from UK b u s i n e s s e s . The EAC called upon numerous s takeholders to 
provide e v i d e n c e including representat ives from the Carbon Trust, government 
advisors and sec tor assoc iat ion representat ives . The Commit tee r e l e a s e d its 
findings in March 2 0 0 8 (Environmental Audit Committee , 2008) . In this report the 
EAC a c k n o w l e d g e d that the CCL h a s not had the e f fect first predicted by the 
Government upon b u s i n e s s energy consumption. Furthermore, the report 
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identified the i s s u e s relating to base l ine se lec t ion and the implications for 
a s s e s s i n g the overall e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the Agreement s : 
'It appears to us that isolating and enumerating the impacts of the Climate 
Change Agreements is even more complex and uncertain than accounting 
for the impacts of the Climate Change Levy. It is remarkable that the 
performance of most sectors is measured from a variety of different starting 
points that predate the start of the Agreements; in three cases stretching 
back to 1990. While measuring the impact of Agreements by reference to 
business as usual projections avoids some of these problems, it also creates 
new ones of its own: as we have argued in previous reports, BAU projections 
intrinsically lack certainty, and depend very much on the quality of the 
assumptions and data used to generate them. For these reasons we 
recommend that, when reporting figures for the impacts of the Agreements, 
the Government gives a range of uncertainty attaching to them.' 
(Environmental Audit Committee, 2008: p.18) 
The EAC a l s o criticised the Government for failing to tighten the interim targets, 
especial ly given the v a s t over-performance of m a n y s e c t o r s in the first three 
target periods. In light of the strength of t h e s e criticisms coupled v\/ith the 
administrative complexity of the CCAs, it is surprising the EAC indicated support 
for the cont inued u s e of C C A s beyond the existing life-span provided the 
A g r e e m e n t s are adapted to better account for other policies (including the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment and the EU ETS (Environmental Audit committee , 2008 ) . 
As a result, Defra h a s surprisingly dec ided to extend the A g r e e m e n t s by five 
years . 
5.8 Overview of evidence-based analysis 
To populate the e v i d e n c e - b a s e d analys i s quest ionnaires w/ere s e n t to the 4 9 
sector a s s o c i a t i o n s party to a CCA. Quest ionnaires altered to account for 
'external' s takeho lders (i.e. non-sector assoc ia t ion actors) w e r e s e n t to a further 
2 5 individuals or representat ives of organisat ions . The 2 5 non-sec tor assoc iat ion 
s takeholders included non-governmenta l organisat ions, a c a d e m i c s , consul tants 
and government departments . The r e s p o n s e rate from both groups w a s 
reasonable: 36% of sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s r e s p o n d e d and 32% of external 
s takeholders re sponded . The overall r e s p o n s e rate w a s 32%. 
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The majority of r e s p o n d e n t s from both the sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s and external 
s takeholder groups (69% and 85% respectively) w e r e willing to b e interviewed. 
Ten interviews w e r e conducted in 2 0 0 7 . T h e interviewees w e r e ca tegor i sed a s 
follows: s ec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s (6 interviews); consul tants (3 interviews); and 
government (1 interview). 
5.8.1 Sector associations 
The responding sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s varied in s i z e according to the number of 
c o m p a n i e s they represent . T h e majority of a s s o c i a t i o n s represented more than 
21 c o m p a n i e s ( s e e Table 5.4). In terms of the number of target units participating 
within the CCA administered by a s ec tor assoc iat ion , the mos t c o m m o n 
frequency is b e t w e e n 11 and 31 target units ( s e e Table 5.5) . 
Table 5.4 Size of responding sector associations (number of companies) 
Size % respondents 
1-5 12.5% 
6-10 12.5% 
11-15 12.5% 
16-20 6.3% 
21 + 50% 
Table 5.5 Number of target units within each CCA administered by responding 
sector associations 
Number of target units % respondents 
1-10 25% 
11-30 31% 
31-50 6% 
51-70 13% 
71-90 0% 
91 + 25% 
On the b a s i s of the r a n g e s presented a b o v e the minimum number of c o m p a n i e s 
represented by the responding sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s is 2 3 6 c o m p a n i e s . The 
maximum number is at l eas t 268 . T h e minimum number of target units within the 
A g r e e m e n t s administered by the responding sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s is 5 5 6 . The 
maximum number of target units is at least 744 . 
5.9 Economic efficiency 
When approached in the context of the policy mix of CCL and CCA, the majority 
of both s takeholder groups s tated that the C C A s operate in an economica l ly 
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efficient m a n n e r althougin a s i z e a b l e minority (25%) of all r e s p o n d e n t s ranked the 
e f f ic iency a s 'very inefficient' or 'quite inefficient'. Approximately 2 0 % of 
r e s p o n d e n t s rated the e f f ic iency a s 'average' , with the remaining 5 5 % rating the 
e c o n o m i c e f f ic iency of C C A s a s either 'quite efficient' or 'very efficient'. More than 
7 9 % of r e s p o n d e n t s a l s o b e l i e v e that voluntary p r o g r a m m e s s u c h a s C C A s result 
in c o s t s a v i n g s to industry c o m p a r e d with traditional regu la t ion-based a p p r o a c h e s 
to environmenta l protection. However , only 4 2 % of all r e s p o n d e n t s b e l i e v e the 
s a m e to b e true for the Government . Defra, on the other hand, s ta ted that the 
C C A s c h e a p e r for the G o v e r n m e n t to administer: 
"A regulatory approach would cost more because additional civil servants 
would be needed to administer the scheme, police it and enforce it. Also 
there would be penalties for breaching the rules in the form of 
prosecutions which cost a lot in time, fees to lawyers (inc. barristers) and 
court costs." 
T h e percept ion of c o s t s and bene f i t s of the C C A s are much m o r e posit ive 
c o m p a r e d with EL) E T S and UK ETS. T h e benef i t s are perce ived by industry to 
slightly outwe igh the c o s t s for both industry and g o v e r n m e n t (50% and 3 8 % 
respect ive ly) . It is surprising that the percept ion in favour of industry is not higher. 
However , during the interview p r o c e s s all s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n s w e r e a s k e d 
whether they b e l i e v e c o m p a n i e s could h a v e m a d e financial s a v i n g s on e n e r g y 
expendi ture in the p r e s e n c e of the full rate of the CCL via e n e r g y e f f i c iency 
m e a s u r e s a lone . All interview participants a g r e e d that this could h a v e occurred. 
H e n c e , industry m a y h a v e b e e n ab le to r e d u c e e n e r g y c o s t s via ef f ic iency 
m e a s u r e s a l o n e without the CCL rebate . C o n s e q u e n t l y , C C A s m a y represent an 
additional administrative burden that is not entirely n e c e s s a r y . P e r c e p t i o n s 
relating to the b a l a n c e of total c o s t s and benef i t s of the C C A s are provided in 
Figure 5 . 4 and Figure 5 .5 . 
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Figure 5.4 Perceptions of costs and benefits incurred by companies participating 
in CCAs 
• Sector 
association 
External 
stakeholders 
Costs Costs slightly Costs equal Benefits Benefits 
significantly outweight to benefits slightly significantly 
outweigh benefits outweigh outweigh 
benefits costs costs 
Figure 5.5 Perceptions of costs and benefits incurred by Government though the 
CCAs 
• Sector association 
External stakeholders 
Costs Costs slightly Costs equal Benefits Benefits 
significantly outweight to benefits slightly significantly 
outweigh benefits outweigh outweigh 
benefits costs costs 
All s u r v e y r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e a s k e d w h e t h e r they be l i eve the CCL/CCA policy 
p a c k a g e r e p r e s e n t s the b e s t policy option in t e r m s of overall e c o n o m i c ef f ic iency 
and environmenta l o u t c o m e s . External s t a k e h o l d e r s are l eas t likely to p e r c e i v e 
C C A s a s the b e s t policy option in both s e n s e s a s l e s s than 4 0 % be l i eve C C A s to 
be the b e s t policy option. T h e majority of s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n s on the other hand 
be l i eve the C C A s are the m o s t e conomica l l y eff icient m a n n e r in which to a c h i e v e 
e n e r g y u s e reduct ions . Converse ly , m o s t s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n s do not be l i eve 
C C A s are the b e s t option in t erms of environmental o u t c o m e s . This contradiction 
is relatively s imple to explain. CCAs , by their voluntary nature, work in favour of 
participating firms a s they m a y b e c h e a p e r to administer than other forms of 
regulation (Karamanos , 2 0 0 2 ) . T h e CCL discount m a k e s the C C A s particularly 
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cos t - e f f ec t ive for firms. T h e majority of all r e s p o n d e n t s (58%) be l i eve a s tand-
a lone e m i s s i o n s trading s c h e m e would b e a more cos t - e f f ec t i ve policy to r e d u c e 
e n e r g y c o n s u m p t i o n in C C A s e c t o r s (Figure 5.6) . During the c o u r s e of the 
interviews it b e c a m e apparent that the primary r e a s o n for this p r e f e r e n c e for 
e m i s s i o n s trading w a s linked to the complexi ty of the CCL/CCA p a c k a g e in a 
s tand a l o n e s e n s e and a l s o the complex i ty of the interaction b e t w e e n C C A s and 
EU ETS. 
Figure 5.6 Preferred poiicy option in economic terms 
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Interview r e s p o n d e n t s frequently d i s c u s s e d e m i s s i o n s trading, with m o s t s e c t o r 
a s s o c i a t i o n s e x p r e s s i n g support for a shift from the non-mandatory C C A s to 
mandatory e m i s s i o n s trading for e n e r g y intens ive s e c t o r s currently falling outs ide 
of remit of the EU ETS. S e n t i m e n t s included: 
"[Emissions trading] is a valid control instrument and likely to give better 
results than CCAs." 
"Emissions trading is having to happen anyway. CCAs are just a 
bureaucratic gateway you have to pass to get to emissions trading." 
However , s o m e c o n c e r n s raised o v e r the u s e of e m i s s i o n s trading w e r e a l s o 
noted. T h e ability of e m i s s i o n s trading to st imulate g o o d e n e r g y m a n a g e m e n t and 
efficient u s e of e n e r g y c a n c a u s e c o n c e r n a s organisat ion m a y b e c o m e "pre-
occupied witii ensuring tiiey iiave enough credits to do what they want to do 
instead of asl<ing whether they actuaiiy need to do what they want to dd\ 
Furthermore, it is p o s s i b l e that e n e r g y price r i ses occurring a s a result of the EU 
ETS d o not provide a sufficient driver a l o n e to m a k e real p r o g r e s s in improving 
the e n e r g y ef f ic iency of industrial e n e r g y c o n s u m e r s . A m e c h a n i s m s u c h a s 
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CCAs on the other hand w a s noted by all interview r e s p o n d e n t s for providing the 
impetus to b u s i n e s s e s to p lace e n e r g y m a n a g e m e n t at the top of the corporate 
a g e n d a . 
The survey a l so led to the identification of fundamental d i f ferences in the cultural 
attitude of s e c t o r s with regard to environmental protection. O n e respondent 
stated that: 
"The CCL discount is the key driver [for participating in a CCA]; all other 
[drivers] are equally insignificant." 
Another re spondent stated in r e s p o n s e to a quest ion concerning whether C C A s 
h a v e resulted in c o m p a n i e s including the c o s t of GHG e m i s s i o n s into their 
b u s i n e s s activities that: 
"Outside of work, I am sure they [people working within manufacturing] 
are concerned about the environment. Inside of their work they are 
struggling to survive and so what is important is getting the next order." 
Conversely , four sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s clearly took more favourable s t a n c e s to 
environmental protection. O n e re spondent cited a key driver as : 
"The collective will to meet targets and therefore demonstrate 
environmental credentials." 
The other three sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s s tated that participation w a s in keeping with 
the environmental policy of the organisation. 
5.10 Environmental effectiveness 
The rel iance of industry-sourced data upon which to b a s e performance targets in 
all but 14 s e c t o r s (the 14 s e c t o r s included in the GAD a s s e s s m e n t ) s u g g e s t s that 
a certain d e g r e e of regulatory capture took place during the negotiation of the 
initial CCA targets. W h e r e GAD modell ing w a s not available Defra relied on 
industry to provide base l ine e n e r g y consumpt ion data and carbon dioxide 
e m i s s i o n s (NAO, 2 0 0 7 a ) . A consultant s tated in d e f e n c e of Defra that: 
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"Industry representatives were adamant that the targets Defra agreed at 
the time were going to cripple them and evidence shows that they 
haven't. But I don't think Defra were in a defendable position to do 
anything more than that." 
The position taken by Defra led to s ignif icant revis ions in the actual contribution of 
C C A s to annual BAD carbon e m i s s i o n s (Figure 5 .7) . 
Figure 5.7 Emission reductions compared to business as usual scenario 
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Actual emissions reflecting reported savings 
Source: NAO (2007a) 
All ques t ionnaire r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e a s k e d to identify w h e t h e r they be l i eve the 
C C A s represent the b e s t policy option for their industrial activities in t erms of 
reducing GHG e m i s s i o n s via e n e r g y e f f i c iency improvements , 4 4 % of s e c t o r 
a s s o c i a t i o n s be l i eve the C C A s are the b e s t policy option. Interestingly, 19% of 
s e c t o r s are unsure and a signif icant minority (38%) be l i eve C C A s are not the b e s t 
policy option. T h e v a s t majority of external s takeho lders (63%) d o not be l i eve 
C C A s are the b e s t policy option in environmental terms. T h e remaining 3 7 % 
d i sagree . However , it should b e noted that within the external s takeho lder group 
there are r e s p o n s e s from Defra and consu l tant s e m p l o y e d on their behalf to 
undertake monitoring and reporting duties . 
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R e s p o n d e n t s w h o e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n about the environmental e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 
C C A s w e r e a s k e d to spec i fy the policy instrument they be l i eve would b e the m o s t 
environmental ly e f fec t ive m e a n s to r e d u c e GHG e m i s s i o n s from CCA s e c t o r s . 
T h e breakdown of t h e s e r e s p o n s e s are p r e s e n t e d in Figure 5 . 8 
Figure 5.8 Preferred policy response of respondents who doubt ttie 
environmental effectiveness of CCAs 
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There is a p r e f e r e n c e for e m i s s i o n s trading from an environmental perspec t ive 
within both s t a k e h o l d e r groups . In order to minimise the administrative burden of 
c o m p a n i e s participating in C C A s and EU E T S o n e r e s p o n d e n t s ta ted that the 
C C A s should b e withdrawn in favour of the EU E T S d u e to the high-profile nature 
of the S c h e m e ; 
"I think the way forward is the EU ETS. On the wider climate change 
policy front emissions trading is now seen as the most important policy 
measure. The EU ETS is looked upon as one of the leaders in the field 
globally. In order to avoid double regulation I think we should not extend 
CCAs beyond the present life." 
Furthermore, environmental benef i t s of allowing installations to i n c r e a s e a b s o l u t e 
e m i s s i o n s yet still c o m p l y of the relative C C A target are unlikely. J o h n s t o n e ( 2 0 0 3 ) 
a s s e r t s the u s e of relative targets in negot ia ted environmental a g r e e m e n t s and 
e m i s s i o n s trading p r o g r a m m e s is of q u e s t i o n a b l e environmental benefit . This is 
largely d u e to the environmental uncertainty surrounding the o u t c o m e of the 
programme a s e m i s s i o n a b a t e m e n t is h inged on production levels . This c o n c e p t 
w a s supported by o n e consultant: 
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"I think it is a much better option and I think the EU ETS is a great way to 
go. I would want the companies currently covered by a CCA to be 
incorporated into the EU ETS. EU ETS is a very good mechanism. It is a 
market mechanism that can't be fudged. You can't create emissions 
credits. With CCAs you manage to create an emissions credit, a public 
good, by increasing output. Your emissions go up but you emit less per 
unit so you create this emissions credit out of nowhere. That is not fair. 
Telling people they have an absolute emissions limit and people can do 
what the hell they like to achieve that - you can close a factory, put in 
more efficient kit, change your product mix. It incentivises people to 
move manufacturing into the most energy efficient and emissions 
efficient type of plant which is what we are trying to achieve ultimately." 
T h e s e s e n t i m e n t s w e r e e c h o e d by a s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n respondent ; 
"From an environmental point of view it is possible to increase energy 
efficiency but at the same time increase emissions. Whereas emissions 
trading when you have an absolute cap, from an environmental point of 
view, might appear to be the most attractive. Whereas relative targets 
such as CCAs do allow companies to increase production and overall 
emissions." 
O n e s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n respondent , w h o s e s e n t i m e n t s w e r e general ly n e g a t i v e 
regarding policy intervention in environmental i s s u e s (specif ical ly e n e r g y 
m a n a g e m e n t ) , surprisingly s ta t ed that they would rather s e e their s e c t o r included 
in EU E T S that s e e the continuation of the CCAs: 
"I don't think the CCAs have worked. Meeting Kyoto targets has been 
primarily down to the dash for gas - and that can only be done once. If 
they start to use nuclear - 20-30 years away - then where else is there to 
go? As much as we have fought to remain outside of EU ETS - we are 
certainly out of Phase II - I still think it is a valid control instrument and 
likely to give better results than CCAs." 
D e s p i t e the c o n c e r n s and availability of data quest ioning the environmenta l 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the CCAs , o n e s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n w a s a d a m a n t that it would 
support the continuation of the C C A s b e y o n d 2 0 1 3 for o n e reason: to avoid 
admitting their prev ious promotion of C C A s m a y h a v e b e e n misguided: 
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"There are major differences between CCAs and EU ETS but we tend to 
stick with CCAs as it was our idea. If we move away from it people might 
even say we were even wrong and we should have gone this other way 
[towards emissions trading]." 
This is alarming and d o e s not contribute positively to arguments in favour of 
continuing the A g r e e m e n t s . If anything, c o m m e n t s s u c h a s this only s e r v e to 
discredit any 'pro-post-2013' CCA arguments . 
5 .11 Transparency 
Many authors h a v e previously highlighted the fundamental role of a reliable and 
credible legal backdrop in V E A s in order to e n s u r e environmental g o a l s are 
ach ieved (Helby, 2 0 0 2 , Makuch, 2 0 0 3 , Ekins and Etheridge, 2006 ) . Ekins and 
Etheridge (2006) a s ser t that C C A s d o indeed offer s u c h credible sanc t ions in the 
form of the removal of the 80% CCL discount from target units failing to m e e t their 
interim targets. T h e empirical data col lected for this thes i s supports this notion, a s 
57% of external s takeho lders and 69% of sec tor a s soc ia t ions be l i eve that the loss 
of the 80% CCL discount is a sufficient penalty to deter non-compl iance . A further 
19% of sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s be l ieve that the penalty is too s e v e r e and should be 
replaced with the i s s u a n c e of a formal warning and public d isc losure of target 
units failing to m e e t their targets. However , this type of penalty is unlikely to be 
acceptab le to external s takeho lders a s voluntary a g r e e m e n t s rely on "credible" 
sanction. A non-financial warning is unlikely to deter sub-optimal behaviour. 
The involvement of s takeholders external to industry is an area of the policy the 
two groups of participants exhibited clear di f ferences . 31% of sec tor assoc iat ion 
bel ieve that external s takeho lders had too much influence in the d e v e l o p m e n t of 
CCAs with the remaining 69% stating external s takeholder participation w a s 
acceptable . Of the external s takeholder group 50% bel ieve that external 
s takeholders w e r e not involved sufficiently during the d e v e l o p m e n t of CCAs. This 
is particularly significant a s the link b e t w e e n public/external participation in policy 
decis ion making and the level of transparency of policies h a s b e e n widely 
a c k n o w l e d g e d and m o s t notably within the Aarhus Convention (UNECE, 2000 ) . A 
further 38% of external s takeho lders s tated that the level of transparency of the 
CCAs either h a s s o m e a r e a s in n e e d of improvement or the level of transparency 
is wholly unacceptab le . External s takeholders identified o n e particularly 
problematic area a s the rel iance on industry to provide reliable and accurate data 
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to inform the setting of base l ines . Two external s takeholders a l s o s tated that the 
a b s e n c e of performance data on individual target units r e d u c e s the level of 
transparency of the A g r e e m e n t s . A practice of 'naming and shaming ' target units 
that fail to m e e t the underlying a g r e e m e n t targets and "comprehensive reporting 
in the public domairl' would significantly improve the perception of transparency 
of the a g r e e m e n t s . However , Defra justified the current level of reporting and 
administrative transparency by stating; 
"This isn't a mandatory scheme. These are voluntary agreements and they 
already have the penalty that if they forget to report or if they fail to report 
their performance against their targets for our reconciliation, their Climate 
Change Agreement is terminated straightaway. So, they stop getting their 
discount from April 1®' after that Our overarching policy aim is to have as 
much energy covered by Climate Change Agreements as possible 
because that way we have the challenging energy efficiency or emission 
reduction targets and we've got some improvement in energy efficiency on 
all of that energy. We don't really want to fight the people out of the 
scheme." 
In e s s e n c e , Defra did not (and plans not to in the future) increase the level of 
public reporting a s it is fearful that in doing s o target units, or e v e n entire sec tors , 
would l e a v e the CCAs. Yet looking at posit ions of both groups - Defra a s 
government negotiator, industry a s the target a u d i e n c e - it is difficult to 
understand the s t a n c e taken by Defra. In offering a significant reduction on CCL 
payments Defra is in an incredibly strong negotiating position. Given the financial 
value of participation to industry (and bearing in mind that e v e n if an individual 
target unit fails to m e e t its target it will still rece ive the discount if the w h o l e s ec tor 
m e e t s the target), it is hard to be l i eve that increased public reporting and the u s e 
of "naming and shaming" would deter participation. 
5.12 Flexibility 
The voluntary nature of the C C A s give c o m p a n i e s the power to improve the 
m a n a g e m e n t of their investment dec i s ions , a s demonstrated by the r e s p o n s e s in 
Table 5.6. T h e u s e of relative targets , in particular, w a s raised in the interviews a s 
having a positive e f fec t upon the flexibility of the A g r e e m e n t s . Further to this 
point, the C C A s w e r e introduced for an initial period of 13 years . The certainty 
that a c c o m p a n i e s s u c h a long-term policy approach is ref lected in the c o n f i d e n c e 
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industry h a s in i n v e s t m e n t dec i s ion making linked to the CCAs . Uncertainty about 
the future of pol ic ies h a s b e e n previously s h o w n to h a v e detrimental e f f e c t s upon 
industry c o n f i d e n c e in future inves tment dec i s ion making (European C o m m i s s i o n , 
2 0 0 6 b ) . 
Table 5.6 Rating of flexibility with regard to management of investment decision 
making 
Respondent 
aroup 
No flexibility Very little 
flexibility 
Moderate 
flexibility 
High flexibility 
Sector 
associations 
0% 0% 88% 12% 
External 
stakeholders 
0% 0% 50% 50% 
Table 5.7 Rating of flexibility with regard to industry deciding how to reduce 
emissions/energy consumption in the most cost-effective manner 
Respondent 
group 
No flexibility Very little 
flexibility 
Moderate 
flexibility 
High flexibility 
Sector 
associations 
0% 25% 56% 19% 
External 
stakeholders 
0% 25% 37.5% 37.5% 
The m o s t interesting results relating to flexibility c o n c e r n the d e g r e e to which 
C C A s allow industry to opt imise e m i s s i o n reduct ion/energy ef f ic iency 
improvement s according to the marginal a b a t e m e n t c o s t s of individual firms 
(Table 5 .7) . A quarter of both g r o u p s of s takeho lder b e l i e v e the C C A s offer very 
little flexibility in this respec t . T h e s e stat ist ics are surprising s i n c e C C A s h a v e a 
trading provision that shou ld help to identify w h e r e marginal a b a t e m e n t c o s t are 
lowest . T h e combinat ion of a voluntary a g r e e m e n t with the ability to buy or sel l 
e x c e s s a l l o w a n c e s should m a k e the C C A s a highly f lexible option for the 
industries c o n c e r n e d . T h e low trading price of a l l o w a n c e s , a characterist ic of the 
UK E T S for all but a f e w m o n t h s in 2 0 0 2 , should h a v e m a d e the p u r c h a s e of 
a l l o w a n c e s an attractive option for c o m p a n i e s . In fact, m o r e than 5 6 % of s e c t o r 
a s s o c i a t i o n s reported that b e t w e e n 11% and 5 0 % of their m e m b e r s had 
p u r c h a s e d a l l o w a n c e s from the UK ETS. Without this facility in p lace , t h e s e 
installations m a y h a v e failed to surrender sufficient a l l o w a n c e s at the e n d of e a c h 
interim target period. 
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5.13 Innovation 
The majority of all stal<eholders be l ieve that C C A s incentivise a d e g r e e of 
technological innovation within participating firms (Table 5.8) . However, a 
s i z eab le minority (25% of sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s and 37 .5% of external 
s takeholders) be l ieve they h a v e no impact either way. The e l e m e n t of e m i s s i o n s 
trading via the UK ETS should provide an additional e c o n o m i c incentive for firms 
to innovate via opportunities to sell e x c e s s a l l o w a n c e s g e n e r a t e d through the 
introduction of more e n e r g y efficient technology . However, the vast over-
allocation of a l l o w a n c e s to UK ETS Direct Participants and the leniency of s o m e 
CCA targets h a v e diminished the financial appea l of making additional energy 
eff ic iency s a v i n g s in order to sell surplus a l l owances . 
Table 5.8 Degree to which CCAs incentivise technoiogicaiinnovation within 
energy-intensive industry 
Respondent 
aroup 
Strong 
disincentive 
Slight 
disincentive 
No impact Slight 
incentive 
Strong 
incentive 
Sector 
associations 
0% 0% 25% 63% 12% 
External 
stakeholders 
0% 0% 37.5% 37.5% 25% 
Sector a s s o c i a t i o n s w e r e a s k e d to identify the c h a n g e s within their s e c t o r s that 
are directly attributable to the p r e s e n c e of CCAs (Table 5.9) . The level of 
a w a r e n e s s within senior m a n a g e m e n t of cl imate c h a n g e w a s identified a s the 
primary c h a n g e . It is reassuring to note that 88% of sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s reported 
that their m e m b e r s had a l so installed n e w equipment with higher eff ic iency 
ratings that previous equ ipment in order to m e e t CCA targets. 
Tabie 5.9 Stated changes within activities arising directiy from CCAs 
Change directly related to CCAs % respondents 
Increased awareness of climate change within senior 94 
management 
Introduction of equipment/machinery with higher energy efficiency 
rating than previous equipment/machinery 
88 
Improved environmental reporting 69 
Inclusion of the cost of carbon in new project appraisals 56 
Process changes 44 
Improved monitoring and reporting of peripheral systems 12 
Improved auditing/comparisons of performance within sector 12 
Improved supply chain management 0 
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5.14 Acceptance and equity 
Industry s takeholders h a v e a strong s e n s e of a c c e p t a n c e for the C C A s with 88% 
of s ec tor assoc iat ion stating they had either qualified or full a c c e p t a n c e (Table 
5.10). It is surprising that 60% of external s takeholders a l so mirrored t h e s e 
sent iments . Voluntary policy instruments often suffer from negat ive p r e s s and 
rece ive little support from circles beyond government and industry, exemplif ied by 
the European car manufacturer's a g r e e m e n t (ACEA, JAMA and KAMA 
agreements ) . 
Table 5.10 Level of acceptance for CCAs according to stakeholder group 
Stakeholder 
aroup 
Full 
rejection 
Qualified 
rejection 
Indifference Qualified 
acceptance 
Full 
acceptance 
Sector 
associations 
0% 6% 6% 44% 44% 
External 
stakeholders 
0% 20% 20% 20% 40% 
R e s p o n d e n t s w e r e a s k e d to rank the level of fa irness of the C C A s taking certain 
i s s u e s into account . T h e s e i s s u e s included: the e c o n o m i c c o s t s of C C A s incurred 
by industry and government; social benef i t s arising from the CCAs; c h a n g e s in 
environmental quality; and the distribution of c o s t s and benef i ts of the CCAs. A 
breakdown of the r e s p o n s e s is provided in Table 5 .11 . 
Table 5.11 Rating of fairness of the CCAs 
Stakeholder 
group 
Very unfair Slightly unfair Fair Very fair 
Sector 
associations 
0% 25% 69% 6% 
External 
stakeholders 
0% 0% 88% 12% 
It is surprising that all external s takeho lders rate the C C A s a s either fair or very 
fair. This contradicts as sumpt ion m a d e by the Aldersgate Group'^" that non-
industry actors do not fully support voluntary environmental policy instruments 
(Aldersgate Group, 2006) . The r e s p o n s e s from sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s provide 
further useful insights. O n e quarter of sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s be l ieve the C C A s to be, 
overall, unfair particularly given e v i d e n c e col lected during the interviews 
indicating that s o m e s e c t o r s be l ieve C C A s in conjunction with the CCL is not a 
44 The Aldersgate Group is a coalition of NGOs, academics, industry representatives and 
think tanks "w/7<? believe that high environmental standards wiii be a major part of future 
economic growth and international competitiveness' 
(www.aldersqateqroup.ora.uk/home). 
- 170 
suitable policy approach and l e a v e s industry vulnerable to international 
competition. However, the v i e w s of industry on this are largely b a s e d on 
anecdotal e v i d e n c e and there is little e v i d e n c e available to support the notion of 
UK firms c los ing or relocating abroad a s a direct c o n s e q u e n c e of the CCL and 
CCAs. 
The strong s e n s e of a c c e p t a n c e of the C C A s within industry coupled with Defra's 
position of Its ability to offer chal lenging targets indicate that lobbying by sec tor 
a s soc ia t ions w a s a key feature in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the A g r e e m e n t s . Many of 
the sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s interviewed for this research talked about the role of their 
organisat ions in the negotiation of the A g r e e m e n t s . They frequently drew 
attention to their s u c c e s s in w e a k e n i n g the targets proposed by Defra only for 
t h e s e targets to b e met with cons iderable e a s e by c o m p a n i e s . Individual 
c o m p a n i e s may not be in a position to lobby g o v e r n m e n t s to s u c h an extent but 
many sec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s are in p lace with the primary objective of ensuring the 
interests of their m e m b e r s are protected. This highlights the importance of having 
parties with conflicting interests, s u c h a s N G O s with an environmental a g e n d a , at 
involved not only in the d e v e l o p m e n t of instrument but during the negotiation of 
performance targets. 
5.15 Other issues 
Several other pertinent i s s u e s w e r e raised in both the quest ionnaire r e s p o n s e s 
and interviews. The key area of concern relates to the interaction b e t w e e n C C A s 
and other climate c h a n g e policies. The c o h e s i o n with the EU ETS is particularly 
concerning d u e to the c o m p l e x methodo logy u s e d to adjust targets for 
installations operating within both s y s t e m s . This sect ion will detail the operation 
of the C C A s within the EU ETS and UK ETS in further detail. Another important 
i s s u e raised repeatedly w a s the impact of escalat ing e n e r g y c o s t s and the 
implications for the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the CCAs. 
5.15.1 Interaction between CCAs and other climate change policies 
Any a s s e s s m e n t of the Climate C h a n g e A g r e e m e n t s would not be comple te 
without deal ing with the often intricate and complex relationship b e t w e e n the 
A g r e e m e n t s and other environmental policies. The role of the IPPC Directive in 
defining the eligibility of an installation to participate in the C C A s and the impact 
of the C C A s on the UK ETS h a s already b e e n ana lysed . O n e further instrument 
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h a s a s ignif icant impact on the CCAs: the EU ETS, T h e interaction b e t w e e n 
IPPC, CCAs , CCL and other key pol ic ies s u c h a s EU ETS and UK ETS is 
d e m o n s t r a t e d in Figure 5 . 9 IPPC forms the b a s i s of qualification for both C C A s 
and EU ETS. Until 2 0 0 7 installations c o v e r e d by a CCA and EU ETS w e r e 
permitted to opt-out of P h a s e 1. This e x e m p t i o n w a s withdrawn for P h a s e 11. All 
installations c o v e r e d by IPPC are subjec t to the CCL. 
Figure 5.9 Interaction between CCL, iPPC, CCA, EU ETS and UK ETS 
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5 . 1 5 . 1 . 1 E u r o p e a n Union E m i s s i o n s Trading S c h e m e 
The interaction b e t w e e n the EU ETS and C C A s is c o m p l e x . T h e m o s t press ing of 
i s s u e s is d o u b l e count ing of e m i s s i o n s that are potentially c o v e r e d by both the 
EU E T S and CCAs . Installations c o v e r e d by both pol ic ies w e r e g iven the 
opportunity to opt-out of the EU ETS until the e n d of P h a s e I. Of the 5 0 0 target 
units el igible for EU E T S participation, 3 3 0 c h o s e to opt out (Defra, 2 0 0 7 a ) . In 
order to avoid target units operat ing within both s c h e m e s receiving twice the 
benefit or twice the penalty for c h a n g e s in e m i s s i o n s , Defra introduced a 
m e t h o d o l o g y to correct the CCA target to a c c o u n t for e m i s s i o n s included in the 
EU ETS. In the majority of c a s e s the e m i s s i o n s a s s o c i a t e d with electricity 
consumpt ion remained within the CCA. Direct e m i s s i o n s from p r o c e s s e s fell 
within the EU ETS. In s o m e s i tuations c o m b u s t i o n e m i s s i o n s w e r e c o v e r e d by the 
EU ETS. T h e s e e m i s s i o n s m a y a l s o h a v e b e e n c o v e r e d by a CCA. H o w e v e r 
s o m e other p r o c e s s e m i s s i o n s could b e included in the CCA but not in the EU 
ETS. Therefore , Defra adjusted CCA targets to r e m o v e EU E T S - c o v e r e d 
e m i s s i o n s . Defra s u b s e q u e n t l y c o m p a r e d the CCA per formance of the target unit 
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aga ins t the rev i sed C C A target (Defra, 2 0 0 6 b ) . Defra g u i d a n c e o n double 
counting s p e c i f i e s that: 
'If an operator reduces emissions, then they may have a surplus of 
allowances for sale on EU ETS or banking for future use. The same 
reduction in emissions may also mean that the operator over-performs 
against their CCA target, which can be converted into allowances for sale 
on UK ETS. in other words, the operator gains allowances on both 
trading schemes for the same reduction in emissions. Conversely, if 
emissions increase, operators may find themselves forced to obtain 
allowances on both EU ETS and UK ETS to meet the requirements of 
different targets.' 
(Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2006b; p.1) 
T h e NAO reported that m a n y s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n s and operators w e r e c o n c e r n e d 
about the interaction b e t w e e n the two pol icies . T h e s e c o n c e r n s f o c u s e d primarily 
on: 
• Data from different c o m p l i a n c e per iods being c o m p a r e d (e .g . 2 0 0 6 CCA 
data c o m p a r e d with 2 0 0 5 EU E T S data, 2 0 0 8 C C A data c o m p a r e d with 
2 0 0 7 EU E T S data) . 
• Difficulties in determining w h e r e the over lap b e t w e e n the two pol ic ies 
o c c u r s on a g iven site, d u e in part to the c o v e r a g e of EU E T S for entire 
installations and C C A c o v e r a g e of only e n e r g y intensive activities in s o m e 
i n s t a n c e s . 
• Operators exper ienc ing difficulties during t h e account ing periods for both 
policies , which h a s on o c c a s i o n resulted in an installation failing to m e e t 
adjusted targets for both the C C A and EU ETS d e s p i t e having initially 
compl i ed with both pol ic ies . 
Interviews for this r e s e a r c h found that s e v e r a l s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n s in terv iewees 
w e r e c o n c e r n e d about the interaction b e t w e e n the EU E T S and C C A s d u e to the 
c o m p l e x nature of d o u b l e counting. There h a v e b e e n f e w invest igat ions into the 
e f f e c t s of d o u b l e counting. Defra and Defra-appointed c o n s u l t a n t s remain the 
major s o u r c e s of information with little in-depth ana lys i s of the i s s u e s . This c o m e s 
desp i t e the Better Regulat ion C o m m i s s i o n (BRC) recently highlighting the 
importance of G o v e r n m e n t ensur ing that the appropriate level of intervention is 
applied within c l imate c h a n g e policy (Better Regulat ion C o m m i s s i o n , 2 0 0 7 ) . 
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Furthermore the BRC s ta t ed that the G o v e r n m e n t should a l s o e n s u r e that 
"double-banking" is avo ided . 
5 . 1 5 . 2 Impact of e n e r g y prices on e n e r g y c o n s u m p t i o n 
In addition to the impacts of other pol ic ies and dramatic c h a n g e s to the industrial 
l a n d s c a p e in the UK in recent years , e n e r g y prices h a v e poss ib ly had the m o s t 
s e v e r e impact British industry. Energy c o s t s w e r e comparat ive ly low during the 
1 9 9 0 s . With the turn of the 2 1 ^ century c a m e not only the CCL, but rapidly 
increasing e n e r g y prices. It is, therefore, difficult to s e p a r a t e the inf luence of 
t h e s e two factors. A s Figure 5 . 1 0 d e m o n s t r a t e s , the rate of i n c r e a s e in e n e r g y 
prices, in particular electricity and g a s , h a s b e e n rapid and s e v e r e . B e t w e e n 2 0 0 1 
and 2 0 0 6 g a s prices i n c r e a s e d by 121%, roughly equal to 9 4 % in real terms. 
Electricity prices a l s o i n c r e a s e d during this t ime by 7 6 % (54% in real terms) (DTI, 
2 0 0 7 b ) . Coal pr ices a l s o i n c r e a s e d but by a l e s s dramatic 1 7 . 6 % (4 .2% in real 
terms). 
Figured. 10 Electricity, gas, coai and LPG prices by quarter since 1999 
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The CCA/CCL policy p a c k a g e w a s d e s i g n e d to e n a b l e c o m p a n i e s willing to 
commit to e n e r g y c o n s u m p t i o n reduction targets to r e d u c e the rising c o s t of 
e n e r g y following the introduction of the CCL. Whilst the s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n s 
general ly g ive credit to the C C A s for increas ing the importance of e n e r g y 
ef f ic iency at the board level, m o s t a l s o be l i eve that e n e r g y prices h a v e had a 
greater impact in reducing e n e r g y c o n s u m p t i o n c o m p a r e d to CCAs , a s s tated by 
o n e s e c t o r as soc ia t ion: 
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"In comparison to the energy price rises we have seen in the last 2 years 
the CCL is a relatively small proportion of the energy bill." 
This indicates that CCL is not applied at a high enough rate in order to achieve 
the maximum energy consumption reductions, which is highlighted by the 
dwarfing of the CCL by the rate of growth in energy prices. Another respondent 
stated that: 
"When CCAs started, energy was probably the third highest cost in the 
industry - the two higher being raw materials and labour. But with the 
increased cost of energy it has now risen to second place ahead of 
labour as labour was cut severely during the financially hard times." 
However, not all respondents expressed such negative views. One sector 
association pointed out that rising energy prices merely highlighted the need to 
ensure the sector participated in a CCA as "the [CCL] discount is invaluable to 
u^'. 
5.15.3 Post-2013 Climate Change Agreements 
Possibly the most startling revelation of the CCA investigation is that all 
respondents were in agreement that participating companies could still have 
reduced their energy costs in the presence of the CCL and in the absence of the 
80% discount though the implementation of energy efficiency measures alone. 
This suggests that the targets, including the revised targets (the majority of which 
were tightened in 2004), were set so low as to not require much additional effort 
beyond business as usual behaviour. 
Despite this, 62% of sector respondents believe that CCAs should continue 
beyond the current life span. A quarter of sector associations and 63% of external 
stakeholders do not support the continuation of CCAs beyond 2013. Reasons for 
this are presented in Table 5.12. 
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Table 5.12 Rationale for withdrawing CCAs in 2013 
Sector associations External stakeholders 
Alternat ive policy instrument wil l result in 
better env i ronmenta l ou tcome 
40% 12% 
More economica l ly eff icient means 
avai lable 
20% 38% 
CCAs are too complex 20% 25% 
CCAs should cont inue but compulsory 
wi thdrawal of EU ETS instal lat ions 
20% 0% 
Too soon to tell 0% 0% 
Relat ive targets are too lenient 0% 25% 
Nevertheless, in addition to saving approximately 1.9 MtC per year by 2010, the 
CCAs have successfully elevated the strategic importance of energy and in 
decision making within many sectors, in some instances, CCAs have inspired the 
implementation of new technologies and procedural changes towards efficient 
energy consumption. The CCAs have also led to the 'cost of carbon' being 
included in the appraisals of new projects within industry. 
From a policy and regulatory learning perspective, the reliance upon industry-
sourced information in the absence of independently derived data (a condition 
precedent to sound law and policy making) has proved to be problematic. This 
state of affairs would appear to have contributed towards the establishment of 
unambitious targets. At the time of the CCA negotiations Defra were in a difficult 
position for a number of reasons. The GAD assessment made certain predictions 
yet could not be applied to all sectors. Therefore Defra had to reply upon 
information provided by the sector associations. By their own admission, some 
sectors provided recommended targets based on energy audits that were 
particularly unambitious. Had the proposed targets been approved by Defra, the 
CCAs would have resulted in energy use reductions little beyond business as 
usual. One would assume that industry knowledge on its performance potential 
would be high. This case highlights two pitfalls of reliance upon industry-source 
information: the previous ambivalence towards energy use within industry and the 
potential for industry to attempt to negotiate targets that could be met with 
considerable ease. 
A final point in relation to the CCAs focused on the use of relative targets. The 
majority of sectors chose relative energy consumption targets. The reasons for 
this are clear; relative targets allow companies to grow and increase production 
without having to reduce their total energy consumption - the amount of energy 
used per unit of output must however decrease. Absolute targets may be more 
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difficult to meet especially if production increases and the target does not reflect 
this. However, it can be argued that absolute targets are fundamental to 
achieving the ultimate objective of deep cuts in GHG emissions. Relative targets 
will allow total GHG emissions to continue on the current increasing trajectory as 
long as industrial productivity continues to increase. In addition to allowing energy 
consumption to increase under certain production conditions, the relative nature 
of CCA targets is contrary to the absolute nature of EU ETS targets and those 
targets which exist within the EU and International climate change policy 
frameworks. This could not have been prevented as the negotiation of CCAs took 
place five years prior to the introduction of the EU ETS, though the backdrop of 
the EU and international frameworks may well serve as a warning against future 
use of relative targets. 
5.16 Chapter summary 
This Chapter has presented a comprehensive analysis of the CCAs. A number of 
key issues that have influenced the degree of success of the CCAs were 
repeatedly raised by respondents to both the questionnaire and interviews. These 
have been identified as: 
• Difficulties in the interaction between the CCAs and other policies, notably 
the EU ETS 
• Changes in productivity within CCA sectors 
• The impact on rapid energy price rises on industrial energy consumption 
reducing the impact of CCAs 
• Issues relating to transparency and public reporting 
• Potential for GHG emissions to increase due to relative energy 
consumption targets 
The current projected carbon savings from the CCAs are significantly lower than 
initial estimates. Evidence concerning the overachievement of the CCL suggests 
that there is a possibility that the application of the CCL alone may have yielded 
similar, if not greater, carbon reductions than CCAs (Ekins and Etheridge, 2006). 
The cumulative effect of these issues is a disappointing environmental outcome 
of the Climate Change Agreements. The Agreements underperformed against 
initial expectations. The Agreements subsequently underperformed against 
177 
revised expectations. Detailed policy recommendations on the CCAs and the 
other three case studies are presented in Chapter 9. 
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6 United Kingdom Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
6.1 Introduction 
The third case study Chapter presents the analysis of the UK Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Whilst this trading scheme was voluntary in nature 
and of limited coverage, it thoroughly deserves the detailed analysis presented in 
this Chapter for the following reasons. Firstly, the UK ETS incorporated three key 
policy instrument techniques: voluntary participation, allowance trading, and 
subsidies. Secondly, the Government was keen in publicising the UK ETS in the 
first few years of its operation. It was a key component of the 2000 Climate 
Change Programme. Yet by the time of the revised 2006 Climate Change 
Programme the Government was less than keen to draw attention to the 
instrument as its lack of achievement became more apparent. This Chapter 
analyses the limited elements of the policy that were particularly successful and 
the key elements that led to the underperformance of the Scheme. 
6.2 Operation and characterisation of the UK ETS 
In 1999, shortly following the Government's announcement to introduce the 
Climate Change Levy, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) published a 
proposal for the introduction for a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme 
within the UK (ENDS, 1999). At the time, many Government Ministers and 
industry insiders were sceptical that the launch of such a scheme within such a 
short timescale would be possible. Furthermore, the Government appeared to be 
showing less interest in trading schemes, pursuing instead the CCL and the 
negotiated CCAs. However, the CBI remained confident that with enough support 
from the Government a trading scheme could be introduced by April 2001 (ENDS, 
1999). Trading proposals were developed by 24 leading companies, many of 
which were power generators or petrochemical industries'*^, all stating their 
interest in pursing a greenhouse gas trading scheme. The significance of the 
industrial activities of those advocating emissions trading should not be 
underestimated. Power generators in particular were in a strong position to make 
The 24 companies identified by ENDS can be categories by sector as follows: Power 
generation (8 companies), petrochemicals (5), cement (2), metals (2), food/beverages (2), 
motor vehicles (2), and aviation (1). (ENDS Report 297, 1999) 
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significant emission reductions with little effort and with minimal risk to 
competitive positions due to fuel (coal to gas) switching. The Government 
subsequently congratulated the CBI on "addressing the key issues" of climate 
change policy and for helping the UK to move along the road towards 
implementing the world's first fully fledged greenhouse gas trading scheme 
(ENDS, 1999). Further developments, notably the publication of the UK Climate 
Change Programme in 2000, began to explicitly set out the desire of the British 
Government to pursue emissions trading. 
The UK Emissions Trading Group (ETG) was established in 1999 with the 
purpose of representing industry and further developing the initial UK ETS 
proposals. In March 2000 the ETG published its full UK emissions trading 
scheme proposals, 9 months prior to the publication of the 2000 Climate Change 
Programme. With some haste, the Government agreed to implement the Scheme 
and included it within the 2000 Climate Change Programme. The UK ETS 
consultation was published in May 2001. In August 2001, the then Minister of 
State for Environment, Michael Meacher, signed the Regulatory and 
Environmental Impact Assessment conducted by Defra, declaring that the 
benefits of the proposed emissions trading system would outweigh the financial 
costs, thus giving the official go-ahead for the Scheme (Defra, 2001c). By March 
2002 the UK ETS was launched and trading commenced on 1®'April. 
The UK ETS had four key objectives: 
1. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions at reasonable cost to Government 
and industry. 
2. To give British industry 'first mover' advantage in anticipation of the launch 
of the EU ETS. 
3. To establish the City of London as a global centre of expertise in 
emissions trading and allied services (i.e. verification, auditing, 
brokerage). 
4. To influence the EU by demonstrating that emissions trading is a practical 
and viable means to meet Kyoto Protocol targets. 
As this Chapter will demonstrate, only one of the four objectives was met with any 
certainty. The City of London is now operating as a major hub for carbon trading, 
with a wealth of expertise in verification, brokerage and off-setting services. 
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However, the cost of the UK ETS, the low participation numbers and the 
significant overlap between the UK ETS and the EU ETS, inter alia, had serious 
ramifications on the achievement of the remaining objectives. 
The UK ETS had two principal groups of participants: Direct Participants and 
Climate Change Agreement Participants. Other parties were permitted to 
participate as traders without compliance commitments (Radov and Klevnas, 
2004). Direct Participants were subject to absolute targets, based on a system of 
baseline and cap-and-trade. Table 6.1 presents the key events during the lifetime 
of the UK ETS from 2000 until the end of 2006. 
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Table 6.1 Timeline of the UK ETS 
Date Event 
January 
2000 
1998-December Baseline period 
November 2000 Launch of UK Climate Change Programme 
April 2001 Climate Change Levy introduced 
August 2001 Publication of draft Framework of the Scheme 
August 2001 Publication of the Regulatory and Environmental Impact 
Assessment 
August 
2001 
2001 December Pre-registration period of organisations considering direct 
participation in the Scheme 
December 2001 Publication of draft rules of the Scheme 
1° January 2002 Commencement of the first compliance period 
January 2002 Registration period and auction bids from organisations wishing 
to participate in the Scheme 
January 2002 Publication of auction format 
February 2002 Publication of final Scheme rules 
f April 2002 Successful Direct Participants enter the Scheme; allocation of 
first allowances - trading begins 
31^ December 2002 End of first compliance period 
1® January 2003 - 31 March 
2003 
First reconciliation period 
April 2003 First incentive payments made to compliant Direct Participants 
May 2003 The Government hails the first year of the UK ETS as a success 
following 900 companies trading emissions allowances 
amounting to more than 7MtC02e. However, critics remain 
sceptical of the potential effectiveness as the price of carbon 
remains low, potentially reducing the incentive for companies to 
continue emissions reductions beyond targets 
3 f December 2003 
f January 2 0 0 4 - 3 f March 
2004 
End of second compliance period 
Second reconciliation period 
31^ December 2004 End of third compliance period 
f January 2005-31^' March 
2005 
Third reconciliation period 
November 2005 The Carbon trust publishes the report "The UK Climate 
Programme: Potential evolution for business and ttie public 
sectof. The report details proposals for a refined emissions 
trading system within the UK following the closure of the UK 
ETS. 
31 December 2005 End of fourth compliance period 
f January 2 0 0 6 - 3 f March 
2006 
Fourth reconciliation period 
December 2006 End of fifth compliance period 
UK ETS closed to Direct Participants (Emissions Trading 
Registry remains open for CCA participants) 
Source: Adapted from DETR (2000a), ENDS (2003) Radov & Klevnas (2004) and 
Person (2004) 
During the reconci l iat ion period Direct Part icipants must have their total emiss ions for 
the preceding compl iance period verif ied by accredi ted verif iers. The emissions are 
subsequent ly reported to the Emissions Trading Author i ty (ETA). Direct Part icipants must 
conduct any f inal t rading to ensure they are in receipt of suff ic ient emiss ions a l lowances 
to cover their veri f ied emiss ions for the compl iance period. Al locat ion of incentive 
payments is based on successfu l ly meet ing these criteria. 
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Of particular importance to the UK ETS is the inclusion of six greenhouse gases 
within the trading scheme. Previous experience of trading schemes, such as the 
US SO2 program and the 1997 volatile organic compounds (VOC) trading scheme 
implemented in Illinois had been restricted to one pollutant (Pring, 2006). The 
approach of including six GHG, followed by conversion of emissions into units of 
CO2 equivalent (C02e), was novel and even beyond the initial remit of the EU 
ETS. 
6.3 Consultation and RIA 
In November 2000 the Government issued a consultation document on the 
proposed scheme. The Government received 89 responses from various 
stakeholder groups, including: sector association representatives and companies 
participating in Climate Change Agreement; other sector association 
representatives and companies; consultants (environmental and business); 
business associations; NGOs; academics; and, traders and brokers (DETR, 
2001). Every response to the consultation document was generally supportive of 
the proposed scheme. However, several concerns were raised including the need 
for simplicity and flexibility, the need for periodic reviews of the scheme, and the 
constraining effect of other Government policies upon the development and 
operation of the scheme. In hindsight, most of these issues were not addressed 
adequately in the framework of the Scheme. 
Initially 34 companies committed to take part in the Scheme (a list of Direct 
Participants and the incentive payments received by each company is located at 
Appendix 7). This is a staggeringly low figure compared with initial expectations 
that between 400 and 3000 companies may have benefited from participation, 
and given that Defra invited more than 6000 companies to participate (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2004). 
The entire process, from first Government proposals to implementation, took 
slightly more than two years. In response to concerns over the number of Direct 
Participants, Defra has since stated it decided to press ahead with the Scheme 
with only 34 participants as it believed that this was a sufficient number to have 
an operational trading market (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2004). Defra also stated that time constraints explains the failure to 
attract more participants as the Scheme needed to be launched and running for 
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several years prior to the introduction of the EU ETS if the objective of gaining 
first-mover advantage for both industry and the City of London v^ /as to be met. 
Had more time been available to Defra to develop the Scheme and to attract 
participants greater emission reduction at lower cost, increasing overall value for 
money, may have been achieved. Furthermore, with more participants the market 
might have been significantly more active resulting in higher trading prices of 
allowances and true realisation of 'first mover' advantage in terms of companies 
obtaining experience in trading. 
6.4 Allowance allocation methodology 
The level of incentive payment per tonne of CO2 abated was calculated using a 
complicated "descending clock" methodology. To enable Direct Participants to 
experience the auction format, Defra issued briefing notes on how to bid and held 
a mock auction shortly before the auction-proper to allow Direct Participants to 
practice using the auction software (Flynn and Lee, 2002). In contrast to the 
format of traditional auctions the UK ETS auction started by setting the highest 
bid. Direct Participants then placed a bid of quantified emissions reductions to 
receive the current sum of money in incentive payments for reducing their 
emissions below their baseline emissions. Another round followed, in which the 
Government reduced the incentive price. This continued until all emission 
reductions bid by Direct Participants multiplied by the lowest auction price totalled 
the incentive fund (Defra, 2002b). 
The Secretary of State opened the auction with a price £100/tC02e. By 
introducing a high starting price, the Government hoped to encourage 
participation in the auction (Flynn and Lee, 2002). Following nine further rounds 
of bidding, the auction closed with a final price of £53.37 per tC02e reduction in 
2006 (Radov and Klevnas, 2004). During the initial auction, the 34 Direct 
Participants committed to reducing 4.03 IVItCOge in 2006. This equated to 12.1 
IVItCOge during the entire operating time of the UK ETS (Radov and Klevnas, 
2004). However, following the withdrawal of 3 Direct Participants this figure 
decreased to 11.88 IVItCOge (NAO, 2004). Two of these participants withdrew at 
the end of 2002 and a further one in 2003. Little information is available publicly 
regarding the reasons behind these withdrawals. However, a conversation with a 
representative from one of the companies established that the withdrawal was 
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'suggested' by Defra on the grounds of under-performance of the company in 
question. 
Further complexity, beyond the descending clock auction, was added to the 
Scheme as Direct Participants were required to make progressively larger 
emissions reductions year on year. As a result, the required emissions reductions 
for 2006 represented one third of all required emissions reductions during the 
entire life of the Scheme (2002-2006). Subsequently, the final auction price of 
£53.37/tC02e corresponds to an actual per unit reduction payment over the life of 
the Scheme of £17.79/tC02e when taking cumulative emissions reductions into 
account (Radov and Klevnas, 2004). The target emissions reduction for the final 
year of the Scheme stood at an aggregate reduction of 13% on all verified 
baseline emissions. 
6.5 Baseline calculation, monitoring and reporting requirements 
Prior to the launch of the Scheme in 2002 Direct Participants had to submit 
baseline data against which performance during the UK ETS would be assessed 
(NAO, 2004). The baseline for each Direct Participant was calculated according 
to the average GHG emissions during the years 1998-2000. The NAO reported 
that some participants wanted a shorter baseline period, but Defra maintained 
that a three year period was required to ensure companies were challenged to 
make real progress against their business as usual performance. Despite 
attempts by Defra to ensure forthcoming legislation that may affect the baseline 
data was accounted for in the final baseline'^^ several Direct Participant's 
emissions were lower at the start of the Scheme than the baseline calculation. 
This had a severe impact on both the credibility and the environmental impact of 
the Scheme. Some companies were able to receive significant sums of money in 
incentive payments for little or no effort to reduce emissions beyond BAD or by 
installation equipment at significantly lower cost than the value of incentive 
payments. For example, ENDS (ENDS, 2004d) identified that Rhodia Organique 
Fine invested £1.25 million in its incinerator to reduce HFC emissions. This 
investment was required to meet legislative IPC requirements yet the company 
still received £23 million in incentive payments from the UK ETS because of the 
impact on the company's GHG emissions. 
For instance, IPC requirements implemented between 2000 and the start of the 
Scheme in 2002 led to a significant reduction in emissions from several companies 
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Four companies in particular caused severe problems for the Scheme: BP, 
invista UK, Ineos Fluor and Rhodia Organique Fine. These four companies were 
the largest emitters operating within the Scheme. Figure 6.1 presents the total 
GHG emissions (converted to million tonnes COge from these Direct Participants) 
between 1995 and 2002. The line labelled 1 indicates the calculated baseline 
before adjustments to account for new regulatory requirements (19.4 IVltCOge). 
The line labelled 2 indicates the adjusted total baseline for all four companies 
(13.3 IVItCOge). Even after the adjustments for regulatory requirements the 
baseline is still higher than the emissions during two of the baseline period years. 
The emissions from these four companies were even lower in the first year of the 
UK ETS thus undermining the economic and environmental performance of the 
Scheme before it even commenced. During the first year the total abated 
emissions exceeded the project savings for the life of the Scheme, and this was 
largely due to the 'over-performance' of these four companies. 
Figure 6.1 Total GHG emissions from four Direct Participants 
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The inadequate baseline calculation had a serious effect upon the total volume of 
allowances entering the Registry. By 2005 ENDS were reporting of a "carbon 
mountain" for sale due to the vast over-allocation of allowances compared to the 
BAU scenario (ENDS, 2004f). In order to rectify the situation Defra first 
announced it would drain the surplus allowances from the market (ENDS, 2004a). 
However, under the threat of forced action, six of the largest emitters within the 
UK ETS (the four companies identified above plus Lafarge Cement and British 
Airways) "voluntarily" agreed to make further emission reductions. Unfortunately 
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confidentiality agreements prevented the Government from releasing specific 
details of the commitments made by each company (ENDS, 2004a). 
The Emissions Trading Registry (ETR) monitored and maintained the UK ETS. 
The ETR was established by the Secretary of State for Environment prior to the 
launch of the UK ETS with the function of holding trading accounts and records 
relating to allocation, holding, transfer, cancellation and retirement of emissions 
allowances (Defra, 2002d). 
Requirements for monitoring and reporting were published by Defra in 2003 
(Defra, 2003a). The guidelines are based on five key principles of: faithful 
representation of events and transactions; completeness of information; 
consistency in methodologies, calculations and data; reliability of baselines and 
annual emissions; and transparency of data via third party audit. 
There is little to doubt about the rigour with which monitoring and reporting was 
been undertaken. The NAO stated that the "Participants' reported results have 
been carefully checked' (NAO, 2004). The Government issued a list of approved 
independent and accredited verifiers. These verifiers were charged with ensuring 
that the reported emissions are correct and that reported results meet the 
requirements of the Scheme. Annual verified results were published by Defra and 
made available to the public on-line. The performance of each Direct Participant 
was detailed annually including the baseline emissions for the year in questions, 
the target performance, actual emissions and the value of incentive payments. 
6.6 Overview of performance 2002-2006 
Direct Participants agreed to an aggregate GHG emission reduction of 13% 
below BAU over the lifetime of the Scheme (Defra, 2006a). However, there was 
vast over-performance against targets in all years of the Scheme (Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2 Aggregate targets and actual performance during years 2002-2006 of 
the UKETS 
Year Target reduction below 
baseline (IVItCOz e) 
Actual performance 
below baseline (MtC02 e) 
Over-performance 
(%) 
2002 0.79 3.85 487% 
2003 1.5 3.7 246% 
2004 5.8 6.0 103% 
2005 5.9 7.1 121% 
2006 5.9 7.2 122% 
Total 19.89 27.85 140% 
Source: Adapted from ENDS (2004e), ENDS (2005c), Defra (2006a) and Defra 
The environmental performance of the UK ETS is analysed in further detail in 
section 6.9. 
6.7 Overview of evidence-based analysis 
The survey of Direct Participants and external stakeholders was undertaken in 
the first half of 2006. A questionnaire exploring issues relating to the evaluation 
criteria was sent to 34 Direct Participants, of which three companies were no 
longer participating. The response rate for this group of stakeholders was 35%. A 
further 38 questionnaires were sent to external stakeholders, including NGOs, 
consultants, verifiers, brokers and academics. The response rate from this group 
was 37%. 
Four stakeholders (one academic, one NGO representative, a Defra 
representative and one Direct Participant company representative) participated in 
a focus group. As discussed in Chapter 2, the outcomes of this focus group led to 
a change in approach and no further focus groups were undertaken. Three one-
to-one interviews were carried out with Direct Participant representatives. 
6.8 Economic efficiency 
Survey analysis shows that Direct Participants have generally positive feedback 
on most aspects of the UK ETS. Due to the voluntary nature of UK ETS results 
from the survey were expected to show an overall positive reaction to the 
Scheme. The Scheme was a policy experiment and did not impose mandatory 
participation. Therefore UK ETS posed minimal risk of coercion from regulators 
and a higher likelihood that companies were willing to improve their 
environmental performance. 
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Upon its closure in late-2006 it was clear that the UK ETS had met some of its 
initial objectives. Results from the survey indicate that the majority (78.6%) of 
Direct Participants feel that costs incurred as a result the monitoring and reporting 
requirements are outweighed by the environmental benefits directly arising from 
the Scheme. It is reasonable to conclude that the significant incentive payments 
also contributed to this outcome as monitoring, reporting and verification costs 
would undoubtedly have been covered by the incentive payments. The three 
interview respondents from Direct Participant companies indicated that the costs 
incurred by Direct Participants during monitoring, reporting and verification stages 
were significantly lower than company income from incentive payments. One 
respondent stated that the company received £50,000 per year in incentive 
payments. Verification cost the company £5000 annually. The incentive payment 
is recycled within the company in energy efficiency measures, saving the 
company approximately £250,000 per year. As Figure 6.2 shows most 
stakeholders believe the UK ETS operated in a relatively efficient manner. 
Figure 6.2 Economic efficiency of UK ETS 
• Direct 
Participants 
External 
stakeholders 
very quite average quite very no 
inefficient inefficient eff iciency eff icient eff icient response 
Response 
However, the provision of substantial incentive payments for many of the Direct 
Participant led to questions concerning the value for money of incentivised 
participation and emissions reductions provided in return. The NAG report of 
2004 was particularly concerned that greater emissions reductions could have 
been achieved at lower cost. Furthermore, a brief case-study of Shell (Figure 6.3) 
highlights the availability of such large incentive payments and the potential over-
spend of the Government on unambitious emissions reductions targets, or more 
worryingly the provision of large incentive payments to companies who 
persistently fail to meet the reduction targets yet remain in profit due to the low 
cost of buying allowances. 
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Direct Participants largely hold the view that UK ETS is economically efficient 
because it is efficient in #76//favour - Direct Participants received large incentive 
payments that are, generally, disproportionate to the costs incurred in meeting 
emissions reduction targets or the cost incurred in purchasing allowances and the 
costs of monitoring, reporting and verification (see Figure 5.1 for allowance price 
trends). The price of an allowance peaked in September 2002 at £12.50. This 
was largely due to an influx of transactions as CCA participants approached the 
end of the first accounting period. Since then the price has rarely exceeded £5, 
with it hovering around £2 from 2005 until trading closed for Direct Participants in 
December 2006. 
Figure 6.3 Shell UK: underperformance and profits 
Shell UK Ltd committed to emissions reductions of 409,087 tonnes C 0 2 e over the life 
of the UK ETS. The company failed to meet its annual targets during every year of the 
Scheme by approximately 2,760,000 tonnes. In order to comply with the rules of the 
Scheme the company bought al lowances to surrender at the end of each compliance 
period. Let's assume the market had managed to maintain the peak price of 
£12.50/ tC02. The company would have to spend approximately £3.5 million on 
purchasing al lowances to meet the deficit. However, this peak price was limited to two 
months in 2002. Since then the price has not risen above £5 per tonne. Purchasing 
allowances at this price would have cost the company £1.4 million. These two figures 
are the maximum amounts the company would have spent on purchasing al lowances 
during the life of the Scheme given the one-t ime price peak at £12.50 and the more 
frequent price high of £5, with figure more likely to be in the region of £1.1 million. 
ENDS stated that "Only one major player. Shell, has consistently fallen short of its 
emission targets. Even so, the company's annual incentive payments of £4.7 million 
have greatly outweighed the cost of buying al lowances to make up the shortfall. UK 
al lowances traded at £3.5-4/tC02 for most of 2004" (ENDS, 2004a) 
The cost Shell of purchasing al lowances is dwarfed by the incentive payments of 
approximately £23.5 million received by Shell, despite the company failing to meet its 
annual emissions reduction targets. The company made a profit of at least £20 million 
from merely participating in the UK ETS. 
Three quarters of Direct Participant respondents stated that the UK ETS 
represents cost savings to industry compared with traditional approaches to 
emissions control (i.e. regulation through command and control legislation). This 
finding further supports the case for market based instruments as a more efficient 
and cost-effective means to achieving environmental goals. 
Defra acknowledged in the focus group that the incentive fund was a "significant 
amount", although the benefits of the Scheme also need to be "fully 
acknowledged". These benefits are identified as 'significant emissions 
reductions', the provision of 'learning by doing', and 'first mover advantage' ahead 
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of the launch of the EU ETS. Whilst these benefits are indeed worthy, as 
discussed in some detail within this section, the value of money achieved is 
questionable. Were these three benefits (first mover advantage; learning by 
doing: and 'significant emissions reductions', despite several Direct Participants 
having already achieved their targets prior to the launch of the Scheme) worth 
£215 million? 
The UK ETS successfully helped to establish the City of London as a major 
centre of international emissions trading expertise. In this sense the 'first mover' 
advantage had a wide-reaching effect via the establishment of verification, 
brokerage and trading services The accomplishment of giving industry first mover 
advantage over EU rivals in anticipation of the EU ETS was supported by Direct 
Participant respondents. 71% believe the UK ETS met this aim. However, one 
must question the value of the 'first mover' experience of Direct Participant firms. 
As stated earlier. Direct Participants come from a variety of sectors. Only 14 
Direct Participants had installations that were eligible to participate in Phase I of 
the EU ETS. 11 of these companies chose to opt-out of Phase I until January 
2007 with the remaining 3 having installations operating within both schemes. Of 
the remaining 17 companies it is unclear how many will be required to operate 
within the proposed Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC)"^ ® as this mechanism 
is still in the early stages of development and the exact participation requirements 
are still in consultation. Although the majority of respondents believe the UK ETS 
did in fact meet its first mover goal (which at the time referred only to the EU 
ETS), the reality is that less than half of the participants could benefit directly .at a 
cost of £215 million. Whether the value of the experience was accurately 
reflected in the cost is difficult to determine but logic reasons that this many not 
have been the best use of resources. 
Furthermore, the cost of the Scheme was slightly higher due to the administrative 
cost to Defra. In an attempt to quantify the costs and benefits of the Scheme 
Defra published the calculations in Figure 6.4 in 2002 (Defra, 2002c). 
The Carbon Reduction Commitment is the newest proposal from Defra targeted at 
commercial energy use and carbon emissions. At the t ime of writ ing the final scope and 
coverage of the scheme were being developed. However, it is envisaged that the CRC 
will be trading scheme for all large, non-energy intensive commercial energy users. 
Participation will be mandatory and will involve sectors such as local authorities (including 
school), universities, hospital. Government departments, retail, hotels and large offices. It 
is anticipates that approximately 10,000 companies will be included in the scheme 
(http://www.defra.aov.uk/environment/climatechanae/ul</business/crc/) 
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Figure 6.4 Calculated costs and benefits relating to the UK ETS 
Net Benefits = Social Benefits + Private Benefits - Exchequer Costs - Administration 
Costs - Private Costs 
£-66m to £467m = (£117m to £469m) + (£127m to £181m) - (£127m - £181m) -
£1.815m - g (£127m to £181m) 
Social benefits = avoided emissions, using the cost of carbon as a guide 
Private benefits = incentive money paid to Direct Participants, in 2006 prices 
discounted to 2002 value. The lower of the two figures refers to 
the amount of incentive money paid if all Direct Participants are 
subject to the highest level of corporation tax 
Exchequer costs = incentive payments (at discounted rate) 
Administration costs = consultancy and Government staffing costs 
Private costs = assumed to be less than or equal too incentive money received 
by Direct Participants 
Source: Defra (2002c) 
Calculation of the benefits of a policy in terms of the monetary value of carbon 
emissions abated is a highly contentious issue. For its calculations Defra turned 
to the estimates provided by European Commission placing the value of abated 
carbon at £70/tC in 2000 (Defra, 2002c). By 2006 this cost had increased to 
£76/tC. In a selection of report Defra has produced several estimates for the cost 
of carbon and places the cost in the region of £35/tC to EMO/tC'*®, with the 
Government supporting the 'mean' cost of £70/tC. Whilst the accuracy of such 
measurements is difficult to determine (Mendelsohn, 2003), these figures allow 
us to perform an interesting comparison with the cost of carbon within UK ETS. 
Allowance trading peaked at £12.50/tC02e. This equates to £3.37 per tonne 
carbon®°, a staggering 22 times lower than calculated cost per tonne of carbon 
employed by the European Commission. The incentive payments equated to 
£4.80/tC. Possibly the most alarming aspect of the calculations in Figure 6.4 is 
the enormous range of the value of the net benefits. Based on these figures the 
minimum and maximum benefits stand a staggering £533 million apart. With a 
range this large one must question the accuracy of the data upon which Defra 
based these calculations. Furthermore, one must question whether the 
calculations add any value to analysis of the Scheme given the vast range and 
the failure of Defra to publish revised or updated values based on more accurate 
Variations in the cost of carbon arise from differences in calculations and reports. 
1 tonne carbon is equivalent to 3.67 tCOge. (Department of Trade and Industry, 2006) 
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data (this data was published the year the Scheme commenced and was never 
updated to reflect the real life operation of the Scheme). The cost of carbon 
ignites furious academic debates which should in part resolve once schemes 
such as the EU ETS establish stable price for allowances. It has been argued that 
this may not occur until all available abatement opportunities have been realised 
(Personal communication, 2008). Only when companies have to buy allowances 
out of necessity as all available abatement opportunities have been utilised will 
we see the true price of carbon established via market forces. 
The 2004 NAO Report highlighted that greater emission reductions could have 
been achieved had more companies participated. Had Defra extended the 
preparation period^^ prior to the launch of the Scheme more firms may have taken 
part, resulting in more emissions reductions being achieved at less cost. The 
NAO also reinforced the position that several companies had reduced their 
emissions below their baselines prior to the launch of the Scheme. This meant 
that several companies did not have to change their operations and were not 
required to make further reductions in order to receive their incentive payments. 
However, following the publication of the report six Direct Participants announced 
they would 'voluntarily' make further emissions reductions which went some way 
to rescuing the Scheme (ENDS, 2005c). 
Interestingly, the publication of the 2004 NAO review led to ENDS questioning the 
impartiality of the organisation. ENDS published claims that the report on UK ETS 
was 'watered' down following comments from Defra and other stakeholders 
(ENDS, 2005a). ENDS applied to see the final draft of the report under the 
Freedom of Information Act. Comparison of the published report and the final 
draft sent to Defra and other directly related parties, to ensure factual accuracy, 
showed several key criticisms of the Scheme had either been removed or 
reduced in severity. Three key 'changes' to the report were: 
• The draft report stated "the scheme's cost-effectiveness in reducing 
emissions is doubtful". Following consultation with Defra and other directly 
related organisations this was changed to "the scheme has achieved 
some emission reductions". 
51 Defra adopted a tight t ime scale from inception to launch of the Scheme in order to 
ensure maximum experience was gained from the Scheme (National Audit Office (2004) 
The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: A New Way to Combat Climate Change.. 
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• The draft report stated that in the cases of four l<ey participants - Ineos 
Fluor, BP, Invista and Rhodia - only 58% of emissions reductions were 
attributable to UK ETS. The remaining 42% would have occurred in the 
business as usual scenario^^. However, the published report stated that 
approximately 66% of emissions reductions from these four companies 
were as a result of UK ETS. The NAO did not respond to ENDS when 
questioned about the changes in the data. 
• In the draft report the auction was described as 'disappointing' because 
fewer than expected companies took part. However, the published report 
changed the slant on this statement to the success of Defra in ensuring 
there were enough participants to ensure a viable auction. 
These criticisms of the NAO draws attention to the difficulty in sourcing 
independent and rigorous analysis of not only the UK ETS but other 
environmental policies which are subject to analysis from organisations beyond 
Whitehall. Hence, the propensity for self criticism and objective analysis may be 
low. 
In terms of costs incurred by industry, 92.9% of responding Direct Participants 
calculated the financial costs and benefits of entering the Scheme prior to joining. 
Many respondents were unable or unwilling to provide further details due to the 
sensitivity surrounding such financial issues. However, several respondents did 
elaborate on how and why costs and benefits of participation were calculated. 
Only one respondent stated that costs outweigh the benefits of participation, by 
approximately 40%. Further details on this response were gathered during a 
telephone conversation with the respondent. This particular company received 
approximately £50,000 revenue for the company per year from incentive 
payments. Verification costs are approximately £6000 per year, plus additional 
consultant fees of several thousand pounds per year. Clearly the participation 
costs were outweighed by the incentive payments drawing attention to the need 
to rigorously investigate industry claims regarding the cost of policy instruments. 
Another compelling response came from a representative of a manufacturing 
firm. The UK ETS is worth approximately £250,000 per year to the firm. Data 
verification costs £5000 annually. The company receives approximately £50,000 
The NAO employed consultants to assess the impact of UKETS upon the emissions 
reductions of the four companies. 
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per year incentive payments, all of which is invested in energy efficiency 
measures within the company (in the production process or within other areas of 
the business). This annual investment has been calculated to save the company 
around £250,000 per year. This case shows that companies meeting or 
exceeding their targets can not only reap the financial rewards of incentive 
payments, but can make even greater financial savings by redistributing income 
from incentive payments into schemes that can further improve their energy 
efficiency. This example highlights the lack of conditions attached to the use of 
incentive monies in the design of the UK ETS ('earmarking'). There were no legal 
requirements for companies in receipt of incentive payments to use this income 
for energy saving or emission reduction schemes or environmental projects, nor 
to return the payments in the event of failure to meet modest emissions reduction 
targets. If these provisions had been outlined within the Scheme rules, greater 
emissions reductions may have been achieved in return for incentive fund. 
Following the NAO report, the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
(PAC) published its own report, based upon the NAO's findings and oral and 
written evidence (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2004). In 
May 2004, Sir Brian Bender, the then Permanent Secretary of Defra, and Henry 
Denwent, Director of Climate at Defra, were called before the Committee in order 
to respond to questions arising from the publication of the NAO report. Questions 
focused on the number of participants, the quantity of incentive payments, and 
the calculation of the baselines. As Figure 6.5 shows, the baselines calculated for 
four big players in the Scheme were above company emissions in both 2000 and 
2001. This proved to be an area of concern for the PAC as these four companies 
were collectively in receipt of more than £111 million (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2004). 
However, representatives from the NAO defended Defra's position by highlighting 
that in Figure 6.5 the dotted line represents emissions reduction commitments 
made by each company prior to the launch of the Scheme. In each case, the 
figure is below the actual baseline, as one would expect. However, in two cases 
actual emissions were below the committed reductions one year prior to the 
launch of the Scheme. Whilst this does not represent any particular failing on the 
part of the companies involved - after all they required to provide verified data and 
were merely operating within a policy experiment - it does indicate a failing on 
Defra's part in allowing such an occurrence. Defra justifies its failure to rectify 
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such baseline and target emissions on the basis of giving credit for 'early action'. 
Unfortunately, from the perspective of equity to stakeholders, including the tax 
payers who funded the programme, this may not be a sufficient excuse. By not 
wishing to penalise companies who allegedly acted early, Defra discriminated 
against the stakeholders to whom they are accountable by jeopardising the value 
for money of the Scheme and failing to secure real emission reductions. 
Figure 6.5 Baseline, targets and actuai performance of four major participants in 
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Defra also acknowledged that the absence of precise data concerning the past 
and projected emissions from companies led it to set baseline limits according to 
regulatory limits. Another problem of this method is the 'headroom' allowed 
between regulatory limits and the expected level of emissions from each 
company (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2004). 
The nature of the auction prior to the launch of the Scheme, the so-called 
descending clock auction, has also been under scrutiny. The closing price was 
£53 per tonne C02e reductions following nine rounds of bidding. Defra did have 
the option to close the auction or reduce the amount of money available at the 
end of the first round of bidding. However, Defra decided to continue the auction 
and to maintain the maximum incentive fund as the opening reduction bids were 
higher than the benchmark set in the rules of the scheme. Defra adopted a 
defensive position towards the auction, the quantity of incentive payments and 
the quantity of emissions reductions in the focus group undertaken for this 
research despite several reputable sources, including the NAO, the PAC and 
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NERA (an economic consulting firm) criticising the auction methodology, the 
quantity of reductions secured and the price paid for reductions (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2004, NAO, 2004, Radov and Klevnas, 
2004). It is now widely accepted that had the auction followed a different 
methodology, such as a process of sealed bids, Defra would have secured 
greater emission reduction commitments from Direct Participants. Interestingly, 
prior to the launch of the Scheme, Defra had to secure approval from the 
European Commission for the provision of incentive payments as state aid. The 
Commission ruled that financially incentivising the Scheme did not represent 
unfair state aid to participants (NAO, 2004). This ruling was also a factor in 
Defra's decision not to impose further emissions reductions on the four 
companies that had already met their targets prior to the launch of the Scheme as 
this could have been viewed as unfair state aid to the remaining participants. 
The survey showed that drivers for participation appear to be uniform across 
companies. Figure 6.6 presents the breakdown of the data. However, interviews 
with three representatives from Direct Participant companies each acknowledged 
that financial gain was one of the most important drivers to participation. This 
seems to contradict the results of the survey, which found that improving 
environmental performance, adhering to company environmental policy, and 
improving the public image of the company were cited as the most important 
drivers for participation. It is likely that these drivers were initially due to the 
uncertainties surrounding the format of the Scheme. When companies joined the 
UK ETS the auction had not been carried out, nor was the exact number of 
participants clear. On this basis, companies would not have had accurate 
information relating to the financial value of participation, not least because the 
high financial value was caused by design faults that most stakeholders, including 
Defra, were unaware of at the time. 
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Figure 6.6 Percentage of respondents ranking drivers as 'important' or 'very 
important' 
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A frequent fundamental driver in research of policy instruments is the desire to 
develop policy instruments and policy tools that are less costly to stakeholders 
yet successfully deliver environmental targets. 75% of Direct Participant 
respondents and 86% of external stakeholders believe that UK ETS represented 
cost savings to industry compared v\/ith more traditional approaches (such as 
binding emissions targets implemented though legislation). This was highlighted 
by Defra in their response to this question; 
"One of the central benefits of a cap and trade scheme is that carbon 
savings can be made in the most cost effective areas, whilst still ensuring an 
overall reduction in emissions." 
In this sense, UK ETS was more than successful. However, it is difficult to assess 
whether UK ETS would have represented cost savings to industry had smaller 
financial rewards been made available. Using common theory of trading systems, 
even without incentive payments, the UK ETS should have still been a cheaper 
method of meeting emissions reductions targets compared with regulatory 
approaches (Helm, 1993). 
6.9 Environmental effectiveness 
The performance of Direct Participants against annual emission baselines is 
presented in Table 6.3. Between 2002 and 2006 total emissions were reduced by 
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nearly 10%. The baseline emissions account for the emission reductions 
committed to by each Direct Participant, hence the reducing in the baseline over 
the five year period. The noted decrease in over-performance against baseline 
data in 2004 is a result of additional emission reduction commitments made by 
the six Direct Participants arising from NAO criticism of the baseline calculations 
for these companies, as discussed earlier in section 6.7 of this Chapter. 
Table 6.3 Performance of Direct Participants 2002-2006 
Year Baseline emissions Actual emissions IVItCOz e saving % difference 
(MtCO? e) (MtC02 e) 
2002 29.74 25.92 3.82 -14.8 
2003 26.28 22.61 3.66 -16.2 
2004 20.73 20.44 0.28 -1.4 
2005 20.49 19.05 1.43 -7.5 
2006 18.88 17.57 1.30 -7.4 
Total 11.61 10.56 10.52 -10.0 
Source: Adapted from Defra (2003c), Defra (2004a), Defra (2005c), Defra 
(2006h) and Defra (2007i) 
The vast overachievement in the first two years of the UK ETS is largely 
attributable to the performance of three chemical companies: Rhodia Organique 
Fine (as states previously), Invista (formerly DuPont) and Ineos Fluor. In the late 
1990s the latter of these companies v^ /ere required to install equipment to comply 
with their IPC requirements. Flaws of the baseline calculation methodology 
leading to insufficient consideration of these events meant that both companies 
had met and exceeded their targets before the Scheme even started (ENDS, 
2004a). As Figure 6.5 (NAO chart in section above) demonstrates, Defra failed to 
adequately account for changes in the regulatory environment when establishing 
baselines. In the interest of equity to Direct Participants all companies were 
subject to the same baseline calculation methodology. However, the impact on 
the overall performance of the Scheme was profound. Figure 6.7 shows that the 
vast majority of Direct Participants achieved significant emission reductions over 
the life of the UK ETS with the exception of 8 companies. 
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Figure 6.7 % change in GIHG emissions from Direct Participants in the UK ETS 
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During the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts hearing in May 
2004, Sir Brian Bender stated that "IVe have iearned....about the importance of 
incorporating future emissions projections into baseiine setting' (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2004; p.Ev3). 
Criticisms of the leniency of the targets do appear to have been heeded by Defra, 
with a representative stating that: 
"Defra do recognise that perhaps they [the targets] could have been set a 
little more str ingently but it was diff icult to do that in 2000/2001, especial ly as 
Defra wanted to give credit for early action." 
However, comments from Direct Participant issue a stark warning for future 
approaches using baselines as this methodology may have even served to attract 
companies who knew in advance that they would be reducing their GHG 
emissions thus providing an opportunity to receive incentive payments for little 
additional effort: 
"The way the basel ine is calculated obviously attracts companies who are 
planning to reduce their emiss ions by whatever means or have opportunit ies 
to reduce them." 
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Comments such as these only reinforce the negative reception policies based on 
voluntary action often receive from NGOs, as stressed by comments from a 
representative from one such organisation in the focus group: 
"Environmental groups do not have an ideological opposition against 
voluntary agreements at all, but the reality is that there is no evidence 
whatsoever that they are going to work." 
Borkey and Leveque (2000) confirm this perception stating that one of the biggest 
political threats voluntary environmental agreements must overcome is the 
negative perceptions of civil society and environmental NGOs, who often 
perceive these approaches to be second best. There is an underlying assumption 
within these stakeholder groups that industry and governments promote these 
approaches as a means to avoid "more substantive environmental improvement^' 
(p.52-53). 
In relation to this point about NGO participation. Friends of the Earth provided a 
statement that organisational policy means they are unable to respond to 
individual requests to participate in surveys. A follow-up phone conversation also 
revealed that the NGO in question did not have any input at any stage of UK ETS 
and has not actively researched the Scheme as the organisation does not 
consider voluntary approaches, or indeed any instruments apart from mandatory 
regulation, as acceptable approaches to environmental protection. Another NGO 
(Greenpeace) explicitly stated that the organisation was opposed to voluntary 
approaches to environmental protection and therefore saw no benefit in 
participating in a survey on a voluntary initiative. This suspicion is countered by 
an increasing body of literature on new policy instruments lends support to the 
case of alternatives to command and control regulation as methods for 
addressing environmental standards at lower costs (Borkey and Leveque, 2000). 
The administrative costs of voluntary environmental agreements may not present 
savings over alternative policy instruments. They can often represent increased 
administrative costs from the regulator to industry and can prove to be 
economically efficient if industry operates more efficiently than the regulator. 
However, Borkey and Leveque also stress that the lack of empirical data on this 
aspect, and the difficulty in collecting such data, means this is a purely analytical 
proposition. 
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In light of this analysis what conclusions can be drawn in relation to the impact of 
the UK ETS on GHG emissions from the UK? In 1997, the British Government 
announced a self-imposed target of reducing GHG emissions to 20% below 1990 
levels by 2010. Table 6.4 below presents some figures relating to this target. 
Table 6.4 UK GHG reduction targets 
1990 GHG emissions = 765 iVltCOae 
20% 1990 GHG emissions (target reduction) = 152.8 MtCOze 
2010 GHG target = 611.2 MtCOae 
UK ETS total GHG emissions reduction = 10.5 MtCOze 
UK ETS represented as % of target reduction = 6.9% 
UK ETS GHG reductions accounting for the 'Big Four'(66% 
of emission reduction attributable to UK ETS) = 
8.3 IVItC02e 
UK ETS represented at % of target reduction accounting 
for the 'Big Four' = 
5.4% 
Based on these figures, the UK ETS should have made a credible contribution 
towards the UK 2010 target of 20% reduction below 1990 levels. However, when 
one considers issues discussed in the previous section on economic efficiency, it 
becomes difficult to assess the rea/contribution of the UK ETS. As reported by 
the NAO, the 'big four' (Ineos Fluor, BP, Invista and Rhodia - the four companies 
that had met their targets prior to the launch of the Scheme) could only attribute 
66% of their emissions reductions to the UK ETS. Therefore, the 6.9% figure 
above is questionable. Hence, the figures have been adjusted to account for the 
UK ETS leading to 66% of emission reduction from these four companies in 
2002/03. Of the 6.3 MtC02e reductions below baselines achieved by these four 
companies during the first two years of the Scheme, only 4.2 MtC02e can be 
directly attributed to the UK ETS. By adjusting the contribution of the UK ETS to 
overall national progress towards GHG reductions by 2010, we can see that the 
impact of the UK ETS is lower than initially envisaged. 
In terms of the contribution of the UK ETS meeting its 2012 Kyoto commitment, 
the UK ETS fared relatively well compared to the other case studies. 29% of 
participating firms believe the policy would make a very positive contribution, 
compared to no PRC respondents (although 64% ranked the contribution as 
slightly positive) and 19% of CCA sector associations. However, the EU ETS 
received the highest rankings for this aspect, with 60% stating the impact would 
be significant and 40% believing it to be slightly positive. External stakeholders 
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appear to have higher expectations of the UK ETS with 43% believing the impact 
would be significant and a further 43% stating it would be slightly positive. The 
data in Table 6.4 does not contradict these findings, as a contribution of more 
than 5% to the overall UK target is not insignificant. Furthermore, survey results 
are particularly interesting as the high result for external stakeholders is 
unexpected as one would imagine this group would be more critical of this 
voluntary, incentive-based Scheme. However, many NGOs, who traditionally 
voice the greatest concern over non-regulatory measures for environmental 
protection, declined to participate in the survey due to resource constraints. 
Therefore the views of the external stakeholder group were limited to academics, 
governmental/regulatory bodies, consultants and verifiers. 
6.10 Transparency 
Annual performance results, containing details of individual Direct Participant 
performance against targets, quantity of incentive monies received and targets for 
the following compliance period are made available to the public via the Defra 
website. This level of detailed reporting is in keeping with the monitoring and 
reporting requirements of the Scheme. 
More than two-thirds of external stakeholders rated the Scheme as slightly 
transparent, and Defra is in agreement with this, stating: 
"We have endeavoured to keep he scheme as transparent as possible....In 
terms of the voluntary agreements we reached with the six participants last 
year, these have been less transparent due to confidentiality agreements 
with the six companies concerned." 
The majority of Direct Participants also believe the Scheme is slightly transparent 
(43%), with a further 36% finding it completely transparent. Of the six Direct 
Participants to 'volunteer' further emissions reductions four completed and 
returned questionnaires. Two of these respondents claimed the Scheme is 
completely transparent, and the remaining two stating it is slightly transparent. In 
light of Defra's response to this question, one might expect these participants to 
rate the Scheme as slightly transparent as they secured additionally 
confidentiality agreements with Defra following their additional emissions 
reduction targets. As a result, it was unclear whether these six companies had 
committed to make additional emission reductions or reduce the size of their 
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'banked' allowances (ENDS, 2005c). It is difficult to envisage the benefits to the 
public of shrouding these negotiations and the outcomes in secrecy. The UK ETS 
was, after all, a policy experiment funding by a significant quantity of public 
money. In keeping the details of the agreements confidential Defra merely served 
to protect the interests of business, perhaps overlooking the best interests of civil 
society. 
6.11 Flexibility 
Economic instruments, and in particular trading systems, should allow flexibility in 
two senses. Firstly, the instrument should allow industry/group of organisations to 
determine where the greatest emissions reductions take place - organisations 
with lowest marginal abatement costs should make greater reductions, potentially 
selling excess allowances to organisations with higher abatement costs. 
Flexibility can also refer to the ability of an instrument to give organisations the 
independence to better manage investment in technological innovation. 
Figure 6.8 depicts the different stakeholder groups and how they view the levels 
of flexibility offered by the Scheme. Only two respondents from the Direct 
Participant group felt that the Scheme offered an inadequate amount of flexibility. 
During an informal conversation with one of these respondents and analysis of 
the questionnaire responses, it became clear that this respondent was 
dissatisfied with most aspects of UK ETS. One reason for this was the refusal of 
Defra to increase the company's baseline following an expansion of activities. 
However, the respondent stated that this eventually did not pose a specific 
problem as other areas of business activities covered by CCAs had generous 
baselines. This meant that overall company emissions were always in compliance 
with the UK ETS target. 
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Figure 6.8 Perception of fiexibiHty offered by UK ETS 
• Direct Participants (technological) 
• Direct Participants (market) 
O External stakeholders (technological) 
• External stakeholders (market) 
Q 
no flexibility very little 
flexibility 
acceptable 
flexibility 
moderate 
flexibility 
high flexibility 
The majority of respondents stated that UK ETS is at least moderately flexible, in 
terms of both technological innovation and market forces. Approximately 50% of 
Direct Participants ranked the flexibility of the Scheme in terms of permitting 
flexibility in investment decision making as moderate. 36% ranked this aspect of 
flexibility as high, which compares favourably with the EU ETS (33%), CCAs 
(13%) and PRC (0%). This is largely due to the provision of incentive payments, 
which has proved to be valuable source of income for many Direct Participants as 
the example of Rhodia illustrates. If we look beyond the startling equity and 
environmental issues relating to such a huge incentive payment for abatement 
that would have occurred regardless of the UK ETS, one can see how the income 
from the UK ETS offsets any financial burden relating to capital investment 
pertaining to other policy instruments. 
In terms of the ability of UK ETS to offer technological flexibility, Defra stated that; 
"The UK emissions trading scheme is highly flexible. The incentive payments 
help participants to make investment decisions on energy efficiency/C02 
abatement that would otherwise not have been feasible. Emissions trading is 
all about meeting targets in the most cost effective manner." 
The outcome of the survey leads to the conclusion that UK ETS is a flexible policy 
instrument that has allowed participants to manage their emissions in the manner 
they see fit. Incentive payments have made the process easier by providing extra 
funds for energy efficiency projects and GHG abatement technologies, should 
they so desire. 
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Additionally, UK ETS allowed the regulating body (i.e. Defra) a level of flexibility 
when dealing with non-compliance with the rules of the Scheme. For example, 
should a company fail to meet its emissions target and fail to buy surplus credits 
to cover the 'excess', then the Secretary of State has the power to impose a 
range of penalties. These penalties vary, depending upon the severity of the 
breach of the rules, but may include the following (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2004): 
• Declaration of invalidity of the emissions statement submitted by a Direct 
Participant 
• Non-payment of incentive monies for the year of the breach 
• Reduction in allowances the following year 
• Refusal to allocate allowances the following year 
• In the case of a Direct Participant withdrawing from the Scheme prior to 
the official end of the Scheme in 2006, the participant will have to repay all 
received incentive monies 
Defra and the Secretary of State for Environment have never employed any of the 
penalties for non-compliance with the Scheme rules as all Direct Participants 
consistently complied, either by reducing emissions below baseline targets, or by 
purchasing allowances to accommodate for emissions above the baseline target. 
The absence of non-compliance is a significant achievement and one of the key 
successes of the Scheme. 
6.12 Innovation 
Over three-quarters of Direct Participant respondents found that UK ETS 
provides some level incentive for technological innovation. Examples of 
innovation ranged from the introduction of energy and environmental 
improvement programmes, process changes, improved data management, 
greater awareness of buildings energy efficiency, and the inclusion of the cost of 
carbon within new projects. The most advanced and ambitious example provided 
was the vision of the company (a non-energy intensive organisation) becoming 
carbon neural by 2020. This type of forward thinking and ambitious self-setting of 
targets is admirable. Furthermore, these examples support the widely-held belief 
that market based instruments are effective means of promoting innovative 
2 0 6 -
behaviour within firms. Examples of the changes resulting directly from the UK 
ETS, as specified by respondents, are provided in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Stated changes within Direct Participants arising directly from the UK 
ETS 
Type of change % respondents 
Increased awareness of energy management opportunities 29% 
Inclusion of the cost of carbon in new projects 14% 
No changes 14% 
Process changes 7% 
Improved data management 7% 
The importance of cross-industry (either within sectors or across sectors) 
cooperation in promoting innovation was highlighted by a focus group participant 
who stated that: 
"Cooperation is desirable perhaps in areas where you are trying to promote 
innovation, for example." 
This notion was supported by 43% of Direct Participants who stated that the UK 
ETS has had a directly positive effect upon communication (in the sense of 
exchange of information regarding any aspect of the business) between firms in 
their sectors. However, only 29% of respondents believe communication 
regarding best environmental practice has improved as a result of the UK ETS. 
Whilst this appears to be a small figure, it is important to remember that spread of 
UK ETS Direct Participants across sectors (supermarkets, local authorities, 
petrochemicals to name but a few) means that within each sector a maximum of 
two or three firms participated. The fact that the UK ETS managed to improve 
best practice communication despite the majority of sector members not 
participating should, therefore, not be under-valued. 
6.13 Acceptance and equity 
Overall, both Direct Participants and external stakeholders find the rules of the 
UK ETS to be a fair (64% of Direct Participants and 57% of external 
stakeholders). The sense of equity and fairness for this Scheme is far higher than 
the PPC Regulations, which was ranked as unfair by 56% of sector association 
respondents. Furthermore, the EU ETS received negative responses in this 
respect with 40% of sectors association ranking Phase I as unfair and even more 
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(60%) believing the same to be true of Phase II. CCAs on the other hand are 
generally perceived by industry to be fair with 69% of respondents stating so. 
There is a clear difference between the two policy instrument groups receiving 
positive feedback: the two voluntary instruments are well received by industry. 
The two mandatory instruments (PPC and EU ETS) presented fewer 
opportunities for industry to be involved in the policy development and 
subsequently received more negative feedback. Furthermore, both the CCAs 
and the UK ETS are policies that provide a significant financial benefit for 
participating companies - the UK ETS via its incentive mechanism and the CCAs 
via a reduced CCL rate. Alternatively, meeting PPC requirements remains the 
financial responsibility of companies and there is no financial reward for meeting 
requirements. The EU ETS is a slightly different case. Whilst allowances are 
allocated free of charge, thus providing opportunities to make financial gains 
thorough selling allowances, a company must first undertake emissions 
abatement in order to be in a position to have excess allowances. During Phase I 
allocations were arguably lenient, thus only 40% of respondents perceiving the 
Scheme to be unfair. However, this figure increased dramatically in reference to 
Phase II when it is envisaged companies will receive more stringent allocations. 
As the EU ETS progressed towards an auction-based allocation the perception of 
fairness will, beyond doubt, decrease further as a reflection of the envisaged 
negative financial upon industry. 
There is a relatively strong sense of organisational acceptance of UK ETS with 
64% of Direct Participant respondents and surprisingly 42% of external 
stakeholders rating their organisations' acceptance of the Scheme as a strong 
level of acceptance. It is entirely reasonable that some external stakeholders, in 
particular those with few ties to Government and regulators, have acknowledged 
that the instrument operates in a manner that is fair to stakeholders despite its 
environmental failings. For example, the level of fairness felt by external 
stakeholders may be linked to the reporting requirements, the lack of non-
compliance by Direct Participants and the provision of sufficient powers to Defra 
to deal with non-compliance should it arise are quite note-worthy outcomes of the 
Scheme. However, external stakeholders do not agree with the allocation of 
incentive payments, with 57.2% of respondents in either strong or slight 
disagreement - a somewhat counterintuitive stance given the earlier data 
revealing external perceptions on fairness. Conversely, more than 85% of Direct 
Participants agree with the allocation of incentive payments, with the obvious 
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financial benefits at the root of this (Figure 6.9). Defra's response on incentive 
payments focused on the need to attract sufficient participants to ensure a viable 
trading market. In order to distribute incentive monies sourced from the 
Government, Defra had to obtain State Aids clearance from the European 
Commission. One condition of this clearance is that participants should fulfil their 
obligations to the Scheme in order to receive incentive monies. 
Figure 6.9 Level of agreement with incentivised participation in tiie UK ETS 
• Direct 
Participants 
Externai 
stakeholders 
strongly slightly indifference slight agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree 
The external stakeholder group were also asked to assess the level of influence 
of external stakeholders during the development of the Scheme. Nearly 30% 
believe there was too little influence from external stakeholders. A further 43% felt 
this stakeholder group had the right level of influence. It is important to relate the 
involvement of external stakeholders (or lack of, as viewed by 30% of external 
stakeholders) to the original proposals for a domestic emissions trading scheme. 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter the UK ETS was originally proposed by 
the CBI, a sophisticated lobbying organisation. The development of these 
proposals to a scheme that allowed 34 companies to make substantial profits for 
very little improvement beyond business as usual emissions demonstrates the 
power with which such organisations operate and the level of influence they have 
in the policy process. 
6 . 1 4 O t h e r issues 
This section of Chapter 6 will analyse other issues relating to the UK ETS that 
may have impeded its performance. Several issues were identified and have 
already been covered to varying degrees in previous Chapters (e.g. the 
interaction with CCAs). 
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6.14.1 Interaction be tween U K E T S and C C A s 
This point relates specifically to the impact of the first CCA reconciliation period 
on UK ETS allowance prices. Uncertainty within CCA participants surrounding 
their ability to meet the first interim target forced the price of UK ETS allowances 
to an all-time high of £12.55 in September 2002. However, vast overachievement 
by both UK ETS Direct Participants and CCA participants against lenient targets 
led to the subsequent near-collapse of the price of allowances. 
6 .14 .2 interaction between U K E T S and E U E T S 
Installations operating within UK ETS but eligible for participation within EU ETS 
were provided with temporary exclusions from Phase I until the end of 2006 
(Defra, 2004b). In total, 63 installations operated by 11 of the 34 Direct 
Participants were excluded from the EU ETS until the end of 2006. In January 
2007, following the closure of the UK ETS, these installations were required to 
join the EU ETS''. 
Installations that opted out of the EU ETS were required to monitor, report and 
verify their emissions as per the requirements of the EU ETS. These emissions 
had to be reported to Defra annually (Defra, 2004b). In allowing installations to 
opt-out of the EU ETS until 2007 the Government was attempting to reduce the 
administrative burden on companies. Furthermore, participation in the UK ETS 
may have been beneficial for companies required to participate in the EU ETS as 
the financial incentives of the UK scheme coupled with three additional years 
experience may have put these installations on a firmer footing regarding 
emissions trading. The respondents to the questionnaire certainly believe so, with 
71% of respondents stating they believe the UK ETS fulfilled its aim to give British 
industry early experience of emissions trading in order obtain a competitive 
advantage over rivals. However, as stated earlier in this Chapter, the limited 
number of participants in the UK ETS is a cause for concern here. At its peak, 
only 34 companies were participating in the Scheme. This is a small fraction of 
the number of companies invited to participate. The benefits of operating a 
scheme that cost £215 million plus administrative costs for the Government to 
provide early experience of emissions trading for just 34 companies seem to be 
Installations within the following companies were eligible for EU ETS participation; 
Royal Ordinance, British Ainways, Battle McCarthy, BP, Imerys Minerals, British Sugar 
Pic, UK Coal, Ford Motor Company, Shell UK Ltd, Dalkia Utilities Services and Lafarge. 
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questionable, especially given that around 700 installations UK-based 
installations operated within EU ETS in Phase I (Defra. 2008b). Furthermore, it is 
difficult to believe that any company beyond the 34 Direct Participants would 
have benefited from the Scheme with regards early learning of emissions trading. 
Beyond these queries, there is a further possibility that the first-mover advantage 
that was one of the rationales behind the Scheme was not realised. The late 
launch of the UK ETS (it was scheduled for 2001 but did not occur until April 
2002) meant that the Scheme overlapped with the start of the EU ETS in January 
2005 with an overlap between the final two years of the UK ETS and the first two 
years of the EU ETS. Companies that opted-out of the EU ETS until 2007 and 
then joined the Scheme had only 2 additional years of experience over their rivals 
within the EU ETS. Companies within other Member States appear to have 
operated within the confines of the EU ETS without much cause for concern 
(particularly in the EU-15 where compliance is generally high). Furthermore, 
Phase I of the EU ETS was designed specifically to be an introductory phase 
lasting only 3 years, the purpose of which was to give the Commission, Member 
States and companies an opportunity to get to grips with emission trading on this 
scale. This puts the notion of first mover advantage over rivals in serious doubt as 
the 'rivals' were also given an introductory phase within which to learn. 
6.15 Chapter summary 
This Chapter has comprehensively analysed the UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Scheme. Areas such as the impact of the UK ETS on innovation, 
stakeholder perceptions of equity and the interaction between the UK ETS and 
other polices have led to several key conclusions that are developed further in 
Chapter 9. 
The UK ETS was a novel policy instrument. The elements of emissions trading, 
availability to all sectors of the economy, the provision of incentive payments and 
the voluntary nature of participation make for a fascinating case study. In this 
Chapter it has been demonstrated that the UK ETS has received higher praise 
from stakeholder compared to similar policy responses. In particular the 
perception of fairness by industry stakeholders is significantly higher within Direct 
Participants than within PPC and EU ETS sectors. Whilst such data may appear 
to support the UK ETS, analysis within this Chapter has shown that the sense of 
fairness does not reflect overall acceptance of a policy instrument. Furthermore, 
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the perception of fairness arising from the UK ETS is largely attributable to the 
vast incentive payments and the absence of any negative financial implications 
for participating companies. 
Defra successfully argued the case in favour for incentivised participation at the 
European Commission, thus providing significant political support. However, the 
level of value for money achieved from this approach is difficult to promote. Whilst 
the overall emission reductions arising from the Scheme were far higher than 
anticipated, an unknown quantity (of which least 44% of emissions from the four 
largest emitters in the first two years have been quantified) can not be directly 
attributed to the UK ETS. The gross miscalculation of baselines and the 
insufficient consideration of other influences (such as regulatory requirements) 
upon the performance of companies seriously undermined any real progress in 
reducing GHG emissions via the UK ETS. Furthermore, the benefit of the so-
called first mover advantage is questionable given the limited number of 
participants and the significant overlap between the UK ETS and the EU ETS. 
These factors combined bring into question the real value of this policy 
experiment. 
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7 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
7.1 Introduction 
In this fourth and final case study Chapter the analysis turns to one of the most 
influential and widely debated policy instruments of recent years; the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Unlike the UK ETS, the EU ETS requires 
mandatory participation. Furthermore, it is intended to operate in a purer sense of 
emissions trading, without incentivised participation. Implemented in 2005, it is 
curious to note that only six years previously some academics were still battling 
the corner of MBIs as many stakeholders were only beginning to relinquish their 
belief in regulatory instruments, as observed by Ellerman (1999): 
'Whether one applauds or deplores this trend [of MBIs], it might reasonably 
be asked, after electricity utilities are restructured, what new domain exists 
for experimenting with freer markets? The increasingly obvious candidate is 
the environment. At first blush, this suggestion seems outlandish.' 
(Ellerman, 1999: p.141) 
Ellerman continues by questioning whether we will ever reach a point when 
regulation is viewed as "sustaining tiigher levels of pollution than would be 
obtained if freer play were given to markets?' (p. 142). The implementation of the 
EU ETS, the first trading scheme to include a vast numbers of installations from a 
large number of countries, heralded a new era in the approach to environmental 
protection. However, the first Phase (and potentially the second) of the Scheme 
has been plagued by difficulties that require urgent attention in order to maximise 
the environmental outcome. 
7.2 Description and characterisation of the EU ETS 
The EU ETS was established via Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending 
Council Directive 96/61/EC (hereafter referred to as the ET Directive). The overall 
aim of the EU ETS is to "promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a 
cost-effective and economically efficient mannef (Article 1). Installations 
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participating in the Scheme must obtain a permit to release GHG emissions into 
the atmosphere from the relevant competent authority in accordance with Articles 
5 and 6. In England and Wales the competent authority is the Environment 
Agency, SEPA in Scotland and the Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA) 
in Northern Ireland (formerly the Northern Ireland Environment and Heritage 
Service). 
Annex I of the ET Directive specifies the activities included in the Scheme which 
is based on I PRC activities although different performance thresholds apply. The 
IPPC Directive sets a threshold for combustion installations of 50 MW. This 
threshold is reduced to 20 MW for the ET Directive, essentially capturing many 
installations that do not fall within the activity categories but do have on-site 
combustion facilities. Further details of the installations participating in the EU 
ETS are presented in Table 7.1. These installations account for approximately 
45% of all CO2 emissions from within the EU (Klepper and Peterson, 2006). The 
number of UK installations within each activity category is located at Appendix 8. 
Table 7.1 Activities participating in the EU ETS (Phase i) 
Activity Threshold values 
Energy activities Combustion installations with rated thermal input exceeding 20 
MW (except hazardous or municipal waste installations) 
Mineral oil refineries 
Coke ovens 
Production and 
processing of 
ferrous metals 
Installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or 
secondary fusion) including continuous casting, with a capacity 
exceeding 2,5 tonnes per hour 
Metal ore (including sulphide ore) roasting or sintering 
installations 
Mineral industry Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns 
with a production capacity exceeding 500 tonnes per day or lime 
in rotary kilns with a production capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per 
day or in other furnaces with a production capacity exceeding 50 
tonnes per day 
Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fibre 
with a melting capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per day 
Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, in 
particular roofing tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware 
or porcelain, with a production capacity exceeding 75 tonnes per 
day, and/or with a kiln capacity exceeding 4 m3 and with a 
setting density per kiln exceeding 300 kg/m3 
Other activities Industrial plants for the production of pulp from timber or other 
fibrous materials 
Industrial plants for the production paper and board with a 
production capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per day carbon dioxide 
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The EU ETS commenced in January 2005 with the launch of the pilot Phase I. An 
estimated €38 billion worth of property rights (in the form of allowances) per year 
were created based on 1.88 billion tonnes of CO2 allowances per year (assuming 
a trading price of €20/tonne CO2) (Ahman et al., 2007). At the time of launch 
9000 installations from 25 Member States were participating in the Scheme (Haar 
and Haar, 2006). 
All installations participating in an activity identified in Annex 1 of the ET Directive 
must possess a sufficient number of allowances (known as EU Emission 
Allowance (EUA) whereby 1 EUA = 1 tonne CO2) at the end of each reporting 
period (e.g. Phase I = 2005 to 2007, Phase II = 2008-2012, Phase III = 2012-
2020). In Phase I and Phase II, the majority of EUAs were distributed free of 
charge according to the quantities defined in National Allocation Plans (NAP) 
approved by the Commission. Phase I NAPs had to be submitted to the 
Commission by the end of March 2004. There followed a process of debate and 
amendments as the Commission evaluated each Member State's NAP against 
criteria outlined in Annex 3 of the ET Directive. Further analysis of the NAP 
process is provided in section 7.4.2 below. 
In addition to intra-EU trading, the EU ETS contains provisions for links with the 
flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. Under the rules of Joint 
Implementation, EU ETS participant firms are permitted to undertake emission 
reduction projects in other countries identified in Annex 1 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Firms may also undertake Clean Development Mechanism projects in non-Annex 
1 countries (Klepper and Peterson, 2006). CERs arising from CDM projects are 
expected to be tradable via the EU ETS from late 2008 following the resolution of 
issues in linking the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) with the 
UN-based International Transaction Log (ITL) (where CERs are initially stored 
and traded). 
7.3 Implementation of the Directive 
The EU ETS was formally launched on f January 2005. Phase I and ran until 
the end of 2007. This three year introductory Phase has been followed by Phase 
II, which will run from 1®' January 2008 until the end of 2012. At the time of writing 
few details surrounding the scope and operation of Phase III (2013-2018) were 
available. In early 2008 the European Commission launched a review of the EU 
ETS Directive with a view to amending the Directive for Phase III, the outcomes 
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of which are predicted to be transposed in to UK domestic law in 2010 (Defra, 
2008c). 
7.4 Consultation process 
The British consultation process relating to Phase I of the Scheme began in 
August 2003 when the Government undertook a consultation on the proposed 
allocation methodologies for the development of the Phase I NAP. Two further 
consultations on the draft NAP were carried out in 2004. In May 2004 the 
Government released its working paper on energy and emissions projections. 
Comments received from NGOs, industry and electricity generators were 
considered prior to the publication of the final document later that year. The 
revised NAP was developed based on comments pertaining to the total national 
cap in late 2004 and industry was given the opportunity to comment on individual 
installation-level and sector level allocations in early 2005 (Defra, 2005b). 
The consultations for Phase II commenced at the same time of the closure of the 
Phase 1 consultations in 2005. Key events are identified in Table 7.2 
Table 7.2 Consultation timeline for Phase // 
Date Event 
March 2005 Publication of informal communication paper on general approach to 
Phase II 
July 2005 Preliminary formal consultation published with details of approach to 
Phase II - Government sough views on auctioning, NER and 
expansion options 
February 2006 DTI launched consultation on emissions projections - process included 
stakeholder workshops to increase transparency 
March 2006 DTI consultation on review of NER benchmarks for Phase II 
March 2006 Publication of Draft UK Phase II NAP for formal consultation -
supplemented by stakeholder events 
July 2006 Launch of consultation on treatment of small emitters 
August 2006 Launch of consultation to allow operators to identify errors in data and 
information used to calculate installation-level allocations 
Continuous Industry informed via the ETG. Government meets "regularly" with 
NGOs and other interested parties 
Source: Adapted from Defra (2007e) 
7.4.1 Regulatory Impact Assessment 
A full RIA for Phase I was published in May 2005, five months after the official 
launch of the Scheme in January 2005. This RIA made a significant effort to 
include the fundamental components of an RIA. It quantified the predicted costs 
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to industry, the costs to consumers (though the passing on of the cost of carbon), 
the benefits of the Scheme and the impacts of the Scheme on the 
competitiveness of British firms within European and global markets. One area 
the RIA failed to address was the cost of administering the EU ETS to 
Government and the relevant regulatory authorities. Furthermore, Defra stated it 
was unable to specify predicted environmental outcomes of the Scheme as this 
was largely dependent on not only the cap applied at the UK-level (through the 
NAP), but this was also affected by the caps set on all other Member States. 
In 2007 Defra undertook several detailed RIAs relating to various aspects of the 
Phase II. A general RIA was also published detailing the proposed 4 options for 
the national cap: 
• Option 7: no cap 
• Option 2. Allocation of 252 MtC02 /year - 3.8 MtC below BAU projections 
• Option 3. Allocation of 245 MtC02 /year - 5.8 MtC below BAU projections 
• Option 4. Allocation of 237 MtC02 /year - 8 MtC below BAU projections 
Legal issues relating to the implementation of the ET Directive lead to the 
automatic dismissal of option 1 as all Member States are required to set national-
level caps (article 9). Following consultation the Government decided to support 
option 4 - the most ambitious and challenging cap set out within the RIA (Defra, 
2007c). Defra selected this option on the basis of the impact of Phase II on the 
costs and benefits associated with, inter aiia, electricity prices, security of energy 
supplies and the impact of this option on domestic emissions. 
7.4.2 National Allocation Plans 
The rules governing NAPs are found in Annex 3 of the ET Directive. The criteria 
against which National Allocation Plans are judged by the Commission include: 
• Total quantity of allowances allocated by Member States should be 
consistent with obligations under Decision 2002/358/EC®'' (concerning 
approval of the Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC) 
54 Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning the approval, on behalf of the 
European Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the joint fulfilment thereunder. 
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• Total quantity of allowances should be consistent with the requirements of 
each Member State in Decision 93/389/EC (on monitoring GHG emissions 
in the EU) 
» NAPs should take account of unavoidable emission increases arising from 
other Community legislation 
• Allocated allowances should be consistent with the potential for a sector 
to reduce its emissions 
• NAPs should not discriminate between sectors or activities in accordance 
with Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty regarding competition 
• NAPs may account for early action using information obtained from IPPC 
BREF documents 
• The NAP should include information on clean technologies and energy 
efficiency measures that have been employed 
• The NAP should include provisions for public consultation 
• Each installation covered by the Directive should be listed along with the 
quantities of allowances to be allocated to each installation 
• The NAP may include information on how non-EU competition will be 
dealt with 
Each Member State must submit their NAP to the Commission for scrutiny 
against the criteria identified above. By the f January 2005 21 NAPs had been 
approved by the Commission (Grubb et al., 2005). Specifically, the Commission 
had issued threats of legal action to Greece and Italy for failing to submit NAPs 
on time (ENDS, 2004b). Other issues involved Germany referring the 
Commission assessment of their NAP to the European Court of Justice following 
severe criticism of initial provision for ex /pos/ adjustments to allocations. In this 
case, Germany argued that it should be permitted to adjust allocations during 
Phase I to account for inaccuracies in initial emission projections provided by 
industry and to account for new and closing installations (ENDS, 2004c). 
Although the proposed eA'yOOs/adjustments were only to be made in a downward 
manner (i.e. reduced allocations), the Commission found that; 
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'Ex-post adjustments would create uncertainty for operators, and be 
detrimental to investment decisions and the trading market. Ex-post 
adjustments substitute more efficient solutions found in the marketplace by 
administrative processes that would be cumbersome to implement. Also 
downward ex-post revisions, that might be argued have a beneficial 
environmental effect, are detrimental to the certainty that businesses need in 
order to make investments that lead to reductions of emissions.' 
(Judgment of the Court of First Instance, 2007) 
In late 2007 a Judgement of the Court of First Instance found in favour of 
Germany and ordered the Commission to revoke its demands for the removal of 
avyoos/adjustment provisions from the German Phase I NAP. 
By the time Phase I commenced, the UK was also still awaiting approval for its 
NAP . In November 2004, four months following the Commission's approval of the 
UK's draft NAP, the Government informed the Commission that it wished to 
increase the national cap by 20 MtC02 in light of revised emission projections 
following revisions of the DTI Updated Energy Projections (UEP) and intense 
lobbying from industry (ENDS, 2005d). The Commission initially rejected the UK's 
amendments to the NAP in a bid to clamp down on generous national allocations. 
The UK subsequently took the Commission to the Court of First instance to 
appeal against the decision. In late 2005 the Court found that the Commission 
should not be allowed to dismiss final amendments to emission projections, or 
indeed to the entire NAP, following final consultation within Member States as this 
would make the consultation process "purely academid' (ENDS, 2005d). The 
Court ordered the Commission to overturn its decision and allow the increase in 
the UK allocation. However, Commission would not let the issue end in a situation 
that could have undermined its future authority regarding NAP approval. By 
February 2006 the Commission had again rejected the increased allocation on 
the basis that the UK did not submit its amendment to the NAP in time for the 30 
September 2004 deadline for taking final decisions on NAPs (ENDS, 2006b). 
After 18 months of legal wrangling, during which time the UK had held the EU 
Presidency and during a period in which the UK was trying to show leadership in 
climate policy and mere months away from the deadline for Phase II NAP 
submission, the UK finally laid the issue to rest, its reputation somewhat tarnished 
and the Commission in a stronger position to challenge Phase 11 NAPs. 
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National Allocation Plans from the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Poland 
were also being contested Member State government by the time the Scheme 
launched. The final total caps per Member State are shown in Figure 7.1. The 
agreed caps for Phase II are also shown in this figure. The annual EU-wide cap 
for Phase I was 2190.0 MtC02. This has decreased to 2036.7 MtCOg per year 
during Phase II - a reduction of 7% on Phase I. The UK's Phase II allocation is 
broadly the same as Phase I reflecting the comparative under-allocation in Phase 
I compared to many EU counterparts, as seen in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1 Approved National Allocation Plan caps in Phase / and Phase H 
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Source: Adapted from individual Commission Decisions relating to Phase II 
NAPs (available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cHmate/2nd phase eg.htm) 
The UK is one of the few Member States to have set cap that was exceeded by 
verified emissions in Phase I (Figure 7.2). For Phase I the baseline emissions for 
installations were calculated by taking the average of the five years with the 
highest emissions during the period 1998-2003 (Defra, 2005b). The power 
generation sector was the only sector to receive Phase 1 allowances below the 
predicted BAU baseline, with the assumption that all other sectors would receive 
allocations that mirror BAU performance. However, in early 2008 ENDS reported 
that 63% of British installations in fact received significantly more allowances than 
they needed in 2006 (ENDS, 2008e). At the sector level, power generators 
exceed their allocation by 45%, the only sector to do so. Every other sector had 
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surplus allowances, with only one third of all installations within sectors having to 
buy allowances from the market. 
The majority of EU Member States vastly over-allocated in Phase 1, as Figure 7.2 
shows. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia saw the greatest differences between 
allocated allowances and actual emissions. Lithuania in particular has been 
identified by Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) as the principal Member State having 
a 'long' position, i.e. over-allocation compared to verified emissions. The UK was 
one of only four Member States with an aggregate short position (higher verified 
emissions than allocations). The source of the short position is largely the power 
sector. 
Figure 7.2 Difference between aiiocated aiiowances and actuai emissions across 
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Figure 7.3 % difference between total Phase / allocations and total Phase / 
emissions 
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The disparity in allocations across the EU is further highlighted in Figure 7.4 and 
Figure 7.5. The long and short positions of all installations in Lithuania (the 
Member State with the greatest difference between allocations and verified 
emissions) demonstrates that aggregated across Phase I only three installations 
were in receipt of allocations below actual emissions (a short position). However, 
when all UK Phase I data is analysed to show the difference between allocations 
and verified emissions at the installation level one can clearly see that a 
significant number of installations were in a net short position, despite all sectors 
(with the exception of the power sector) producing aggregate emissions lower 
than the aggregate sector allocation. 
In reference to Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5, all installations below the x-axis are in a 
short position (net buyers of allowances during the Phase) and all installations 
above the x-axis are in a long position (net sellers of allowances during the 
Phase). 
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Figure 7.4 Long and short positions of UK installations in Phase / (with exception 
of power sector) in Phase / 
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Note: Figure 7.4 excludes data from the power sector in order to facilitate the 
presentation of the data form other sectors. 
Figure 7.5 Long and short positions of Lithuanian installations in Phase i 
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Regardless of the comparatively accurate allocation of the UK in Phase 1, the 
impact of widespread over-allocation by Member States led to the collapse of the 
allowance trading price Figure 7.6. By the end of 2007 EUA were being traded for 
less than €0.05 compared to the peak price of €30 in 2006. The initial decrease in 
the carbon price in 2006 was a result of the publication of 2005 verified emissions 
data demonstrated that Phase I was likely to be vastly over-allocated (ENDS 
2007). A consequence of the excessive allocations and the subsequent collapse 
of the trading price severely undermined the credibility of the EU ETS in Phase I. 
Figure 7.6 Price of EU ETS allowances (1t CO2) from 2005 to 2008 
— Hiase I Allowances -Phase II Allowances (2011) -Phase II Allowances (2008) 
Source: (Carbon Trust, 2007) 
7.4.3 Auctioning and EU harmonisation 
In Phase I 95% of UK allowances were allocated free of charge. This figure 
reduced to 90% in Phase II. The remaining allowances generally form part of a 
new entrant reserve (NER). This reserve can be accessed by either completely 
new entrants or by operators wishing to expand existing installations 
(Environment Agency, 2008a). 
In Phase II the quantity of allowances available for auction can increase 
according to the conditions of the ET Directive. Member States are able to set the 
maximum quantity of allowances for auction provided this quantity does not 
exceed 10% of the total national cap. This unharmonised approach means that 
Member States have implemented difference levels of auctioning in Phase 11. The 
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UK has established the highest quantity at 7% of the national cap, one of the 
highest across the EU. 
7.4.4 Exemption of British firms In Phase I: UK ETS and CCAs 
The ET Directive contains provisions for the temporary exclusion of installations 
in the instance of the installation being subject to a national policy to limit GHG 
emissions via taxation (recital 24). It is upon this basis that UK CCA and UK ETS 
participating installations were given the opportunity to opt-out of Phase I of the 
Scheme. As discussed in Chapter 5, approximately 330 firms opted out of Phase 
I on the basis of CCA involvement (Defra, 2008b). A further 59 opted out on the 
basis of UK ETS involvement. All eligible CCA participants are required to 
participate in Phase II and the 59 UK ETS installations were required to 
participate from January 2007 following the closure of the UK scheme in late 
2006. 
7.5 Monitoring, reporting and verification 
Provisions for monitoring and reporting are made in Art. 14 of the ET Directive. 
This article does no more than state that the Commission will provide guidelines 
to Member States regarding monitoring and reporting. Commission Decision 
2004/156/EC, and the subsequent revision in 2007, form the basis of the 
monitoring and reporting requirements of installations participating in the EU ETS 
(European Commission, 2004, European Commission, 2007). The ET Directive 
provides a wide-ranging and detailed framework for monitoring and reporting 
(Peeters, 2006). Annex I of the 2007 guidelines identifies the key principles of the 
monitoring and reporting of the EU ETS. These include, inter alia, transparency of 
monitoring and recording of data, cost-effectiveness in selecting monitoring and 
reporting methodologies, and consistency in the approach to enable the 
comparison over time of performance. The guidelines include Annexes dealing 
with each EU ETS sector on an individual basis. The responsibility for ensuring 
installations adhere to the monitoring and reporting guidelines rests with Member 
States (Peeters, 2006). 
Verification is accounted for in Art. 15 of the ET Directive. Reported emissions 
must be verified annually by 31^ March. In the instance of an installation not 
having reported its verified emissions for the preceding year by this date, the 
Member State must ensure the installation is prevented from further trading until 
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a verified emissions report has been received (Peeters, 2006). In the instance of 
failure to surrender sufficient allowances to cover verified emissions in any given 
year an installation operator's trading account is frozen. A €40Aonne fine is 
applied to each unaccounted tonne of COg. The operator must also purchase 
sufficient allowances from the market to cover the unaccounted emissions. This 
double-requirement is indented to prevent installation opting to pay a fine instead 
of purchasing allowances if the allowance price is higher than the fine. Thus far, 
compliance with the EU ETS has been high with 100% compliance in the UK in 
2006 and 2007 (Defra, 2007g; Defra, 2008e). Member States are permitted to 
decide whether verifiers are state-appointed operators or third-party 
organisations. In the UK, third-party operators provide verifications services with 
Defra issuing a list of Government-approved verifiers for operators to employ. 
These verifiers must be authorised by the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) as 
verifiers of GHG emissions data (UKAS, 2007). 
7.6 Provisions for new market entrants, exits and changes to installations 
Under Art. 11 (3) of the ET Directive, Member States must have provisions in 
place for new market entrants. Member States are required to resen/e a 
proportion of the total national allocation for new entrants. The approach to this is 
determined individually by Member States. During Phase 1, the UK's NER 
contained 46.8 million allowances (representing 6.3% of the total national 
allocation) (BERR, 2008d). A further 13.9 million allowances were set aside for 
good quality combined heat and power (GQCHP) plants. The NER increased 
significantly in Phase II to 51.7 million allowances for new entrants and 27.5 
million allowances for GQCHP (BERR, 2008b). Analysis conducted by the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) in late 2007 indicated that providing generous allocations to 
existing installations and less than generous provisions for new market entrants 
could have a negative effect on innovation. Without sufficient provisions for new 
entrants existing operators may be inclined to extent the life of their existing plant 
as the development of new cleaner technologies may not be rewarded sufficiently 
with allowances (World Wildlife Fund, 2005). 
Prior to Phase II Defra consulted with industry and other stakeholder regarding 
the provisions for new entrants, closures and GQCHP. An RIA dealing specifically 
with this issue was published in 2007 and details the options considered by the 
Government (Defra, 2007b). The Government took the decision to have a NER 
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fund which would reserve 95% of the allowances for non-large electricity 
producers and CHP producers, with surplus allowances within the NER being 
auctioned or sold. One proposal that was rejected by the Government was the 
cancellation of surplus NER allowances. Defra acknowledged that this would be 
the most environmentally beneficial option which would be reliant upon the 
number of surplus allowances to be cancelled. However, the revenue for 
Government from the sale of surplus allowances and the benefits to industry in 
terms of facilitating emission increases appear to have carried more weight. The 
Government also decided to maintain the closure regime from Phase I whereby 
operators have to surrender their ETS permit. Any allowances allocated for the 
year in which the closure occurs may be retained by the operator but allocations 
for subsequent years will be cancelled (Defra, 2005a). This could be beneficial for 
multi-site organisations that close specific installations at the start of a reporting 
year as the emissions for the remainder that year will be avoided but the 
allowances retained. These may then be used in other business areas or sold via 
the registry. 
However, this approach to the NER is also the source of its key weakness. By 
withdrawing allowances from sites that close, operators may be reluctant to close 
older, more polluting activities. Furthermore, providing free allocations to new 
installations effectively rewards more polluting activities as installations with 
higher projected emissions receive more allowances than installations with lower 
projected emissions. This also removes the need to factor the cost of carbon in to 
investment decisions as more polluting operations in Phases I and II receive 
higher allocations than installations with low-carbon technology on-site. If all new 
installations had to buy allowances there would be a far greater financial incentive 
for operators to invest in low carbon technologies. 
7.7 Overview of evidence-based analysis 
The collection of evidence to populate the evaluation of the EU ETS was again 
based on stakeholder surveys and interviews, and third party literature and 
analysis. Emissions data from Phase I was collected from the European 
Commission and Defra. Questionnaire responses were received from 9 external 
stakeholders, including academics, consultants and the Environment Agency. 
Defra did not provide a written response to the questionnaire but a representative 
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from the EU ETS team was interviewed. 7 responses were received from sector 
associations as industry representatives. 
7.7 .1 Sector associations 
Responding sector associations generally represented between one and ten 
companies. The number of companies represented by respondents is presented 
below in Table 7.3 
Table 7.3 Size of responding organisations 
Size % respondents 
1-10 members 58% 
11-20 members 14% 
21-30 members 0% 
31-40 members 0% 
41-50 members 14% 
More than 51 members 14% 
Sector associations responded on behalf of a minimum of 107 companies and a 
maximum of 161 companies. Of all the companies represented by responding 
sector associations, 48 installations participated in Phase I representing 7% of 
the 703 installations in the UK participating by the end of 2006 (Defra, 2008b). A 
further 81 installations are participating in Phase II taking the total number of 
participating firms 115. This figure represents approximately 12.5% of the UK 923 
installations participating in Phase II (Defra, 2007e). 
7 .7 .2 Emissions/environmental data collection 
Data relating to allowance prices, CO2 emissions and allocations is freely 
available via Defra and the CITL®®. There were no issues relating to quality and 
availability of data largely due to the application of Community-wide guidelines on 
monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions and surrendered allowances. 
7.8 Economic efficiency 
In Phase I the economic efficiency of the EU ETS was dictated by the quantity of 
allowances allocated across all Member States. The majority of Member States 
Refer to the Defra website for compliance and results 
http://www.defra.Qov. uk/environmenl)climatechanae/tradina/eu/operators/compliance.htm 
and the Commission for details of Member State verified allowances and surrendered 
allowances http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl en.htm . 
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over-allocated allov/ances. The UK allocation appeared to be comparatively more 
stringent as the UK was one of only four Member States to have higher verified 
emissions than allocations. However, the UK allocation was, in fact, only stringent 
for the power generation sector. All other sectors received a higher allocation 
than their actual emissions (see Figure 7.7, Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9). 
The Government attempted to quantify the cost of EU ETS participation to firms in 
2005 via the RIA (detailed analysis is attached at Appendix 4). However, a 
detailed reassessment of the actual costs incurred to either the Government or 
industry have not been undertaken in light of actual experience of the ETS. The 
Carbon Trust has been the most prominent organisation in terms of evaluating 
the economic cost of the EU ETS, although the focus of much of this work has 
focused on the identification of sectors vulnerable to international competition and 
the quantification of the risk posed by the EU ETS (Carbon Trust, 2004, Carbon 
Trust, 2006, Carbon Trust, 2008). 
There is a clear difference between the views of external stakeholders and 
industry with regards to the balance of the costs incurred and the environmental 
benefits of the EU ETS (Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8). External stakeholders 
generally believe that the costs incurred by industry are far outweighed by the 
environmental benefits. Even though the environmental benefits of Phase I 
appear to be limited (see section 7.9), free allocation of allowances mean that the 
economically the EU ETS works in favour of industry especially given the 
generous allocations witnessed during Phase I. Industry, on the other hand, is 
distinctly more negative about the balance of costs and benefits. As will be 
discussed later in this Chapter, many industry respondents also felt the Phase I 
allocations were unfair despite all sectors receiving higher aggregate allocations 
compared to actual emissions, thus making the negative perceptions of costs and 
benefits of Phase 1 difficult to justify. 
With regard to the costs incurred by Government and the balance with 
environmental outcomes the situation changes noticeably. The majority of sector 
associations believe that the costs incurred by Government are outweighed by 
environmental benefits, yet external stakeholders appear to be more reserved 
about the benefits of the approach when compared with administration costs. If 
allocations were not issued free of charge, thus providing a source of revenue for 
the Government and potentially minimising or eliminating the administration 
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costs, as seen with the PPC charging system, the responses of this stakeholder 
group are likely to shift to a more positive stance. 
Figure 7.7 Comparison of perceptions of costs incurred by industry with tiie 
overall environmental benefits of the EU ETS 
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Figure 7.8 Comparison of perceptions of costs incurred Government with the 
overall environmental benefits of the EU ETS 
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The absence of accurate data provided by the Government concerning the total 
cost of administering the EU ETS to the UK tax payer is disappointing. As one 
sector association noted, the number of Government departments (including 
Defra, BERR (formerly DTI) and the Environment Agency) and quantity of 
personnel involved indicate that the costs are likely to be significant insignificant: 
"On the Government side, they seem to have a very large team working on 
EU ETS in Defra, BERR, Treasury, Department for Transport and the 
Environment Agency and a large budget for consultancy backup. This, too, 
needs to be added to the real cost of EU ETS." 
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RIAs carried out prior to both Phase I and Phase II focus solely on the costs of 
the Scheme for industry supporting OECD analysis that RIA in the UK is used 
only as a means to justify a policy in terms of the costs incurred by industry 
(OECD, 2006b). Even the new lA guidance does make requirements for analysis 
of the costs likely to be incurred by the Government. The costs incurred by the 
taxpayer seem to be of little importance in either the ex ante or the ex post 
situation as these issues are not dealt with in any detail in any analysis of the EU 
ETS from a UK perspective. 
Despite concerns relating to the administrative costs, another sector association 
respondent highlighted that these costs are balanced by the EU ETS being the 
most efficient means to achieve emission reductions: 
"Whilst the cost of administering the EU ETS is significant, this is by far the 
most flexible way of encouraging emission reduction without simply driving 
investment (and emissions) abroad to countries without carbon policies." 
Furthermore, one external stakeholder identified that the determination of some 
stakeholders to apply pure economic theory, distracting from the need to focus on 
delivering emission reductions, to the EU ETS as one of the main problems with 
the Scheme: 
"Economic dogmatists [who] simplify the economic text book model and 
focus on flexibility instead of shaping the scheme so as to deliver the 
desired emission reductions." 
This appears to be a logical and rational argument. Although the economic theory 
behind an emissions trading scheme is in place to facilitate the achievement of a 
policy objective, one must question the value of striving to achieve a system 
reflecting the purest form of emissions trading if the environmental outcomes are 
unsatisfactory. If the environmental objectives of a policy can be achieved under 
imperfect conditions, this should be viewed as a satisfactory outcome. 
The inclusion of smaller installations was noted on several occasions as a factor 
affecting the economic efficiency, and to a certain extent the equity, of the EU 
ETS. One interview respondent, a representative from a small participating firm, 
stated that the primary problem in Phase I for small organisations were the de 
minimis rules. 
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"They [the regulatory authorities] have relaxed the tier level because we 
are such a de minimis and minor emitter. We can use supply records and 
national inventories and data sets so we are not so reliant upon our own 
monitoring and testing. It will reduce our costs and work input. And rightly 
so. I think it is now more in line with how it should be. I can appreciate if 
you are a big emitter that you do need robust monitoring and reporting 
procedures. I just felt it was over the top for the amount of carbon we were 
emitting under Phase I." 
The de minimis rules in Phase I refer to an installation with several small 
combustion activities that amount to a total thermal capacity of 20 MW (for 
example an installation v\/ith small back-up generators and other units with a 
thermal output less than 3 MW that aggregate to 20 MW). This led to concerns 
from some sectors, in particular the ceramics sector that the administrative 
burden to these installations was not believed to be proportionate to their COg 
emissions. For Phase II the Government introduced new de minimis rules 
allowing operators to voluntarily exempt any combustion installation with a 
thermal output of less than 3MW. If the aggregate output from an installation is 
more than 20 MW all elements must be included (Defra, 2007d). The impact of 
the changes to the de minimis rules remain to be seen. However, given that 
installations may only withdraw from the Scheme if the aggregate output is less 
than 20 MW it is unlikely that significant changes will be seen. Installations 
comprising numerous small combustion units will still be required to participate if 
the total output is more than 20 MW. 
This approach was supported by two further sector associations. One believes 
larger installations should only be subject to EU ETS and smaller installations 
should be subject to CCAs. There should be no overlap between the two policies, 
thus reducing the administrative burden for companies and reducing the 
problems relating to double counting between the two polices. Furthermore, the 
administrative costs incurred by Defra and the Environment Agency in relation of 
double-counting calculations and amendments would be reduced. The second 
sector association made this statement in relation to the administrative burden 
created by the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) requirements on small 
businesses: 
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"The sector is fully engaged in the need for a c l imate change policy, and 
recognises that all industry must reduce emissions. However, inevitably as 
the first major t rading scheme there have been issues with the permitt ing, 
al locat ion and M R V process that have greatly increased the administrat ive 
burden on members . Even in the long term it remains true that despi te 
proposals cover ing special t reatment for smal l emitter, general ly the cost of 
regulat ion for smal ler industry is many t imes more than the major emitters 
per tonne of carbon emitted." 
It w a s observed that none of the survey participants (external s takeholder or 
sector associat ions) identified the economic impact of passing through the cost of 
E U E T S to consumers . It is v^/idely acknov^ledged that electricity generators 
opera ted in the m a n n e r in P h a s e I by raising electricity prices ( C a r b o n Trust, 
2 0 0 6 ) . E n e r g y generators w e r e the only installations in the U K to receive P h a s e I 
and P h a s e II al locations be low B A U projections, m a d e on the basis that electricity 
generat ion is not subject to the s a m e risks of international competi t ion as other 
E U E T S sectors. Fur thermore, electricity generators are in a unique position in 
terms of passing on opportunity costs to consumers d u e to the immobility of 
electricity a n d the d e g r e e of immunity they enjoy from international competit ion. 
T h e impact of this on other businesses, particularly energy- intensive industries, 
particularly C C A participants, w a s ana lysed in detail in C h a p t e r 5. Analysis by the 
C a r b o n Trust in 2 0 0 6 led to the conclusion that in 2 0 0 5 a lone the U K power 
sector m a d e € 1 billion windfall profits f rom the E U E T S (Carbon Trust, 2 0 0 6 ) . This 
w a s largely c a u s e d by power generators using m o r e gas to g e n e r a t e electricity 
w h e n a l lowance prices w e r e high reducing the quantity of a l lowances required to 
cover emissions. A s gas prices increased and E U E T S a l lowance prices dropped 
more coal w a s used as the marginal cost of coal generat ion plus the a l lowance 
price w a s less than the who lesa le gas price. T h e windfall profits w e r e increased 
further by power c o m p a n i e s incorporating the cost of E U E T S a l lowances in to 
every m e g a w a t t hour ( M W h ) of electricity they sold including electricity that w a s 
a l ready covered by f ree a l lowances. 
At this point, there is o n e final note on the economic eff iciency of the E U E T S . 
Grubb a n d Neuhof f ( 2 0 0 6 ) identify two key factors that inf luence the per fo rmance 
of an emissions trading s c h e m e ; 
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'Like any market the key to prices is scarcity, and the price depends on both 
the absolute quanti ty of a l lowances avai lable and expectat ions about the 
future. ' 
(Grubb & Neuhoff , 2006: p.8) 
T o this end, a n d considering the i m m e n s e windfall profits of the British power 
generators in P h a s e I, the economic eff iciency of the E U E T S has, thus far, been 
at best disappointing. At worst it is a reflection of poor j u d g e m e n t of national 
governments in assuming individual M e m b e r S ta te over-al locat ion in a bit to 
protect domest ic industries would not impact upon the eff icacy of the S c h e m e . It 
is too ear ly to de te rmine if P h a s e II will repl icate the P h a s e I situation or if the 
Commiss ion has d o n e e n o u g h to t ighten the nat ional al locations. T h e 
Commiss ion does a p p e a r to be taking a more assert ive stance. In October 2 0 0 6 
the Commiss ion received 17 N A P s that had collectively set P h a s e II caps 1 5 % 
higher than 2 0 0 5 verif ied emissions ( E N D S , 2 0 0 6 a ) . T h e Commiss ion responded 
by reducing the nat ional caps of nine countr ies by an a g g r e g a t e of 7%®®. T h e U K 
w a s o n e of the f e w M e m b e r States to h a v e its first draft P h a s e II N A P accepted 
by the Commiss ion with the requi rement for revisions indicating that the UK, in its 
bid to s h o w leadership, is moving in the right direction. 
7.9 Environmental effectiveness 
As d iscussed earl ier in this Chapte r , in P h a s e 1 only the power generat ion sector 
w a s al located a l lowances below B A U projections. T h e rational behind this 
approach w a s justified by Defra on the basis that: 
' [The] sector faces l imited international compet i t ion and has relatively low 
cost abatement opportunit ies, such as fuel switching. ' 
(Defra, 2006e: p.9) 
This approach has been repea ted in P h a s e II, as only large electricity producers 
have rece ived al locations below their projected B A U emissions. Furthermore, the 
quantity of a l lowances avai lable for P h a s e II auction in the U K w a s taken f rom the 
overall al location for the electricity generat ion sector. Consequent ly , the 
emissions f rom all sectors with the except ion of the e n e r g y sector w e r e far lower 
than the sector- level al locations throughout P h a s e I, as demonst ra ted in Figures 
The nine countr ies are: Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovakia and Sweden. Germany received a cut of 6%, whi le Latvia and Lithuania 
revived nat ional cap cuts of 57% and 47% respectively (END Report 383, 2006). 
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7 .7 , 7 . 8 a n d 7 .9 , largely at t r ibutable to conserva t ive B A U project ions. Th is over -
al locat ion is indicat ive of the k e y p rob lem of P h a s e 1 - over al locat ion leading to 
low C O 2 a l l o w a n c e pr ices a n d a nega t i ve ef fect on the e n v i r o n m e n t a l ga ins of the 
S c h e m e . D a t a for the p o w e r sector a r e not inc luded in F igures 7 .9 , 7 . 1 0 and 7 . 1 1 
for v isual r e a s o n s , a n d a r e instead presents in F igure 7 . 1 2 (Def ra , 2 0 0 7 j , De f ra , 
2 0 0 8 e ) . 
Figure 7.9 UK verified emissions and total aiiocation in 2005 (excluding power 
sector) 
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Figure 7.10 UK verified emissions and total allocation in 2006 (excluding power 
sector) 
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Figure 7.11 UK verified emissions and totai allocation in 2007 (excluding power 
sector) 
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Figure 7 . 1 2 p resen ts the d a t a for the p o w e r sector. T h e p o w e r sector is t h e 
g rea tes t emi t ter of C O 2 in the U K a n d rece ives the largest quant i ty of a l l o w a n c e s 
yet w a s in a net short posit ion in t e r m s of a l locat ions. N e v e r t h e l e s s , in 2 0 0 5 the 
total emiss ions f r o m U K instal lat ions w e r e 2 7 . 1 M t C 0 2 a b o v e the total al locat ion 
( 2 4 2 . 3 M t C 0 2 ) a n d in 2 0 0 6 emiss ions w e r e 3 3 . 3 M t C O a a b o v e total a l locat ions 
(217 .7 IVt tC02) (De f ra , 2 0 0 6 e ; De f ra , 2 0 0 8 b ) . Ver i f ied emiss ions inc reased by 5 % 
in 2 0 0 6 c o m p a r e d to 2 0 0 5 emiss ions . Th is rise in emiss ions , a n d the impact this 
had o n the percept ion of the U K N A P , is beh ind the pe rce ived str ingency of U K 
al locat ions. 
Figure 7.12 Phase / allocations and actual emissions from the electricity 
generation sector 
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Analys is of s t a k e h o l d e r percept ions of the e n v i r o n m e n t a l e f fec t iveness of t h e E U 
E T S s h o w s a c lear d i f fe rence b e t w e e n those with a practical , d a y - t o d a y 
relat ionship with t h e E U E T S , a n d t h o s e w h o e x a m i n e the E U E T S f rom a further 
d is tance (i .e. a c a d e m i c s a n d consul tants not work ing directly with E U E T S ) . O n l y 
3 3 % of sector assoc ia t ions be l ieve the E U E T S e n c o u r a g e s a smal l d e g r e e of 
C O 2 a b a t e m e n t be low al locat ions f rom f irms, with e v e n f e w e r ( 1 7 % ) bel ieving the 
E U E T S d o e s the s a m e at t h e sector- level . Th is is in stark contrast with ex te rna l 
s takeho lders , of w h o m 6 7 % be l ieve t h e E U E T S should e n c o u r a g e C O 2 emiss ion 
reduct ions b e l o w a l locat ions f r o m individual f i rms a n d 7 7 % stating t h e s a m e for at 
the sector - level . O n l y 1 1 % of ex terna l s takeho lders be l ieve the E U E T S has no 
impact on C O 2 emiss ions at the f i rm- level a n d n o n e be l ieve the s a m e at the 
sector- level . In this situation, e v i d e n c e in the form of emiss ions da ta supports the 
s t a n c e of t h e sector associat ions. A s F igures 7 .9 , 7 . 1 0 a n d 7 , 1 1 demonst ra te , all 
sectors p e r f o r m e d wel l aga ins t their a l locat ions lead ing to a long position of be ing 
in a posit ion to sell surplus a l l o w a n c e s . H o w e v e r , t h e sen t iments of the sector 
associa t ions conf i rm that the a l locat ions w e r e too g e n e r o u s a n d did not provide 
a n y incent ives to i m p r o v e p e r f o r m a n c e . 
O n e c a n n o t a n a l y s e t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of a n emiss ions t rading s c h e m e wi thout 
e x a m i n i n g t h e m e t h o d of a l locat ion. Th is is o n e of the most content ious fea tures 
of the s c h e m e . T i e t e n b e r g ( 2 0 0 3 ) identif ies four possible a p p r o a c h e s to 
al location; 
• R a n d o m a c c e s s ( lotteries) 
• First c o m e , first s e r v e d 
• Admin is t ra t ive rules b a s e d on eligibility criteria (such as grandfather ing , 
B A U - b a s e d a l locat ions or b e n c h m a r k i n g ) 
• Auct ion 
C lear ly the first two a p p r o a c h e s a r e not sui table for a n emiss ions trading s c h e m e 
of this s ize a n d scope . T h e s e a p p r o a c h e s a r e usually appl ied in t h e al locat ion of 
permits resource use (e .g . water ) . T h e third a n d fourth opt ions a r e the only two 
ava i lab le to G H G emiss ions trading. H o w e v e r , within t h e s e two ca tegor ies t h e r e 
exist n u m e r o u s var iat ions of the methodo logy . For e x a m p l e , a n auct ion m a y b e 
b a s e d on t h e d e s c e n d i n g clock a p p r o a c h used in the U K E T S , or if m a y be b a s e d 
on c losed or o p e n bids. Auct ions, h o w e v e r , often rece ive criticism f rom industry 
d u e to t h e addit ional opera t iona l costs incurred through t h e p u r c h a s e of 
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al lowances. Converse ly , administrat ive rules for allocating a l lowances often 
require the application of complex methodologies such as 'grandfathering' 
w h e r e b y installations are al located a l lowances based on historical emissions 
trends and benchmark ing w h e r e b y a l lowances a re al located according to best 
technological practice. P h a s e s I and II of the E U E T S h a v e relied on B A D 
projections, but as per formance data from P h a s e I suggests, this approach is also 
fraught with difficulties, not least d u e to underest imat ing the ability of industry to 
under take emissions a b a t e m e n t and information asymmetr ies b e t w e e n 
G o v e r n m e n t and industry. 
In light of the importance of the allocation issues, all research participants w e r e 
asked to identify their preferred method of a l lowances allocation. T h e distribution 
of responses is provided in F igure 7 .13 . 
Figure 7.13 Preferred allocation method according to stakeholder group 
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T h e s e results support the findings of the 2 0 0 5 study under taken by Ecofys and 
McKinsey on behalf of the Commiss ion (European Commiss ion , 2 0 0 6 b ) . T h e 
2 0 0 5 study found that the vast majority of compan ies and sector associat ions 
( 8 0 % and 8 8 % respectively) w e r e not in favour of auctioning 5 % of the total 
allocation in P h a s e I and 1 0 % in P h a s e II. This is in direct contrast with the 
majority of G o v e r n m e n t bodies, N G O s a n d market intermediar ies who bel ieve 
that M e m b e r Sta tes should either be ab le to choose to have greater auctioning 
( 5 2 % , 3 0 % and 4 1 % respectively) or that more auctioning should be mandatory 
across the E U ( 2 1 % , 5 5 % and 3 5 % respectively) (European Commiss ion , 
2 0 0 6 b ) . 
T h e r e w a s a clear pre ference a m o n g external s takeholders surveyed for this 
research for 1 0 0 % auctioning of a l lowances. O n e external s takeholder w h o 
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selected "other" In fact supported auctioning but se lected 'other' on the basis that 
the m e t h o d of al location is not hugely important; 
"Talk ing about maximisat ion of the reduct ion, the method of al locat ion is 
not the most important thing but the readiness of the legislator to 
implement it in a meaningfu l way . Nevertheless, I a m in favour of auct ion, 
but the polit ical wil l is low." 
T h e issue raised by this respondent is very important. A n emissions trading 
s c h e m e b a s e d on f ree al locations should theoretical ly work wel l in te rms of 
achieving an env i ronmenta l object ive in a cost-effect ive manner . Therefore , with 
perfect knowledge of the ability of industry to aba te and the p resence of rel iable 
data , a sys tem b a s e d on basel ines could produce the desired results. Policy 
m a k e r s a re of ten in a w e a k e n e d position d u e to information asymmetr ies . 
Regard less of the desire of a government to implement the policy in a 
"meaningful" manner , informational difficulties m a y negat ively affect its ability to 
do so (Ekins a n d Ether idge, 2 0 0 6 ) . 
Only o n e external s takeholder suggested the cont inued use of f ree a l lowance 
allocation on the basis that both methods should in theory lead to the s a m e 
env i ronmenta l outcome: 
"The effects of auct ioning and free distr ibution of a l lowances on the level 
of abatement should be the same (except for possible emiss ions 
consequences of the dif ferent incentives for new entry and exit). The 
method of distr ibution affects the profits of f i rms, but not the va lue of 
permits, wh ich wil l be def ined by marginal abatement cost." 
H o w e v e r , Joskow a n d S c h m a l e n s e e ( 1 9 9 8 ) a rgue that the highly politicised 
approach to establishing the allocation methodology often leads to "interest 
group politick' and rent seek ing behaviour by firms. Furthermore, the impact of 
distribution costs and barriers to trading also have implications on the eff iciency 
of a trading s c h e m e . In instances of regulators relying on industry-provided 
information the impact of rent seeking should not be over- looked, particularly in 
situation such as the E U E T S w h e n powerful industry lobbying w a s a feature of 
the ent ire process of developing, implement ing and a l lowance allocation of the 
E U E T S ( M a r k u s s e n a n d S v e n d s e n , 2 0 0 5 ) . 
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In addi t ion to the nega t i ve percept ion of m a n y externa l s takeho lders t o w a r d s f ree 
al locat ions, t h e r e m a y i n d e e d b e legal ramif icat ions of such a n a p p r o a c h . 
Johnston ( 2 0 0 6 ) d r a w s at tent ion to the possibility that f r e e a l locat ions could b e 
d e e m e d to b e a form of S t a t e aid a n d m a y c o n t r a v e n e the provisions surrounding 
S t a t e aid in the E C Trea ty . Th is a r g u m e n t is b a s e d on the pass - th rough of costs 
f rom e n e r g y g e n e r a t o r s to c o n s u m e r s . Crucial ly, t h e lack of S t a t e aid a s s e s s m e n t 
of N A P s led the au thor to t h e conclus ion that severa l M e m b e r S ta te N A P s 
involved a n e l e m e n t of S t a t e aid wh ich h a d not b e e n notif ied to, a n d c lea red by, 
the C o m m i s s i o n . J o h n s t o n a r g u e s that this fact leads to a d e g r e e of legal 
uncerta inty of t h e E U E T S w h i c h m u s t b e t a k e n into a c c o u n t in future p h a s e s of 
the S c h e m e . Further , the over -a l locat ion by s o m e M e m b e r S t a t e s reflects a n 
addit ional inequity of s o m e s ta tes grant ing h igher levels of 'S ta te aid' than others. 
H o w e v e r , t h e a b s e n c e of legal c h a l l e n g e s on the g rounds of S t a t e aid s ince the 
imp lementa t ion E U E T S indicates that this m a y not b e a signif icant issue within 
the opera t ion of the S c h e m e . 
H o w e v e r , t h e issue of S t a t e aid d o e s s e r v e to s t rengthen t h e a r g u m e n t in favour 
of a cent ra l ised a l locat ion structure with the r e m o v a l of N A P s a n d t h e 
C o m m i s s i o n tak ing c h a r g e for distributing a l l o w a n c e s or pre ferab ly full auct ioning 
of a l l o w a n c e s . Whi ls t the latter a l locat ion m e c h a n i s m might not necessar i ly 
p revent t h e p a s s through of costs to c o n s u m e r s , it w o u l d e l imina te t h e d o u b l e 
d iv idend r e c e i v e d by s o m e industr ies via t rading of a l l o w a n c e s coup led with 
increasing product prices. 
If all a l l o w a n c e s a r e auct ioned , emiss ions trading beg ins to h a v e similar 
character ist ics a n d ef fects a s taxat ion. Th is is espec ia l ly t rue if g o v e r n m e n t s (or 
the E U ) in te rvene in t h e pr ice-sett ing by establ ishing a f loor-pr ice to e n s u r e a 
m i n i m u m v a l u e of a t o n n e of CO2. O n e must also quest ion w h e t h e r 1 0 0 % sa le 
will b e politically feas ib le , desp i te current c la ims of if be ing so, g iven t h e 
insurmountab le difficulties e x p e r i e n c e d by the E U in the 1 9 9 0 s in its a t tempt to 
introduce a C o m m u n i t y - w i d e e n e r g y tax ( M a k u c h , 2 0 0 0 ) . 
T h e C o m m i s s i o n in its 2 0 0 8 c l imate c h a n g e e n e r g y p a c k a g e has s u g g e s t e d a n 
a p p r o a c h that m a y r e d u c e al locat ion distortions across the E U . O n e key proposal 
of the p a c k a g e is the r e p l a c e m e n t of nat ional a l locat ions with e i ther centra l 
al locat ion b a s e d on s t a n d a r d i s e d methodo log ies or rep laced by full auct ioning of 
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a l lowances ( E u r o p e a n Commiss ion , 2 0 0 8 d ) . In response to this Defra art iculated 
the G o v e r n m e n t ' s support for such an approach; 
"We we lcome much greater predictabil i ty in the cap-sett ing process with a 
long-term trajectory cap. This will provide business with the certainty to 
invest in a low-carbon economy." 
Despi te the obvious f laws of P h a s e I al locations, the limited env i ronmenta l 
benefits a n d the inequity c a u s e d by s o m e national al location plans, o n e sector 
associat ion s u m m e d up w h a t has been learned over the previous 3 years of 
large-scale emissions trading; 
"More has been achieved than many commentators acknowledge, and 
the prospects are for higher carbon prices in Phase II as a result of better 
basel ine data emerg ing f rom Phase I." 
This is an important point. T h e improvement in basel ine data should in theory 
result in increased accuracy in allocations. Improved basel ines should improve 
the prospects for a stable carbon price over the course of P h a s e II. 
As d iscussed earl ier in C h a p t e r 5 (C l imate C h a n g e A g r e e m e n t s ) the issue of 
basel ine data has a crucial impact on the success or fai lure of a policy. In the 
c a s e of the E U E T S , P h a s e I has proved to be of i m m e n s e benefit to establ ishing 
accurate a n d reliable basel ine data for future phases. 
7 . 1 0 T r a n s p a r e n c y 
As stated earl ier, t ransparency is o n e of the fundamenta l principles of the 
monitoring and reporting requirements. A n n e x I of the 2 0 0 7 guidel ines states; 
'Monitor ing data, including assumpt ions, references, activity data, 
emiss ion factors, oxidat ion factors and convers ion factors shall be 
obtained, recorded, compi led, analysed and documented in a manner 
that enables the reproduct ion of the determinat ion of emiss ions by the 
verif ier and the competent authority. ' 
(European Commiss ion , 2007a) 
T h e Env i ronment A g e n c y has responsibility for monitoring and reporting 
requirements. Def ra , being the competent authority in the UK, is responsible for 
241 -
publishing per fo rmance data in the public domain . T h e s e per fo rmance reports 
can be found on the Defra webs i te a n d general ly contain a n overv iew of the UK's 
per fo rmance fol lowed by sector- level per fo rmance details relating to al located 
a l lowances a n d actual pe r fo rmance (Defra , 2 0 0 6 e , Defra, 2 0 0 8 b ) . 
T h e percept ion of t ransparency within the E U E T S w a s a s s e s s e d during the 
survey. All s takeholders w e r e a s k e d to rank the level of t ransparency of the 
S c h e m e a n d subsequent ly rate how they perce ived about this aspect of the 
S c h e m e . Sector associat ions general ly find the E U E T S opera tes in a s o m e w h a t 
t ransparent m a n n e r ( 6 7 % ) . T h e remaining 3 3 % stated the E U E T S is complete ly 
t ransparent . This c o m p a r e s with 9 0 % of external s takeholders ranking the 
t ransparency as 'slightly' t ransparent ' a n d 1 0 % ranking it as 'confidential subject 
to commerc ia l secrets' . Only 1 7 % of the sector associat ions bel ieve there is room 
for improvement with regards to the level of t ransparency. T h e remaining 8 3 % 
bel ieve the level is acceptab le a n d not in need of improvement . T h e perception of 
external s takeholders is very different. 7 0 % of external s takeholders bel ieve the 
t ransparency of the E U E T S n e e d s to be improved, with only 3 0 % believing the 
situation is acceptab le . In their analysis of the E U E T S and its compl iance with 
the A a r h u s Convent ion, M a c D o n a l d a n d M a k u c h ( 2 0 0 6 ) conclude that inquiry into 
the S c h e m e from a a c a d e m i c a n d professional s tance m a y be e n h a n c e d if the 
t ransparency w e r e to be improved. Fur thermore, the authors asser t that "a public 
information campaign should be developed in order to stimulate stakeholder 
involvement in what is otherwise a technical and inaccessible field' (p. 148). 
C o m m e n t s rece ived from external s takeholders support the v iew that the 
t ransparency of the S c h e m e would be improved if communicat ion and public 
e n g a g e m e n t w e r e increased; 
"More information to stakeholders in terms of funct ioning and rules of the 
system." 
Furthermore, the process of developing and reviewing N A P s is also an a rea of 
concern with criticisms being levied towards the w a y in which N A P s a re a s s e s s e d 
by the Commiss ion , public disclosure of the rationale behind decision mak ing a n d 
difficulty in understanding the al location methodology; 
' The re is poor t ransparency and accountabi l i ty in the basis for al locating 
a l lowances. Over-generous al locat ions made by individual member 
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states damage the interests of the system as a whole , and need to be 
just i f ied more publ icly and transparent ly." 
T h e difficulty in assess ing w h e t h e r a country has m a d e over ly -generous 
allocations, however , lies in the t imescale . During P h a s e I the vast over-
al location within most M e m b e r Sta tes did not b e c o m e apparent until the latter 
part of the Phase . This is likely to be repea ted in P h a s e II, w h e n sufficient data 
relating to actual emiss ions a n d the impact of the al locations on trading prices 
b e c o m e s avai lable. 
Another a rea of concern relates to the complexi ty of the N A P methodology. It 
goes without saying that given the s ize a n d scope of the E U E T S a n d the 
complexi ty of the activities operat ing within the S c h e m e any methodology 
relating to basel ine calculat ions, c a p setting and a l lowance allocation is going 
reflect this complexity. H o w e v e r , o n e external s takeholder points to the failing of 
M e m b e r Sta tes to simplify these methodologies w h e n they are included in 
documentat ion to improve public understanding: 
"The main prob lem relates, in my opinion, to the complexi ty of NAPs 
regarding methodolog ies for sett ing caps and al locat ing a l lowances, 
wh ich prevent any non-expert f rom understanding what 's going on. 
Improvement most probably requires more harmonlsat ion at EU level 
and a dif ferent approach to al location, either through general 
benchmarks or auct ioning." 
T h e final point of the c o m m e n t a b o v e relating to the use of benchmark ing or 
auctioning to increase public understanding is very useful. Not only would 
al ternat ive al location methodologies, such as auctioning, increase the s e n s e of 
equity, it m a y also improve public understanding of the S c h e m e as it would 
r e m o v e m a n y of the complexit ies of the existing BAU-project ion based system. 
H o w e v e r , the es tab l ishment of an E U - w i d e c a p under which auctioning would 
take place is not without data issues. In order to set a chal lenging c a p a 
significant quantity of data n e e d s to be col lected f rom participating industries. 
However , the method is m a d e m u c h simpler by not assigning specific quantit ies 
of a l lowances to individual f irms, as stated by an external stakeholder: 
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"The measure wou ld be to replace the present system wi th an auct ion. 
As long as the administrat ion of f ree al locat ion wil l be upheld, the 
t ransparency wi l l be less than desired." 
Moving beyond the al location methodology to the monitoring, reporting a n d 
verification requi rements , o n e sector associat ion interview respondent highlighted 
how the M R V requi rements have proved to be particularly successful . A s 
previously stated in this thesis, efficient monitoring, reporting and verification 
procedures a re f u n d a m e n t a l to achieving t ransparency within policy: 
"I think that the moni tor ing and veri f icat ion systems have proved pretty 
robust. The compl iance rate is very high." 
This c o m m e n t , f rom a sector associat ion, accurate ly reflects the situation during 
P h a s e I. In 2 0 0 5 , 9 9 . 7 % of U K installations sur rendered sufficient a l lowances 
prior to the compl iance deadl ine (Defra , 2 0 0 6 e ) . Only four installations w e r e 
subject to civil penal t ies amount ing to approx imate ly £ 7 5 8 , 0 0 0 for failure to 
surrender sufficient a l lowances by the compl iance deadl ine . In 2 0 0 6 , the 
per formance of U K installations improved with all installations submitt ing 
sufficient a l lowances by deadl ine on 3 0 April 2 0 0 7 (Def ra , 2 0 0 8 b ) . 
T h e C I T L opera tes in a m a n n e r that al lows any s takeholder to a c c e s s information 
relating to the t ransact ions of all installations operat ing within the S c h e m e 
(European Commiss ion , 2 0 0 8 a ) . It a lso provides contact information for persons 
responsible for var ious activities within the Env i ronment A g e n c y and Defra . A 
transaction log of this type is vital for s takeholders to obtain detai led information. 
7.11 Flexibility 
An emission trading s c h e m e , by its very nature, should offer a high level of 
flexibility to participating companies , as d o c u m e n t e d in numerous studies ( O E C D , 
1989; Joskow, a n d S c h m a l e n s e e , 1998 ; Stavins, 2 0 0 3 ; T ie tenberg , 2 0 0 6 ) . 
Quest ionnai re respondents supported this notion. All sector associat ion 
respondents rated the flexibility of the E U E T S in terms of al lowing investment 
m a n a g e m e n t a n d a b a t e m e n t options as either moderate ly flexible or highly 
flexible. External s takeholders mirrored this with the except ion of one respondent 
who bel ieves the E U E T S offers very little flexibility in te rms of a b a t e m e n t 
decision mak ing ( T a b l e 7 . 4 and T a b l e 7 .5 ) . 
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Table 7.4 Rating flexibility of EU ETS with regard to management of investment 
decisions 
Respondent No flexibility Very little flexibility Moderate flexibility High flexibility 
aroup 
Sector 0% 0% 67% 33% 
associat ions 
External 0% 0% 30% 70% 
stakeholders 
Table 7.5 Rating of flexibility with regard to allowing industries to optimise 
emission reductions via assessment of marginal abatement costs 
Respondent No flexibility Very little flexibility Moderate flexibility High flexibility 
group 
Sector 0% 0% 50% 50% 
associat ions 
External 
stakeholders 
0% 10% 30% 60% 
B a s e d on this ev idence , it s e e m s appropr iate to assert that the E U E T S provides 
a sufficiently f lexible m e c h a n i s m within which c o m p a n i e s c a n under take 
emissions a b a t e m e n t . 
7 . 1 2 Innovat ion 
A significant proportion of the respondents ( 8 0 % of sector associat ions a n d 7 7 % 
of external s takeholders) stated they bel ieve the E U E T S fosters a small a m o u n t 
of technological innovation within industry. This is in-line with the genera l 
economic rat ionale behind marke t based instruments. T h e potential to genera te 
revenue following investment in 'good' behaviour should inspire a firm to pursue 
activities that reduce emissions if it is f inancially v iable to do so. Firms 
subsequent ly benefi t f inancially though sa le of surplus a l lowances. This is 
ba lanced by f irms w h o s e marginal a b a t e m e n t costs are higher than the a l lowance 
cost. There fore , there is less incentive for these firms to a b a t e emissions. 
H o w e v e r , only o n e sector associat ion l inked the ability of the E U E T S to promote 
innovative behaviour and the method of a l lowance allocation, stating that: 
"It does not matter whether the initial al location is free or auct ioned; all 
companies see a price of carbon. Expectat ions of long term carbon 
prices are factored into investment decisions." 
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This a p p e a r s to add support to calls for 1 0 0 % auctioning of a l lowances as 
innovative behaviour c a n h a v e a positive impact on envi ronmenta l per formance. 
T h e m o r e a f irm innovates the m o r e its envi ronmenta l impact will decrease . 
There fore , sa le of a l lowances should be the preferred route for a l lowance 
allocation. 
O n e external s takeholder w a s keen to stress that e v e n with full auctioning a 
carbon tax could h a v e b e e n a m o r e effect ive a n d efficient m e a n s to promote 
d e v e l o p m e n t and investment in low carbon technologies: 
"I th ink it was absolutely essent ial to get the Scheme in place. I wou ld 
have preferred a carbon tax but that was inconceivable. It wou ld give 
some sense of surety about the price of carbon because the price of 
carbon is the carbon tax. investors in low carbon technology know 
exact ly where they are. With the EU ETS they have absolutely no idea 
what the price of carbon is going to be. It wou ld be wor th putting in a 
carbon tax now because it would establ ish a f loor for the EU ETS - the 
price of carbon wou ld never fall below the price of the tax." 
However , it is important to note that s o m e key difficulties lie within the 
establ ishment of a 'green' tax. T h e s e include setting the tax at the correct rate in 
order to elicit the desired response (Stavins, 2 0 0 3 ) ; minimising the distributional 
ou tcomes of the tax (i.e. ensur ing the pol luter-pays a n d other s takeholders a re 
not unfairly burdened) (Sadler , 2 0 0 1 ; O E C D , 2 0 0 6 a ) ; and, the impact of taxat ion 
on the compet i t iveness of businesses (Rosenstock , 2 0 0 6 ) . 
N u m e r o u s authors h a v e d o c u m e n t e d the detr imental impact of price instability on 
long-term investment (e.g. G r e e n , 2 0 0 1 , BIyth et al., 2 0 0 7 , Fischer, 2 0 0 8 ) . T h e 
fluctuating carbon price of P h a s e I coupled with uncertainty surrounding the long-
term future of the E U E T S p o s t - P h a s e II is likely to lead to industry exhibiting 
reluctance to invest. This is supported by 6 0 % of sector associat ions w h o stated 
long-term uncertainty has a negat ive impact on investment decision making of 
industry. Furthermore, the low carbon price does not reflect the real cost of 
carbon a n d as a c o n s e q u e n c e fails to give the required price signals to invest in 
low carbon technologies. 
However , analysis by the C a r b o n Trust has st ressed that ex post g o v e r n m e n t 
interference the marke t (e.g. draining 'surplus' a l lowances) to increase a l lowance 
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prices could h a v e detr imental effects upon the ability of the E U E T S to incentivise 
investment in technological research and d e v e l o p m e n t as the government action 
m a y be s e e n by industry as penal ising 'good' behaviour (e.g. a b a t e m e n t ) (Carbon 
Trust, 2 0 0 6 ) . This v jas e c h o e d by an interview respondent: 
"Price discovery al lows projects to be valued including the revenue 
st ream f rom carbon abated. Therefore whi lst under Phase I abatement 
primari ly involved generator fuel switching, t rue technological innovat ion 
wil l become increasingly common going forward." 
T h e data col lected as part of this study indicates that sector associat ions bel ieve 
the E U E T S has a greater impact on innovation than individual firms. A survey 
conducted by M c K i n s e y and C o m p a n y and Ecofys on behalf of the Commiss ion 
in 2 0 0 5 found that 5 3 % of c o m p a n i e s (of 1 3 4 survey respondents f rom across the 
E U ) bel ieve the E U E T S has a strong or m e d i u m impact of decisions to deve lop 
innovative technologies ( E u r o p e a n Commiss ion , 2 0 0 6 b ) . This survey w a s 
conducted in 2 0 0 5 - the first year of the E U E T S - which m a y offer an explanat ion 
as to w h y the impact on innovation w a s lower than found in this study. T h e full 
impacts of the S c h e m e a re unlikely to have been felt within c o m p a n i e s until 
further into P h a s e I. 
In order to populate the concept of innovation within E U E T S participants sector 
associat ions identified the types of innovative behaviour that had b e e n exhibited 
within their sector arising directly f rom participation in the E U E T S ( 
Tab le 7 .6 ) . A significant majority s tated that the E U E T S led to an increase In 
a w a r e n e s s of senior m a n a g e m e n t of G H G emission reduction and energy 
efficiency opportunit ies, but only 5 0 % reported c h a n g e s to process and 
equ ipment indicating the scale of the cha l lenge f a c e d by the E U E T S in P h a s e II if 
significant emissions a b a t e m e n t is to occur. 
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Table 7.6 Stated changes arising within sectors as a result of the EU ETS 
Change % respondents 
Increased awareness of G H G reduct ion opportuni t ies wi th in 
senior management 83 
Increased awareness of energy saving opportuni t ies within senior 
management 67 
Process changes 50 
Introduction of equ ipment of higher eff ic iency rat ing/ lower 
emissions rating than previous equ ipment 50 
Inclusion of cost of carbon in new project appraisals 50 
Improved envi ronmenta l report ing 33 
Improved supply chain management 17 
Development of strategies to manage carbon as a resource 17 
T h e estab l ishment of a stable carbon price will inevitably lead to greater industrial 
conf idence towards mak ing f inancial investments in n e w technology. However , 
low carbon prices in P h a s e 1 a n d high g a s prices led 'negat ive' fuel switching by 
m a n y power generators - f rom gas to coal ( E N D S , 2 0 0 8 e ) , which should be 
avoided a s the marke t gains strength. 
7 . 1 3 A c c e p t a n c e a n d equity 
T h e percept ions of equity and the a c c e p t a n c e exhibited by different s takeholders 
w e r e eva lua ted (Figure 7 .14 ) . External s takeholders h a v e a stronger sense of 
accep tance for the E U E T S with all respondents professing either qualif ied or full 
acceptance of the S c h e m e . Whi lst m o r e than half of sector associat ions exhibit a 
sense of a c c e p t a n c e of the E U E T S , slightly f e w e r than 2 0 % completely reject the 
approach. It is useful to note that the level of strong a c c e p t a n c e within the 
external s takeholder group is approx imate ly 5 0 % lower than the U K E T S a n d 
C C A external s takeholder groups. It b e c a m e clear over the course of the 
interviews and quest ionnaire analysis that this stakeholder group is largely 
supportive of M B I s but has concerns over the design a n d operat ion of the E U 
E T S . 
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Figure 7.14 Level of acceptance exhibited by both stal<eholder groups 
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A second e l e m e n t of the evaluat ion of fairness, equity and accep tance is 
industry's percept ion of allow/ance allocation in P h a s e s I and II. N o n e of the 
responding sectors stated that their sectoral al location w a s excess ive for either 
P h a s e I or P h a s e II. Wi th 6 0 % of respondents stating that their sectoral allocation 
in P h a s e I w a s either unfair or very unfair, o n e must investigate the validity of 
such claims (Tab le 7 .7 ) . 
Tabie 7.7 Rating of fairness of allocation of Phase / allowances from the 
perspective of sector associations 
Allowance allocation Fair allocation Slightly unfair Very unfair allocation 
excessive compared with EU allocation but no leading to competitive 
counterparts significant detrimental disadvantage 
effects on members compared with EU 
counterparts 
0% 4 0 % 4 0 % 20% 
Evidence disputes the ranking of three of the respondents w h o stated that their 
sectoral al location as unfair or very unfair. In 2 0 0 5 the actual emissions from 
these sectors ranged from 2 0 % to 3 0 % below the 2 0 0 5 allocation. 2 0 0 6 
allocations for these sectors w e r e b e t w e e n 1 5 % and 4 0 % higher than actual 
emissions. This clearly disputes the notion that the allocations w e r e in any w a y 
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unfair. It is interesting to note that two sectors w h o stated their allocation w a s fair 
had significantly lower over-al locat ions c o m p a r e d to the remaining respondents 
( b e t w e e n 5 % a n d 1 5 % in 2 0 0 5 , 1 0 % and 1 8 % in 2 0 0 6 ) . It is difficult to provide a 
valid explanat ion of the 2 0 % of sector associat ions w h o ranked the P h a s e I as 
'very unfair' beyond a genera l percept ion of negativity towards the S c h e m e . T h e 
al locations for P h a s e II a re perceived to be more unfair than P h a s e I (Tab le 7 .8) . 
H o w e v e r , at the t ime of writing there w a s no emissions data avai lable to support 
or dispute t h e s e claims. 
Table 7.8 Rating of fairness of allocation of allowances in Phase i and Phase H 
from the perspective of sector associations in Phase ii 
Allowance allocation Fair allocation Slightly unfair Very unfair allocation 
excessive compared with EU allocation but no leading to competitive 
counterparts significant detrimental disadvantage 
effects on members compared with EU 
counterparts 
0% 20% 60% 20% 
Responding sector associat ions w e r e asked to descr ibe the overal l exper ience of 
their m e m b e r s during P h a s e I of the S c h e m e . Overwhelmingly , industry appears 
to h a v e negat ive f e e d b a c k (Tab le 7 .9 ) . 
Table 7.9 Overall experience of members 
Completely More negative than More positive than Completely positive 
negative positive negative 
20% 60% 20% 0% 
In order to obtain further insight as to the perception of industry responses w e r e 
ana lysed for reasons behind the negat ive or positive feedback , of which two 
sector associat ions chose to e x p a n d on their answer . O n e w a s largely 
dissatisfied with the bureaucrat ic requi rements of the S c h e m e . T h e other w a s 
dissatisfied with the level of consultat ion prior to the d e v e l o p m e n t of the N A P . 
However , as section 7 . 4 . 2 of this C h a p t e r demonstra tes , Defra w e n t to significant 
effort to consult with industry prior to the d e v e l o p m e n t of the N A P s for both 
P h a s e s I and II. G i v e n that no other respondents raised the issue of bureaucracy 
and administrat ive requirement , and bear ing in mind the n e e d to ensure accuracy 
of emissions inventories, it is unlikely that there is a real issue behind these 
comments . 
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Externa l s takeho lders w e r e a s k e d to rank the level of in f luence they be l ieve non-
industry s t a k e h o l d e r s h a d in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the EL) E T S . T h e major i ty ( 6 6 % ) 
be l ieve t h e r e w a s too little in f luence of non- industry s takeho lders . O n e third 
be l ieved the a m o u n t of in f luence w a s a b o u t right. N o n e of the respondents 
be l ieve non- industry s takeho lders had too m u c h inf luence in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of 
the E U E T S . In t h e U K t h e G o v e r n m e n t w e n t to g rea t lengths to consul t on m o s t 
a s p e c t s of P h a s e s I a n d II. T h e G o v e r n m e n t is current ly under tak ing a 
consul tat ion on t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s proposals to revise the E T Direct ive for P h a s e 
III. T h e r e h a v e certa inly b e e n a d e q u a t e opportunit ies for all s takeho lders to 
e n g a g e in t h e pol icy process. 
Looking a t the b r o a d e r c o n c e p t of equity, o n e m u s t quest ion a n al locat ion 
m e t h o d o l o g y b a s e d on the creat ion of property rights wh ich a r e then distr ibuted 
f ree of charge . T h e c o m m o n l y help belief of industry is that only f ree al locat ions 
c a n protect industry f r o m nega t i ve compet i t ion f r o m n o n - E U industry, in part icular 
compet i tors w h o a r e not subject to equ iva len t levels of e n v i r o n m e n t a l control 
( H e p b u r n at al. , 2 0 0 6 ) . H o w e v e r , t h e s e a r g u m e n t s a r e d iscredi ted by H e p b u r n et 
al. ( 2 0 0 6 ) w h o d r a w part icular at tent ion to sectors that a r e largely i m m u n e to 
fore ign compet i t ion , n a m e l y p o w e r genera t ion . T h e a s s u m p t i o n that auct ioning of 
a l l o w a n c e s w o u l d h inder the compet i t i veness of E u r o p e a n industry is misgu ided 
on the basis that f ree a l locat ions prov ide shor t - term subsid ies to f i rms a n d protect 
profits, y e t d o not offer a n y long- te rm protect ion aga ins t fore ign compet i t ion a n d 
do not protect a c o m p a n y ' s m a r k e t share . 
Possibly the m o s t crucial e l e m e n t of the eva lua t ion of equi ty a n d a c c e p t a n c e for 
the E U E T S is the c o n c e p t of responsibil i ty. V a n Asse l t a n d B i e r m a n n ( 2 0 0 7 ) 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y a n a l y s e a host of m e a s u r e s p r o p o s e d by industry, a c a d e m i c s , 
politicians a n d lobbyists d e i g n e d to protect the compet i t i veness of E u r o p e a n 
industry, to s e c u r e e c o n o m i c growth a n d to mainta in e m p l o y m e n t rates. T h e s e 
m e a s u r e s include, inter alia, re laxing al locat ions, the provision of subsid ies for 
e n e r g y c l imate - f r iendly industrial activit ies, t h e restriction of compet i t ive imports 
into the E U (via border tax ad jus tments , imposit ion of quotas , or imposit ion of 
technical s tandards ) , a n d raising of c o n s u m e r a w a r e n e s s across the E U with 
regards to g o o d s p r o d u c e d in a c c o r d a n c e with the E T Direct ive. F r o m a n 
env i ronmenta l a n d e c o n o m i c standpoint , in the s e n s e of establ ishing a price-
stable, funct ioning marke t , t h e re laxat ion of a l l o w a n c e al locat ion is 
incomprehens ib le . A n y of the o ther m e a s u r e s p roposed must a lso m e e t with strict 
- 2 5 1 -
W T O t r a d e guide l ines . H o w e v e r , t h e r e is o n e criteria noted by v a n Assel t a n d 
B i e r m a n n ( 2 0 0 7 ) that is f u n d a m e n t a l to the d iscussion of equi ty a n d the E D E T S : 
the a d h e r e n c e to t h e f u n d a m e n t a l principle of U N F C C C of c o m m o n but 
d i f ferent ia ted responsibil i ty. B a s e d on ability to a b a t e , the e c o n o m i c situation of 
EL) M e m b e r S t a t e s a n d t h e historical ( a n d cont inued) contr ibution global G H G 
emiss ions , E D industry has a signif icant responsibi l i ty to u n d e r t a k e emiss ions 
a b a t e m e n t regard less of the efforts (or lack of) within n o n - E U countr ies. Th is is 
not to p r e s u m e that the compet i t i veness of E U industry should b e s e v e r e l y 
c o m p r o m i s e d in order to a c h i e v e G H G emiss ion reduct ion. H o w e v e r , on the basis 
of d a t a p r e s e n t e d in this thesis it is r e a s o n a b l e to asser t that the protestat ions of 
industry should not b e g iven u n d e s e r v e d w e i g h t in future d e v e l o p m e n t s of the 
S c h e m e . Th is is part icularly per t inent g iven the largely nega t i ve percept ion of 
British industry t o w a r d s P h a s e I desp i te g e n e r o u s al locat ions. 
N o n e of t h e prev ious th ree c a s e studies h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d lobbying to the 
extent of t h e E U E T S . Dur ing its d e v e l o p m e n t , imp lementa t ion a n d s u b s e q u e n t 
revisions industry g roups h a v e b e e n persistent . A un ique a s p e c t of lobbying in 
the E U E T S context is the lengths g o v e r n m e n t f rom M e m b e r S t a t e s h a v e g o n e to 
m a x i m i s e t h e level of protect ion for their industries. T h e c a s e of G e r m a n y a n d 
other e a s t e r n M e m b e r S t a t e s th rea ten ing legal act ion fol lowing the C o m m i s s i o n ' s 
revisions to their N A P s highlights the se r iousness with wh ich s o m e M e m b e r 
S ta tes v i e w the impact of the E U E T S on their industr ies. 
T h e creat ion of proper ty rights, wh ich a r e distr ibuted without charge , a lso leads to 
a situation w h e r e b y industry will f iercely lobby to e n s u r e the m a x i m u m quant i ty of 
this t r a d a b l e c o m m o d i t y is a l located . In t h e c a s e of the U K , the total a l locat ion in 
P h a s e I a n d II w e r e identif ied be fore the a l locat ions to individual sectors a n d 
instal lations w e r e d e t e r m i n e d . Th is natural ly l eads to in tense lobbying f rom 
c o m p a n i e s a n d sector associat ions. H o w e v e r , des i re a n d p u r p o s e of such 
lobbying ( u n d e r the a s s u m p t i o n that successfu l lobbying c a n lead to f a v o u r a b l e 
a l locat ions) w o u l d d e c r e a s e through increas ing the u s e of auct ioning ( H e p b u r n et 
a!., 2006). 
7 . 1 4 O t h e r issues 
T h e conc lud ing analys is sect ion of this C h a p t e r will p resent addi t ional issues 
identif ied th rough t h e survey a n d interv iew process , name ly ; 
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the interaction b e t w e e n the E U E T S and other env i ronmenta l policies; 
overal l w e a k n e s s e s and fai lures of the E U E T S in P h a s e 1 a n d projections 
for P h a s e II. 
7.14.1 Interaction between the EU ETS and other climate policies 
T h e interaction b e t w e e n the E U E T S a n d other env i ronmenta l polices at both the 
E U and UK- leve ls a p p e a r to be of little concern to industry. Only 4 0 % of sector 
associat ion bel ieve the E U E T S and other British env i ronmenta l policies c rea te a 
significant or slight regulatory burden for their m e m b e r s (Tab le 7 . 1 0 and T a b l e 
7 .11 ) . 
Table 7.10 Rating of the interaction between EU ETS and other British 
en vironmentai poiices 
Interaction between 
EU ETS and other 
policies creates a 
significant regulatory 
burden 
Room for 
improvement. Some 
problems with 
cohesion between EU 
ETS and some policies 
- slight regulatory 
burden 
Minor problems with 
interaction between 
EU ETS and other 
policies but nothing 
too serious 
EU ETS and other 
polices operate In a 
complementary 
manners - excellent 
level of cohesion 
20% 20% 60% 0% 
Tabie 7.11 Rating of the interaction between EU ETS and other EU 
en vironmentai polices 
Interaction between 
EU ETS and other 
policies creates a 
significant regulatory 
burden 
Room for 
improvement. Some 
problems with 
cohesion between EU 
ETS and some policies 
- slight regulatory 
burden 
Minor problems with 
interaction between 
EU ETS and other 
policies but nothing 
too serious 
EU ETS and other 
polices operate In a 
complementary 
manners - excellent 
level of cohesion 
20% 0% 80% 0% 
T h e rat ionale behind t h e s e patterns can be expla ined by both the C l imate 
C h a n g e A g r e e m e n t s and the P P C Regulat ions, as identified by o n e sector 
association: 
T h e UK has CCA, EU ETS and is now introducing the Carbon Reduct ion 
Commi tment . A l though PPC is not in direct confl ict there are ser ious 
issues here on the interaction of this regulation. In some areas the PPC 
forces sites to increase energy use e.g. manual handl ing regulat ions and 
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dust control measures, wh ich is in direct opposi t ion to energy and 
emiss ion reduction." 
However , this w a s contradicted by another respondent w h o bel ieves that 
difficulties in meet ing health a n d safety requi rements a re g iven sufficient 
considerat ion within the context of the E U E T S : 
"Other policies somet imes require more energy to be used, e.g. to 
remove sulphur f rom oil products or operat ions. The EU ETS al lows a 
reasonable interact ion between these policies." 
Recital 2 9 of the i P P C Direct ive states that the Direct ive should be imp lemented 
without prejudice to C o m m u n i t y provisions for health and safety at the 
workplace. T h e site-by-site nature of the P P C permitting process should, 
technically, t ake into account health a n d safety requi rements if these lead to 
increases in specific emissions. Recital 2 1 of the E U E T S Directive 
( 2 0 0 3 / 8 7 / E C ) , on the other hand, only m a k e s provisions for the interaction 
b e t w e e n this Directive a n d the I P P C Direct ive insofar as prohibiting M e m b e r 
States f rom applying G H G emission limits to installations operat ing within the E U 
E T S . Fur thermore, e n e r g y eff iciency requirements m a y not be imposed via the 
I P P C permit if an installation opera tes within the E U E T S . Beyond these specific 
requirements, no further requi rements are m a d e in relation to the I P P C Direct ive 
nor in relation to any heal th a n d safety re lated E U legislation. 
In 2 0 0 1 , Smith a n d Sorrel I publ ished detai led analysis of the potential interaction 
be tween the I P P C Directive a n d a potential emissions trading s c h e m e (at that 
point the E U E T S w a s yet to be deve loped) (Smith and Sorrell, 2 0 0 1 ) . Under 
various scenar ios, the authors identify the possible ou tcomes following the 
implementat ion of both Directives. G iven the da te of this analysis, it is interesting 
to c o m p a r e the possible scenar ios within this paper with the real outcomes. Of 
particular impor tance is 'Scenar io 3 ' " , which is the closest to the existing 
Smith and Sorrel l identify three possible scenar ios for the interaction between the IPPC 
and EU ETS Direct ives: 
Scenario 1: 'Strictinterpretatiort whereby quant i tat ive limits on energy use and CO2 
emissions are specif ied wi th in IPPC on a site-by-site basis 
Scenario 2: 'Minimalistinterpretatiori whereby energy eff ic iency and CO2 emissions are 
not subject to any quant i tat ive limits and are t reated as secondary considerat ions to IPPC 
Scenar io 3 : ' Trading based interpretatiori whereby energy eff ic iency and CO2 emiss ion 
requirements of IPPC are met through emiss ions trading. Al locat ions may be based on 
either a si te-specif ic assessment of BAT for energy ef f ic iency/C02 emiss ions or on a 
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situation. It w a s proposed that removing e n e r g y eff iciency a n d G H G emissions 
f rom the remit of I P P C would , in fact, be beneficial in te rms of reducing 
emissions on the basis that the I P P C B A T for energy eff iciency could be used as 
a m e a n s to b e n c h m a r k installations. T h e s e b e n c h m a r k s could be the basis of 
al locations. Unfortunately, the real-life situation did not mirror the scenar io 
proposed by Smi th a n d Sorrell . A n opportunity m a y h a v e not b e e n max imised in 
terms of allocating a l lowances b a s e d on accepted best practice. Instead, 
al locations b a s e d on historical emiss ions and projected B A U s h o w e d little regard 
for the notion of best avai lable technique, mean ing that installations operat ing 
within I P P C a n d the E T E T S a re not subject to any form of B A T - b a s e d 
requi rements for e n e r g y eff iciency and G H G emissions. 
7 . 1 4 . 2 Qual i ty of legislation 
T h e c a s e study of the E U E T S raises s o m e interesting issues about the root 
c a u s e s of the problems assoc ia ted with policy instruments. Certainly in the c a s e 
of the E U E T S there are Articles in Direct ive 2 0 0 3 / 8 3 E C that h a v e undoubtedly 
led to s o m e of the failings of P h a s e I a n d risk undermining P h a s e I. T w o Articles 
of the Direct ive h a v e p layed a particular role in reducing the ef fect iveness of the 
S c h e m e : 
• Article 9 National Allocation Plans 
T h e use of domest ic- level N A P s led to an unharmonised approach to 
al locating a l lowances . M a n y M e m b e r States, particularly in Eastern Europe, 
provided a l lowances beyond n e e d to the vast majority of installations. Such 
an a p p r o a c h led to not only the col lapse of the P h a s e I a l lowance price, but 
possibly compet i t ive distortions within the C o m m u n i t y as industries in s o m e 
countr ies w e r e t reated m o r e favourably than in others. 
• Article 10: Method of Allocation 
T h e restrictions imposed limiting the m a x i m u m quantity of a l lowances without 
stipulating the minimum quantity led to only four M e m b e r states choosing to 
auct ion in P h a s e 1. In P h a s e II only the U K and G e r m a n y plan to auction 
significant quantit ies of a l lowances ( 7 % and 8 % respectively) . T h e U K 
generic approach in wh ich gener ic energy eff ic iency/COz emiss ions BAT are used as a 
basis to determine al locat ions 
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E n v i r o n m e n t a l Audi t C o m m i t t e e h a s also previously identif ied is 
d i s a p p o i n t m e n t at the G o v e r n m e n t ' decis ion not to auct ion the full a l lowab le 
quota in P h a s e II ( E n v i r o n m e n t a l Audi t C o m m i t t e e , 2 0 0 7 ) . If t h e Direct ive 
speci f ied a m i n i m u m quant i ty of a l l o w a n c e s that e a c h M e m b e r S t a t e should 
auct ion t h e r e w o u l d b e mult iple benef i ts including: 
• Industry w o u l d obta in m o r e e x p e r i e n c e of auct ioning; 
• R e d u c i n g t h e creat ion of proper ty rights that a r e distr ibuted f r e e of c h a r g e 
m a y inc rease t h e s e n s e of equi ty within sectors b e y o n d t h o s e 
part ic ipat ing in the S c h e m e ; and , 
• G e n e r a t i o n of r e v e n u e s for M e m b e r S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t s . 
B e y o n d specif ic Art ic les, t h e r e a r e other a s p e c t s of t h e Direct ive that m a y h a v e 
contr ibuted to the d isappoint ing p e r f o r m a n c e of P h a s e I. For e x a m p l e , the 
Direct ive w a s p a s s e d in O c t o b e r 2 0 0 3 a n d M e m b e r S t a t e s had less t h a n th ree 
months within wh ich to i m p l e m e n t s t h e Direct ive fully in to d o m e s t i c legislation. In 
addit ion to t h e imposit ion of a strict t ime constraint for d o m e s t i c t ransposit ion the 
Direct ive only prov ided M e m b e r S t a t e s with o n e y e a r to col lect a n d va l ida te t h e 
data upon w h i c h a l locat ion of a l l o w a n c e s w a s to b e b a s e d . 
T h e s e factors c o m b i n e d highlight the impact of pr imary legislat ion on ef fect ive 
imp lementa t ion . It is of c o u r s e impossib le to d e t e r m i n e w h a t t h e o u t c o m e of 
P h a s e I w o u l d h a v e b e e n had the a l locat ion m e t h o d o l o g y a n d the t i m e 
constraints b e e n m o r e robust. Th is s e r v e s a useful learning purpose for P h a s e III 
of the E U E T S a n d for the d e v e l o p m e n t in future E U - l e v e l e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
legislation. 
7.14.3 Overall strengths and weaknesses of the EU ETS 
T o conc lude t h e ques t ionna i re all r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e a s k e d to identify t h e k e y 
strengths a n d w e a k n e s s e s of the E U E T S ( s e e T a b l e 7 . 1 2 a n d T a b l e 7 . 1 3 ) . T h e 
most p rominent s t rength of t h e E U E T S w a s identif ied a s the political support it 
has s u c c e e d e d in genera t ing . T h e s u c c e s s of the E U in deve lop ing a C o m m u n i t y -
w ide emiss ions t rading s c h e m e that w a s politically a c c e p t a b l e to 15 i n d e p e n d e n t 
countr ies ( the E U E T S w a s initially d e v e l o p e d p r e - e x p a n s i o n in 2 0 0 4 ) d e s e r v e s 
praise a n d should not b e underes t imated . Fur thermore , the S c h e m e w a s 
d e v e l o p e d a n d i m p l e m e n t e d in less t h a n th ree years . O n e ex terna l s takeho lder 
neat ly s u m m a r i s e d the signif icant benef i ts ar ising f rom P h a s e I despi te the 
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presence of factors that seriously undermined the env i ronmenta l ef fect iveness of 
the S c h e m e : 
"EU ETS is an extraordinary policy phenomenon. W h e n you think about 
how long it usual ly takes the EU to introduce even bog-standard 
regulat ions the fact that it came up wi th an absolutely ground-breaking 
scheme that had not been done anywhere in the wor ld and put that in 
p lace unanimously is really quite remarkable. The sheer policy innovat ion 
must not be underest imated. I think that it is not at all surpr is ing that it 
hasn't worked perfectly. I recommended that permits should be auct ioned 
but equal ly business wou ld not have a l lowed it. It's as s imple as that. So 
the grandfather ing of a l lowances was a necessary part of gett ing it [EU 
ETS] introduced. Now even businesses real ises that the permits need to 
be auct ioned." 
T h e s e sent iments w e r e e c h o e d by another interviewee, a consultant: 
"The EU ETS is a fascinat ing insti tut ional development . Because at one 
level, the mere ach ievement of a European-wide carbon cap and t rade 
market, created f rom a lmost nothing in the space of three years, is 
actual ly s tagger ing when you think that the European Union spent about 
50 years try ing to negot iate a c o m m o n energy market, and mostly 
d ismal ly fai led. Then it spent ten years bashing its head over the 
European carbon tax, and that ended in d ismal fai lure. So, the mere fact 
of achieving a common carbon price across Europe wi th a freely traded 
market is no smal l thing." 
Across both groups of s takeholders the d e v e l o p m e n t of the E U E T S a n d the 
political ramifications of establ ishing such a S c h e m e w e r e identified as the key 
strengths ( T a b l e 7 . 1 2 ) . T h e innate flexibility of emissions trading a n d the potential 
for the S c h e m e to promote cost-effect ive emissions a b a t e m e n t w e r e also 
identified as key strengths of the S c h e m e . However , the exper ience of P h a s e I, in 
terms of problemat ic al locations a n d minimal env i ronmenta l outcomes, indicates 
that t h e s e respondents m a y be providing this response based on future benefits 
of the s c h e m e should the problems encountered in P h a s e I be adequate ly 
addressed in P h a s e II. 
Al though s o m e respondents identified the creat ion of a carbon price and the cost-
ef fect iveness of emissions trading as key strengths of the E U E T S analysis of 
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per formance da ta of P h a s e I indicates that t h e s e sent iments do not reflect the 
actual impact of the S c h e m e . Emissions a b a t e m e n t w a s limited and al though a 
carbon price w a s created it w a s so low in P h a s e 1 that it is unlikely to have had a 
serious impact on long-term investment decisions. 
Table 7.12 Strengths identified by all respondents 
Identified strength % respondents 
Political support 38% 
Flexibil ity 25% 
Most cost-ef fect ive emiss ions reduct ions 25% 
Long-term visibil i ty of carbon price 19% 
First mover /EU at forefront of global policy 12% 
Industry support 12% 
Link wi th C D M 12% 
Innovative approach to env i ronmenta l policy 12% 
Equal impact on all industry across EU 6% 
Abil i ty to link EU ETS to other markets 6% 
Representa t ives f rom Defra w e r e also a s k e d to identify the key strengths of 
P h a s e I. T h e s e w e r e identified as; 
• T h e E U E T S is a long t e r m policy that w a s establ ished in a short t ime 
f r a m e 
• P h a s e 1 provided m a n y lessons that can be used to improve the E U E T S 
in the future 
• T h e monitoring, reporting a n d verification systems w o r k e d well and h a v e 
improved the quality of emissions data . This should help ensure future 
emission targets del iver" real emission reduction^' 
• P h a s e I establ ished a thriving carbon market . 
• T h e estab l ishment of the City of London as a centre of carbon trading 
expert ise 
Despi te these strengths, respondents provided a var ied and extensive list of 
w e a k n e s s e s of the E U E T S (Tab le 7 .13 ) . Unsurprisingly, f ree allocation of 
a l lowances, the leniency of N A P s , a n d the lack of str ingency in the overall E U cap 
w e r e identified by 3 8 % of respondents are a key w e a k n e s s . A s discussed earlier 
in this Chapter , the E U a n d M e m b e r S ta te governments have acknowledged the 
problems relating to the N A P s a n d al locations in P h a s e I. It is hoped that the 
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P h a s e II a l locat ions will b e m o r e chal lenging. H o w e v e r , a t rading s c h e m e b a s e d 
on f ree a l locat ions m a y n e v e r b e as equ i tab le or env i ronmenta l ly benef ic ia l a s a n 
a u c t i o n - b a s e d s y s t e m as the creat ion of f ree property rights ins inuates that 
industry h a s a 'right' to emit . T h e r e is a further issue relat ing to equi ty a n d 
fa i rness to s t a k e h o l d e r s in the p r e s e n c e of f ree al locat ions. Th is m e t h o d o p p o s e s 
the pol lu ter -pays principal a s pol luters a r e g iven property rights wh ich c a n b e 
used to g e n e r a t e income. If f ree a l locat ions a r e both str ingent a n d a c c u r a t e this is 
less of a n issue. But t h e p r o b l e m s relat ing to m e t h o d o l o g i e s to ca lcu la te c a p s a n d 
informat ion a s y m m e t r i e s m e a n that t h e only rat ional a n d equ i tab le a p p r o a c h to 
t a k e is to e n s u r e all pol luters h a v e to buy a l l o w a n c e s . 
T h e c a s e for s t r ingent targets is s u p p o r t e d by r e s e a r c h u n d e r t a k e n by the C a r b o n 
Trust. Th is r e s e a r c h indicates that b e y o n d two sectors at risk ( c e m e n t a n d steel ) 
there is little e v i d e n c e to s h o w that E u r o p e a n industry will suffer a s a result of t h e 
E U E T S . In fact , t h e C a r b o n Trus t predicts that during P h a s e II most c o m p a n i e s 
should benef i t f inancial ly, provided the total c a p is cha l leng ing a n d a sufficiently 
high pr ice of c a r b o n is es tab l i shed ( C a r b o n Trust , 2 0 0 6 ) . 
Table 7.13 Weakness identified by all respondents 
Identified weakness % respondents 
Allocations/NAPs/cap setting 3 8 % 
Overly bureaucratic/complexity 2 5 % 
Lack of proportionality (i.e. dealing with small emitters, onus on 
industry to prove competitiveness effects, Phase 1 allocations) 
25% 
Policy constraints/lack of political support 19% 
Lack of additional policies to meet G H G reduction goal 12% 
Lack of linking of EU ETS with other markets/schemes 6 % 
Competitive disadvantage for industry if other countries do not 
follow suit 
6 % 
Absence of mechanism to value carbon 6 % 
Lack of support for renewable 6 % 
Insufficient action to meet post 2012 needs in developing 
countries (via C D M ) 
6 % 
Too focused on flexibility not designing a scheme to meet policy 
goals 
6 % 
Illiquid market 6 % 
Insufficient compliance mechanisms 6 % 
T h e complex i ty of the S c h e m e a n d t h e lack of proportionali ty a r e both c o m m o n 
crit icisms of t h e E U E T S . D e a l i n g wi th complex i ty first, a certa in level of 
b u r e a u c r a c y is unsurpr is ing g iven the s c o p e , c o v e r a g e a n d s ize of the E U E T S . It 
is a n internat ional , cross- industry emiss ions trading s c h e m e that must fulfil the 
E U r e q u i r e m e n t s for subsidiari ty. In a l lowing M e m b e r S ta tes to d e t e r m i n e their 
nat ional c a p using a bot tom up a p p r o a c h the C o m m i s s i o n is g iven the burden of 
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responsibility for chal lenging and approving N A P s . T h e informational 
requi rements for a N A P a re significant. Information asymmet r ies m a y h a v e a 
negat ive ef fect upon the overal l per fo rmance of the S c h e m e as demonst ra ted by 
the c h a n g e s in the U K P h a s e I N A P (follov\/ing the c h a n g e s in the DT I energy 
model ) . There fo re M e m b e r Sta tes and the Commiss ion require a significant 
a m o u n t of information to aid the decision making process. 
Defra w e r e aga in a s k e d to identify w h a t they bel ieve to be the key w e a k n e s s e s of 
P h a s e I. T h e s e w e r e noted as: 
• Over-a l locat ion d u e to the majority of M e m b e r S ta tes over-calculat ing 
emission f igures 
• Over-a l locat ion creat ing a surplus of a l lowances in the marke t leading to 
low trading price, thus removing f inancial incentives to invest in low-
carbon technologies a n d other a b a t e m e n t opportunities 
• Harmonisat ion issues in relation to; 
o Definit ion of combust ion activities 
o Monitoring, reporting a n d verification 
o Difficulty in creat ing a level playing field d u e to over-al location by 
s o m e M e m b e r Sta tes 
T h e s e concerns mirror m a n y of the concerns raised by other stakeholders. 
However , o n e of the main w e a k n e s s e s identified by external s takeholders relating 
to the t ransparency of the S c h e m e w a s not identified by Defra as being an a rea of 
concern. Specifically, during an interview a Def ra representat ive stated that the 
S c h e m e is " very transparent and it is undertal<en with stal<eholder consultation". 
Stal<ehoider consuitatiori' w a s further clarified as specifically being taken to the 
Emissions Trad ing G r o u p (ETG)®®, an industry lobbying organisat ion. This does 
not, as Defra m a y bel ieve, represent public involvement in the policy process. A s 
previously d iscussed in this Chapter , information relating to the E U E T S should 
be continually improved a n d specifically, translation of technical issues (such as 
N A P s ) into formats that are eas ier to digest would greatly improve the 
t ransparency a n d public involvement in the policy process. T h e concerns of 
^ The Emiss ions Trading Group (ETG) represents businesses account ing for 95% of the 
UK emissions captured by the EU ETS. The ETG asserts that:" The business-led ETG 
offers a forum for discussion and resolution of all aspects of emissions trading and 
enables communication to take place between commerce and industry, and the UK 
Government in so doing, we contribute to Government thinking at a formative stage of 
policy development" (http://www.uketa.com/) 
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s takeho lders a b o u t the complex i ty of d o c u m e n t a t i o n a n d N A P m e t h o d o l o g i e s 
should b e cons idered . 
It a p p e a r s tha t t h e major i ty of t h e w e a k n e s s e s f rom P h a s e 1 will b e r e m e d i e d 
though the introduction of centra l a l locat ion or sa le of all a l l o w a n c e s in P h a s e III. 
Th is should r e m o v e a n y compet i t i ve distort ions a n d level the 'playing field' for 
f i rms wou ld b e level ac ross t h e Union. Fur thermore , full auct ioning of a l l o w a n c e s 
m a y r e d u c e the adminis t ra t ive complex i ty for both f irms a n d nat ional 
g o v e r n m e n t s a s this w o u l d r e m o v e the n e e d to col late a n d verify base l ine d a t a 
fo l lowed by t h e appl icat ion of technica l k n o w l e d g e requi red to app ly cha l lenging 
sector - leve l caps . 
7 . 1 5 C h a p t e r s u m m a r y 
Th is C h a p t e r h a s a n a l y s e d the E U E T S f rom t h e perspect ive of industry (in the 
form of sector associa t ion representa t ives ) a n d ex te rna l s takeho lders . In genera l , 
both s t a k e h o l d e r g roups h a v e posit ive f e e d b a c k on the S c h e m e , a l though t h e r e 
a r e c lear d i f fe rences b e t w e e n the groups regard ing issues of concern . 
It is c lear f rom the analys is in this C h a p t e r that emiss ions t rading is, in theory a n d 
in pract ice to a l imited d e g r e e , a m o r e eff icient m e a n s to r e d u c e act ively 
emiss ions f o r m industry c o m p a r e d with regulatory a p p r o a c h e s . H o w e v e r , a s t h e 
C C A , U K E T S a n d E U E T S c a s e studies show, fa i lures in m a r k e t des ign a n d 
w e a k negot ia t ion of c a p s u n d e r m i n e a n y ef f ic iency ga ins over regulatory 
a p p r o a c h e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , sub-opt ima l policy des ign in P h a s e I has led to low 
trading pr ices within t h e U K E T S a n d t h e E U E T S with the a d d e d ef fect of 
reducing t h e incent ive to u n d e r t a k e emiss ions a b a t e m e n t , prevent ing innovat ion 
a n d lead ing to d isappoint ing e n v i r o n m e n t a l o u t c o m e s a n d t h e fai lure of the 
instrument to d a t e in m e e t i n g its original e n v i r o n m e n t a l a ims . 
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RESEARCH OUTCOMES 
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8 Comparative evaluation of case studies 
8.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter the comparative analysis of the case-studies will be completed, 
the focus of v /^hich is Table 8.1. The data presented in this table is largely based 
on the analysis of primary data collected for this research. Other sources of 
information feed into the table where appropriate in order to enhance the 
analysis. Sections 8.2 to 8.10 will draw together the notable outcomes in relation 
to each evaluation criterion, as specified in Chapter 2 (methodology). 
8.2 Economic efficiency 
The comparative analysis commences with the economic efficiency of the case 
studies. The economic efficiency analysis undertaken within this thesis indicates 
that contrary to offering cost savings, some market based approaches may in fact 
be more costly to some stakeholders, usually government/regulators. The PPC 
Regulations are broadly revenue neutral for the Government as the Environment 
Agency recoups costs through application and subsistence charges. These 
charges provide the Environment Agency, on their own admission, with sufficient 
resources to undertake all necessary PPC-related activities. The costs to industry 
of such an approach are evident, but this is firmly in-keeping with the 'polluter-
pays' principle. After all, why should the tax payer shoulder the financial burden of 
regulating industry? However, the tiered charging system, based on gravity of 
environmental impact and historical compliance, attempts to redress any potential 
issues of inequity towards smaller polluters. Conversely, the CCL has transpired 
to be a policy of net cost to the Government as the income of CCL was 
substantially below the cost of reducing employers National Insurance 
contributions (see Table 5.1). The incentivised participation in the UK ETS also 
contradicts the notion of MBIs offering cost savings. The outcome of this Scheme 
was a perverse situation whereby many companies made significant profits in 
return for little abatement effort at significant cost to the Government and by the 
nature of government funding, the tax payer too®®. 
The costs to tax payers are likely to be higher than for any other stakeholder group 
within the policy process. Firstly, government funding is sourced from taxation revenue. 
Secondly, the costs incurred by industry are often passed on to consumers. The cost of 
regulation, for example, is only a cost for industry when it negatively affects the profit 
margin of a product and impacts upon the competitive position of a company within the 
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The reporting requirements for industry and Government vary greatly within the 
case studies. For Government the most onerous are the PPC Regulations, due to 
the number of installations involved and the frequency of emissions reporting for 
industry. The situation is mirrored by EU ETS. EU ETS requirements for industry 
involve the submission of annually verified data to Defra and compliance with 
trading and banking requirements. The approach within the CCAs is one of 'light 
touch', a phrase often employed by Defra during current consultations on the 
proposed Carbon Reduction Commitment. Not all energy consumption data has 
to be verified, significantly reducing the cost and administrative requirements for 
industry compared with the EU ETS and UK ETS, which both have formal 
requirement for all emissions data to be independently verified. Sector 
associations act as intermediary organisations between the Government and 
target units reducing the burden of data collection for Defra. Sector associations 
are responsible for providing data with a degree of verification to Defra, whereby 
the "sector association would identify a number of sites that wish to have their 
emissions verified for trading purposed' (Defra, 2002a). The negative impact of 
this approach could be viewed as significantly outweighing the positive impact. 
Defra acknowledged in an interview that only about 5% of energy consumption 
data is verified following the bi-annual reconciliation period. 
Such a low verification rate is concerning in terms of the environmental 
(in)effectiveness as the guarantee of reliable data is reduced, transparency (in 
terms of industry-Government transparency and Government-public transparency 
as the data does not have the safety net of independent validation), and equity 
(absence of verified data may reduce accountability of industry, a particularly 
pertinent issue when the outcome may be financially beneficial). 
The comparison of perceptions of costs and benefits incurred by industry and 
Government reveals some key observations. For both trading schemes, external 
stakeholders are split across all options on the financial and environmental 
benefits of the approach for Government. Both schemes are viewed by external 
stakeholders as being financially beneficial for industry, yet the benefits for 
Government in administering an emissions trading scheme are less clear. The 
incentivised participation is the likely cause of the responses in relation to the UK 
ETS. However, the EU ETS is a far more complex issue. The provision of free 
international market. The impact on competition is significantly lower in terms of domestic 
competition as, generally, all companies within a sector will be subject to the same 
regulation. 
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emission allowances can be compared to a financial incentive for participation as 
firms undertaking emissions abatement benefit financially from the sale of surplus 
allowances. As asserted by Johnston (2006) free allocations, which remain 
unchallenged and uninvestigated by the Commission, possess many similarities 
with State aid as defined within the EC Treaty. 100% auctioning may increase the 
perception of cost-effectiveness for governments as auction revenue may be 
used to cover administration costs, as seen in Member States planning to auction 
small quantities of allowances in Phase II of the EU ETS, such as Ireland (0.5% 
of total allowances) and Poland (0.9% of total allowances) (Pelchen, 2006). 
Unfortunately, analysis of previous ex post evaluations proves that the 
Government has not adopted a coherent and systematic approach towards 
calculating the costs®° to itself and to industry. The most detailed evaluation of 
costs to both stakeholder groups was undertaken in relation to the PPC 
Regulations (Defra, 2007f). The remaining three case studies have not been 
subject to comparable levels of economic evaluation by the Government. With 
regards to the EU ETS, it is likely that this is caused by the relative infancy of the 
Scheme and the principle of Phase I acting as an introductory/pilot phase. 
Nevertheless, early analysis undertaken by the Carbon Trust draws attention to 
the significant profits made by British energy generators in the first three years of 
the Scheme (Carbon Trust, 2008). It is rational to assume that the financial 
impact of Phase I should also be calculated for other sectors and the Government 
yet there is no evidence of such analysis. 
Defra attempted to quantify the costs and benefits of the UK ETS, yet arrived at a 
figure between a net cost to the tax payer of £66 million and a net benefit of £467 
million (Defra, 2002c). The huge range of this calculation diminishes its value in 
terms of allowing a comparison with alternative policies. Finally, the CCAs have 
not been subject to any form of economic impact analysis in terms of the costs to 
Government. The cost savings, as reduced CCL rates, for industry are readily 
available but the lack of any quantitative evaluation of the costs incurred to 
industry and the administrative costs for Government (for both Defra and HM 
Customs and Excise as the department charged with CCL collection) has a 
negative impact on the inclusion of this policy in the comparative analysis. 
Furthermore, it begs the question of the quality of policy decision making if the 
'Costs' refers to the administrative, environmental and profit related financial impacts of 
the policy. 
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Government can commit to extending tine CCAs by five years despite the 
absence of accurate evidence in support of the economic impacts of the 
instrument. 
Hanh (2000) analysed projected ex ante and actual ex post cost savings of 
implementing an MBI®^  over a regulatory approach in various situations in the 
USA. In many instances projected cost savings were not confirmed through the 
analysis of expostdaXa as evaluations were not undertaken. However, the Offset 
Policy®^ is believed to have generated cost savings in the region of $960 million-
Si 3 billion and the sulphur dioxide trading program is believed to have saved 
$600 million (in the region of 35% less than a command and control approach). 
However, the robustness of these projections is questionable as further reliable 
evidence relating to other programmes designed to offer cost savings to industry 
and regulators have not been subject to ex post analysis to determine the 
accuracy of initial projections. 
Analysis undertaken by Harrington et al. (2004) relating to the static efficiency 
and informational requirements of regulatory and market-based instruments 
approaches to pollution control may be contradicted by the case studies used in 
Hahn (2000) analysed the estimated and actual cost savings from five emissions 
trading programmes operating in the USA; 
• Emissions Trading Program (arising from the Offset Policy) 
• Lead Credit Trading 
• Ozone Depleting Chemicals Allowance Trading 
• Sulphur Dioxide Allowance Trading 
• RECLAIM 
The Offset Policy was established in 1976 in response to concerns that many regions in 
the USA would fail to meet air quality standards within the timeframes set out within the 
1970 Clean Air Act. The US EPA was faced with the task of prohibiting new industrial 
market entrants on the basis of the contribution to atmospheric emissions. Therefore, a 
new policy was implemented that allowed new market entrants on the condition that their 
emissions would not exceed regulatory limits and the quantity of emissions they produced 
would be 'offset' through investment in abatement at existing installations to ensure 
regional emissions met standards set out in the Clean Air Act. The Offset Policy was 
eventually combined with three other trading-based mechanisms (bubble, banking and 
netting) to form the Emissions Trading Program. The 'bubble' policy refers to the 
approach towards whole site emissions: instead of regulating emissions from specific 
processes or sub-sections of sites only the total emissions from a site are quantified (the 
site effectively becomes a 'bubble'). Expansion within the site would not be subject to 
additional regulatory requirements provided emissions are abated elsewhere and the total 
emissions from the site do not increase (Oates, 1999). Similarly, the 'netting' of emissions 
allowed for sites to expand provided the overall ('net') emissions did not increase 
significantly. The banking approach was added to the Emissions Trading Program in 
1979. This element of the program enabled sites to reserve emissions credit for future use 
against regulatory targets. This element of the program had initially been rejected by the 
EPA over concerns that it would be counter-productive in achieving regional emissions 
standards. However, revisions to the Clean Air Act in 1977, including new deadlines, 
reduced the conflict between the regulatory and banking approaches (Oates, 1999). 
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this research. The authors assert that on the basis of informational requirements, 
MBIs lead to more cost-effective emission reductions due to significantly lower 
information requirements compared with command and control approaches. 
However, as three of the case studies demonstrate (CCAs, UK ETS and EU 
ETS), in order to achieve the desired environmental outcomes a significant 
quantity of information is required, sou reed largely from industry, in order to 
establish emission caps, to set baselines and to negotiate targets. Although an 
economic instrument approach may initially be perceived to have cost-saving 
advantages for administrators over command and control mechanisms without a 
significant quantity of reliable information from industry the cost-effectiveness and 
hence the environmental effectiveness of an instrument, is at risk of being 
compromised. 
Glachant (1999) asserts that in evaluating the effectiveness of a voluntary policy 
approach one should view it within the context of existing regulatory and market-
based mechanisms. Theoretical analysis has concluded that under very specific 
conditions voluntary environmental approaches may, in fact, be more efficient 
than regulatory or market-based approaches. In particular, some companies may 
over-comply with a VEA in order to reap the price benefits of improved 
environmental credentials (Arora and Cason, 1995). Further conclusions drawn 
from Segerson and Miceli (1998) indicate that a VEA may offer a higher degree of 
equilibrium than other policy responses. In this case, companies face cost-
savings due to higher flexibility in meeting the negotiated target and reduced 
transaction costs. However, this is based on one crucial assumption: that the 
regulator aims to maximise welfare via negotiated emissions reductions that 
reflect equal marginal social costs and marginal social benefits. In the absence of 
these factors, the VEA is likely to operate in an inefficient manner. It is also 
important to remember that the level of 'success' of a VEA (i.e. meeting the target 
performance) is often a result of the enforcement provisions and threat of 
regulation used as a backdrop to the VEA, not necessarily the VEA itself. 
On the basis of these conditions, how well do the UK ETS and the CCAs perform 
in efficiency terms? The most notable area for examination is that of how well the 
UK ETS regulator (Defra) performed in terms of maximising the welfare gains of 
the financial outlay of the UK ETS on behalf of society. The provision of 
significant subsidies for participation contradicts the notion of equal social costs 
and benefits. Furthermore, a subsidy and a trading mechanism provided many 
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companies with possible double-dividend for participation whilst the outcome in 
terms of the social good (i.e. emissions abatement) was highly questionable due 
to uncertainty of the precise cause of abatement (i.e. existing regulations, pre-
determined plans to close sites, or, in fact, the UK ETS). In this regard, the CCAs 
are even more complex. Provisions for tightening of targets and the sector-by-
sector approach to target negotiation indicate the Defra was in a stronger position 
to balance the marginal social costs and the marginal social benefits. However, 
this theoretical proposition does not necessarily translate when in practice. In the 
presence of modelling and a strong negotiating position due to the financial 
incentive for CCA participation, Defra negotiated comparatively weak targets and 
failed to adequately address this issue when given the opportunity to do so with 
the revision of targets in 2004. This highlights the immense importance of 
information asymmetry within the policy negotiation process and the political 
willingness to negotiate policies with the highest environmental standards. 
8.3 Environmental effectiveness 
With the exception of the PPC Regulations, the use of baselines is a common 
feature of the case studies. This has revealed some serious issues relating to the 
environmental efficacy of the instruments for a number of reasons. These include, 
inter alia, the choice of baseline year (CCA), the use of only one baseline year 
(CCA), insufficient consideration of legislative requirements (UK ETS) and 
difficulty in predicting BAU emissions in relation to the baseline (EU ETS). The 
EU ETS made a step towards improving baseline calculations compared to the 
approach of CCAs and UK ETS in requiring 5 years' worth of data and excluding 
the year with the lowest emissions. However, this proved to be insufficient to 
establish realistic and challenging allocations in Phase I despite the aim of this 
Phase being the allocation of allowances broadly in line with BAU projections. 
The extended use of a baseline against which to calculate BAU projections in 
Phase II may also prove to hinder the environmental outcomes of the Scheme 
until 2012. 
Sources have stressed the importance of investment in new technology as a 
response to rising GHG emissions (Carbon Trust, 2006). In this respect, the 
requirement for industry to implement recognised 'best' technologies, as required 
by the PPC Regulations, has a significant advantage over market based 
mechanisms, particularly when MBIs fail to work in the desired manner. An MBI 
- 2 6 8 -
that works in its optimal capacity provides the correct level of financial incentives 
for firms to abate emissions and invest in new technologies. However, critical 
factors have been identified as having detrimental effects upon investment in 
abatement technologies (Rajah and Smith, 1993): 
• Informational failures (e.g. firms being unaware of advances in technology 
and the potential cost savings of implementing such technology). 
• Difficulties in acquiring capital or knowledge. 
• Imperfections within the relationship between the market and capital 
income. 
The EU ETS, in particular, has suffered as a result of at least two of these 
influencing factors, with the market failing to offer sufficient financial incentives 
and secure returns for investments, and possible informational failures arising 
from uncertainty surrounding the future direction of the Scheme post-2012. 
The environmental effectiveness of voluntary policy instruments, such as 
negotiated agreements, remains highly debateable. Research undertaken by the 
OECD in 2003 based on case studies from Denmark, Canada, Japan and the 
USA led to the conclusion that the environmental effectiveness of voluntary 
approaches is unclear and that in some instances this could be a result of a 
"significant degree of "reguiatory capture"' (OECD, 2003: p. 14). Furthermore, 
whilst the environmental targets of most voluntary approaches were met, it is 
likely that the same outcome would have been achieved in the absence of the 
policy. The data obtained from this research, specifically the comparison of 
emission reductions arising from the four case studies, does not contradict the 
conclusions of the OECD. It is indeed possible that the policy package of CCL 
and CCAs would not have influenced energy consumption behaviour had energy 
prices not risen so dramatically in recent years. 
The cases of the CCAs and the UK ETS add further weight to the argument, put 
forward by the OECD, in relation to the apparent over-performance of companies 
operating within voluntary agreements. The case of Intel's Project XL^ indicates 
^ Project XL was established by the US EPA in 1995 as a means to provide participants 
with 'regulatory relief in return for voluntary emission reductions. Intel Corporation was 
one of the first companies to participate in the scheme. In return for atmospheric 
emissions abatement of volatile organic compounds, NOx, carbon monoxide and S02, 
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that the company was probably aware of its projected emissions five years in 
advance. Thus, following the establishment of a baseline and the subsequent 
vast over-performance against the target emission reductions the OECD 
concluded that is was likely the company would have know in advance of the 
scheme what its emissions trends would be (OECD, 2003). Such knowledge on 
the part of a company represents an acceptable situation provided the same 
information is available to the regulator and that the regulator uses the 
information to negotiate challenging environmental targets. Industry knowledge of 
future energy or emissions trends should only be problematic in the policy 
development cycle if the regulator is unaware of the projections. Therefore, 
regulators must operate in a creative manner in order to obtain the required 
information. The vast over-performance of many UK ETS Direct Participants also 
indicates that many of these companies were aware of impending emissions 
abatement, either as a result of regulatory requirements or through changes to 
existing plants (i.e. closure of particularly polluting plants). This notion was 
supported by one industry stakeholder who identified the link between firms 
volunteering to participate and existing knowledge of short-term emissions 
abatement. 
Of particular importance to the sectoral approach of the Climate Change 
Agreements, Enevoldsen (2005) concludes that some sector-level voluntary 
agreement may be more cost-effective than regulatory or MBI approaches. The 
sector level agreement provides stimulus for the companies within the sector to 
cooperate and collaborate in the search for pollution abatement technologies 
specifically when compliance is based on the entire sector meeting the target, 
regardless of individual firm performance. However, this approach is only more 
economically efficient if the sector is homogenous and there is widespread 
uncertainty surrounding the pollution abatement technology as the level of 
burden-sharing reduces transaction costs and technological innovation may be 
inspired through the application of the VEA. Therefore, within CCA sectors that 
had undergone significant energy consumption improvements in the early 1990s 
(the sectors that selected early baseline years) the Agreements present an 
opportunity to reduce transaction costs and improve prospects for innovative 
solutions to energy efficiency across the sector. However, Glachant (1999) 
asserts that within sectors that do not face the same uncertainty regarding 
the EPA reduced demands for new permit applications in relation to process changes 
(OECD, 2003). 
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pollution abatement since voluntary agreements lead to burden sharing of 
information, thus increasing the cost-effectiveness of the approach compared to 
command and control and economic policy. This is the situation within the CCAs 
as the majority of sectors selected baseline years that were relatively close to the 
start of the Agreements, indicating that the majority of energy saving 
opportunities had not yet been realised which should not outweigh the additional 
communication costs of the collaborative approach. This is because the required 
technologies were likely to already exist; they merely required implementation by 
firms. Removal of the need to invest in R&D significantly reduces costs. Crucially, 
Glachant argues that although in instances of waste minimisation and recycling, 
VEAs can be the most efficient means to reach a policy goal the ability of VEAs to 
result in CO2 abatement is less certain: 
'Concerning C02 reduction agreements in high energy consuming 
industries, we can be more suspicious about the cost efficiency of voluntary 
approaches. As a matter of fact, in these sectors, given the weight of 
energy cost in total production costs, firms have paid much attention to 
energy saving activities for a long time. It can be assumed that the nature 
and the cost of energy saving techniques are well known by each firm and 
the informational context is asymmetrical' 
(Glachant, 1999: p.88) 
To conclude this section on environmental effectiveness, questions remain 
regarding the benefit of applying a VEA over other policy instruments. The 
environmental outcomes of the four case studies are, at present, somewhat 
disappointing. However, it is clear that when the carbon savings and length of 
policy are balanced, the CCAs have resulted in the most carbon savings although 
it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of the CCL alone and the CCAs. 
The UK ETS, in fact, resulted in higher carbon savings over the life of the policy, 
but the difficulty in attributing abatement to the Scheme and the impact of other 
policies upon the behaviour of firms it difficult to attribute these emission 
reductions to the UK ETS. The PRC Regulations have made very little impact on 
energy consumptions and GHG emissions and show little prospect of doing so. 
There are two key reasons for this. Firstly, other instruments exist for some 
installations that are designed to specifically deal with energy efficiency and GHG 
emissions. Secondly, the Regulations and the associated BREF documents pay 
little attention to the issues of energy efficiency and GHG emissions, placing 
minimal requirements on installations falling outside of the remit of other policies 
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in these areas. It is, however, the EU ETS that shows the greatest prospects for 
GHG emission reductions. In Phase I the environmental outcomes were very 
poor. However, long-term expectations for the Scheme are high provided 
problematic areas such as allocations, auctioning, new entrants and maintaining 
a stable and high carbon price are resolved. 
8.4 Innovation 
Both MBIs and regulatory approaches have been found to incentivise innovation 
(Harrington et al., 2004). However, various case studies also indicate that MBIs 
provide a much greater incentive to reduce emissions further below a specified 
standard by providing a clear financial incentive to do so. These case studies 
include examples from the United States (phasing-out of leaded gasoline and 
SO2 trading), Sweden (NOx taxation/charging) and the Netherlands (industrial 
water pollution control via charges). The analysis undertaken for this research 
shows a clear difference between the impact of a regulatory approach on 
innovation and the impact of a market based approach. The PPC Regulations do 
not appear to provide any incentive for companies to invest in or investigate new 
technologies. The prescriptive, technology focus of the Regulations (and, of 
course, the IPPC Directive) reduce any financial incentive to innovate as once a 
company meets the required technology standard no further action is required 
until the BAT Reference documents are amended to account for changes in 
technology. The impetus for individual companies to innovate is thus removed. In 
their study of 'ecological modernisation'®'*, Murphy and Gouldson (Murphy and 
Gouldson, 2000) found that the common operating practice within industry leans 
towards control measures (such as end-of-pipe technologies), with restricted 
organisational change and focus on operational issues. Therefore, unless 
specifically designed to do so, regulatory approaches may not provide an 
incentive for industry to innovate beyond minimum required operational practices. 
An approach incorporating emissions trading should provide a clear financial 
incentive for companies to pursue new, more efficient/less polluting technologies 
and practices. The EU ETS provides the strongest incentive for innovation 
despite economic shortcomings of Phase I. Although there is uncertainty 
surrounding the post-2012 form of the Scheme, there is probably more certainty 
Where ecological modernisation refers to "a way of addressing some of the 
environmentalprobiems associated with industrialism whilst at the same time improving 
economic competitiveness' p.43. 
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within this policy than the CCAs. Companies participating within EL) ETS know 
the Scheme will be continuing post-2012, but the details (particularly the method 
of allocation) are yet to be decided® .^ The short lifespan of the UK ETS and the 
only recent extension of the CCAs will lead to greater uncertainty within industry. 
Previous analysis of the impact of VEAs on innovative behaviour within firms 
suggests that unambitious targets, that require little additional effort beyond BAD, 
are unlikely to lead to advances in technology as the incentive to do so (through 
the threats in place for non-compliance) does not exist (Carraro and Leveque, 
1999). Conversely, challenging targets may require investment in new 
technologies to achieve compliance. In the case of the CCAs, the impact on 
innovation was deemed to be minimal with most sector associations reporting an 
increased awareness of energy management issues are the primary change 
within companies. Coupled with the lower than expected carbon savings, this 
indicates that the CCAs are not sufficiently challenging to provide an incentive to 
innovate. 
8.5 Flexibility 
Market based instruments, by their inherent design features, are assumed to offer 
the maximum level of flexibility to firms, particularly when compared to regulatory 
approaches (Prakash and Kollmann, 2004). This is largely due to the creation of 
financial incentives to abate and disincentives to pollute, based on the theory of 
the equalisation of abatement costs across industry (Baumol and Gates, 1988). 
However, Prakash and Kollmann (2004) stress that despite the advantages for 
firms, in terms of flexibility, equalisation of abatement across industry and 
financial incentives MBIs may offer less security regarding levels of pollution in 
instances where information asymmetry between firms and regulators is present. 
Furthermore, in the instances of taxation without an absolute emissions cap 
equity issues arise as pollution abatement is dictated by firms' responses to the 
^ In January 2008 the Commission launched a review of EU ETS Directive for Phase III. 
At tiie time of writing the UK Government had recently closed its consultation on the 
Commission's proposals and its own response to these proposals. Key areas of 
difference between the two bodies include: the inclusion of aluminium sector 
(Commission stance, UK against); the creation of an EU carbon bank to be responsible 
for future caps, allowance distribution and mechanics of the carbon market (UK stance. 
Commission makes no reference): harmonised auctioning (Commission stance) vs. 
minimum auction levels, allowing Member States to increase quantity (UK stance); and, 
auction revenues should be earmarked for environmental use (Commission stance, UK 
very opposed) (European Commission, 2008f; Department for Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs, 2008g) 
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tax, which can lead to an increase in emissions if firms choose to pay rather than 
abate. This highlights the fundamental requirement of setting taxation at a level 
high enough to make abatement the most financially attractive option. All sector 
associations agree that rising energy prices had a far greater impact on 
consumption than the CCL or CCA discount. This indicates that the rate of the 
CCL was not set at a high enough level to significantly change energy 
consumption behaviour. 
The data collected for this research shows that the PPC Regulations are 
regarded as offering the least flexibility of the four case studies. Although the site-
by-site approach of issuing permits takes site-specific conditions into account, 
installations are still required to meet minimum technology and not exceed 
maximum emission threshold values. Such an approach should lead to the 
achievement of minimum technology standards across an industry thus ensuring 
a level playing field across the EU for companies. However, it is widely 
acknowledged that the most efficient policies allow companies with the lowest 
marginal abatement costs to reduce emissions, leaving companies with higher 
abatement costs to continue operating in such a manner and compensating the 
market for doing so (via purchase of allowances from an emissions trading 
scheme or by paying more tax). The remaining three case studies (EU ETS, 
CCAs and UK ETS) were found to offer comparable levels of flexibility in terms of 
allowing companies to manage investment decision making and allowing industry 
to decide where emissions abatement takes place according to marginal 
abatement costs largely a result of the trading mechanisms. This outcome is to be 
expected when dealing with a regulatory approach and three policies containing 
significant economic elements. 
8.6 Acceptance and equity 
Rajah and Smith (1993) draw attention to the feasibility, or lack of, in the 
implementation of direct taxation to reduce pollution. The authors assert that a 
direct taxation is often the 'first-best' policy response®® yet may not prove to be 
the most feasible option due to the requirement of support from political, 
administrative and industrial circles. This may not be forthcoming. 
Whereby 'first-best' refers to the "maximisation ofo government objective function in 
which aggregate economic weifare (inciuding appropriate vaiuation of environmentai 
effects) is the soie argument, and in which no account is tal<en of the costs of 
administering and enforcing taxes and otherpoiicy instruments"'p.bQ 
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The use of subsidies is also addressed in Rajah and Smith's analysis. At the time 
of publication there are few real-life examples of subsidies in practice. Even now, 
there exist few instances of such an approach in environmental protection, 
particularly in relation to climate policy. The UK ETS is one exception, although 
the approach taken by Defra does not meet the operational requirements set out 
by Smith and Rajah. A policy based on provision of subsides should, in fact, work 
in one of two manners. Firms may either be paid to reduce emissions with the 
value of the payment varying in accordance with the level of abatement 
undertaken. The second approach may involve issuing a subsidy to help firms 
meet emissions abatement requirements set out in other policies (such as 
regulatory requirements). However, in neither case would one expect firms to 
receive subsidy payments in the absence of abatement efforts. The UK ETS 
contravened this notion directly by providing a subsidy for participation (in a bid to 
attract involvement and also to negate any financial risk undertaken by firms), yet 
failed to implement safeguards against firms who do not actively undertake 
emissions abatement (see Figure 6.3 for the example of Shell pic). Whilst this 
was not direct profiteering on the part of participating firms, as Defra were 
charged with developing the rules of the Scheme, it does represent a lack of 
political will to minimise the ability of private actors to manipulate a policy to reap 
financial rewards to the detriment of the tax payer, as seen with the massive 
windfall profits made by the UK power sector in Phase I. 
It is common for certain stakeholder groups to believe they are unfairly treated 
with the implementation of environmental policies (Harrington et al., 2004). In 
instances such as increases in taxation the severest effects are often felt by 
poorer members of society. However, industry stakeholders are also subject to 
inequalities within such policy development. Comparative analysis undertaken by 
Loh and Morgenstern (2004), Millock and Sterner (2004), Harrington (2004), and 
Hammar and Lofgren (2004) found that small businesses have been identified as 
being at risk of suffering inequitable effects of policy instruments. 
The PRC Regulations, in particular, were been identified as having the greatest 
impact on small businesses. The Government attempted to deal with the impacts 
on small businesses within the RIA. However, economic analysis undertaken by 
Atkins and Defra (Defra, 2007f) identified high average costs associated with the 
PPC Regulations. Furthermore, the feedback from industry from the survey 
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indicates that many sectors perceive the Regulations to be unfair, indicating that 
inequalities relating to the economic cost of the regulations have not been 
adequately addressed. The EU ETS also received negative feedback in relation 
to equity and fairness. However, as discussed in Chapter 7, data relating to 
allocations serves to discredit this stance of industry. 
The voluntary nature of the CCAs and the UK ETS also present an opportunity for 
interesting analysis of the perception of such instruments. Previous scholarship 
has identified the importance of including adequate sanctions for non-compliance 
and penalties for failure to meet the requirements of the agreements as a means 
to obtain the support of external stakeholders (Makuch, 2003, Ekins and 
Etheridge, 2006). There is a general sense of acceptance for these policy 
instruments and it is notable that external stakeholders exhibit a relatively strong 
level of acceptance. This indicates that the provisions for non-compliance are 
sufficient to warrant support from non-industry actors. 
However, despite the majority of external stakeholders lending a degree of 
support to the two voluntary and the EU ETS policy instruments, the perceptions 
of stakeholder involvement within the policy development process indicate that 
insufficient consideration has been given to the involvement of external 
stakeholders. 66% of EU ETS external stakeholders and 57% of CCA external 
stakeholders rated the level of external involvement as insufficient. There is 
limited other evidence, relating to the impact of external, third-party participation 
in the development of VEAs. However, a recent study undertaken in Costa Rica 
found that in instances where the target sector, the regulators and NGOs 
(representing civil society) all fully participate in the policy development process 
the outcome of the policy was highly satisfactory (Miranda et al., 2007). Although 
the case studies presented by Miranda et al. focus on watershed management, 
some valuable conclusions were drawn from that paper that may be particularly 
insightful in this research. In most of the examples from Costa Rica, the VEA was 
negotiated between companies and an NGO with governmental departments 
having a limited role within the negotiation of the agreement. Furthermore, the 
participation of NGOs within the process is thought to have provided a mediatory 
role within the process that may not have been possible within negotiations 
between companies and the state. The use of this illustrative example is not 
intended to advocate the use of VEAs between NGOs and industry in the UK. It 
does, however, reinforce the importance of involving stakeholders beyond 
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industry and government witliin tine policy development process. This is 
particularly important when performance targets are to be negotiated (as seen 
with CCAs and UK ETS) as the presence of NGOs may provide a tougher stance 
than government within the negotiations resulting in an overall increase in the 
stringency of targets. 
8.7 Transparency 
The two case studies originating from EU Directives (IPPC and EU ETS) contain 
explicit provisions to meet requirements of the Aarhus Convention relating to 
public reporting and provision of information. All case studies are generally 
perceived to be slightly transparent to stakeholders, although the EU ETS 
received the highest ranking. However, these outcomes appear to be 
counterintuitive following analysis of access to data in relation to each case study. 
As detailed in Chapter 4, PPC performance data and permit-related 
documentation is comparatively difficult to obtain with the onus being on the 
stakeholder (e.g. member of the public) to contact and visit the relevant 
Environment Agency regional office. General performance data, such as total 
emissions from all PPC sectors is available on-line, yet more detailed installation-
level information is significantly more difficult to obtain. 
The CCAs and the UK ETS both retained a certain level of secrecy. Despite bi-
annual reporting within CCAs performance data relating to individual target units 
is not released into the public domain. Furthermore, performance data relating to 
individual companies within UK ETS was publically available but the revised 
targets of six Direct Participants remain protected by a confidentiality agreement 
between companies and Defra. In addition, of all the existing analyses of policies, 
undertaken by Government, Government-appointed consultants or third parties 
(such as the Carbon trust) examined as part of this research none address the 
issue of transparency and availability of data to external stakeholders. This is a 
disappointing situation as evidence from this research indicates that the 
transparency of the four case studies needs to be addressed in order to 
continually improve transparency standards, instead of simply meeting minimum 
requirements (e.g. requirements set out in the Aarhus Convention). 
-277 
8.8 Instrument cohesion 
In instances where multiple policy objectives are in place a mix of policy 
instruments may be more effective than implementing one single policy 
(Bohringer et al., 2008). However, if the policy objectives overlap there is a risk 
that efficiency will decrease. The achievement of the objectives may become 
more costly and may even prove to be counterproductive in environmental terms 
(Johnstone, 2003). In the case of the four policies examined within this thesis 
there are instances of policy overlaps and corresponding evidence highlights the 
resulting efficiency losses. In implementing the UK Climate Change Programme 
the Government appeared to focus most of its efforts on GHG emissions and 
energy consumption from industrial and business sectors, with few policies 
targeted at other major sources of emissions such as domestic consumers and 
transport (Darkin, 2006). The vast number of policies targeted at industry (see 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5) reflects the seriousness with which the Government is 
attempting to tackle GHG from these sectors but the absence of any stringent and 
challenging policies targeted at domestic and transport consumers is cause for 
concern. 
The infancy of climate policy, compared to other forms of environmental 
protection policy (such as water effluent control, atmospheric emissions of non-
GHGs such as sulphur dioxide) means that the most recent decade has been one 
of trial-and-error for the Government in terms of developing and testing policies. 
Consequently, the mixture of policies, which have been developed in an ad hoc 
manner, creates problems for industry, regulators and society as maximum 
efficiency®^ is difficult to achieve. 
The CCAs and EU ETS pose a particular challenge to policy makers as a 
substantial number of installations are presently eligible to participate in both 
schemes. When questioned about the efficacy of this approach Defra stated that 
it believes the two policies can co-exist as CCAs focus on energy efficiency and 
EU ETS on direct CO2 emissions. However, it is arguable that the desired 
outcome - CO2 emissions abatement - is the same for both policies thus meeting 
the "same policy objective" criteria identified by Johnstone (2003). Furthermore, 
the specific eligibility requirements for both schemes are closely linked with both 
targeting energy intensive industrial installations that are regulated under the 
In this sense, maximum efficiency refers to the efficiency of a policy to deliver maximum 
emissions abatement at an acceptable cost to industry, government and society. 
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PPC Regulations. Therefore, if the target industries and the overall policy 
objectives are mirrored within the policies it is unlikely that optimal policy 
efficiency, in economic and environmental terms, can be achieved. 
In light of the voluntary nature of both the UK ETS and the CCAs the use of such 
approaches, within the context of a policy mix, should be addressed. The EU and 
the UK Government have both exhibited a keen desire to pursue "better 
regulation" (European Commission, 2005a, Better Regulation Executive, 2007a). 
In June 2007 the UK Government renamed and rebranded the former 
Department for Trade and Industry as the Department for Business, Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform (with the Better Regulation Executive operating as a sub-
division within this department) (BERR, 2008a). This gave a clear indication of 
the vigour with which "better regulation" is to be pursued in the UK. The notion of 
developing policy based on numerous policy responses (including co-regulation, 
self-regulation and other instruments) and employing a more consensus- and 
participatory-based format is often believed to result in "better regulation" that is 
more efficient and effective than more traditional approaches®® (Hey et al., 2007). 
However, Hey et al. (2007) also assert that most 'new' forms of environmental 
governance are hybrid combinations of traditional regulatory approaches and new 
policy instruments. Examination of the impact of these approaches, from the 
perspective of the individual policy outcomes and the performance of the 
instrument within the context of an overall policy framework (e.g. the operation 
and performance of the UK ETS within the context of the policy package of the 
UK Climate Change Programme), have rarely been undertaken. Hence, the 
usefulness of such approaches remains unclear. 
In a case study of the EU REACH (Registration, Evaluation Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals)®® regulation. Hey et al. analyse the use of 'hybrid' policy 
Traditional approaches are largely regulatory policy responses such as performance 
standards, technology standards and banning of certain substances/processes. 
The principal aim of Regulation EC 1907/2006 REACH is to improve protection of 
human health and the environment via earlier identification of the intrinsic properties of 
chemicals. This is undertaken through the employment of various approaches centred 
around a regulatory framework that makes formal requirements on companies to provide 
data relating to substances with the possibility of substance restrictions/bans through the 
use of cooperative dialogue between industry and regulators. The other approaches used 
within the framework are identified by Hey et al. as; 
• Public risk communication so markets, consumers and the public can react to 
substances of concern 
• Chemical producers are obliged to undertake a self-regulatory role to implement an 
appropriate risk management strategy 
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responses (whereby a variety of policy instrument features are employed to 
achieve one policy objective). In the case of REACH, they hybrid system is based 
on safety management information and the phasing out of some substances 
(European Commission, 2008c). The cooperative approach within REACH was 
found to be beneficial in both conflict management and in making the decision 
and implementation process robust. Specifically, the cooperative approach and 
the pursuit of consensus-oriented decision making ensured that the concerns of 
environmental groups were not overshadowed by the concerns of industrial 
lobbyists. The purpose of drawing this case into the policy cohesion debate is to 
draw parallels with various elements of the approach to climate policy in the UK. 
The CCAs, for example, could also be categorised as a hybrid instrument due to 
the key influencing factors such as the incentivised participation, the negotiation 
of targets (which are supposedly reached through debate and consensus 
between industry and Government) the informational requirements placed on 
industry and the linking in of the scheme with other instrument (UK ETS). 
8.9 Ex ante appraisal 
The United Kingdom is regarded as a "forerunnef of EU countries regarding best 
practice of Regulatory Impact Assessment (Italian, Irish and Dutch Presidencies 
of the Council of the European Union, 2004). This arose from RIA being a 
compulsory stage in the policy process for all proposals what are predicted to 
have some impact on stakeholders and is applied in a systematic manner. The 
European Council report also states that the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands are the only Member States in the EU that assess multiple policy 
options ''before the regulatory option is chosen and mal<e this analysis 
transparent to the pubiid' (p.14). However, the four cases studies within this 
thesis contradict this finding. The EU ETS and the PRC Regulations were not 
subject to such analysis as both of these policies stem from EU Directive. The UK 
has a legal obligation to transpose these Directives into domestic law. Ironically, 
the remaining two policies, the CCAs and UK ETS, were not subject to such an 
analysis either for one crucial reason: t UK ETS and the CCAs (and CCL) were 
seemingly implemented without consideration of alternative policy options. 
A cooperative approach as the Regulation only provides a framework for basic rules 
and procedures 
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Russel and Jordan (2007) present a comprehensive analysis of policy appraisal 
trends in the UK between the last 1980s and 2004. The outcomes of which 
indicate that Defra is providing leadership to other Government department in the 
field of RIA. The use of environmental policy appraisal (EPA)™, a category of 
policy analysis within which RIA (and the EL) approach of Impact Assessment) 
belongs, across Government departments is found to have rarely been influenced 
by the political persuasion of the administration of that time. Furthermore, despite 
Government guidelines specifying that EPA should be incorporated into all areas 
of policy development and appraisal, Defra (and its predecessors) was the 
leading department in terms of quantity of EPAs undertaken between 1997 and 
2004 (48 out of 62 across all Government departments). Furthermore, Defra 
undertook the highest number of RIAs across all departments between 1999 and 
2004 (228 out of 631). The analysis undertaken by Russel and Jordan led to the 
conclusion that RIAs are generally undertaken in a uniform fashion across 
Government departments (with approximately 90% of all department complying 
with requirements to undertake RIAs), yet EPAs are hugely under-represented 
within eYa/7/B policy analysis compared to RIAs. 
In the case of the CCAs, the RIA was partially included in the CCL RIA and 
partially dealt with in a separate analysis (see Appendix 4). However, neither of 
these documents, as stand alone analyses or combined, provided a complete 
RIA prior to the implantation of the Agreements. The UK ETS RIA was a very 
limited document with no reference to any potential negative outcomes of the 
Scheme. One must question whether in real-life situations a policy instrument has 
no negative effects. Defra was either aware of these but unwilling to share the 
information with the public or had made no attempt to consider any negative side 
effects. The PPC Regulations, which were subject to an RIA in 2000, was dealt 
with in a slightly more rigorous manner. This RIA analysed the projected impacts 
of the Regulations on small businesses and the economic costs to industry of 
implementation. It also attempted to make provisions for ex/?os/evaluations and 
considered other options in relation to the implementation of the Regulations. 
Considered within the context of a comparative analysis, this RIA was undertaken 
to a surprisingly high standard given the timing and the early stage of RIA 
™ Russel and Jordan describe the approach to EPA as " [the] UK Central government 
sought to produce ex ante assessment of the potential environmental Impacts of different 
policy option^'. Therefore, the use of EPA was not limited to strictly environmental 
policies. The purpose of EPA was to transcend policy arenas to ensure environmental 
impacts of all policies were considered, regardless of the sector, scope or objectives of 
policy. 
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development in the UK in 2000. The EU ETS RIA of 2004 was a comparatively 
robust document with most key areas (such as competition assessment) dealt 
with in a satisfactory manner. However, the document focused on justifying the 
implementation of the Scheme in terms of the costs to industry, a conclusion 
previously drawn by the OECD (OECD, 2002). Regrettably, Defra did not 
undertake any analysis of the costs to Government or consumers (through energy 
price rises). 
8.10 Evyocs/evaluation 
For the purposes of clarity and comparison, the approach to E.AR/JOS/evaluation 
attached at Appendix 9 has been segregated into two categories. The first, 
'Government-led/commissioned evaluations, deals with evaluations undertaken 
by Government departments, consultants commissioned to undertake evaluations 
on behalf of Government and evaluations undertaken by the EU (either the 
Commission or the relevant Directorate). The second category, 'other ex post 
evaluation', indicates exyoos/evaluation undertaken by organisations that are not 
directly accountably to the Government. NAO evaluations are presented within 
this category as this organisation reports to Parliament, not Government, and is 
intended to operate in an objective manner. 
As discussed in section 8.2, the only case study to undergo a substantial ex post 
assessment of the financial costs to industry and Government is the PPC 
Regulations. In 2006 prior to the end of the UK ETS, Defra published an 
evaluation of years 1-4 of the Scheme. The timing of this report coincided with the 
start of consultations in relation to the proposed Carbon Reduction Commitments. 
However, it is unfortunate that the evaluation was not undertaken to incorporate 
the final year of the Scheme to provide a comprehensive account of emission 
reductions and allowances prices over the life of the Scheme. 
The situation of ex post evaluation of the EU ETS and the CCAs is more 
concerning. Currently, the only Government/EU-led evaluation of the EU ETS 
was undertaken in 2005 before a full reporting cycle of the Scheme had been 
completed. Although this evaluation provides a useful base for future ex post 
evaluations (specifically from a comparative stand-point), the value of the 
analysis is undermined by the dramatic changes within the Scheme following the 
publication of this report. As Figure 7.6 shows, at the time of this evaluation EU 
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ETS allowances were trading between the relatively healthy figures of €10 and 
€30 per tonne of CO2. Less than six months into 2006 the price decreased to 
around €10 again, before a brief period of recovery followed by the start of a 
downward spiral in the autumn 2006. By early 2007, allowances were trading at 
less than €5 per tonne. It stands to reason that the performance of the market, 
arising from over-allocations, would have an impact on the recommendations and 
conclusions arising from any ex post evaluation. Although the 2005 review 
provides an interesting snapshot of the first year of trading, it does not reflect the 
reality of Phase I. 
The final point in reference to government ex post evaluation relates to the 
Climate Change Agreements. In late 2007 the Government announced the 
extension of CCAs to 2017. However, in depth ex post evaluation by the 
Government is limited. It seems likely that the decision to extend the Agreement 
was based on the 2007 NAO review of the CCAs and CCL and the 2007 EAC 
inquiry. The NAO is not in a position to endorse the continuation or withdrawal of 
a policy, however, the NAO analysis led to some serious criticisms of the CCAs. 
The resulting EAC inquiry led to a lukewarm response to the outcomes of the 
Agreements. This makes the decision to continue the instrument all the more 
surprising. In summary, the NAO concluded that the CCAs have resulted in 
significantly lower emission savings than initially projected, the majority of targets 
are too lenient (despite subsequent revisions) and industry is divided on the 
impact of the policy. One of the few positive outcomes is the success that CCAs 
have had in raising the importance of energy management within business 
operations. On the basis of these conclusions, it is puzzling that the Defra 
decision to continue CCAs beyond 2013 is viewed as the most appropriate 
course of action. 
The approach to ex post evaluation undertaken by organisations external to 
Government varies greatly across the four cases studies. The EU ETS has been 
the subject of most interest, with the Carbon Trust being the principal source of 
analysis. Since the Scheme was launched in 2005 the Carbon Trust has 
undertaken several detailed analyses of various aspects of the Scheme including, 
based on data from Climate Strategies, an EU-wide academic network, which are 
summarised in Appendix 9. 
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The inclusion of stakeholder participation within the Carbon Trust analysis is 
limited to Climate Strategies and academic participation. Conversely, the NAO 
reports on CCAs and the UK ETS have a strong stakeholder-engagement focus, 
with industry. Government departments and academic consultation being at the 
core of the analysis. 
Finally, the PPC Regulations have been subject to very little ex post analysis 
beyond the Defra mid-term review. The size, scope and coverage of the 
Regulations no doubt presents a major challenge to any evaluator. Undertaking 
an evaluation of two aspects of the Regulations - the impact on energy efficiency 
and GHG emissions - proved to be a major undertaking for this research. 
Extending this to incorporate all elements of the Regulations (i.e. all emissions 
into all media) would require significant resources that are probably beyond the 
reach of independent researchers. 
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Table 8.1 Comparative summary of case studies based on various evaluative criterion 
Each criterion within the table commences with a colour-coded ranking of the performance of each instrument in relation to that criterion. This is 
followed by a brief rationale for the ranking. The purpose of this is to facilitate comparison between case studies for the reader. 
Best 
Average 
Weak 
Criterion Sub-criterion Pollution Prevention and 
Control Regulations 
Climate Change 
Agreements 
UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (Phase 1) 
Economic 
efficiency 
Overall performance 
Reason Alttiough rougtily revenue 
neutral to the Government 
the benefits of the 
Regulations in terms of 
GHG emissions and energy 
efficiency are low. 
The revenue from the CCL 
has been lower than 
anticipated resulting in a 
significant shortfall. 
The high subsidies and low 
allowance price lead to a 
rather inefficient trading 
scheme. 
Phase 1 operated sub-
optimally, but future Phases 
should operate in a more 
efficient manner. 
Approximate cost/income to 
Government to date 
£47.1 million income (2005) Intended to contribute to 
making CCL revenue 
neutral for Exchequer 
however the net cost of 
meeting NIC rebate against 
total CCL income cost the 
Exchequer £2.1 billion 
between 2001 and 2006. 
Within range of £66 million 
net cost to £467 net value of 
benefits (accounting for 
value of carbon saved). 
No accurate data. 
Approximate cost/income per year 
of operation 
£9.42 million income No data available Between £13,2 million net 
cost to £93.4 net benefit per 
year 
No data available 
Approximate annual cost to £84,716 Per tonne carbon the No data available. No accurate data available. 
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industry following CCL payments 
(including CCA discount) 
are applicable: 
Electricity: £0.56 
Natural gas: £0.43 
Coal: £0.27 
However evidence suggests 
that in many instances 
incentive payments negate 
costs associated with 
emissions monitoring and 
verification. 
However, in Phase 1 the UK 
power sector made £1 
billion profit. All other 
sectors received over-
allocations thus providing 
sectors with aggregate 
surplus allowances to sell. 
Approximate one-off costs to 
industry 
£430,105 n/a n/a Permit: £1230-5490 
Access to NER: £1030 
Time from proposals (e.g. EU 
Directive adoption ) to full 
implementation in UK 
11 years (Directive adopted 
in 1996 - full implementation 
across EU by 2007) 
3 years (1999-2001) 3 years (1999-2002) 2 years (Directive adopted 
in 2003 - full implementation 
of Phase 1 2005) 
Reporting cycles Annual Bi-annual Annual Annual 
Reporting requirements for 
government 
Implementation review 
submitted to EU every three 
years (2003 and 2006 so 
far). 
Bi-annual reports published 
by AEA Technology 
(government consultants) 
detailing sector-level 
performance including total 
energy consumption per 
sector, quantity of UK ETS 
allowances ring-
fenced/purchased/sold, and 
number of target units failing 
to meet targets leading to 
suspension of CCA and 
CCL discount. 
Publication of annual 
commitments from each 
Direct Participant against 
actual performance. 
Publication of annual 
performance data. 
Reporting requirements for industry On-site inspections carried 
out by Environment Agency 
inspectors to check 
performance of installations 
against permit 
conditions/requirements. 
Installations generating 
emissions exceeding 
thresholds must report 
emissions to EPER. 
Sector associations submit 
verified data on bi-annual 
basis in order to receive re-
certification for the following 
compliance period. 
Submission of verified 
annual performance data to 
Defra. 
Emissions must be verified 
by an approved verifier. 
Competent authority issues 
emissions trading permit to 
installations it believes can 
sufficiently monitor 
emissions. 
Emissions reports from 
operators must be verified 
by an accredited verifier -
failure to do leads to 
suspension of trading 
rights. 
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Use of consultants by government n/a Frequent: AEA technology 
employed by Defra from 
inception of CCAs to date. 
Involved in negotiating initial 
and subsequent targets, 
analysis of reported data. 
During development phase 
to establish a suitable 
auction methodology. 
DTI economists to calculate 
Updated Energy 
Projections. 
Use of consultants by industry Application process 
Annual assistance 
Occasional: sector 
associations provide 
significant administrative 
and technical advice to 
members. 
Verification services Verification services 
Industry evaluation of the balance between environmental benefits and financial costs incurred by: 
Industry Costs significantly outweigh 
benefits (55%) 
Benefits slightly outweigh 
costs (50%) 
Benefits significantly 
outweigh costs (36%) 
Costs and benefits equal 
(40%) 
Mean ranking 
(1= poor, 5= best) 
2.8 3.5 3.6 2.5 
Standard deviation 0.94 1.03 1.44 1.29 
Government Benefits slightly outweigh 
costs (33%) 
Benefits slightly outweigh 
costs (38%) 
n/a Benefits slightly outweigh 
costs (50%) 
Mean ranking 
(1 = poor, 5= best) 
1.7 3.31 n/a 1,6 
Standard deviation 1.45 1,07 n/a 1.25 
External stakeholder evaluation of the balance between environmental benefits and financial costs incurred by: 
Industry n/a Split: 
Costs significantly outweigh 
benefits (29%) 
Equal costs and benefits 
(29%) 
Benefits significantly 
outweigh costs (29%) 
Benefits significantly 
outweigh costs (43%) 
Benefits significantly 
outweigh costs (40%) 
Mean ranking 
(1= poor, 5= best) 
n/a 3.1 4 3,7 
Standard deviation n/a 1.67 1.46 1,32 
Government n/a Benefits significantly 
outweigh costs (50%) 
Split: 
Costs significantly outweigh 
benefits (29%) 
Split: 
Costs slightly outweigh 
benefits (25%) 
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Environmental 
effectiveness 
Mean ranl<ing 
(1= poor, 5= best) 
Standard deviation 
n/a 
Overall performance 
Reason 
Use of baseline years 
Baseline calculation 
Key environmental objectives 
n/a 
Difficulties in obtaining a 
complete data set from 
EPER relating to carbon 
emissions and energy 
efficiency mean it is difficult 
to accurately determine the 
impact of the PRC 
Regulations on 
performance. 
3.3 
None 
n/a 
To achieve integrated 
prevention and control of 
pollution arising from the 
activities listed in Annex I. 
1.76 
Despite the negotiation of 
weak targets and 
underperformance of the 
Agreements in relation to 
the predicted carbon 
savings the CCAs 
performed have performed 
comparatively well against 
the other three case studies. 
A caveat of this 
performance is the difficulty 
in separating the impact of 
the CCL and the CCAs. The 
CCL alone may have led to 
similar emission reductions. 
Benefits slightly outweigh 
costs (29%) 
Benefits significantly 
outweigh costs (29%) 
3.1 
1.7 
Yes 
Variable: between 1990 and 
2001 
Based on energy 
consumption and perceived 
ability to reduce 
To contribute towards 
making the Climate Change 
Levy revenue-neutral for the 
Government. 
Although the carbon 
savings arising from the UK 
ETS are higher than the 
other three case studies, 
there is evidence to suggest 
that a significant proportion 
of the carbon savings would 
have been undertaken 
regardless of the UK ETS 
due to other regulatory 
requirements. 
Yes 
Average of emissions from 
1998-2000 
To reduce GHG emissions 
from Direct Participants 
below baseline calculations. 
Costs and benefits equal 
(25%) 
Benefits significantly 
outweigh costs (25%) 
3.1 
1.45 
Total UK carbon emissions 
for Phase I actually 
increased compared to BAU 
projections. However, many 
stakeholders involved in 
this research stressed that 
the environmental 
performance of the Scheme 
should dramatically improve 
once the allocation 
methodology is improved 
and once a stable carbon 
price is established. 
Therefore, the overall 
performance is deemed to 
be average based on the 
potential impact of the 
Scheme. 
Yes 
1998-2003 (average 
excluding year with lowest 
emissions) 
To contribute to fulfilling the 
commitments of the 
European Community and 
its Member States more 
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To prevent or, wfhere that is 
not practicable, to reduce 
emissions in tine air, water 
and land from the 
abovementioned activities, 
including measures 
concerning waste, in order 
to achieve a high level of 
protection of the 
environment taken as a 
whole. 
To provide an incentive for 
energy efficiency 
improvements in return for 
80% discount on CCL. 
To give industry early 
experience of emissions 
trading prior to the launch of 
the mandatory EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. 
To influence the 
development of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. 
To establish the City of 
London as an international 
centre of expertise in 
emissions trading. 
effectively, through an 
efficient European market in 
greenhouse gas emission 
allowances, with the least 
possible diminution of 
economic development and 
employment. 
Predicted UK carbon savings pre-
implementation 
2.5 MtC combined total with 
CCAs following full 
implementation. 
4.5MtC per year by 2010 
based on GAD modelling 
(total over life of the policy = 
max. 40.5MtC). 
Actual value of negotiated 
targets: 2.5MtC per year by 
2010 
(total over life of the policy = 
Max. 22.5 MtC) 
3.36MtC over life of 
Scheme. 
Between SMtC and 8MtC 
per year by 2010. 
Revised carbon savings n/a 1.9 MtC per year by 2010 
(NAG calculation) 
Figures revised following 
withdrawal of three Direct 
Participants: 3.2MtC of the 
life of the Scheme. 
Targets tightened for 6 
Direct Participants following 
NAG report: 5.4MtC over 
the life of the Scheme. 
Significant room of 
alteration within current 
predictions. 
Carbon savings to date None reported directly from 
PRC regulations. Change 
between EPER 2001 and 
2004 reported emissions 
(total basket of GHGs) = 
2141 MtC increase. 
5.7MtC 7.5MtC (this total volume of 
carbon reduction cannot be 
attributed entirely to the UK 
ETS. However it is difficult 
to differentiate between 
emission reductions arising 
UK installations (excluding 
power sector) emitted 
2.6MtC below projected 
BAU emissions/allocations 
in 2005 and 3.5MtC below 
projected BAU 
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from UK ETS and emission 
reductions arising from 
other influences). 
emissions/allocation in 
2006. 
The power sector emitted 
10.13MtC above the 2005 
allocation and 12.75 MtC 
above the 2006 allocation. 
This equates to an 
aggregate increase in 
emissions beyond BAU 
(2005-2006) of 16.78 MtC 
from all UK installations. 
% change between predicted and 
actual carbon savings 
n/a Assuming reductions of 
2.5MtC per year by 2010 
(15 MtC by 2006) emissions 
to 2006 were 263% above 
target. 
Total policy emissions were 
223% higher than predicted 
savings (note points raised 
above). 
Assuming 3MtC per year 
2005 emissions were 250% 
above target 
2006 emissions were 308% 
above target. 
Value of carbon reductions to date 
against baseline assuming a 
carbon value of £70/tonne 
(sensitivity analysis £35/tonne -
£140/tonne). Add £1 per year since 
2000. 
n/a £984.2million benefit (to 
date assuming carbon value 
of £70/tonne plus £1 annual 
increment). 
Sensitivity analysis (taking 
£1/year increment into 
account): £518.4m - £1.91 
billion. 
£565.8million benefit (to 
2006 assuming carbon 
value of £70/tonne plus £1 
annual increment). 
Sensitivity analysis (taking 
£1/year increment into 
account): £299.4m - £1.09 
billion. 
£564.7 million cost (2005) 
£703 million cost (2006) 
Total = £1.2 billion cost 
Sensitivity analysis: 
2005 = £301.2 m-£1.1 
billion 
2006 = £379.2 m-£1.3 
billion 
Total = £680m - £2.4 billion 
Impact on UK meeting 2012 Kyoto target 
Overall Slightly positive Impact 
(77%) 
Slightly positive impact 
(75%) 
Very positive impact (18%) 
Slightly positive impact 
(42.9%) 
Very positive impact (50%) 
Mean ranking 
(1=low impact, 5= high 
impact) 
3.7 4.06 3.8 4.5 
71 Defra (2006) Greenhouse Gas Policy Evaluations and Appraisal in Government Departments. 
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Standard deviation 0.67 0.68 1.16 0,54 
Perceptions of environmental effectiveness in terms of reducing GHG emissions 
Industry stakeholders Slightly positive impact Slightly positive impact 
(75%) 
Slightly positive impact 
(43%) 
Split: 
No impact (33%) 
Slightly positive impact 
(33%) 
Very positive impact (33%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
effectiveness, 5=high 
effectiveness) 
3.2 4.06 3.85 4 
Standard deviation 0.92 0.68 1.09 0.89 
External stakeholders n/a Split: 
No impact (38%) 
Very positive impact (38%) 
Split: 
Slightly positive impact 
(43%) 
Very positive impact (43%) 
Slightly positive impact 
(78%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
effectiveness, 5=high 
effectiveness) 
n/a 4 4.2 4.2 
Standard deviation n/a 0.92 0.72 0.44 
Innovation Overall performance 
Reason Stakeholder feedback 
indicates that despite 
assumption that a BAT 
system should inspire 
technological innovation the 
reality is the opposite with 
the majority of industry 
stakeholders finding that the 
Regulations have no impact 
on innovation. 
The linking of the CCAs with 
the UK ETS means that 
firms have clear price 
signals to incentivise over-
performance against a 
target as surplus 
allowances may be sold. 
However, the lenient CCA 
targets and over allocation 
within the UK ETS led to 
very low trading prices thus 
reducing the level of 
financial incentive. 
As detailed in the previous 
CCA box, the over 
allocation (due largely to 
several firms reducing 
emissions prior to the start 
of the Scheme) led to the 
collapse of the trading price 
of allowances. This situation 
reduces the financial 
incentive to invest in new 
technologies and to 
undertake R&D as it may be 
financially cheaper to 
purchase allowances rather 
than undertake abatement. 
The EU ETS experienced a 
price collapse similar to that 
of the UK ETS. Vast over-
allocation by some EU 
Member States led to prices 
falling to less than €5 per 
tonne in 2007. However, the 
longevity of the Scheme (it 
is expected to continue for 
at least 3 phases until after 
2012) led to many industry 
representatives stating the 
Scheme presents a strong 
incentive to innovate as 
once issues relating to 
allocations and carbon 
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prices are resolved there 
should be clear price 
signals to incentivise 
innovation. 
Provisions for innovation witliin 
policy documentation 
BAT should take into 
account "technological 
advances and changes in 
scientific knowledge and 
understanding". 
No explicit provisions. 
Trading mechanism 
designed to provide further 
financial incentives to 
reduce energy 
consumption. 
No explicit provisions. 
Trading mechanism 
designed to provide 
financial incentive to reduce 
GHG reductions and 
promote innovative 
behaviour^^. 
No explicit provisions. 
Perceptions of effect of policy on innovative behaviour 
Industry stakeholders No impact (64%) Slight incentive (63%) Slight incentive (57%) Split: 
Slight incentive (40%) 
Strong incentive (40%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
effectiveness, 5=high 
effectiveness) 
3.4 3.8 4 4.3 
Standard deviation 0.69 0.61 0.67 1.00 
External stakeholders n/a Split: 
No impact (38%) 
Strong incentive (38%) 
Split: 
No incentive (29%) 
Strong incentive (29%) 
Slight incentive (55%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
effectiveness, 5=high 
effectiveness) 
n/a 4 3.5 3.8 
Standard deviation n/a 0.92 1.44 0.92 
Most frequent change within 
industry arising from policy 
Introduction of equipment to 
meet BAT (73%) 
Improved environmental 
reporting (73%) 
Increased awareness of 
GHG/energy efficiency 
improvements within senior 
management (94%) 
Increased awareness of 
energy management/GHG 
reduction opportunities 
^g%) 
Increased awareness of 
CO2 reduction opportunities 
within senior management 
(83%) 
Incentivised emission reductions 
beyond requirements 
No No - CCAs focus on energy Yes - via trading 
mechanism 
Yes - via trading 
mechanisms 
72 Defra (2001) Framework for the UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
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Yes - where energy 
consumption relates directly 
to GHG emissions (i.e. 
facilities with on-site power 
generators) 
The inherent design 
features of a cap and trade 
emissions trading scheme 
allow companies to manage 
investment decision making 
on the basis of carbon price 
signals. Furthermore, it 
allows companies to decide 
whether to undertake 
abatement or not on the 
basis of marginal 
abatement costs. 
Incentivised energy efficiency 
improvements beyond 
requirements 
No 
Flexibility Overall performance 
Reason 
Flexible mechanisms within policy 
structure 
The site-by-site approach 
leads to a good level of 
flexibility within the permit 
process. However, the very 
nature of a technology-
based regulatory regime 
does not allow for cost-
effective emissions 
abatement across an 
industry. 
Site-by-site approach, 
consideration of local 
conditions. 
Yes - CCL discount and 
ability to sell excess 
allowances via UK ETS 
The arrangement of 
Agreements (umbrella 
agreements and individual 
agreements) bestow a good 
level of flexibility as not all 
target units have to meet 
targets provided the sector 
meets its target set out in 
the umbrella agreement. 
Further flexibility is found in 
the provisions for UK ETS 
trading. 
Sector targets arising from 
individual target unit 
agreements. 
Provisions to allow CCA 
participants to operate 
within the UK ETS to buy 
sell and bank allowances. 
Ability of participants to 
terminate agreements. 
Descending clock auction 
allowed companies to 
decide the quantity of 
emission they would be 
willing to abate. 
Yes - where energy 
consumption translates 
directly into CO2 emissions 
(i.e. on-site electricity 
jeneration) 
In addition to the factors 
noted in the previous UK 
ETS box, the EU ETS 
provides added flexibility by 
containing provisions for 
new markets entrants and 
market exits. Furthermore, 
Member States are 
currently charged with 
developing NAPs, allowing 
a degree of national 
flexibility relating to the 
methodology used, the 
distribution of allowances 
and the quantity of 
allowances for sale. 
Member States develop 
individual National 
Allocation Plans in 
consultation with industry. 
New Entrant Reserve used 
to provide allowances to 
new market entrants. 
Perception of flexibility: investment decision making 
Industry stakeholders 
Mean ranking (1= low 
flexibility, 4=high 
Moderate (55%) 
2.5 
Moderate (88%) 
3.6 
Moderate (50%) 
3.7 
Moderate (67%) 
3.3 
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flexibility) 
Standard deviation 0.44 0.71 1.25 0.51 
External stakeholders n/a Split: 
Moderate (50%) 
High (50%) 
High (57%) High (70%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
flexibility, 4=high 
flexibility) 
n/a 4.5 3.5 4 
Standard deviation n/a 0.53 0.51 0.50 
Perception of flexibility: cost-effective abatement across industry 
Industry stakeholders Very little flexibility (45%) Moderate (38%) Moderate (43%) Split: 
Moderate (50%) 
High (50%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
flexibility, 4-high 
flexibility) 
2.6 3.5 3.6 3.5 
Standard deviation 0.80 1.09 0.85 0.54 
External stakeholders n/a Split: 
Moderate (38%) 
High (38%) 
High (57%) High (60%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
flexibility, 4=high 
flexibility) 
n/a 3.9 3.5 3.5 
Standard deviation n/a 1.24 0.51 0.70 
Equity and Overall performance 
acceptance Reason Industry has a reasonable 
level of acceptance for the 
Regulations but exhibits a 
high perception of 
unfairness. This coupled 
with the absence of external 
stakeholder participation in 
the survey leads to a 
borderline assessment of 
the overall performance as 
external stakeholder 
As the CCAs are based on 
voluntary participation only 
firms willing to participate 
have to do so. Therefore 
industry is supportive of the 
Agreements. The presence 
of sanctions (i.e. removal of 
CCL discount for 
sectors/target units failing to 
meet targets) lead to a high 
level of external stakeholder 
Similar to the CCAs, UK 
ETS Direct Participants 
exhibit a high level of 
acceptance. External 
stakeholders also display 
good levels of acceptance -
a surprising outcome given 
the heavy subsidisation. 
However, the high level of 
external stakeholder 
participation in the survey 
Industry perceives the EU 
ETS to be unfair, 
particularly in relation to 
allowance allocations. 
However, allocations in 
Phase 1 were far in excess 
of actual emissions 
indicating the industry is 
feeling 'hard done by', 
particularly in comparison to 
EU counterparts that 
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perceptions are not Included 
In the analysis. 
acceptance. Coupled with 
the general perception of 
fairness (In relation to 
targets, sanctions, 
administration 
requirennents), the CCAs 
perform well In this 
category. 
led to the conclusion that 
the UK ETS performed well 
In this category. 
received higher allocations. 
Surprisingly, external 
stakeholders had a lower 
level of acceptance for the 
EU ETS compared with the 
CCAs and UK ETS, 
although this was largely 
due to the over allocation of 
Phase 1. 
Stated level of acceptance for the policy 
Industry Qualified acceptance (55%) Spilt: 
Qualified acceptance (44%) 
Strong acceptance (44%) 
Strong acceptance (64%) Qualified acceptance (50%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
acceptance, 5=high 
acceptance) 
3.4 4.25 4.5 3.5 
Standard deviation 1.07 0.85 0.873 1.37 
External stakeholders n/a Strong acceptance (40%) Spilt: 
Qualified acceptance (43%) 
Strong acceptance (43%) 
Qualified acceptance (78%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
acceptance, 5=high 
acceptance) 
n/a 3.8 4.2 4.2 
Standard deviation n/a 1.30 0.72 0.44 
Perception of fairness 
Industry Unfair (56%) Fair (69%) Fair (64%) Phase 1: Spilt 
Fair (40%) 
Slightly unfair (40%) 
Phase II: 
Slightly unfair (60%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
fairness, 4=high 
fairness) 
2.5 3.37 3.76 Phase 1: 3 
Phase II: 3 
Standard deviation 0.7 0.95 1.09 Phase 1: 0.89 
Phase II: 0.63 
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External stakeholders n/a Fair (88%) Fair (43%) Fair (89%) 
Mean ranking (1= low 
fairness, 4=high 
fairness) 
n/a 3.5 3.7 2.8 
Standard deviation n/a 0.75 1.20 0.30 
Stated preferred policy response to achieve greater GHG reductions 
Industry 1. Voluntary agreement 
2. Emissions trading 
3. BAT or binding 
emissions requirements 
1. Voluntary agreement 
(CCA) 
2. BAT 
3. Emissions trading 
n/a 1. Emissions trading 
2. Voluntary agreement 
3. Binding emissions 
requirements 
External stakeholders n/a 1. Emissions trading 
2. Policy mix: regulation & 
MBI 
3. Policy mix: regulation 
&/or MBI & voluntary 
agreement 
n/a 1. Emissions trading 
2. Taxation 
3. Binding emissions 
requirements 
Stated preferred policy response to achieve greater energy efficiency 
Industry 1. Emissions trading 
2. Voluntary agreement 
3. Binding emissions 
requirements 
n/a n/a n/a 
External stakeholders n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Transparency Overall performance 
Reason Difficulties relating to public 
access to permit information 
and the performance of 
EPER reduce the 
transparency of the PPC 
Regulations. 
The lack of target unit-level 
performance data has a 
negative effect upon the 
transparency of the CCAs. 
The involvement of eternal 
stakeholders within the 
development of CCAs also 
reduce the transparency of 
the Agreements. 
Generally a good level of 
transparency. However, 
details of the additional 
targets negotiated between 
Defra and six companies in 
2004 were not publicised 
due to a confidentially 
agreement between Defra 
and the companies. 
External stakeholders have 
concerns relating to the 
methodologies used to 
develop NAPs, the 
publication of negotiations 
of NAPs at the 
Commission-level and the 
communication of highly 
technical EU ETS 
information with the public. 
Provisions for transparency within 
policy documents 
Article 15 of IPPC Directive 
dealing with access to 
Bi-annual reports published 
by Defra detailing sector-
Annual publication of 
company-level 
Article 14 of EU ETS 
Directive and Commission 
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Description of transparency 
Industry 
information and public 
participation in permit 
process introduced 
following Aarhus 
Convention. Deals with 
public access to permit 
applications, regulatory 
authorities making 
emissions data available to 
the public, and involving the 
public in permit decision 
making. 
Part V of PPC Regulations: 
Public access to registers at 
Environment Agency offices 
(with exception of 
information that may 
compromise national 
security and certain other 
confidential information). 
Advertisement of high-
profile applications in at 
least one local paper and 
London Gazette. 
level results including the 
targets, actual performance, 
quantity of UK ETS 
allowances bought, sold or 
ring fenced, and the number 
of target units failing to meet 
individual targets from 
Underlying Agreements. 
No provisions for publication 
of target unit-level data 
publication. 
performance. 
Publication of transaction 
log. 
Decision 2004/156/EC 
detail requirements relating 
to monitoring and reporting. 
Decision 2004/156/EC 
specifies that data provided 
by operators should be 
documented in a manner 
that allows the competent 
authorities and verifiers to 
replicate the outcomes. 
Data possessed by 
competent authorities 
should be made public in 
compliance with the 
requirements of Directive 
2003/4/EC relating to public 
access to information. 
Mean ranking (1= low 
transparency, 4=high 
transparency) 
Standard deviation 
External stakeholders 
Mean ranking (1= low 
transparency, 4=high 
transparency) 
Slightly transparent (64%) 
3.4 
0.51 
n/a 
n/a 
Confidential subject to 
commercial secrets (57%) 
2.3 
0.84 
Slightly transparent (50%) 
2.6 
Slightly transparent (43%) 
3.1 
0.77 
Slightly transparent (71 %) 
2.8 
Slightly transparent (67%) 
3.3 
0.51 
Slightly transparent (90%) 
2.9 
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Standard deviation n/a 0.91 0.36 0.31 
Overall perception of transparency 
Industry Acceptable (91%) Acceptable (94%) n/a Acceptable (83%) 
Mean ranking 
(1=unacceptable, 
4=acceptable) 
2.8 2.9 n/a 2.8 
Standard deviation 0.42 0.25 n/a 0.40 
External stakeholders n/a Acceptable (63%) n/a Areas in need of 
improvement (70%) 
Mean ranking 
(1=unacceptable, 
4=acceptable) 
n/a 2.5 n/a 2.3 
Standard deviation n/a 0.75 n/a 0.48 
Involvement of non-industry 
stakeholders in policy process 
n/a Split: 
Not enough (50%) 
A c c e p t a b l e ( 5 0 % ) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
n/a Unacceptable (67%) 
Policy cohesion Overall performance 
Reason Provides a route for 
implementation of various 
other policies (such as WID) 
but problems remained 
leading to the revision of the 
PPC Regulations and other 
environmental regulations 
under the Environmental 
Permitting Programme. 
Very complex interaction 
between CCAs and EU ETS 
entailed complicated 
methodologies to alter 
targets. Lenient CCA targets 
also had negative effect 
upon the UK ETS allowance 
price. 
Difficulties towards the end 
of the Scheme relating to 
EU ETS participants. 
However, these issues were 
resolved with the closure of 
the UK ETS to Direct 
Participants in late 2006. 
See details in CCA box 
relating to policy cohesion. 
Problematic areas Health and safety 
regulations 
EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
Climate Change 
Agreements 
EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
Waste Incineration Directive 
UK ETS Climate Change 
Agreements 
UK ETS 
IPPC 
Issues relating to problematic 
policy cohesion 
PPC Regulations replaced 
by Environmental Permitting 
Programme in early April 
EU ETS: double counting EU ETS: companies 
participating in both 
Scheme leading to 
Refer to previous issues 
noted in this row. 
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Elf ante appraisal/ 
Regulatory 
Impact 
Assessment 
Overall performance 
Reason 
2008. 
Identification and 
quantification of 
approximate costs to 
industry 
Consideration of impacts on 
small businesses 
Identifies the level of 
uncertainty surrounding the 
quantification of costs to 
industry 
Provisions for post-
implementation review after 
five years 
No quantified costs to public 
sector/Government, no 
consideration of non-
compliance 
UK ETS: impact of lenient 
CCA targets on fluidity and 
price stability within UK ETS 
Focus of RIA solely on 
eligibility criteria 
CCL RIA deals fleetingly 
with CCAs 
CCA RIA does not meet 
requirements to consider 
impacts on competition, 
non-compliance, monitoring, 
and no quantification of 
costs to industry or 
Government beyond the 
cost of sub-metering for 
certain sites 
No consideration of 
uncertainty 
administrative burden from 
double counting measures 
or requirement opt-out 
status. 
CCA: impact of CCA 
participants on allowance 
price (rush from CCA 
participants in September 
2002ledtopeakpr ice^ 
RIA limited to positive 
outcomes of the Scheme. 
Extensive RIA but focus on 
justifying the costs to 
industry. 
No consideration of the 
costs to Government. 
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8.11 Chapter summary 
This Chapter has presented the key outcomes of the four case studies in a 
tabular format to facilitate the comparison of the policy-specific outcomes. 
Chapter 9 will draw the outcomes together to lead to a discussion of 
generalisable policy recommendations and case study-specific 
recommendations. 
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9 Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
The primary purpose of this research was to develop a methodological approach 
to evaluate contrasting policy instruments. Further to this purpose, the research 
aimed to undertake a comparative analysis of the evaluation outcomes in order to 
advance policy learning through the identification of specific elements of 
instrument design that lead to the best policy outcome. Finally, this research has 
critiqued four important instruments within UK climate change policy in a manner 
that goes far beyond traditional examination of financial costs and environmental 
benefits. This approach has led to vital conclusions concerning the applicability of 
policy instruments under certain conditions. 
An examination of existing policy evaluations undertaken in the environmental 
field in the UK led to the conclusion that evaluations in the UK do not adequately 
deal with aspects of instrument design beyond economic efficiency and 
environmental effectiveness (Appendix 9). Further to this point, Minogue (2005) 
identified four problems currently associated with comparative analyses of policy, 
ranging from the influence of law and political science within traditional economic 
scholarship, difficulties in differentiating between regulation and normal state 
intervention, and problematic comparisons of cross-sectoral or cross-national 
evaluations which display familiar weaknesses. Crucially, Minogue also asserts 
that problems also lie in the measurement of evaluations. Quantitative analyses 
are often based on weak data and qualitative analyses are rarely undertaken 
(Minogue, 2005). 
Therefore, in this thesis the following research problem has been addressed: 
Ex post policv evaluation, with a view to improving instrument 
design, is not adequately undertaken in UK policv making 
In order to tackle this problem an overarching research question was established, 
as detailed in Chapter 2; 
How can policy evaluation practices be improved to ensure the 
maximum amount of policy learning is achieved? 
- 3 0 1 -
The overarching research question has been addressed by answering three 
detailed sub-questions: 
1. What characteristics of policy assessment techniques could be employed 
effectively in the eA-yOos/evaluative situation? 
2. Can a systematic approach to policy evaluation enable the comparative 
evaluation of different policy instruments? 
3. In light of the comparative evaluation, what conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the role of different policy instruments in environmental policy 
making, specifically policies relating to climate change mitigation? Which 
elements of policy instruments work best under a given set of conditions? 
Before approaching the discussion in relation to each research question, the 
policy recommendations arising from the case study evaluations will be presented 
and discussed. The recommendations have been segregated into two categories: 
• Generalisable recommendations (which are largely a result of the 
comparative analysis following the identification of trends across the 
case studies). 
• Case study-specific recommendations (arising from individual 
analyses). 
9.2 Generalisability of case study outcomes 
As Yin (2003) asserts, case study research must take account of outcomes that 
are generalisable (the outcomes and recommendations can be applied in other 
situations) and those that are non-generalisable (the outcomes and 
recommendations relate specifically to the case study in question due to the 
unique features of the case study). Table 8.1 presents a comprehensive 
breakdown of the key elements of analysis in this thesis. There are certain 
features and lessons from each policy that have a limited level of generalisability 
in other policy contexts. However, each policy evaluation has led to the 
identification of lessons, recommendations and features that can be transferred to 
other instances of policy development, implementation, review and improvement. 
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9.2.1 Outcome 1: Caution in the establishment and use of baselines 
Three of the case studies (CCAs, UK ETS and EU ETS) relied heavily on the use 
of baselines against which sectoral or individual performance was to be 
measured. There are several notable difficulties in establishing baselines and 
subsequent difficulties in measuring performance against these baselines. 
The negotiation of targets at both sector and target unit levels within the Climate 
Change Agreements was based upon one baseline year. This alone presents an 
obstacle in setting a reliable baseline as the year in question may not present an 
accurate picture of performance over a longer time frame. Furthermore, sectors 
were permitted to select a baseline year of their choosing but the value of such an 
approach is limited as industry will inevitably select a year that is advantageous in 
the context of the policy (i.e. when energy use was particularly high). Using the 
notion of "credit for early action" as the rationale behind this approach, Defra 
permitted some sectors to select baseline years as early as 1990. The resulting 
commitments to reduce energy consumption were, with few exceptions, lenient 
and easily met. 
The UK ETS baseline methodology also proved to undermine the efficiency and 
environmental outcome of the Scheme. Even early analysis undertaken by the 
NAO, less than two years into the five year scheme, identified that the approach 
to baseline setting had been flawed, resulting in some of the major Direct 
Participants meeting their 5-year targets prior to the start of the Scheme (NAO, 
2004). 
The approach taken in the development of the EU ETS was an improvement on 
the practices of the CCAs and UK ETS as the baseline was determined using the 
average of 5 years' data (1998-2003) excluding the year with the lowest CO2 
emissions. However, this was not without problems as demonstrated by the over-
performance of all but four Member States (the UK, Italy, Spain and Slovenia) 
during Phase I. Future Phases of the EU ETS are likely to minimise any further 
complications as years with verified data (such as 2005 - the first year of the 
Scheme) will be used as baseline years. 
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9.2.2 Outcome 2: A need to improve the transparency of policies specifically in 
relation to performance and negotiation of targets 
The need to ensure transparency within the policy process is well documented 
(UNECE, 1998, Silvo et al., 2002, Graafland and Eijffinger, 2004, BERR, 2007b). 
The benefits of operating a policy based on clear and transparent processes such 
as public disclosure of information, stakeholder engagement and transparency 
are numerous. Within the development and negotiation of targets transparency 
leads to a situation of increased accountability, providing greater incentives to the 
'regulated' to maximise performance, and helps to ensure that policy makers are 
being effective and are seeking to maximise the public good. 
9.2.3 Outcome 3: With the exception of PPC, which is roughly revenue neutral 
for the Government, there is little analysis/publication of the costs of 
climate polices to Government 
The Government is to be applauded for undertaking a comprehensive analysis of 
the costs of implementing the PPC Regulations to both industry and Government. 
However, this level of examination remains the exception rather than the norm. 
Although the UK ETS incentive fund provides some indication of the costs to the 
public and the government attempted to calculate the administrative costs of the 
scheme (Defra, 2002c), the range of the total costs and benefits was so large that 
the outcomes are rendered virtually meaningless. Of greater concern is the 
complete absence of implementation and administration cost data relating to the 
CCAs and EU ETS. 
This problem concerning lack of publication of costs incurred by Government is 
likely to stem from the approach taken to RIA in the UK. In general, British RIAs 
focus on the costs likely to be incurred by industry as a means to justify the 
implementation of a particular policy (OECD, 2002). Therefore if an ex post 
evaluation is undertaken, the basis of which is often the RIA, and it overlooks the 
importance of assessing the cost to tax payers via Government administration 
costs. This means there is very little evidence relating to the cost effectiveness of 
climate polices from the perspective of costs incurred by society. 
- 3 0 4 -
9.2.4 Outcome 4: Impact of"credit for early actiorl' 
This phrase appeared frequently in relation to CCAs and UK ETS, specifically as 
justification for the approach to setting baselines. The Government's desire to 
give industry "credit for early action" meant that some CCAs sectors used 
baseline years as far back as 1990, on the premise that most energy saving 
activities were undertaken sometime after, with little hope of significant energy 
consumption reductions in later years (this was specified within an interview with 
a Defra representative). UK ETS Direct Participants were also given such credit. 
The impact of this approach on baselines is profound. CCAs targets and UK ETS 
commitments were far from challenging for many participants and the desire to 
give industry additional credit for action only served to further undermine the 
environmental effectiveness of the policies as subsequent abatement is not easily 
attributable to the policies. In the interest of equity and also to preserve the value 
of policy instruments it would be highly recommended to avoid the inclusion of 
credit for early action in future policy design, with exceptions made in exceptional 
circumstances such as niche areas of industry that are already operating in the 
most efficient manner. 
9.2.5 Outcome 5; Industry will generally perceive targets to be unfair and too 
challenging despite evidence to the contrary 
The majority of EU ETS sectors stated they found the allocation in Phase I to be 
unfair. However, every one of these sectors received aggregate installation 
allocations that were in excess of verified emissions for the entire period. This 
contradiction not only serves to strengthen the bargaining position of 
Government, it serves as a warning on the reliance on industry-supplied data 
when determining allocations and targets. Many of the CCA sectors associations 
interviewed also stated that at the time of CCA target negotiation they were of the 
belief that the targets were too stringent. Following the first reconciliation period 
all CCA sector targets were tightened in light of evidence proving the initial 
targets were, in fact, too lenient. The Government should ensure that any future 
negotiations relating to targets should not give too much weight to the 
protestations of industry that targets are too stringent in the absence of verified 
data and evidence of the impact of more stringent targets on the competitiveness 
and profitability of British companies. This outcome also indicates that data 
collection should not be sacrificed for time and finances. Delaying the 
implementation of a policy in order to collect data may lead to better 
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environmental outcomes in the long run, potentially offsetting the downside of 
delaying implementation. 
9.2.6 Outcome 6: While voluntary schemes, such as UK ETS and CCAs, have 
proved to have limited environmental benefits, they compared well against 
the performance of Phase I of EU ETS and the PPC Regulations 
The CCAs have under-performed against initial expectations of the Government. 
The UK ETS appeared to over-perform against emission reduction commitments 
yet a significant quantity of the reductions cannot be directly attributed to the 
Scheme. However, compared to Phase 1 of the EU ETS these two instruments 
actually performed relatively well in environmental terms. This is partly due to the 
vast over-allocation of EU ETS allowances reducing the environmental outcome 
of Phase 1 and partly due to the overall increase in CO2 emissions from UK 
industry during the period 2000-2006. On the basis of this evidence, there may be 
a case for the continued use of voluntary schemes provided a strict set of 
conditions are met, including: 
• The availability of verified and reliable data upon which to base targets 
• Adequate provisions to ensure value for money is achieved if any form of 
financial incentive is available 
• Credible penalties in cases of non-compliance (e.g. significantly higher 
fine than under regulatory schemes to reflect the cost savings of the 
voluntary policy) 
• Rigorous av/pos/evaluations to ensure the policy is performing and if not, 
to ensure the policy is either refined or withdrawn 
• Extensive public reporting to maximise the incentives for companies to 
perform and to maintain a sense of accountability. 
9.2.7 Outcome 7: Policies implemented under strict time constraints may 
experience greater difficulties in achieving environmental objectives 
The implementation of the PPC Regulations was a lengthy process, commencing 
with the adoption of the EU IPPC Directive in 1996 (EU Council Directive 
96/61/EC). Member States were required to fully transpose the Directive into 
domestic legislation by 2007. By the time this deadline arrived the majority of UK 
installations were in possession of a PPC permit. The staggered implementation 
meant that the Environment Agency could implement the Regulations in a sector-
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by-sector approach giving the added benefit of developing industrial knowledge of 
staff at the same time. 
Conversely, Defra acknowledged that time constraints prior to the launch of the 
UK ETS was a contributing factor in the low participation rate (NAO, 2004). This 
in turn contributed to the low liquidity of the market and the resulting value for 
money of the provision of the incentive fund. The EU ETS was also implemented 
under significant time constraints, which is particularly apparent when one 
considers the number of countries and installations involved. MBIs and voluntary 
environmental agreements may offer superiority over regulatory approaches due 
to the comparable speed with which they can be implemented. However, as these 
two case studies show, under pressing time constraints the environmental 
outcomes of an instrument may be compromised. It is therefore recommended 
that the complexity of an issue and the policy response should be reflected in the 
time allocated to policy instrument development. 
9.2.8 Outcome 8: The positive effect of data accumulation and the impact on 
information asymmetry 
Since the turn of the 21®' century the quantity of regulations, economic 
instruments and other more novel approaches to environmental protection, such 
as voluntary agreements, has increased to such a level that a significant quantity 
of data now exists in relation to industrial environmental performance. For 
example, the establishment of EPER represents a crucial development in data 
collection, despite its limitations. The replacement of EPER with E-PRTR should 
serve to reduce the limitations of the existing approach, through requirements 
that all chemical installations report all emissions to the Register (European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2006), thus greatly increasing 
the volume of data available for analysis. 
With respect to the Climate Change Agreement sectors, Defra, its appointed 
consultants (AEA Technology) and individual sector associations are in 
possession of bi-annual performance data from every target unit participating 
within the Agreements. Defra stated in an interview that due to resource 
constraints not all data is verified, with approximately 5% of target units being 
subject to spot audits. This diminishes the value of the data as external 
verification is critical to achieving a transparent, robust and meaningful system of 
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assessment of performance against targets. However, the data will nevertheless 
prove to be of significant value in determining the form of any post-2013 
instruments targeted at these sectors. 
The situation in relation to the EL) ETS is a significant improvement on the CCAs 
and PPC Regulations as all installations must submit verified data on an annual 
basis. As the Scheme progresses further into Phase II the long-term performance 
trends of installations become clearer as the bank of emissions data will increase 
providing a more reliable and robust platform for future cap setting (a necessity 
even if 100% auctioning is achieved as an overall cap must still be established). 
Even if allocations continue to be based on grandfathering, a situation that is 
likely to be unacceptable to most stakeholders beyond industry, the availability of 
data will should provide the Commission with much needed evidence to set a 
challenging emissions cap. However, whether the Commission utilises its position 
effectively is a political issue and likely to be subject to intense lobbying from 
industry and Member States as they seek to protect their competitive positions by 
obtaining a lenient cap. 
On a more general note, the historic problems of information asymmetry between 
the regulator and the regulated has been studied to a limited degree, with 
examples such as Sauer et al (2003) and Dassler et al. (2006). Crucially, Dassler 
et al. assert that regulation is also subject to information asymmetries that can 
lead to allocation distortions. They conclude that benchmarking, by way of 
comparing a regulated firms' costs with those of a firm operating efficiently within 
the sector, provides an adequate solution to many of the difficulties encountered 
when a regulator has to rely upon company-provided information. In these 
situations, additional resources, in the form of regulatory personnel, are likely to 
improve the negative impacts of regulatory capture and the absence of data. 
However, one must also be mindful of the often strict resource constraints that 
regulatory bodies are operating under. 
Whether the UK Government intends to pursue climate change policy responses 
based on grandfathering, the foundation of which is invariability a baseline, or 
whether the it intends to adopt a more aggressive policy approach (such as 
auction-based emissions trading), the implementation of the CCAs, PPC 
Regulations and the EU ETS all serve to reduce any informational asymmetries 
that currently work in the favour of industry. 
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9.2.9 Recommendation 9: Policy makers need to demonstrate greater 
awareness of (and willingness to challenge) lobbying by industry 
Lobbying by business groups and other stakeholders is a key feature of all policy 
development, regardless of the subject in question. However, in three of the case 
studies examined in this thesis, industry lobbing has undoubtedly led to the 
weakening of environmental targets. The willingness of sector associations to 
discuss their roles within the policy development process and the apparent 
susceptibility of Government departments of such practices has led indirectly to 
the disappointing performance of each case study instrument when compared 
with the initial policy objectives. There are many other factors that influence the 
performance of an instrument, such as the application of rigorous monitoring and 
reporting, the use of sufficient penalties, and the data upon which targets are set 
and monitored. Industry lobbying is active in all areas and as such precise impact 
of this compared with other areas of the policy design can not easily be 
disentangled. However, this highlights the need for policy makers to increase 
their awareness of industry tactics with a view to strengthening their negotiating 
position. 
Lobbying is not, of course, limited to industry groups. As the recent EU-level 
negotiations (in late 2008( on the Commission's proposals for a revised EU ETS 
Directive demonstrate, governments are also culpable of intense lobbying with 
dramatic consequences. For example, the Commission sought to implement 
100% auctioning for the power sector from 2013. Following weeks of intense 
negotiations this was amended to allow eastern Member State to phase in 
auctioning until 2020 for this sector on the grounds of their dependency on coal. It 
is for this reason that auctioning is required and auctioning would provide the 
right financial incentive for governments and power sector companies to invest in 
cleaner technologies. The perceived need of some governments to protect 
industry clearly outweighed the need to implement an ambitious and effective 
approach to the power sector. 
9.3 Policy-specific outcomes and recommendations 
This section of Chapter 9 presents the policy-specific recommendations arising 
from the case study evaluations undertaken in this study. Provisional lists of 
recommendations, grouped according to policy instrument, were circulated to 
relevant stakeholders. These stakeholders were identified as the industry and 
external stakeholders who participated in the surveys and interviews. The 
recommendations were not circulated to the total set of stakeholders to whom the 
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original surveys were sent to on tine basis that the recommendations were 
developed in light of the responses from the surveys. The purpose of this 
exercise was two-fold: 
• to obtain a ranking of the level of agreement from stakeholders towards 
each recommendation and the associated rationale; 
• to obtain further comments from stakeholders on how they perceive the 
recommendations and rationales. 
Tables 9.1 to 9.4 present the instrument-specific recommendations with the 
associated rationale. Each table also includes the aggregate level of agreement 
for each recommendation and rationale. Furthermore, the tables include 
comments received in relation to the policy recommendations in order to explain 
the patterns of agreement. 
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9.3.1 Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations (England and Wales) 2000 
Before commencing the discussion of PPC-specific lessons and 
recommendations one must first consider the key limitation of the PPC 
Regulations. If the truest interpretation of BAT was successfully implemented and 
maintained (e.g. via a cycle of continuous monitoring of technological advances 
and transposition of any advances into I PPC permits) would there be a 
requirement for other policies relating to any of the emissions and media 
specified within the Directive (in effect, the EU ETS and potentially the CCAs)? 
The definition of BAT (see section 4.2.3) within the Directive indicates technology 
standards and emission limits should be based on "the most effective and 
advanced stage in the development of activities'. Furthermore, this definition of 
BAT also specifies that the aim of the I PPC Directive is to eliminate emissions 
where possible and reduce emissions when elimination is not practicable. In an 
ex 5/7/e study of the IPPC Directive on efficiency within the dairy industries in the 
UK, Finland and Sweden, Honkasalo et al. (2005) found that the efficiency 
requirements within the BREF document for this industry was lacking in ambition 
despite the focus being on processes not emissions. This unique study also 
found that the implementation of energy efficiency requirements via permits was 
a problematic area for regulators in the three countries. No other studies have 
been carried out to investigate the impact of the IPPC Directive on energy 
management nor have any other studies been published relating to the 
interaction between the IPPC Directive and greenhouse gas emissions. Only one 
other study made a limited attempt to analyse the implementation of IPPC with a 
brief reference to energy efficiency (Silvo et al., 2002). 
As the figures in the third row of Table 9.1 show, the level of agreement exhibited 
by stakeholders for the policy recommendations and rationales was mixed, with 
most recommendations receiving a spread of responses across all levels of 
agreement (1=strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). A selection of comments 
is presented alongside the figures, displaying the stated level of agreement in 
brackets in order to illustrate the reasons behind the agreement figures. It should 
be noted that not all respondents provided comments relating to each 
recommendation. 
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Table 9.1 Policy recommendations, rationales and stakeholder feedback: Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations 
Recommendation Rationale Stakeliolder feedbacic Stal<eliolder comments 
1 - Greater inclusion 
of energy efficiency in 
permits and within 
BA T guidance notes 
Evidence from tlie survey suggests tliat 
tlie majority stal<eiioiders (64%) do not 
beiieve tiiat the PPC Regulations 
incentivise energy efficiency 
improvements. Wtiiist installations 
operating within EU ETS and CCAs are 
required to meet energy/emissions 
requirements of those schemes, 
installations operating outside of these 
schemes may not have sufficient policy-
driven incentives to consume energy 
more efficiently. 
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Level of agreement I Recommendation 1 
I Rationale 1 
"Energy efficiency may conflict with other 
environmental objectives, especially where 
companies are under pressure to process their 
own waste and discouraged from using 
communal facilities' (4) 
"i agree that we need better guidance on the 
viability of energy efficiency measures. The 
BREFhas finally been completed -years too 
(3) 
"PPC requires energy to be used efficiently, and 
operators outside the EU ETS and CCA must still 
pay the rising cost of the energy they use, and in 
the future join the CRC scheme under 
development Changing the iPPC regime will 
cause double regulation but not achieve any 
benefit' (1) 
2 - Access to permit 
and performance 
information should be 
improved using a 
web-based system 
Sectors outside industry (e.g. members of 
the public, NGOs, academics) wfould be 
better served if information relating to 
permit applications, changes to permits, 
enforcement action and the permits 
themselves were available electronically 
on the internet. The existing system of 
accessing permits and any related 
information at Environment Agency 
regional offices and the process of 
requesting specific documents via the 
Environment Agency website presents 
significant barrier to the public accessing 
this information. 
5 3 - = 
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Level of agreement I Recommendation 2 
I Rationale 2 
"Much of the information is likely to he highly 
technical and there are issues of confidentiality 
and whether the information is lil<ely to be used 
responsibiHtf (3) 
" The costs/burdens associated with making 
everything available electronically (which are 
ultimately passed on to the consumer) are 
extremely high relative to the return for the 
environment' (3) 
" have no problem with better accesd' (3) 
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3 - Activity-level 
environmental 
performance 
reporting and analysis 
needs to be improved 
with a web-based 
compliance system 
Reporting at the EU-level should improve 
with the replacement of EPER with E-
PRTR. The current format makes it 
difficult to access information that 
correlates with the activity codes of the 
PRC Regulations. 
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Level of agreement I Recommendation 3 
I Rationale 3 
"AH reporting systems need to improved and 
standardised' (4) 
"Not sure, but we have no problem with better 
info, the concern is how it is used and the danger 
of false comparison^' (2) 
7 would suggest concentrating on EPER' (1) 
4 - Consideration of 
removing the two-
tiered approach to 
administration -
referring responsibility 
for LAAPC to regional 
En vironment A gency 
offices 
The Environment Agency acknowledges 
that the existing approach to regulation 
(with the majority of installations falling 
within the remit of the Environment 
Agency but approximately 400 
installations being regulated by Local 
Authorities) causes an administrative 
burden. Industry and regulators (the 
Environment Agency and local 
authorities) would benefit from a more 
centralised regulatory system. 
Q) 
"D 
1 -
" Would be a significant improvement' (5) 
"No real experience to bring to thi^' (3) 
" The current arrangement appears to work 
satisfactorily in our sectof (1) 
1 2 3 
Level of agreement • Recommendation 4 
Rationale 4 
5 - The technology-
based standards do 
not promote 
technological 
innovation and 
investment in new 
technologies. 
Provisions need to be 
implemented to 
incentivise firms to 
investigate new 
technologies to 
continually change 
BAT. These 
65% of sector associations do not believe 
the PRC Regulations provide any 
incentive for firms to innovate. Investment 
in research and development has been 
identified as a key requirement in 
progressing towards a low carbon 
economy. 
1 2 
Level of agreement I Recommendation 5 
I Rationale 5 
" / would support incentivisation to investigate and 
develop new technologies but would question 
whether BA T should be changed frequently 
because to be BAT i would expect technologies 
to be tested and validated as practical, 
appropriate and financially viable - all of which 
takes timd' (4) 
"Difficult to see what policy measures would 
improve technological development. No real 
evidence that current policies do not drive 
innovation or that other policies would do bettef 
(2) 
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provisions could 
involve the iPPC BA T 
Bureau codifying 
innovation within 
permit requirements. 
" The purpose of the PPC Regs is a high 
standards of environmental protection. That is 
ambitious enough! Incentives for the low carbon 
economy are in high energy prices, climate 
policies such as EU ETS, and advice from 
organisations such as the Carbon Trusf (1) 
314-
9.3.2 Climate Change Agreements 
The Climate Change Agreements were implemented to provide industry with a 
financial incentive to consume energy more efficiently. However, on the basis of 
the evaluation undertaken in this study a number of factors must be taken into 
account in the development of post-2013 CCAs. Uncertainty surrounding the 
shape and form of EU ETS post-2012 will have a major impact on the coverage of 
CCAs if the Government is to avoid the double-regulation that has plagued 
climate policies since 2002. Indeed, if the scope of the EU ETS is extended to 
include most target units currently within CCAs then the continuation of the 
agreements would be futile as the overlap between the two instruments is already 
problematic. However, in addition to the key benefit of the CCAs cited by the 
National Audit Office - the elevation of energy to senior industrial management 
level - CCAs have also provided an opportunity to gather a vast amount of energy 
consumption data which will prove to be invaluable in informing future policy 
making. The fact that the majority of this data is unavailable in the public domain 
is a cause for concern, but there are significant environmental benefits to be 
reaped from this data in establishing accurate baselines for future legislation and 
policies. 
The responses in relation to the policy recommendations in Table 9.2 are 
polarised with Defra and some sector associations strongly disagreeing with most 
recommendations, and the remaining sector associations and external 
stakeholders exhibiting strong agreement with the recommendations. It is 
plausible that Defra and the opposing sector associations are unwilling to support 
changes to the existing CCA format as this would indicate a level of failure of the 
Agreements and may make the process more rigorous in the future. One area 
that consensus was reached is in relation to the interaction between the CCAs 
and the EU ETS (recommendation 6). 
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Table 9.2 Policy recommendations, rationales and stakeholder feedback: Climate Change Agreements 
Recommendation Rationale Stakeholder feedback Stakeholder comments 
1 -A certain degree of 
regulatory capture 
(industry tiad 
disproportionate 
infiuence in the policy 
mal<er process) 
occurred during the 
negotiation of CCA 
targets. Therefore 
greater resources (i.e. 
staff and 
impiementation time) 
shouid be allocated to 
future policy 
developments of this 
nature. 
Despite modelling evidence (provided by the Global 
Atmospheric Division of Defra) indicating possible 
carbon savings, the final negotiated targets were 
significantly lower (2.5MtC compared to 4.5MtC in 
2010). The combination of the financial incentives 
for CCA participation means that Defra was in a 
very strong negotiating position that may not have 
been maximised. Many of the sector association 
respondents to this survey acknowledge that their 
original target demands were too lenient. In future 
negotiations Defra should capitalise on the financial 
incentives of participation to obtain energy 
consumption/emission targets that are significantly 
more stringent. 
3 — 
1 2 
Level of agreement I Recommendation 1 
I Rationale 1 
"Agreed, though would accept that 
Defra were trying to do something not 
done before in the UK and therefore, in 
practice, optimisation was not lil<ely to 
happen from the start. The real 
weakness was in the first review stage 
when much tougher targets could have 
been pushed (5) 
"Many sectors offered soft initial targets 
to Defra, who could not really challenge 
them as energy was not a major priority 
for most companies in 2000 and many 
did not have accurate datd' (5) 
" Global Atmosphere Division achieved 
the best targets possible in the given 
circumstanced' (1) 
"Not in our sector-the targets were 
regarded as challenging at the timd' (1) 
2- By the end of the 
current Agreements 
possession of 13 
years of energy and 
emissions data from 
more than 10, ODD 
energy-intensive 
installations will 
provide Defra with an 
excellent opportunity 
to implement 
Whether its through the extension of CCAs, the 
establishment of a new policy, or the integration of 
CCA target units into another policy (e.g. EU ETS), 
the data accumulated during the life of the CCAs 
places Defra in an good position relating to any 
future policies due to the significant reducing in 
information asymmetry which often has a negative 
effect on policy development. This is particularly 
important if the use of baselines is to be continued. 
It seems unfortunate that the scope of the CCAs 
was not widened to increase the number of target 
units, and hence the amount of data relating to 
6 -
5 ' 
4 
3 ' 
2 
0 r B 1 2 3 
Level of agreement Recommendation 2 
Rationale 2 
"Difficult to disagree with this - but the 
interpretation of the data will be cruciaf 
(5) 
"Problem has been the difficulty of 
relating relative data/targets to anything 
tangible - reflecting only the awful 
complexity of the initial agreement^' (5) 
"Should CCAs continue beyond2013 
Defra will need to rebaseiine. Care will 
be required as facilities which have 
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challenging future 
targets for these 
installations based on 
the deep cuts in 
emissions proposed 
reduction below 1990 
levels by2020, 50% 
be low 1990 levels by 
energy consumption and carbon emissions. been in CCAs since 2000 cannot be 
expected to have the same potential 
energy savings as those Just entering 
an agreement in 20 /J' (5) 
" / strongly disagree with the 
recommendation because the targets 
are already challenging and the 2008 
review will push to get even more 
challenging targets for the sectors and 
target unit^' (1) 
3 - The use of relative 
targets should not 
continue beyond the 
current Agreements 
The general industry viewpoint regarding relative 
targets is one of necessity. Relative targets are 
promoted as the best manner to protect growrth as 
overall energy consumption can increase provided 
energy consumption per unit of output does not. 
Greenhouse gas emissions in the UK have 
increased in recent years. The most suitable means 
of reducing total emissions from energy intensive 
industry is to implement absolute targets. Absolute 
targets also provide a guarantee of emission 
reductions. 
g 2 -
2 1 
0 E 3 
1 
Level of agreement • Recommendation 3 
I Rationale 3 
"Absolutely! As long as the traded 
sector is broad enough and deep 
enough (e.g. EU-wide, not just UK-
wide) the arguments for relative targets 
are easily disposed of {5) 
" There should be a grater degree of 
compatibility between the various 
instruments i.e. CCAs, EU ETS and 
CRC (4) 
" In a sector that is forecast to continue 
global growth of 3% to %% per annum, 
and in which the UK and northern 
Europe has a competitive advantage, it 
is not welcome to tax the sector into 
contractiori' (1) 
" This is a matter for decision after the 
full public consultatiori' (1) 
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4 - The level of 
publicly a valiable 
Information should be 
Increased by providing 
target-unit level 
performance data 
Existing reporting requirements within CCAs 
provides performance analysis at a sector level. 
However, the provision of more detailed 
performance information, for example at target unit 
level (e.g. through identification of target units failing 
to surrender performance information) would greatly 
increase the transparency of the scheme and may 
incentivise better performance. 
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Level of agreement I Recommendation 4 
I Rationale 4 
" Yes - but reflects on the crazy 
complexity of the whole scheme. Not 
sure you want to Introduce a marginal 
change Into CCAs - just stick the target 
units In an emissions trading scheme 
and public emissions data/surrender 
pattern^' (5) 
"People are becoming disillusioned by 
the league table mentality of the present 
government. Falling companies are 
already penalised by having to seek 
compliance through the purchase of 
allowances." (2) 
" Sector Information Is good - target unit 
Information Is commercially sensltlvd' 
(1) 
"Defra Is limited by the Data Protection 
Act and the terms of the CCAs, which 
state what can and cannot be made 
public. Remember that Information can 
be used by competitors In the UK and 
abroad to the detriment of the 
company/target unit concerned. Defra 
has to be carefuT (1) 
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5 - High energy prices 
were identified as 
having a greater 
impact on energy 
management than 
CCAs bringing into 
question the 
usefulness of the 
Agreement. Therefore, 
future policy 
de veiopment should 
carefully take account 
of the impact of 
external factors on the 
usefulness of a policy. 
All sector associations interviewed as part of this 
research identified rising energy prices as having a 
greater impact on energy consumption compared to 
the Climate Change Agreements. Furthermore, all 
sector associations agreed that companies could 
have reduced their energy bills in the presence of 
the full rate of the CCL through the implementation 
of energy efficiency measures alone. An alternative 
approach post-2013, such as emissions trading, 
may provide a greater financial incentive for 
companies to reduce energy consumption through 
the explicit opportunities to benefit via sale of 
allowances. 
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Level of agreement I Recommendation 5 
I Rationale 5 
" The CCL is just a further marginal cost 
on a key cost in our sector - it is the 
base cost of energy that drives decision 
making - a tax on the energy does not 
significantly alter decision^' (5) 
"Agreed - a central problem of mine has 
been how to believe Government 
statements about how effective 
CCAs/CCL package has been at 
reducing emissions compared with my 
experience of working with companies 
affected and hearing how little 
difference CCAs have made to decision 
making' (5) 
"Emissions trading (both UKETS and 
EU ETS), to date, has had very little 
impact and will not have until 
allowances are more realistically priced' 
(5) 
"/ understand that the idea of 
(legitimately) stopping the Exchequer 
getting some tax had an important effect 
- it brought the CCAs to Finance 
Directors' notice and CCAs became a 
board level issud' (1) 
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6 - The interaction 
between CCAs and 
the EU ETS should be 
centrai in the post-
20 13 design of CCAs 
through harmonisation 
of reporting cycles, 
targets and 
simplification of 
adjustment 
methodologies 
Approximately 500 installations are currently 
included in both the CCAs and EU ETS. The 
administrative burden of this, including double 
reporting requirements, conflicts between relative 
CCA targets and absolute EU ETS allocations, and 
conflicting reporting cycles, indicate that any 
installation eligible for EU ETS participation should 
be withdrawn from CCAs. The presence of both 
policies for some installations is in direct 
contradiction with the Government's agenda of 
pursuing 'better regulation'. 
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Level of agreement I Recommendation 6 
I Rationale 6 
"It is a nightmare to have two different 
schemed' (5) 
"Absolutely - expand EU ETS where 
possible, and if not put CCA target units 
into UK CRC; get rid of complex 
nonsense that is the CCA/CCL 
packagd' (5) 
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9.3.3 UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
T h e UK ETS presented an opportunity to e x a m i n e a unique instrument which 
drew on severa l different instrument types to d e v e l o p a s c h e m e b a s e d upon 
trading, of a voluntary nature with incentivised participation through the provision 
of a subsidy. T h e analys i s within this t h e s i s reflects the c o n c e p t that the UK ETS 
w a s a policy exper iment that w a s not intended to be a long-term r e s p o n s e . T h e 
limited s c o p e of the policy in terms of number of participants and the short five-
year time s c a l e are ref lected within the quantity of policy recommendat ions . 
A s with the other s e t s of policy recommendat ions , the UK ETS d o c u m e n t w a s 
circulated to all participating s takeho lders including the representat ive from Defra 
from the department respons ib le for its d e v e l o p m e n t and implementation (this 
department c l o s e d in early 2 0 0 7 following the c losure of the S c h e m e to Direct 
Participants). However , this civil servant refused to c o m m e n t on the 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s citing the following; "In my area of Defra it is the policy not to 
contribute to recommendations on an area where you have been directly 
involved'. However , Defra provided r e s p o n s e s in relation to the C C A s and the EU 
ETS. T h e s e departments , including the former UK ETS department, form part of 
the larger Climate and Energy; B u s i n e s s and Transport (CEBT) division of Defra. 
This anomaly is curious. Whether the civil servant in quest ion w a s unwilling to 
contribute for other r e a s o n s or whether there is, in fact, a departmental policy that 
w a s ignored by fel low Defra c o l l e a g u e s , remains a mystery. The lack of continuity 
d o e s not b o d e well for the des ire of Defra to e n g a g e in research and facilitate 
d ia logue with s takeholders . The majority of other r e s p o n s e s are broadly 
supportive of the policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s with particular support being exhibited 
for the n e e d to cons ider existing regulatory requirements w h e n implementing n e w 
policies. 
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Table 9.3 Policy recommendations, rationales and stakeholder feedbacic United Kingdom Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme 
Recommendation Rationale Stakeholder feedback Stakeholder comments 
1 - Existing or 
imminent regulatory 
requirements 
should be given 
greater 
consideration when 
determining 
baselines 
In the cases of several Direct Participants 
imminent regulatory requirements were accounted 
for to some degree by Defra when establishing 
baselines. However, these companies had already 
reduced emissions below the baseline before the 
Scheme started. This indicates that insufficient 
consideration was given to the impact of regulatory 
requirements. In future, policies requiring the use 
of baselines should pay much greater attention to 
the impacts of other polices on baseline emissions. 1 2 3 
Level of agreement I Recommendation 1 
I Rationale 1 
" / think this is a very important 
recommendation - BERR proposed to 
introduce a trading scheme for oil in 
produced water discharges from offshore 
installations. However plans to do this 
effectively collapsed due to the fact that a 
change was made in the analytical 
technique used to measure oil in produced 
water between the baseline year and now 
and it appears not possible to make a 
reliable correlation between the results of 
old and new method^' (5) 
" The implementation of the CRC pays little 
attention to those installation that have 
reduced core emissions prior to setting up 
the baseiind' (5) 
"Many policies now do take this into 
account' (3) 
2 - The value of 
'experiments' 
involving such 
small numbers of 
participants needs 
to be evaluated in 
detail and perhaps 
rejected following 
negative outcomes 
One of the key aims of the UK ETS was to provide 
UK businesses with early experience of emissions 
trading in anticipation of the EU ETS. The value of 
this experience is yet to be evaluated by the 
Government. However, analysis carried out for this 
research raises questions over the value of early 
experience for only 34 companies, many of whom 
are not eligible for EU ETS participation. 
1 2 
Level of agreement I Recommendation 2 
I Rationale 2 
" There were many companies in CCAs that 
participated and gained experience. 
However, the £215m spent on incentlvlsing 
the Direct Participants could possibly have 
been better spent given that some had 
already met their targets. For us, we found it 
valuable to gain some experience in 
advance of EU ETS' (2) 
" The scheme was open to all businesses but 
only 34 voluntarily joined in. They should be 
praised not questioned as the lessons 
learned were used to help create the EU 
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3 - Future schemes 
involving 
subsidised 
participation need 
cioserpre-
impiementation 
scrutiny and post-
impiementation 
accountability to 
more accurately 
determine the value 
for money for tax 
payers. This could 
be undertaken 
through the use of 
a multi-stakeholder 
group to assess the 
value for money of 
a proposal. 
The UK ETS was not subject to a Regulatory 
Impact Assessment. Without clear calculations 
relating to the predicted value for money the task of 
assessing the actual performance of the Scheme 
was more challenging. Furthermore, beyond the 
2004 National Audit Office assessment, there has 
been no analysis of the value for money of the 
Scheme to taxpayers in reference to the emission 
reductions achieved in return for the £215 million 
incentive payments. 
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Level of agreement Recommendation 3 
Rationale 3 
ETS' (3) 
"Agree with proposal re: pre-impiementation 
scrutiny. Less convinced about post-
implementation accountability. Defra did 
amend the rules of the scheme in response 
to findings from NAO report, e.g. tightening 
up rules re: partial closures. / also question 
whether it is realistic to expect that value for 
money for taxpayers could be calculated. 
This would mean that companies would 
have to be able to calculate how much 
reduction in emissions was attributable to 
UK ETS. if the Government had designed 
the scheme such that it forced participants 
to release more information, would as many 
companies have signed up to it7 (3) 
" The UK ETS was a learning by doing 
scheme and so the determination of value 
would be difficult if only considered in money 
term^' (3) 
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9.3.4 EL) Emissions Trading Scheme 
The analys i s of the EU ETS led to s o m e critical observat ions of the des ign and 
operation of P h a s e I. Of the four c a s e s tudies , the EL) ETS evaluation had the 
smal l e s t quantity of e m i s s i o n s data upon which to b a s e the evaluation. This w a s 
d u e to the relative infancy of the S c h e m e . However , the political and e c o n o m i c 
importance of the EL) ETS led to the accumulat ion of a significant quantity of 
ana lys i s of both historical performance of the EL) ETS and analys i s of the future 
of the EL) ETS. Any d i s a d v a n t a g e s a s s o c i a t e d with availability of performance 
data w e r e significantly reduced by the quantity, and indeed the quality, of pre-
existing EU ETS analys is . 
Again, mos t r e s p o n s e s from s takeholders in relation to the policy 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s are spread a c r o s s the spectrum of agreement . However , there 
is a higher level of support for the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s compared to the other c a s e 
s tudies . In particular, transparency i s s u e s and the allocation methodo logy 
rece ived substantially higher leve ls of support than r e s p o n s e s d isagree ing with 
the recommendat ions . 
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T a b l e 9 . 4 Po l i cy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , ra t iona le s a n d s t a k e h o l d e r f e e d b a c k : E u r o p e a n Union E m i s s i o n s Trading S c h e m e 
Recommendation Rationale Stalceholder feedback Stakeliolder comments 
/- TheEUETS 
represents a 
significant 
achievement in 
poiicy development 
The methods used 
to development of 
the Scheme and to 
achieve of 
consensus among 
Member States 
should be replicated 
where possible in 
future policy design. 
Despite any shortcomings of PInase I, and 
indeed Phase II, the EU ETS amounts to a 
phenomenal achievement of the European 
Union in establishing a Union-wide trading 
mechanism within less than 5 years. The EU 
ETS has succeeded in areas the EU and the 
UK have previously failed. The EU attempted 
to implement a Community-wide carbon tax 
in the 1990s. Political and industrial 
obstacles prevented the tax from reaching an 
implementable stage. In the UK, the process 
of developing and implementing the UK ETS 
was delayed, for reasons of low participation 
numbers and industry requirement more time 
to prepare, yet the EU scheme was rolled out 
on-time regardless of the preparedness of 
industry, not least because Phase I was 
deemed to be the pilot phase in which 
industry was to learn. 
1 2 
Level of agreement 
" The interaction with CCAs is unfortunate. They 
should dovetail more, for ease of administration 
and future development (4) 
I Recommendation 1 
I Rationale 1 
2 - Free allocations 
are fraught with 
both technical 
difficulties and 
equity issues that 
must be minimised 
in order to maximise 
the social and 
environmental 
outcomes of the 
Scheme. Therefore 
future programmes 
of trading should 
consider a voiding 
free allocations. 
The use of baselines to predict allowance 
need in the future led to significant over-
allocation in Phase I in all Member States. In 
the United Kingdom only one sector (power 
generation) received a lower-than business 
as usual allocation. Despite this, the power 
sector in the UK made an estimated £1 billion 
profit from Phase I. Furthermore, the total 
emissions of UK installations in 2005 and 
2006 were 16.8 MtC above the total national 
allocation. 
5 -
4 -
3 
2 
1 
0 
1 2 
Level of agreement I Recommendation 2 
I Rationale 2 
" The UK and a few other MS did not overaiiocate 
in Phase /. Our NAP set out that the power 
sector would be the only sector not to receive an 
allocation based on BAUprojections. Although 
the UK was over it's cap - we purchased 
allowances, this is the point behind emissions 
trading and should not be viewed as meaning 
that the UK performed worse than other Memebr 
Stated' (4) 
"Industries that are particularly sensitive to 
energy costs need special provision, and time in 
the consultation process to understand their 
position. The sector basis was crude, and failed 
to address the complexity of UK industry' (3) 
3 2 5 -
" It Is Important to realise that any other allocation 
mechanism, whether benchmarks or auctioning, 
are also fraught with enormous technical 
difficulties and equity Issues. Hence, the 
argument should be extended to allocation 
methods In general, and otherwise the policy 
recommendation should be nuanced' (3) 
" The allocation system IS fraught with difficulties, 
but this Is too simplistic. It should be no surprise 
if most industries have delivered emissions 
lower than the verified baseline used in UK- this 
Is a success. Power is unique in not being 
exposed to import substitution, for most other 
Industries the realities of international 
competition constrain the ability to compete for 
investment with non-EUlocation^' (2) 
3 - Future phases of 
the EU ETS must 
avoid this method of 
allocation if the 
optimal 
environmental 
effectiveness and 
economic efficiency 
of the ETS Is to be 
realised 
Many organisations, including the Carbon 
Trust, liave analysed the impact of the 
continuation of free allocations on the 
effectiveness (in both environmental and 
economic terms) of the EU ETS. In particular, 
the continued use of free allocations will 
continue to reap large profits for the power 
sector. 80% of industrial organisations 
surveyed for this research support the 
continued use of free allocations. However, 
an equal number of external stakeholders 
would prefer an auction-based approach. It is 
difficult to justify on economic and 
environmental terms the long-term 
continuation of free allocations. 
1 2 
Level of agreement I Recommendation 3 
I Rationale 3 
" The European Commissions' proposals on 
allocation, moving towards full auctioning by 
2020, and full auctioning for the power sector 
from 2013, are broadly sound (5) 
"important that decision on deciding the levels of 
auctioning for sectors are evidence-based' (4) 
" Bit too strong. Transitions needed for some 7 
(4) 
" The basis of the recommendation is the 
extensive real life experience with free 
allocation. However, there is no such a 
experience with benchmarks or allowances. 
Real implementation of both will show that also 
they lead to problems of efficiency and equity 
(3) 
"Consideration of carbon leakages and 
- 3 2 6 -
competitiveness must iiapperi' (2) 
" ne power industry siiouid speal< for itseif but i 
don't tfiinl< this statement is true -
EUROELECTRiCf^ accept fuii auctioning. The 
i<ey issue is exposure to internationai 
competitiorl' (1) 
4 - The 
transparency of the 
existing approach to 
NAP development 
should be reviewed 
and improved. For 
example, 
consultation 
meetings between 
government and 
industry relating to 
sector level 
allocations could be 
monitored by other 
stai^ehoiders (e.g. 
NGOs). 
External stakeholders have concerns about 
the transparency of the Scheme, in particular 
the complexity of National Allocation Plans 
(specifically public disclosure of negotiations 
between Member State governments and 
industry the, ad between governments and 
the Commission relating to the content of 
NAPS). 70% of external stakeholders believe 
the transparency of the EU ETS is in need of 
improvement. The most frequently cited 
cause for this is the level of disclosure 
relating to the negotiation of national and 
sector-level allocations. Another cause 
relates to the complexity of the 
methodologies used within National 
Allocation Plans. Therefore, a review of the 
existing approach may be required in order to 
determine how public disclosure of 
information could be improved. 
1 2 3 
Level of agreement I Recommendation 4 
I Rationale 4 
" Consultation for Phase ii was non-existent - the 
supposed consultation breached department 
guidelines, and the outcome was decided before 
the consultation process had started' (5) 
"if the proposal of the Commission to amend the 
EU ETS is adopted as it stands now, NAPs will 
be history (4) 
"Moves to auctioning will eventually remove the 
need for a NAP' {2) 
"As the body of historic verified emission data 
increases, so this problem becomes smaiiei" (2) 
"Phase a caps are based on a transparent 
formula set out by the Commissiod' (2) 
73 EUROELECTRIC is the " professional association which represents the common interests of the electricity industry at pan-European level' 
(http://www2.eurelectric.orq/Content/Default.asp?) 
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9.4 Response to detailed research questions 
This sec t ion of Chapter 9 will f o c u s on exploring how this thes i s h a s a d d r e s s e d 
the detailed research ques t i ons outlined in sec t ion 9 .1 . 
9.5 What characteristics of policy existing evaluation and appraisal techniques 
could be employed effectively in the eyr/jos/evaluative situation? 
The m o s t commonly u s e d a p p r o a c h e s to ex ante policy a s s e s s m e n t s , in the form 
of c o s t benefit ana lys i s and Regulatory impact A s s e s s m e n t (the bas i s of which is 
CBA) w e r e p r e s e n t e d in Chapter 3 in detail. T h e UK h a s a relatively strong history 
of both CBA and RIA in anticipation of n e w environmental policies. However , 
ana lys i s a l so s h o w s that the approach to ex post evaluation is limited and 
undertaken, at bes t undertaken in an ad h o c manner. This situation m e a n s that 
the cont inuous cyc le of policy improvement ( s e e Figure 3 .1) is not, in fact, 
maintained in many environmental policy i n s t a n c e s in the United Kingdom. 
9.5.1 Transparency 
Following the e x t e n s i v e examination of a c a d e m i c evaluat ive t echn iques and ex 
ante policy a s s e s s m e n t practices e m p l o y e d in the United Kingdom in Chapter 3 
' economic eff iciency' and 'environmental e f f e c t i v e n e s s ' w e r e found to be two 
criterion that are present in every form of environmental instrument analysis . T h e 
remaining criteria w e r e s e l e c t e d according to the arguments presented in 
previous s tud ies referring to the importance of the criterion within policy analys is . 
Transparency w a s highlighted by Silvo e t al. (2002) and S a n t o s et al. (2006) a s 
being a fundamental part of the policy p r o c e s s . However, examination of existing 
UK Government policy a s s e s s m e n t s of the four c a s e s tudies found that this 
criterion w a s over looked in every ins tance (NAO, 2 0 0 4 , Future Energy Solutions, 
2 0 0 4 , Future Energy Solutions, 2 0 0 5 , Defra, 2 0 0 7 a , Defra, 2 0 0 7 g ) . Beyond t h e s e 
s o u r c e s of validation of the inclusion of transparency within the evaluation criteria, 
the Aarhus Convent ion provides poss ibly the s tronges t support for the inclusion. 
A founding principle of the Convent ion s t a t e s that the Parties recogn i se that: 
-328 
'In the field of the environment, improved access to information and public 
participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the 
implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of 
environmental issues, give the public the opportunity to express its 
concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of such 
concern.' 
(UNECE, 1998: p.2). 
It is the notion of "improved' a c c e s s to information upon which this criterion w a s 
evaluated. Whilst the importance of a policy operating in a transparent manner is 
beyond doubt, the situation should be o n e of cont inuous improvement. Policy 
makers and regulators should b e actively s e e k i n g to improve the level of 
transparency and the public participation within the policy p r o c e s s . The level of 
transparency should not b e stationary. For this r eason 'transparency' held a 
deserv ing p lace within the s e t of evaluation criteria, not least b e c a u s e the 
evaluat ions found that the level of transparency is in n e e d of improvement a c r o s s 
the board. 
9.5.2 Innovative behaviour 
The impact of a policy on innovative behaviour w a s determined according to the 
tes t imony of industry representat ives . In 2 0 0 6 the Stern R e v i e w (Stern, 2 0 0 6 ) 
w a s explicit in n e e d for technological innovation a s a r e s p o n s e to cl imate 
c h a n g e . Furthermore, Stern highlighted that technological innovation w a s reliant 
not only on carbon pricing but on increasing incent ives for R&D and the provision 
of support for "early stage commerciaiisation investments in some sector^' 
(p.347) . A concerning o u t c o m e of the Stern Rev iew is the identification of the 
rate of private investment in R&D over the last 3 0 years . The rate of investment 
h a s fallen dramatically and is clearly in n e e d of reversal if the required c h a n g e s 
in t echno logy are to be ach ieved . T h e e v i d e n c e col lected for this study indicates 
that beyond the carbon price e s tab l i shed within the EU ETS and the UK ETS; the 
existing policy a p p r o a c h e s in the UK do not contain spec i f ic incent ives for 
investment in innovation. Furthermore, the m o s t notable o u t c o m e in terms of 
innovation and behaviour c h a n g e s within all responding s e c t o r s relate to an 
increase in a w a r e n e s s of the n e e d to m a n a g e energy and minimise GHG 
e m i s s i o n s . Unfortunately, this h a s not translated into investment in n e w 
t echno log i e s a s a significantly smal ler proportion of r e s p o n d e n t s reported 
- 3 2 9 -
c h a n g e s to operat ions and equipment a s a direct c o n s e q u e n c e of the policy (with 
the except ion of the PRC Regulat ions with m o s t s ec tor a s s o c i a t i o n s reporting the 
implementation of n e w equipment to m e e t P P C permit requirements) . 
Rest ing on the point of the P P C Regulat ions and innovation, analys i s undertaken 
by O E C D found that the incent ives for t echno logy d e v e l o p m e n t within a permit-
b a s e d framework are usually w e a k and rarely are they s trengthened through the 
addition of a voluntary policy instrument (OECD, 2003 ) . 
9.5.3 Acceptance and equity 
T h e level of a c c e p t a n c e for e a c h policy instrument resulted in s o m e insightful 
statistics, particularly relating to the two policies b a s e d on voluntary participation 
(UK ETS and CCA). External s takeho lders a p p e a r e d to s h o w higher than 
e x p e c t e d leve ls of a c c e p t a n c e for the policies. Previous research in this area h a s 
indentified the n e e d for external s o u r c e s of validity in the policy p r o c e s s 
(Hepburn et a!., 2006 ) , e spec ia l ly if a voluntary approach is to b e taken (Makuch, 
2 0 0 3 , Ekins and Etheridge, 2006 ) . This e l e m e n t of the evaluat ions ties in with the 
transparency, a s def ined by the Aarhus Convention, for enabling the public and 
other s takeho lders to e x p r e s s c o n c e r n s or otherwise in relation to a policy. 
At this point in the d i scuss ion , it is va luable to note that the positive percept ions 
of industry towards all of the c a s e s tud ies w e r e general ly lower than that of the 
external s takeholder group. The EU ETS and the C C A s rece ived negat ive 
f eedback , specif ically in relation to targets and allocations, desp i te the majority of 
s e c t o r s meet ing performance targets with e a s e . This indicates a limit to the va lue 
of the industry standpoint. Furthermore it is surprising that, in general , external 
s takeholders exhibited more positive percept ions of the voluntary pol ices 
c o m p a r e d to the industry s takeholder group. This may add weight to the 
argument that industry displays a feel ing of being 'hard d o n e by' in the p r e s e n c e 
of s o m e environmental protection policies. 
9.5.4 Flexibility 
The final spec i f ic evaluation criterion w a s flexibility. This criterion w a s found to 
h a v e strong links with the level of innovation arising from a policy. The P P C 
Regulat ions w e r e d e e m e d to h a v e the lowes t impact on innovation and a 
correspondingly low level of flexibility for c o m p a n i e s in terms of pollution 
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a b a t e m e n t and investment dec is ion making. This contradicts the fundamental 
notion of BAT and the cyc le of improvement it is m e a n t to inspire. Moreover, a s 
s tated earlier in this Chapter, if BAT and the IPPC Directive w e r e operating in the 
m o s t efficient manner it would n e g a t e the n e e d for supplementary m e a s u r e s to 
reduce energy consumpt ion and drive down GHG e m i s s i o n s . 
T h e importance of flexibility within policy des ign and operation h a s b e e n 
identified by m a n y influential s o u r c e s (Dupuy, 1997, S u n n e v a g , 2 0 0 0 , Wu, 2 0 0 0 , 
Carbon Trust, 2 0 0 6 , Stern, 2 0 0 6 ) . The pursuit of a low carbon e c o n o m y requires 
n u m e r o u s drivers and incentives , ranging from a c lear price s ignal for carbon, the 
promotion (via g o v e r n m e n t s c h e m e s or through the price of carbon) of 
inves tment in low carbon techno log ies , research and d e v e l o p m e n t in n e w 
t e c h n o l o g i e s and the u s e of market m e c h a n i s m s to e n a b l e industry to undertake 
cos t -e f fec t ive e m i s s i o n s abatement . All of t h e s e factors require a high d e g r e e of 
flexibility within policy d e s i g n in order to m e e t changing d e m a n d s and to account 
for c h a n g e s in knowledge . T h e c a s e s tud ies s h o w that greater flexibility is to be 
found within e m i s s i o n s trading s c h e m e s but only w h e n the carbon price is s table 
and high e n o u g h to m a k e investment in a b a t e m e n t more financially attractive 
than simply purchasing a l l owances . 
9.6 Can a systematic approach to policy evaluation enable the comparative 
evaluation of policy instruments? 
This research quest ion can be a n s w e r e d in part through the a s s e s s m e n t of the 
research des ign ( s e e sec t ion 2 .13) . Yin (2003) refers to various s o u r c e s of 
research validity, including construction validity, internal validity, external validity, 
and reliability. T h e suitability of undertaking a comparat ive analys i s of the policy 
instruments should therefore be subject to t h e s e s o u r c e s of research validity. By 
its nature, comparat ive analys is l eads to a d e g r e e of internal validity through the 
compar i son of c a s e study o u t c o m e s and the examination of overlapping 
o u t c o m e s within the c a s e s tudies . T h e detailed approach taken to policy c o h e s i o n 
and policy interaction within the wider cl imate c h a n g e policy framework further 
e n h a n c e s the level of internal validity of the comparat ive approach. 
In order to validate the construction and methodology of the approach, various 
t echn iques w e r e employed . Yin a d v i s e s the u s e of multiple s o u r c e s of ev idence , 
the e s tab l i shment of a chain of e v i d e n c e and the review of c a s e study reports by 
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s takeho lders . In order to m e e t t h e s e requirements the individual eva luat ions and 
the larger comparat ive ana lys i s involved the col lect ion and ana lys i s of primary 
data and s e c o n d a r y data (i.e. e m i s s i o n s data), the ana lys i s and inclusion of other 
policy rev i ews (i.e. Carbon Trust ana lys i s of the EU ETS), and the u s e of 
s t a k e h o l d e r f e e d b a c k in relation to the arising policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . 
Furthermore, a s detai led in s ec t i on 2 . 1 3 . 1 , ques t ionnaire r e s p o n s e s and interview 
transcripts w e r e e x a m i n e d in detail on an individual b a s i s and v i e w e d a s a w h o l e 
s a m p l e in order to identify any a r e a s of conflicting e v i d e n c e . T h e s e a r e a s w e r e 
s u b s e q u e n t l y incorporated in to the policy eva lua t ions in Chapter s 4 -7 . 
T h e external validity of the e a c h evaluat ion w a s attained through the u s e of 
e x t e n s i v e s takeho lder e n g a g e m e n t within the p r o c e s s through quest ionnaire 
circulation and interviews which provided an opportunity to obtain detai led 
information to e n h a n c e the analys i s . Every effort w a s u s e d to involve external 
s t a k e h o l d e r s in the p r o c e s s , a l though in s o m e i n s t a n c e s this proved to b e a 
chal lenging task. Finally, following the accumulat ion and ana lys i s of all avai lable 
e v i d e n c e (including the s u r v e y data, interview data, G o v e r n m e n t documentat ion , 
a c a d e m i c r e s e a r c h and any other avai lable policy ana lys i s documentat ion) , the 
a s s e m b l e d policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ( a s a s s o c i a t e d rationales) w e r e circulated to 
all s t a k e h o l d e r s w h o participated in the research . This provided an opportunity for 
s t a k e h o l d e r s to c o m m e n t on the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s b a s e d on their contributions to 
the research . Furthermore, it provides a va luable s o u r c e of s takeho lder validation 
of the m e t h o d o l o g y u s e d in this r e s e a r c h and the a s s o c i a t e d o u t c o m e s . 
T o further e n h a n c e the external validity of the re search des ign , the policy 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s w e r e c a t e g o r i s e d into g e n e r a l i s a b l e and n o n - g e n e r a l i s a b l e 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . This e x e r c i s e s e r v e d to justify the comparat ive e l e m e n t of the 
m e t h o d o l o g y , a s the g e n e r a l i s a b l e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s support the notion of 
comparat ive ana lys i s through the identification of c o m m o n t h e m e s and trends 
within the four c a s e s tud ies . 
T h e reliability of the ana lys i s w a s t e s t e d through the u s e of the c a s e s tudy 
protocol ( s e e Figure 2.2) . In order to m e e t the requirements of the protocol a 
d a t a b a s e of ques t ionnaire r e s p o n s e s , policy documenta t ion and a c a d e m i c 
literature w a s d e v e l o p e d . Table 8.1 p r e s e n t s a succ inct vers ion of this d a t a b a s e . 
During the p r o c e s s of deve lop ing the d a t a b a s e and during the comparat ive 
ana lys i s of the c a s e s t u d i e s it w a s imperative to remain mindful of p o s s i b l e 
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c h a l l e n g e s in comparing policy instruments which, in s o m e a s p e c t s , operate in 
contrasting manners . 
In addition to the methodological approach of this s tudy and the provisions in 
p lace to e n s u r e the analys i s w a s undertaken in a rigorous manner, the 
genera l i sab le policy o u t c o m e s s e r v e to support the u s e of comparat ive analys is 
within the methodological framework. 
9.7 What lessons can be drawn from this research regarding the role of policy 
instruments in environmental policy making, specifically policies relating to 
climate change mitigation? 
In order to a d d r e s s this research quest ion it is imperative to v iew the c a s e s tud ies 
in this research in the context of the policy mix within which they operate . The 
O E C D h a s long b e e n a supporter of the c o n c e p t of policy mixes to a d d r e s s 
environmental protection (OECD, 2003) . Michaelowa (2004) highlights the 
limitations of a s s u m i n g e m i s s i o n s trading p r e s e n t s a o n e - s t o p solution to GHG 
e m i s s i o n s on the bas i s of high monitoring and transaction cos t s . Severa l authors, 
however , h a v e identified shortcomings of a p p r o a c h e s to policy mixes (Johnstone , 
2 0 0 3 , Sorrell and Sijm, 2 0 0 3 , Oikonomou and J e p m a , 2008) . For example , the 
lack of empirical research, both ex anteax\6 ex post, is be l ieved to h a v e an impact 
on the i s s u e of optimal policy mixes . Yet more fundamental problems h a v e b e e n 
identified in the limited literature available. Analysis by J o h n s t o n e (2003) 
c o n c l u d e s that w h e n dealing with policy mixes , and specifically w h e n dealing with 
GHG-related policy mixes , the mix must m e e t certain criteria to justify the inclusion 
of pol icies additional to an e m i s s i o n s trading s c h e m e . The criteria are b a s e d on 
the additional policies: 
• legitimately meet ing a policy goal that cannot be met via the e m i s s i o n s 
trading s c h e m e ; 
• being the optimal policy r e s p o n s e to the problem in hand; 
• can be administered in a c o s t e f fect ive manner; 
• and, provide a "reasonable c o m p l e m e n t to the e m i s s i o n s trading s c h e m e . 
T h e s e criteria coupled with the assert ion that in many ins tances policy m i x e s may 
be at b e s t redundant and at worst counter-productive (Johnstone , 2 0 0 3 ) l e a d s to 
s o m e critical observat ions regarding the u s e of policy instruments within the UK. 
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At the time of implementation of the CCL, C C A s and UK ETS the European 
s c h e m e w a s yet to be d e v e l o p e d . Therefore, o n e cannot levy too much criticism 
towards the UK Government for implementing policies that had problematic 
Interactions with the EU ETS. However , s o m e additional points are worth 
considering. Firstly, the UK ETS w a s intended to influence the d e v e l o p m e n t of 
the EU ETS and provide first mover a d v a n t a g e to participating c o m p a n i e s . Both 
of t h e s e benef i t s w e r e severe ly diminished by the p o s t p o n e d start of the UK 
s c h e m e and the very small number of participants that would eventually b e 
included in the EU s c h e m e . Secondly , the t ime frame of the CCL and C C A s is 
curious. The CCL h a s b e e n implemented indefinitely and c o v e r s all installations 
operating within the EU ETS. The C C A s h a v e b e e n e x t e n d e d to 2 0 1 7 , yet EU 
ETS eligible installations w e r e only given temporary exc lus ion from the EU ETS 
until the end of 2 0 0 7 . O n e must quest ion the va lue of operating the policy mix in 
s u c h a manner a s it h a s b e e n frequently a c k n o w l e d g e d in a c a d e m i c research that 
s u c h policy over- laps only s e r v e to increase bureaucracy, decreas ing the 
e c o n o m i c eff ic iency of the trading s c h e m e and is of limited environmental benefit 
(Sorrell and Sijm, 2 0 0 3 , Michaelowa, 2 0 0 4 , Darkin, 2 0 0 6 , Bohringer et al., 2008) . 
Furthermore, in a Danish c a s e study with similarities to the VEA/tax mix of the 
CCL and CCAs, J o h a n n s e n (2002) c o n c l u d e s that on the bas i s of low efficiency, 
information asymmetry and high administration c o s t s this policy mix is far from 
the optimal policy r e s p o n s e . This highlights the n e e d for more joined-up thinking 
in the policy p r o c e s s and perhaps greater consideration of the timing of 
instrument implementation. 
9.7.1 Specific implications for voluntary policy instruments 
The utility and ef f icacy of voluntary policy instruments s u c h a s negot iated 
a g r e e m e n t s , a s either stand a lone policies or within the context of policy mixes 
h a s b e e n d e b a t e d to a limited d e g r e e over the last d e c a d e . Furthermore, there 
h a s b e e n e v e n l e s s comparat ive analys i s to inform policy makers of the optimal 
policy r e s p o n s e under certain conditions. This research h a s provided an 
opportunity to a d d r e s s this v a c a n c y in knowledge . 
This sub-sec t ion of the thes i s will a d d r e s s a key line of enquiry of this research: in 
light of e x p e r i e n c e to da te of the Climate C h a n g e A g r e e m e n t s what role, if any, 
should t h e s e forms of voluntary policies h a v e in the future of British climate policy 
making? 
334-
This w a s a quest ion p o s e d to ail interview participants to establ ish any c o n s e n s u s 
or underlying trends relating to the application of s u c h policy instruments. 4 0 % of 
participants be l ieve that VEAs should be promoted and do h a v e a place in the 
policy "tool kit". The rationales behind e a c h r e s p o n s e are s u m m a r i s e d in Table 
9.5. 
Table 9.5 Rationales for positive/negative support for the promotion of voluntary 
policy measures in British climate policy 
Positive Negative 
Improves communication within industry Climate change is such an important issue 
it requires mandatory action 
Already have a place within EU framework 
for policies 
People find a way of not acting - free riding 
Voluntary action is more cost-effective than 
mandatory 
Voluntary does not always mean 'voluntary' 
e.g. companies had no choice but to 
participate in CCAs if they wanted CCL 
discount 
Participants have the option to leave if the 
approach is not right for them 
Lack of longevity of voluntary policies 
Lack of industrial support e.g. during 
Carbon Reduction Commitment 
consultation there was little support for the 
voluntary option 
Industry will only improve performance if 
there is a direct benefit-voluntary 
measures risk allowing industry to do 
nothing 
T h e remaining 60% o p p o s e d this v iew and exhibited a clear preference for 
mandatory a p p r o a c h e s , which is d e v e l o p e d further in sec t ion 9 .5 .6 .2 . 
9.7.2 Preferred approach to climate change mitigation in energy intensive 
industrial sectors 
All quest ionnaire r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e a s k e d to rank their preferred policy r e s p o n s e 
to deal with GHG e m i s s i o n s from energy intensive industries. The preferred 
policy r e s p o n s e from sec tor a s soc ia t ions is e c o n o m i c - b a s e d , in the form of 
e m i s s i o n s trading and taxation, in order to financially incentivise e m i s s i o n 
reductions (Figure 9.1). External s takeho lders e x p r e s s e d a preference for a policy 
mix approach utilising regulatory e m i s s i o n s limits and MBIs to incentivise further 
e m i s s i o n reductions (Figure 9.2). 
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Figure 9.1 iViean ranl<ing of preferred policy response and associated standard 
deviation within sector association group 
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Figure 9.2 iViean ranking of preferred policy response and associated standard 
deviation within externa! stakeholder group 
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T h e s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s ( S D ) from the s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n g r o u p a r e g e n e r a l l y 
h igher than that for t h e external s t a k e h o l d e r s g r o u p a s d e m o n s t r a t e d in Figure 
9 .1 , Figure 9 . 2 and T a b l e 9 . 6 . 
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Table 9.6 Standard deviation forpoiicy preferences 
Policy option Sector associations (rank) External stakeholders (rank) 
Market based instrument 
approach 
1.50 (1) 1.37 (2) 
Policy mix of regulation and 
MBIs 
1.51 (2) 0.69(1) 
Voluntary approaches 2.00 (3) 0.94 (6) 
Policy mix of regulation 
and/or MBIs AND voluntary 
approaches 
1.50 (4) 1.25 (5) 
Regulatory (BAT based) 1.58 (5) 0.99 (4) 
Regulatory (performance 
based) 
1.81(6) 1.34 (3) 
T h e d i f f e r e n c e s in the s t a n d a r d s dev ia t ions indicate that there is greater 
c o n s e n s u s within the external s t a k e h o l d e r group regarding the preferred policy 
r e s p o n s e . In particular, the h ighes t ranked option for this s takeho lder group 
(policy mix: regulation and MBIs) d e m o n s t r a t e d the l o w e s t s tandard deviation of 
a n y option, indicating the h ighes t level of c o n s e n s u s of all opt ions . 
This d e m o n s t r a t e s real-life policy d o e s not a l w a y s reflect the preferred policy 
r e s p o n s e s of s t a k e h o l d e r groups . T h e u s e of voluntary a g r e e m e n t s , in the form of 
C C A s , d o e s not mirror the opinion of external s t a k e h o l d e r s w h o ranked this 
a p p r o a c h a s the l eas t preferable. This a p p r o a c h is far more appea l ing to industry 
representa t ives . However , the high s tandard deviation ind icates that its position 
a s third within the ranking is not a true reflection of the d e g r e e of variation within 
the opinions . Unsurprisingly, s e c t o r a s s o c i a t i o n s exhibited a s trong d i s tas te for 
regulatory a p p r o a c h e s either b a s e d on t e c h n o l o g y or e m i s s i o n s s tandards . 
However , both s takeho lder g r o u p s s h o w e d a p r e f e r e n c e for an approach b a s e d 
on regulatory s t a n d a r d s and MBIs. Taking the ana lys i s of this t h e s i s into account , 
it is c lear that the exist ing policy a p p r o a c h to c l imate c h a n g e is not mee t ing the 
preferred requirements of either s t a k e h o l d e r group. 
A persona l conc lus ion in relation to the application of policy instruments , b a s e d 
on the a n a l y s i s of this s tudy, is o n e of hes i tant u s e of voluntary m e a s u r e s . T h e 
C C A s h a v e e n j o y e d limited s u c c e s s in reducing e n e r g y consumpt ion , ye t the 
d e s i g n of the A g r e e m e n t s requires substantial ref inement . Furthermore, the 
operat ion of the A g r e e m e n t s within the policy mix is problematic. Voluntary 
m e a s u r e s m a y b e better sui ted in s i tuat ions requiring a l e s s urgent r e s p o n s e and 
in s e c t o r s that h a v e a lower environmenta l impact than e n e r g y intens ive industry. 
E m i s s i o n s trading b a s e d on c a p and trade should provide far greater 
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environmental certainty yet tine allocation of free a l l o w a n c e s significantly r e d u c e s 
the perception of equity. Regulatory a p p r o a c h e s a l so offer greater certainty 
c o m p a r e d with voluntary a p p r o a c h e s , but lack the des ired impact on innovation 
and behavioural c h a n g e s . Therefore a policy mix drawing on the posit ive 
e l e m e n t s of e a c h instrument category is undoubtedly the b e s t route. 
9.8 Further applications of the evaluation framework 
T h e f o c u s of this t h e s i s h a s b e e n the application of the evaluation framework in 
the ex post context. H o w e v e r there is s c o p e for the framework to provide 
g u i d a n c e in the ex ante appraisal, policy d e v e l o p m e n t and implementation 
set t ings . Regulatory impact a s s e s s m e n t s are often u s e d a s the informant to ex 
evaluat ions (when they take place) regardless of the s c o p e and quality of the 
RIA. Therefore the application of a more robust and detailed evaluation 
framework could b e facilitate the d e v e l o p m e n t of more rigorous ex ante 
appraisals . 
The data and informational requirements of the evaluation framework may a l s o 
s e r v e to notify policy makers at an earlier s t a g e of the data required in order to 
a s s e s s fully the level of s u c c e s s of an instrument. Ex post evaluat ions are 
chal lenging w h e n the information required to c o m p l e t e a rigorous and meaningful 
evaluation is not available. This s tudy found this w a s a particular i s s u e relating to 
environmental performance (e .g the reporting of e m i s s i o n s data relating to P P C 
s i t e s d o e s not facilitate avyoos /eva luat ion d u e to the thresholds applied in EPER) 
and the availability of data relating to the c o s t of implementation for public bodies . 
Regulated parties m a y be unwilling to d i s c l o s e data relating to the c o s t of a 
policy. However , policy implementation (and s u b s e q u e n t policy evaluat ions) 
would benefit greatly from earlier considerat ion of the c o s t s incurred by 
government b o d i e s and regulatory a g e n c i e s . 
Moving beyond the application of the evaluation framework in the e x a/7/e context, 
the o u t c o m e of evaluat ions carried out in line with the framework would facilitate 
the des ign , d e v e l o p m e n t and implementation of future policy instruments. By 
drawing on the o u t c o m e of previous evaluat ions policy makers would be in a 
position to identify potentially problematic a r e a s of their policy des ign prior to 
implementation. This would allow policy markers to explore and implement 
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suitable s a f e g u a r d s against t h e s e risks (e .g . base l ine data difficulties could be 
a d d r e s s e d through the application of more stringent verification procedures) . 
9.9 Critique of research methodology 
In order to undertake this research n u m e r o u s m e t h o d o l o g i e s w e r e employed . To 
obtain s takeholder percept ions of the c a s e study policy instruments a 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e survey, b a s e d on quest ionnaires and interviews w a s undertaken. 
Other e v i d e n c e s o u r c e s w e r e a n a l y s e d to e n h a n c e the c a s e s tudies . Finally, 
e m i s s i o n s data w a s obtained in order to provide quantitative e v i d e n c e of 
instrument o u t c o m e s . 
O n e area that proved to be chal lenging w a s the inclusion of external s takeholders 
in the surveys . The r e s p o n s e rate from the P P C external s takeholder groups w a s 
very low. Only o n e r e s p o n s e w a s rece ived from the Environment Agency . Whilst 
this proved to be very useful input in terms of giving detailed insights into the 
practical a s p e c t s of P P C from a regulator's perspect ive it w a s insufficient to g ive 
balanced, reliable and meaningful representation for this s takeholder group. 
Substantial efforts w e r e m a d e increase the r e s p o n s e rate by all recipients of the 
quest ionnaire by either t e l e p h o n e or email to promote r e s p o n s e s to the 
quest ionnaire. Desp i t e b e s t efforts no further r e s p o n s e s w e r e received. 
Never the l e s s , the intimate relationship b e t w e e n the four c a s e s tud ies meant the 
many of the other respondents , in particular interviewees , m a d e a significant 
number of r e f e r e n c e s to the I P P C Directive and the P P C Regulat ions, thus 
providing further information. 
T h e eva luat ions w e r e carried out in the following order: 
• UK E m i s s i o n s Trading S c h e m e (January 2 0 0 6 - May 2 0 0 6 ) 
• Climate C h a n g e A g r e e m e n t s (January 2 0 0 7 - May 2 0 0 7 ) 
• Pollution Prevention and Control Regulat ions (May 2 0 0 7 - D e c e m b e r 
S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 7 ) 
• EU E m i s s i o n s Trading S c h e m e (May 2 0 0 7 - D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 7 ) 
The p u r p o s e of this t imetable w a s to account for the duration of the policy, the 
length of time the policy h a s b e e n in p lace and the availability of other s o u r c e s of 
information s u c h a s e m i s s i o n s inventories and compl iance period reports. It w a s 
d e e m e d appropriate to c o m m e n c e the evaluation p r o c e s s with the UK ETS a s 
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this S c h e m e w a s approaching its e n d d a t e and to e n s u r e sufficient contact with 
the re levant staff at Defra and Direct Participant c o m p a n i e s . Given that this w a s 
the first of the four e v a l u a t i o n s it w a s u s e d a s an opportunity to t e s t a p p r o a c h e s 
to the ques t ionna ire and interviews. A s d i s c u s s e d in Chapter 2, f o c u s g r o u p s 
w e r e d e e m e d to b e unsui table for this project b a s e d on the e x p e r i e n c e of the UK 
E T S f o c u s group. T h e r e s p o n s e s to the ques t ionnaire a l s o led to minor c h a n g e s 
prior to the d e v e l o p m e n t of the s u r v e y s for the remaining three instruments , 
including shortening of ques t ion length and reducing the total n u m b e r of 
q u e s t i o n s (particularly for external s takeho lders ) . 
A total of 2 9 interviews w e r e carried out o v e r the duration of this re search . T h e 
n u m b e r of interviews w a s limited by o n e key factor: the n u m b e r of quest ionnaire 
r e s p o n d e n t s willing to participate. All ques t ionna ire r e s p o n d e n t s w h o e x p r e s s e d 
an interest in further participation in the r e s e a r c h w e r e c o n t a c t e d to arrange 
interviews. However , a n u m b e r of r e s p o n d e n t s w h o had e x p r e s s e d initial interest 
s u b s e q u e n t l y dec l ined to participate further. This w a s disappointing and efforts 
w e r e m a d e to i n c r e a s e the n u m b e r of interview participants by contact ing 
ques t ionna ire recipients w h o had dec l ined to participate in the written e l e m e n t of 
the survey . A total of s ix interviews w e r e c o n d u c t e d on this bas i s . 
T h e u s e of s t a k e h o l d e r f e e d b a c k in relation to the policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
proved to b e a highly benef ic ia l a p p r o a c h in t erms of validating the key o u t c o m e s 
of t h e re search . 
Ana lys i s of policy documenta t ion , including RIAs, EU Direct ives and British 
G o v e r n m e n t s o u r c e s , w a s carried out in a rigorous and s y s t e m a t i c m a n n e r b a s e d 
on the evaluat ion criteria identified in Chapter 2. This facilitated the c r o s s -
c o m p a r i s o n of the c a s e s t u d i e s and e n s u r e d that all re levant s o u r c e s on 
information had b e e n e x a m i n e d to the depth required for a s tudy of this nature. 
Prev ious non-official (i.e. not produced by or on behalf of Government ) reports 
examin ing relevant a s p e c t s of the c a s e s t u d i e s w e r e u s e d , w h e r e they ex i s ted , to 
val idate the f indings of this re search . In s o m e i n s t a n c e s the f indings of this 
r e s e a r c h corroborated previous work (e .g . NAO c o n c l u s i o n s relating to the impact 
on corporate behaviour arising from CCAs) . In others , the re search contradicted 
prev ious s t u d i e s to varying d e g r e e s . It is important to s t r e s s that this approach 
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w a s not poss ib le in many i n s t a n c e s a s this research w a s specif ical ly d e s i g n e d to 
fill a v a c a n c y in existing research relating to the four c a s e s tudies . 
9 . 1 0 Limitations of the research 
A s with any form of research, there are limitations in terms of the practical 
undertaking of the research and limitations of the analys is . T h e s e limitations a s 
they apply to this research will be d i s c u s s e d in this sect ion. 
T h e u s e of c a s e s tud ie s a s a research approach is not without limitations. 
Harrington et al. (2004) identify severa l limitations of their comparat ive analys is of 
policy instrument c h o i c e which a l so apply to this research. Firstly, c a s e study 
research naturally involves a limited number of e x a m p l e s from which to draw 
conc lus ions . Second ly , e x a m p l e s or c a s e s tud ies are rarely s e l e c t e d at random, 
which m a y a l s o limit the observat ions arising from the evaluation. In order to 
minimise the impact of t h e s e two i s s u e s the following approach w a s taken. In 
light of t h e s e limitations the methodological approach of Yin (2003) w a s 
e m p l o y e d in order to minimise the potential difficulties in undertaking both c a s e 
study research and comparat ive research. 
A further limitation of the c a s e study approach relates to o n e spec i f ic c a s e study 
e x a m i n e d in this thes is: the P P C Regulat ions . The Regulat ions are intended to 
reflect a holistic approach to environmental protection. The Regulat ions (and the 
EU Directive) specif ical ly mention the n e e d to e n s u r e energy is u s e d efficiently. 
However , g r e e n h o u s e g a s e m i s s i o n s are not explicitly s tated a s key pollutants 
c o v e r e d by the Regulat ions . Whilst this certainly d o e s not m e a n that the P P C 
Regulat ions do not h a v e a responsibility to help deliver GHG e m i s s i o n reductions 
o n e should b e mindful w h e n comparing this instrument with others that are 
special ly d e s i g n e d to do so . 
Following the complet ion of the four evaluat ions it b e c a m e clear that in addition to 
the original six criteria a further two w e r e required to e n s u r e the evaluat ions w e r e 
holistic: policy instrument c o h e s i o n and the impact of lobbying on the policy 
p r o c e s s . T h e ability of the instruments to work together while minimising the 
burden on industry and regulators w a s an i s s u e that w a s repeatedly raised by 
s takeholders . Consequent ly , the criterion of policy c o h e s i o n w a s a d d e d to the 
evaluat ions retrospectively. 
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T h e i s s u e of lobbying on the policy p r o c e s s is another key area that e m e r g e d 
from the analys is . Lobbying w a s only raised a s an i s s u e by s o m e external 
s takeholders . However , during the construction of the four evaluat ions and the 
comparat ive analys i s it b e c a m e evident that lobbying h a s had an e f fect on e a c h 
of the instruments to varying d e g r e e s . Therefore the impact of lobbying is another 
criterion that should be included in future evaluat ions b a s e d on the methodology 
identified in this thes is . 
9.11 Chapter summary 
This Chapter h a s d i s c u s s e d the key o u t c o m e s of the individual c a s e study 
evaluat ions , presented a s e r i e s of genera l i sab le policy recommendat ions , 
explored the s takeholder f e e d b a c k in relation to policy-specif ic o u t c o m e s , and 
identified the impact of this research in relation to the continually expanding field 
of c l imate c h a n g e policy. 
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10 Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
T h e final Chapter of this t h e s i s presen t s the key conc lus ions arising from this 
e x t e n s i v e study of ex post policy evaluation v^fithin the environmental policy 
s p h e r e and its application to the cl imate change-re la ted c a s e s tudies . 
Ex post policy evaluation w a s identified a s a p r o c e s s that is of i m m e n s e 
importance in the policy cycle . A s this thes i s h a s demonstrated , w h e n undertaken 
in a s y s t e m a t i c and rigorous manner it can lead to the identification of positive 
and negat ive e l e m e n t s in policy des ign with o u t c o m e s ultimately informing future 
policy making. 
10.2 Conclusions 
This research h a s led to the identification of key conc lus ions in four speci f ic 
areas; 
• The methodologica l approach to a f / o o s / p o l i c y evaluation 
• T h e utility of comparat ive analys i s 
• T h e posit ive des ign e l e m e n t s of industrial c l imate policy in the UK 
• T h e negat ive d e s i g n e l e m e n t s of industrial c l imate policy in the UK 
10.2.1 Eyposf policy evaluation 
Firstly, the approach to avyoos /po l i cy evaluation h a s historically b e e n overlooked 
in many i n s t a n c e s of environmental policy. W h e r e ex post policies h a v e b e e n 
undertaken they largely f o c u s on the c o s t s to industry a s this appears to be the 
driving force behind ex ante a s s e s s m e n t . This s tudy h a s demonstrated that ex 
policy evaluation of environmental pol icies in the United Kingdom is limited. 
Evaluation of c l imate c h a n g e policies is limited further, with the Carbon Trust 
being the dominant s o u r c e of evaluation (and e v e n then, this is limited to the EU 
Emiss ions Trading S c h e m e ) . The National Audit Office h a s undertaken s o m e 
valuable work in relation to the environmental o u t c o m e s of the UK Emiss ions 
Trading S c h e m e and the Climate C h a n g e A g r e e m e n t s , but the analys is of the 
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latter s t o p s short of making spec i f ic policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s in order to improve 
the operation and performance of the policies. 
T h e analys i s presented in Chapters 4 to 7 d e m o n s t r a t e s how detailed ex post 
evaluat ions can be s u c c e s s f u l l y undertaken by giving equal weight to quantitative 
data ( such a s e m i s s i o n s inventories and financial data) and qualitative data 
(including s takeholder percept ions of performance) . The a n a l y s e s that form the 
central pillar of this thes i s g o beyond a narrative of the c a s e s tud ie s or an 
exploration of the causa l relationships b e t w e e n the c a s e s tud ies and external 
inf luences ( s e e Table 3.1) . The analys i s took a normative approach, which w a s 
important in deve loping the policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a s o n e must be able to 
m e a s u r e performance critically either against a benchmark or through the 
compar i son with other similar c a s e s tudies . This brings us neatly to a f e w 
concluding observat ions about the comparat ive analys i s e l e m e n t of the research. 
10.2.2 Utility of comparative analysis 
O n e must be caut ious w h e n comparing the o u t c o m e s of different policy 
instruments, a s highlighted by Minogue (2005) . However, under certain 
condit ions the limitations of comparat ive analys i s of different policy instruments 
are minimised. In order to maximise the m e a n i n g f u l n e s s of the o u t c o m e of the 
comparat ive analys i s a s y s t e m a t i c approach w a s adopted to data collection. 
In addition to supporting the normative approach of the research, the comparat ive 
analys i s a l s o provides o n e of the key e l e m e n t s of originality. This point will b e 
d e v e l o p e d further in sec t ion 10.3 . 
10.2.3 Positive policy design lessons in relation to the UK approach to industrial 
environmental governance 
Both the individual a n a l y s e s and the comparat ive evaluation identified severa l 
l e s s o n s that b o d e well for cl imate c h a n g e policies in the UK. Through 
implementing the P P C Regulat ions the UK met the transposition requirements of 
the IPPC Directive (with the except ion of a f e w remaining installations that had 
not rece ived permits by the October 2 0 0 7 deadline) . The implementation of the 
Climate C h a n g e Levy, the Climate C h a n g e A g r e e m e n t s and the UK Emiss ions 
Trading S c h e m e represented a novel a p p r o a c h e s to instrument des ign on the 
part of the Government . Particularly, the CCL and C C A s w e r e an a d v a n c e d . 
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a lmost brave, r e s p o n s e to cl imate c h a n g e mitigation given the remaining level of 
uncertainty of the s c i e n c e in the late 1 9 9 0 s . T h e UK ETS w a s an innovative policy 
in terms of its industrial c o v e r a g e and the inclusion of n u m e r o u s pollutants, 
neither of which had b e e n w i t n e s s e d previously in e m i s s i o n s trading. Desp i te the 
limitations clearly outweighing the benef i t s of the S c h e m e , for a time it did further 
e n h a n c e the environmental credentials of both the Government and participating 
c o m p a n i e s . It a l so s e r v e d to en force the s t a n c e of the Government in relation to 
cl imate c h a n g e mitigation and d e m o n s t r a t e s an admirable des ire to s h o w 
leadership in tackling the c a u s e s of cl imate c h a n g e . 
Comparatively speaking , the UK outperformed all but o n e EU counterpart in 
P h a s e I of the EU ETS. Only the UK, Spain, Italy and S lovenia i s sued f ewer total 
a l l o w a n c e s c o m p a r e d to actual performance b e t w e e n 2 0 0 5 and 2 0 0 7 . T h e 
Government h a s b e e n very k e e n to publicise this fact. However, the picture 
painted is not a s positive a s o n e might hope , the r e a s o n s for which follow in 
sec t ion 10 .2 .4 . 
10.2.4 Weaknesses of design in UK Industrial climate change policy 
T h e previous a b s e n c e of rigorous and sys t emat i c e x / ? o s / e v a l u a t i o n of the c a s e 
s tud ie s s erved to en force the hypothes i s of this thesis: that a v e v a l u a t i o n 
with a v iew to improving instrument des ign is undertaken in an inadequate 
manner in the United Kingdom. The va lue of implementing innovative policy 
instruments is hugely diminished if no attempt to learn l e s s o n s is m a d e . For 
without evaluation how can the existing instruments be improved? How can future 
policy making be informed? This research h a s a l so identified the difficulty 
deve loping policy instruments b a s e d on performance base l ines . Policy makers 
must remain caut ious of the over-rel iance on industry sourced data, particularly 
given the t e n d e n c y of s o m e industrial organisat ions to m a k e c laims of inequity 
and financial hardship that are not a lways b a s e d on sound ev idence . This is 
probably b e s t e v i d e n c e d through the negotiation of CCA targets. The initial 
targets w e r e w e a k and yet the opportunity to significantly tighten the targets in 
2 0 0 4 following the first mi les tone period w a s not maximised by Defra with an 
a c r o s s the board tightening of 3 .2 % desp i t e e v i d e n c e that the over-performance 
w a s in fact nearer to 5%. 
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T h e P P C R e g u l a t i o n s form the central pillar of environmental protection for 
Industry in the UK. Energy e f f i c iency and e m i s s i o n s into a / / m e d i a (including GHG 
e m i s s i o n s in to air) are intended to b e regulated a s part of P P C . D e s p i t e m a n y 
c o m p a n i e s having their e n e r g y e f f ic iency and GHG e m i s s i o n s controlled via the 
C C A s and EU ETS, the a b s e n c e of c lear gu ide l ine s and stringent e n f o r c e m e n t of 
e n e r g y e f f i c iency and GHG control via the permitting p r o c e s s m e a n s that s o m e 
c o m p a n i e s d o not h a v e to a d d r e s s t h e s e i s s u e s . This is a worrying situation and 
hints at a failure within the UK to a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r the condi t ions of the IPPC 
Directive. 
It is unfortunate that at the t ime of writing no p e r f o r m a n c e data relating to the first 
y e a r of P h a s e II of the EU E T S h a s b e e n r e l e a s e d . However , drawing 
c o n c l u s i o n s from P h a s e I o n e c a n s e e that the d e s p i t e the apparent 'good' 
p e r f o r m a n c e of the UK in relation to EU counterparts , the data p r e s e n t e d in 
Chapter 7 indicates that the G o v e r n m e n t h a s failed to a d e q u a t e l y c o m m u n i c a t e 
the true nature of UK a l locat ions in P h a s e I. It is only the m a s s i v e , comparat ive 
under-al location to o n e s e c t o r (the p o w e r sec tor) that h a s led to the impress ion 
that the UK total al location w a s stringent. Every other s e c t o r rece ived an 
al location far higher than its actual e m i s s i o n s in e v e r y y e a r of P h a s e I. Coup led 
with a hos t of other i s s u e s the EU E T S h a s thus far failed to m e e t its objec t ives in 
sett ing a realistic carbon price with the intention of driving d o w n e m i s s i o n s and 
facilitating the transition to a low carbon e c o n o m y . T ime will tell if the l e s s o n s 
from P h a s e I h a v e b e e n a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d in the e x e c u t i o n of P h a s e II. 
This r e s e a r c h h a s s h o w n that the c a s e s tudy c l imate pol ic ies h a v e had some 
impact on G H G e m i s s i o n s , but h a v e thus far failed to m a x i m i s e their potential. In 
the c a s e of the C C A s (and the UK E T S to a certain d e g r e e ) the n u m e r o u s f l aws in 
the policy d e s i g n indicate that a radical overhaul is required to improve the 
env ironmenta l o u t c o m e s . In s u c h an ins tance , o n e m u s t bear in mind c o m m e n t s 
m a d e by the Better Regulat ion C o m m i s s i o n : 
'A good policy outcome depends on the quality of the regulatory framework 
crafted to implement it. The issue is too important to get it wrong; it deserves 
the most sophisticated response possible. We must not let climate change 
become a victim of 'quick fix' legislation. Failing to live up to expectations and 
consequently losing public support is a real possibility, and one that must be 
avoided at all costs.' 
(Better Regulation Commission, 2007) 
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Therefore , it may b e t ime for Defra explore other opt ions to deal with the GHG 
e m i s s i o n s from non-EU ETS e n e r g y intensive industry. 
10.3 Originality of research 
T h e comparat ive and criteria-based a s p e c t s of this s tudy are an original and 
innovative approach to policy evaluation. Following the examinat ion of existing 
a p p r o a c h e s to evaluation, which remain limited, a framework for analys is w a s 
d e v e l o p e d drawing on e x p e r i e n c e with e x a/7/e t e chn iques s u c h a s RIA and CBA. 
This framework, b a s e d on a s e t of key criteria to a s s e s s the performance of a 
policy instrument, presented a significant deviation a w a y from the existing 
approach to e x p o s e evaluation, which is a s b e s t ad h o c and d o e s not currently 
take a sys temat i c approach. This s tudy h a s demonstra ted that evaluat ions can be 
undertaken in a sy s t emat i c manner, akin to the existing approach to RIA, through 
the application of identical methodological and analytical t echniques . This study 
h a s a l s o demonstra ted that comparat ive analys i s of differing policy instruments is 
not only poss ib le , but that it a l s o provides an exce l l ent b a s i s for the identification 
of trends within the policy p r o c e s s . 
Previous s tud ies in relation to the c a s e s tud ies w e r e limited in terms of the s c o p e 
and type of analys is . In the 2 0 0 0 Climate C h a n g e Programme the P P C 
Regulat ions and the UK ETS w e r e cited a s two of the key climate c h a n g e 
mitigation policies targeted at industry. However, by the t ime the Programme w a s 
revised in 2 0 0 6 there w a s little mention of either policy. Furthermore, beyond a 
limited review of the UK ETS in late 2 0 0 6 (that did not account for the results of 
the final year of the operation and w a s strictly limited to the impact on GHG 
e m i s s i o n s ) (Defra, 2 0 0 6 a ) neither instrument h a s b e e n e x a m i n e d in comparable 
detail in order to determine the true extent of the impact on GHG e m i s s i o n s from 
British industry and at what cost . T h e EU ETS is an except ion within the four c a s e 
s tudies . The s i z e and political implications of the S c h e m e m e a n it h a s b e e n 
subject to a significant quantity of analys i s in its relatively short life. However, 
much of the analys is w a s found to f o c u s on refining the e c o n o m i c performance of 
the S c h e m e in the future. Furthermore, much of the remaining analys i s f o c u s e s 
on h o w the S c h e m e should \)Xo\r\o\.e innovation, inves tment and equitable carbon 
e m i s s i o n s in theory. This study, however , h a s a d d r e s s e d the reality what h a s 
h a p p e n e d in P h a s e I implementation. 
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Finally, s t a k e h o l d e r invo lvement w a s a f u n d a m e n t a l c o m p o n e n t of the 
methodo log ica l framework. This invo lvement w a s e x t e n d e d b e y o n d 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e s and interviews for the p u r p o s e of obtaining information to populate 
the evaluat ion to the invo lvement of s t a k e h o l d e r s in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the policy 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . This provided a level of validation b e y o n d the norm of the 
policy evaluat ion p r o c e s s (cons ider , for e x a m p l e , that the e x t e n s i o n of C C A s w a s 
granted on the b a s i s of the NAO report and the Environmental Audit C o m m i t t e e 
p r o p o s a l s with the public consu l ta t ions d u e to take p l a c e following \he dec i s ion to 
e x t e n d the a g r e e m e n t s be ing taken) . 
1 0 . 4 Fur ther r e s e a r c h 
This s tudy h a s laid the foundat ions for further r e s e a r c h in s e v e r a l a r e a s . T h e r e 
are potential a r e a s for further r e s e a r c h in within both the methodo log ica l field a n d 
in relation to the c a s e s tud ie s . 
Future r e s e a r c h o n the nature and extent of regulatory capture and the more 
detai led impac t s of information a s y m m e t r i e s on the policy p r o c e s s would greatly 
a d v a n c e the subjec t area . E v i d e n c e from the C C A s , UK ETS and EU ETS 
indicates that industry's inf luence in the sett ing of per formance targets w a s too 
high. But in the a b s e n c e of robust data upon which policy m a k e r s c a n mount 
c h a l l e n g e s to industry it is difficult to e n v i s a g e rapid c h a n g e in this area . 
However , greater k n o w l e d g e about h o w to minimise the disparity in k n o w l e d g e 
and h o w to improve the quality of the data u s e d in instrument d e s i g n would better 
prepare policy m a k e r s and e n a b l e t h e m to m a x i m i s e the bene f i t s of industrial 
'regulation' to soc ie ty . 
This s tudy w a s limited to four c a s e s tud ies , all of which are key e l e m e n t s of the 
UK Climate C h a n g e P r o g r a m m e . A r e c o m m e n d e d e x t e n s i o n of this s tudy would 
b e an evaluat ion of additional pol ic ies within the P r o g r a m m e to determine the 
impact on the target a u d i e n c e (e .g . b u s i n e s s , agriculture, d o m e s t i c c o n s u m e r s ) . 
Furthermore, m a n y of the s t a k e h o l d e r s interviewed for this s tudy drew attention 
to the disparity b e t w e e n the quantity of instruments a i m e d at commerc ia l e n e r g y 
u s e r s / G H G emitters and d o m e s t i c c o n s u m e r s . A comparat ive ana lys i s of the 
approach to t h e s e different s takeho lder g r o u p s would b e highly r e c o m m e n d e d . 
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This study has highlighted the limited availability of literature relating to the IPPC 
Directive. Although the IPPC Directive is in the process of being revised, the 
ground-breaking nature of the Directive (in terms of its size scope, size, coverage 
and timescale) means that there are a significant number of areas that require 
additional investigation. The relationship between IPPC (PPC Regulations as it is 
transposed in the UK) and energy efficiency and GHG emissions has been 
largely ignored in any pre-existing analysis. It therefore stands to reason that 
there are other areas within the Directive that warrant the same attention. In 
particular, the relationship between IPPC and non-climate change policies may 
require further examination. 
In light of the interaction between the Government and industry in relation to the 
establishment of environmental performance targets it would be beneficial for the 
role of institutions (e.g. sector associations, different governmental departments 
and civil society represented by governments and NGOs) within the policy 
development process to be investigated further. Further scrutiny of the 
Government-industry relationship is required in order to determine the extent of 
influence of industry in the policy process and the significance of this influence on 
the overall environmental outcomes of policy. This would be particularly beneficial 
if carried out at the EU-level as the case of the revisions to the EU ETS Directive 
demonstrate. When industry effectively lobbies governments, governments are 
then in the position to effectively lobby the Commission, and as this case shows 
this leads to significant watering down of environmental objectives. Furthermore, 
the ability of sectors to work at an intra-EU level (e.g. via EU-level sector 
associations) adds further weight to their powers and further weight to the need to 
ensure the relationships between these organisations, governments and the 
Commission are examined in more depth. 
A final recommendation for future development of the themes explored in this 
thesis regards the impact of the quality of primary legislation on the outcome of 
environmental policies. The case of the EU ETS demonstrated the need to 
consider impacts beyond domestic transposition of Community legislation to 
account for the imposition of restrictions or time constraints that may negatively 
influence success levels of policy instruments. 
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10.5 Thesis summary 
This research has demonstrated the importance of rigorous ajc/jos/evaluation in 
the policy process. The evaluation framework v^as tested using four case studies 
that are central to the UK's climate change mitigation strategy. The analysis in 
Chapter 8 highlights the value of undertaking comparative assessments (either ex 
post or ex ante) in policy development. It has been demonstrated that 
comparative analysis of policy instruments can be undertaken effectively under 
certain conditions. The current approach to ex post evaluation in the UK is in 
need of attention as advances in RIA have not been mirrored in the ex post 
context. The framework applied in this thesis is a platform from which to develop 
a system within Government for undertaking effective evaluations of policy 
instruments, which would lead to untold benefits for policy making in the future. 
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Appendix 1: Example questionnaire 
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Imperial College 
London 
Environmental policy instruments in the UK: 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
The Centre for Environmental Policy at Imperial College London is undertaking a 
research project examining the effectiveness of various environmental policy 
instruments w/ith particular focus on policies targeted at greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and energy efficiency. 
We are in the process of assessing the impact of the Pollution Prevention and Control 
Regulations (PPC) and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) upon British 
industry. As the two policies are closely linked - with PPC setting the criteria for 
inclusion in the EU ETS - we have decided to combine the two policies within one 
questionnaire. 
To obtain a complete picture of the impacts of these policies we are surveying all 
sector and trade associations representing sectors included in the PPC Regulations. 
We believe you will be able to provide clear, accurate and immensely useful 
information from the view-point of your members. This will enable us to analyse the 
impacts of these policies upon the target industry based on comprehensive and 
reliable data. This will facilitate the development of recommendations to present to 
policy makers within the Government to refine and improve the policies. 
This questionnaire comprises 3 sections: 
Part 1; Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations 
Part 2: EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
Part 3: Climate change policy and concluding remarks 
We ask that all participants complete Part 1 (PPC) and Part 3 (part 3 only contains 1 
question and space to make any comments you have on the issues raised in this 
questionnaire). If you represent a sector association with members participating in 
Phase 1 and/or Phase 2 of the EUETS please also complete Part 2. 
We have designed the questionnaire to take as little t ime as possible. The majority of 
questions are multiple-choice and there are opportunities to elaborate on your 
answers if you wish. 
Of particular interest to the research project are your opinions on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the policies, the performance of policies with regards to improving or 
promoting energy efficiency within your area of business, and the usefulness of the 
policies in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
The research is independently funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and there are no links to organisations external to Imperial College London. 
This ensures that the research is conducted in a rigorous, objective and confidential 
manner. Your response will be treated as confidential and will not be viewed by any 
third parties. 
Thank you in advance for taking the t ime to complete this questionnaire. I would be 
grateful if you would return the questionnaire to nia.davies@imperial.ac.uk or to the 
postal address/fax number below by Friday 16 November. 
If you have any queries or questions regarding the content of this questionnaire or the 
research project in general please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Yours sincerely, 
Nia Davies 
378 
Your details 
Name (optional - please state if you 
wish to participate further in the research): 
Occupation: 
Organisation: 
Are you will ing to participate in a one-to-one interview based on the issues covered 
in this questionnaire? Yes • No • 
How many companies do you represent? 
• 1-10 O 11-20 • 2 1 - 3 0 • 3 1 - 4 0 • 4 1 - 5 0 
• 51 + 
Do any of your members have installations operating in Phase 1 of the EU ETS? 
Yes^ No^ 
If yes, please specify approximately how many: 
In addition to the members operating in Phase 1, do any of your members have 
installations participating in Phase 2 of the EU ETS (i.e. inclusion in EU ETS for the 
first t ime)? 
Y e s Q N o ^ 
If yes, please specify approximately how many: 
All participants please complete Part 1 AND Part 3 (page 13). If any of your members 
are participating in Phase 1 and/or Phase 2 of the EU ETS please complete Part 1, 
Part 2 AND Part 3. 
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PART 1: Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations 
Environmental effectiveness 
1. To what extent do you think the PPC Regulations encourage energy efficiency and 
greenhouse gas emission reductions beyond the requirements of the permit in both 
the technical activities {e.Q. production processes) AND the non-technical activities 
(e.g. office energy use) of your members? Please make one selection per row. 
Strongly 
discourages 
additional 
improvement 
s beyond 
permit 
requirements 
Slightly 
discourages 
improvement 
8 beyond 
permit 
requirements 
Neither 
encourages 
or 
discourages 
improvement 
s beyond 
permit 
requirements 
Encourages 
some 
improvement 
s beyond 
permit 
requirements 
Encourages 
significant 
improvement 
s beyond 
permit 
requirements 
Technica 
1 
activities 
Greenhouse 
gas 
emissions 
• • • • • 
Energy 
efficiency • • • • • 
Non-
technical 
activities 
Greenhouse 
gas 
emissions 
• • • • • 
Energy 
efficiency • • • • • 
2. Alternatives to regulation in environmental policy making are becoming increasingly 
popular at the UK. EU and international levels. 
With regards to energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions which of the 
following policy instruments do you think would result in the highest energy efficiency 
improvements and GHG emission reductions from your members if applied as a 
stand-alone policy? Please select your 3 preferred policies (1= most preferred policy 
option) 
Energy efficiency Greenhouse gas emissions 
Existing BAT-based permit system - -
Binding emissions-based 
requirements 
Emissions trading - -
Energy tax (e.g. Climate Change 
Levy at a rate of 0.44p/kWh 
electricity) 
Voluntary agreement (e.g. Climate 
Change Levy Agreements) 
Other (please specify) - -
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3. Under the Kyoto Protocol the United Kingdom has committed to reducing its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5% by 2012. What contribution do you thinl< the 
PRC Regulations will have in terms of the UK meeting this target? 
Very negative Slightly No impact Slightly Very positive 
impact - PRC negative either way positive impact impact - PRC 
will impact - PRC - P R C will will 
significantly will slightly slightly reduce significantly 
increase GHG increase emissions reduce GHG 
emissions emissions emissions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
• • • • • 
Transparency 
4. Please consider the fol lowing points: 
• Public access to PRC permit information 
• Involvement of stakeholders external to industry and government in the 
permitting process 
• Availabil ity of environmental performance data to stakeholders external to 
government and industry 
• Industrial access to information and involvement in decision making 
Taking these factors into account, how would you describe the level of 
transparency of the PRC permitting process? 
Completely 
confidential 
(1) 
Confidential subject to 
commercial secrets 
(2) 
Slightly transparent 
(3) 
Completely 
transparent 
(4) 
• • • • 
5. How would you rate the overall level of transparency of the PRC process? 
Unacceptable 
(1) 
Some areas in need 
improvement 
(2) 
Acceptable 
(3) 
• • • 
Please use the box below to indicate what measures should be introduced to 
improve the level of transparency or confidentiality if you feel the current level is 
too high or too low? 
Innovation 
Noting that technological innovation is a key response to climate change, to what 
extent do you think PRC Regulations foster technological innovation? 
Strongly Slightly No impact on Encourages Encourages 
discourages discourages innovation some significant 
technological technological either way technological technological 
innovation innovation innovation innovation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
• • • • • 
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Further to your answer to question 6, in the box below briefly identify elements of PRC 
permitting that either encourage or discourage innovation 
7. Have the PRC Regulations resulted directly in any of the fol lowing changes within the 
activities of your members in relation to greenhouse gas emissions and energy 
efficiency? Please select all that apply. 
• Increased awareness of energy saving opportunities within senior management 
• Increased awareness of greenhouse gas emission saving opportunities within 
senior management 
• Introduction of equipment/BAT specif ied within the PRC permit 
• Introduction of equipment of higher efficiency rating/lower emissions rating than 
specified within PRC permits 
• Improved supply chain management 
• Process changes 
• Inclusion of the cost of carbon in new project appraisals 
Q Improved environmental reporting 
• Other (please specify) 
Acceptance and equity 
8. In general, what level of acceptance do your members have for the PRC permitting 
process? 
Full rejection 
(1) 
Qualified 
rejection 
(2) 
Indifference 
(3) 
Qualified 
acceptance 
(4) 
Full acceptance 
(5) 
• • • • • 
9. Please consider the fol lowing factors: 
• economic costs of the PRC Regulations incurred by industry; 
• administrative requirement of the Environment Agency and government; 
• changes in environmental quality arising from the PRC Regulations; 
• distribution of costs and benefits arising from the PRC Regulations. 
How do you rate the overall fairness of the PRC Regulations? 
Very unfair (1) Unfair (2) 
Fair 
(3) 
Very fair 
(4) 
• • • • 
10. How would you describe your member's overall experience of PRC? 
Completely 
negative 
(1) 
More negative 
than positive 
(2) 
More positive 
than negative 
(3) 
Overwhelmingly 
positive 
(4) 
• • • • 
Please use the space below to identify the aspects of the PRC that influenced your 
answer to question 10. 
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Economic efficiency 
11. How would you rate ttie overall economic efficiency of t i ie PPC permitting process? 
Very Slightly Slightly Very 
economically economically economically economically 
inefficient inefficient efficient efficient 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
• • • • 
12. How would you compare the costs incurred by your members and government 
through the PPC Regulations with the environmental benefits in terms of energy 
efficiency and GIHG em/ss/b/? reductions? Please make one selection per row. 
Costs 
significantly 
outweigh 
benefits 
Costs 
slightly 
outweigh 
benefits 
Costs equal 
to benefits 
Benefits 
slightly 
outweigh 
costs 
Benefits 
significantly 
outweigh 
costs 
Members • • • • • 
Government • • • • • 
If you answered 'costs significantly outweigh benefits or 'costs siightiy outweigh benefits 
to question 12 please use the space below to identify the aspects of the PPC Regulations 
that you believe contribute towards the costs outweighing the environmental benefits 
arising from the scheme 
Flexibility 
13. Some experts believe that in order for a policy to be successful industry must be 
al lowed flexibility to choose the most cost-effective means to meet their targets. 
In this sense, flexibility can have two meanings: 
• Flexibility to manage investment in technological innovation towards 
achieving greenhouse gas emission reductions and improving energy 
efficiency 
• Flexibility can also refer to the ability of businesses to optimise their 
emissions reductions via financial assessment of the most practical means to 
do so (e.g. companies with lowest abatement costs mal<e the most emission 
reductions) 
What level of flexibility do you think the PPC Regulations allow flexibility in terms of 
the two statements above? Please make one selection per row. 
No flexibility Very little 
flexibility 
Moderate 
flexibility 
High 
flexibility 
Investment 
management • • • • 
Financial assessment 
of cheapest way to 
abate emissions 
• • • • 
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14. How do you rate the interaction between the PPC Regulations and other 
environmental 'poWaes applied at both the EU and UK level from the perspective of 
industry? Please make one selection per row. 
The interaction 
between PPC and 
other policies 
creates significant 
regulatory burden 
There are some 
problems with 
cohesion between 
PPC and some 
policies - there is 
slight regulatory 
burden on industry 
and room for 
improvement 
There are minor 
problems with the 
interaction between 
PPC and other 
policies but 
generally it is ok 
PPC and other 
policies operate in 
a complementary 
manner - excellent 
level of cohesion 
UK • • • • 
EU • • • • 
Please use this space to identify any specify policies that led to your selection to 
question 14. 
Overall strengths and weaknesses of PPC 
15. Please use the space below to identify the key strengths of the PPC Regulations 
16. Please use the space below to identify the key weaknesses of the PPC Regulations 
384 
PART 2: European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
Environmental effectiveness 
17. To wtiat extent do you ttiinl< t l ie EU ETS encourages carbon dioxide (CO2) emission 
reductions beyond the allocated al lowances from individual companies within your 
sector and from the entire sector^ Please make one selection per row. 
Strongly 
discourages 
additional 
reductions 
beyond 
allocation 
Slightly 
discourages 
reductions 
beyond 
permit 
allocation 
Neither 
encourages 
or 
discourages 
reductions 
beyond 
allocation 
Encourages 
some 
reductions 
beyond 
allocation 
Encourages 
significant 
reductions 
beyond 
allocation 
Emission 
reductions 
from individual 
firms 
• • • • • 
Emission 
reductions 
across the 
sector 
• • • • • 
18. Which of the fol lowing policy instruments do you think would result in the highest CO2 
emission reductions within the sectors included in the EU ETS if implemented as a 
stand-alone policy? 
Please select the three instruments you believe would achieve the highest emission 
reductions using numbers 1 to 3 to indicate your preferences (1= most preferred). 
Technology-based permit system 
Binding emissions-based standards 
Emissions trading 
Energy tax (i.e. Climate Change Levy at a rate of 0.44p/kWh) 
Voluntary agreement (i.e. Climate Change Levy Agreements) 
Other (please specify) 
19. There are two ways in which al lowances can be allocated within an emissions trading 
scheme; 
• Company-level cap applied and al lowances allocated free of charge 
• Al lowances sold via auction/the market, economy-wide cap may be applied but 
individual firms decide how many al lowances they wish to buy 
Which of the three al lowance allocation methods do you would maximise the 
reduction of CO2 emissions via the EU ETS? Please select one. 
• Free allocations 
• Auction 
• Other (please specify) 
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20. Under the Kyoto Protocol the United Kingdom has committed to reducing its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5% by 2012. What contribution do you thinl< the EU 
ETS will have in terms of the UK meeting this target? 
Very negative Slightly negative No impact either Slightly positive Very positive 
impact - EU ETS impact - EU ETS way Impact - EU ETS impact - EU ETS 
will significantly will slightly will slightly will significantly 
increase GHG increase reduce reduce GHG 
emissions emissions emissions emissions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
• • • • • 
Transparency 
21. Please consider the following points: 
• Public access to EU ETS information 
• Involvement of stakeholders external to industry and government (e.g. public 
involvement) 
• Availability of environmental performance data to stakeholders external to 
government and industry 
• industrial access to information and involvement in decision making 
Taking these factors into account, how would you describe the level of 
transparency of the EU ETS? 
Completely 
confidential 
(1) 
Confidential subject to 
commercial secrets 
(2) 
Slightly transparent 
(3) 
Completely 
transparent 
(4) 
• • • • 
22. How would you rate the overall level of transparency of the EU ETS? 
Unacceptable 
(1) 
Some areas in need 
improvement 
(2) 
Acceptable 
(3) 
• • • 
If you rated the level of transparency as 'in need of improvement' or 
'unacceptable' please use the box below to indicate what measures should be 
introduced to improve the level of transparency or confidentiality? 
Innovation 
23. Noting that technological innovation is a key response to climate change, to what 
extent do you think the EU ETS fosters technological innovation within industry? 
Strongly Slightly Neither Encourages Encourages 
discourages discourages encourages or some significant 
technological technological discourages technological technological 
innovation innovation technological innovation innovation 
innovation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
• • • • • 
Further to your answer to question 23, in the box below briefly identify elements of the 
EU ETS that either encourage or discourage innovation 
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24. Has the ED ETS resulted directly in any of the following changes within the activities 
of your members in relation to CO2 emission reductions? Please select all that apply. 
• Increased awareness of energy saving opportunities within senior management 
• Increased awareness of CO2 reduction opportunities within senior management 
• Introduction of equipment of higher efficiency rating/lower emissions rating than 
previous equipment 
• Improved supply chain management 
• Process changes 
D Inclusion of the cost of carbon in new project appraisals 
• Improved environmental reporting 
• Other (please specify) 
Acceptance and equity 
25. How do you think your members have been treated in terms of allowance allocations 
during Phases I and II of the EU ETS compared to their EU counterparts? Please 
make one selection per row. 
Allowance 
allocation very 
much in favour 
of our 
members 
Fair allocation 
compared with 
counterparts 
Slightly unfair 
allocation, but 
no significant 
detrimental 
effects on our 
members 
Allocation very 
unfair leading 
to competitive 
disadvantage 
compared to 
EU 
counterparts 
Not applicable 
Phase 
1 
• • • • • 
Phase 
II 
• • • • • 
26. In general, what level of acceptance do your members have for the EU ETS? 
Full rejection 
(1) 
Qualified 
rejection 
(2) 
Indifference 
(3) 
Qualified 
acceptance 
(4) 
Full acceptance 
(5) 
• • • • • 
27. How would you describe your member's overall experience of the EU ETS? 
Completely 
negative 
(1) 
More negative 
than positive 
(2) 
More positive 
than negative 
(3) 
Overwhelmingly 
positive 
(4) 
• • • • 
Please use the space below to identify the aspects of the EU ETS that influenced 
your answer to question 27 
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Economic efficiency 
28. How would you rate the overall economic efficiency of the EU ETS? 
Very Slightly Slightly Very 
economically economically economically economically 
inefficient inefficient efficient efficient 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
• • • • 
29. How would you compare the costs incurred by your members and the government 
arising from the EU ETS with the environmental benefits in terms of CO2 emission 
reductions arising directly from the EU ETS? Please select one box in each row. 
Costs 
significantly 
outweigh 
benefits 
Costs 
slightly 
outweigh 
benefits 
Costs equal 
to benefits 
Benefits 
slightly 
outweigh 
costs 
Benefits 
significantly 
outweigh 
costs 
Members • • • • • 
Government • • • • • 
If you answered 'costs significantly outweigh benefits' or 'costs slightly outweigh 
benefits' to question 29 please use the space below to identify the aspects of the EU 
ETS that you believe contribute towards the costs outweighing the environmental 
benefits arising from the scheme 
Flexibility 
30. What level of flexibility do you think the EU ETS offers in terms of: 
• Allowing companies to manage investment in technological innovation to 
achieve CO2 emission reductions? 
• Allowing companies to optimise their emissions reductions via financial 
assessment of the most practical means to do so (e.g. companies with lowest 
abatement cost make greatest emission reductions) 
Please make one selection per row. 
No flexibility Very little 
flexibility 
Moderate 
flexibility 
High 
flexibility 
Investment management • • • • 
Financial assessment of 
cheapest abate emission 
• • • • 
31. How do you rate the interaction between the EU ETS and other environmental 
policies applied at both the EU and UK level from the perspective of industry? Please 
make one selection per row. 
The Interaction There are some There are minor EU ETS and other 
between EU ETS problems with problems with the policies operate in a 
and other policies cohesion between interaction between complementary 
creates significant EU ETS and some EU ETS and other manner - excellent 
regulatory burden policies - there is policies but level of cohesion 
slight regulatory generally it is ok 
burden on industry 
and room for 
improvement 
UK • • • • 
EU • • • • 
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Please use this space to identify any specify policies that led to your answer to 
question 31 
32. Do you think uncertainty surrounding the post-2012 (post-Phase II) future of the EU 
ETS have an impact upon the investment decisions of your members? 
• Y e s D N O • Unsure 
Overall strengths and weaknesses of EU ETS 
33. Please use this space to identify your thoughts on the allocation of al lowances during 
Phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS considering the fol lowing factors: 
• Impacts of allocation on UK-based industry 
• Harmony across the EU 
• Pursuit of environmental aims 
• Equity to all stakeholders 
34. What do you think are particular strengths of the EU ETS? 
35. What do you think are particular weaknesses of the EU ETS? 
Please continue to page 13 to complete Part 3. 
- 3 8 9 -
PART 3 Climate change policy options and concluding remarks 
36. In terms of an overarching climate change policy for energy-intensive industry please 
rank in order of effectiveness (1= most effective, 6= least effective using each number 
once) the type of policy regime you think would achieve the best results in terms of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving energy eff iciency? 
1 Regulatory - performance based (e.g. prescribed emissions limits/energy 
efficiency targets) 
1 Regulatory- technology based (e.g. BAT-based permitting system) 
1 Market based (e.g. emissions trading, energy taxes, emission taxes) 
1 Non-mandatory (e.g. voluntary agreements, eco-labell ing, voluntary bench 
marking) 
1 Policy mix of regulation and market based instruments 
1 Policy mix of regulation and/or market based instrument and non-mandatory 
approaches 
Please use the space below to identify any reasons that you feel are important for 
your selection or if you think an alternative to the policy regimes above would be 
more suitable 
37. Please use the space below to make further brief comments/suggestions on the 
adequacy of PPC as a policy instrument 
38. Please use the space below to make further brief comments/suggestions on the 
adequacy of the EU ETS as a policy instrument 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
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Appendix 2; Example interview schedule 
Review of interviewee's role in CCAs. 
Would the CCA/CCL policy package represent cost savings to industry in the 
absence of the 80% CCL discount? Could energy savings alone result in a policy 
instrument more cost effective than, for example, regulatory energy use 
limitations? 
What are your overall impressions of the targets? 
With regards to your members, what influence have CCAs had on the inclusion of 
energy and carbon management in new projects? 
What impact do you think the CCA/CCL policy package is having upon capital 
investment within your sector? 
Optionaf. You stated that [e.g. emissions trading] represents a better policy option 
in terms of environmental effectiveness. Can you give your reasons? 
How do you think the CCA/CCL policy package fits into the overarching approach 
to climate change in the UK? 
What are the key strengths of the CCA/CCL policy package? 
What are the key weaknesses of the CCA/CCL policy package? 
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In hindsight, would you recommend the inclusion of \sectoi\ in CCAs? 
Considering the overall content of the UK Climate Change Programme are its: 
• strengths 
• weaknesses? 
What role, if any, do you think non-mandatory policy instruments should have 
within the overall context of UK climate change policy? 
What would be your ideal means to tackle climate change from the perspective of 
energy-intense industry? 
What type of policy instrument do you believe provides the optimal conditions to 
foster technological innovation with regards to climate change? 
What are your thoughts, if any, on the existing situation and practices regarding 
post-implementation environmental policy assessment in the UK? 
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Appendix 3; Interview Participants 
Date Subject Name Position 
/ Organisation 
Phone/person 
3™ March 
2006 
UK ETS Richard Hemmings Head of 
Engineering, 
Somerfield 
phone 
2 8 " March 
2006 
UK ETS Toby Campbell-
Colquhoun 
Trader, Shell 
Trading 
person 
30'" March 
2006 
UK ETS Chris McGlen UK Coal Mining 
limited 
phone 
2T 
November 
2006 
UK ETS Liz Hoskins Emisisons Trading 
Coordinator, Shell 
UK 
phone (focus 
group) 
2T 
November 
2006 
UK ETS Deborah Park UK Emissions 
Trading Team, 
Defra 
person (focus 
group) 
2T 
November 
2006 
UK ETS Germana Canzi Senior Climate 
Change 
Campaigner, 
Friends of the 
Earth 
person (focus 
group) 
2T 
November 
2006 
UK ETS Peter Pearson Director of the 
Imperial College 
Centre for Energy 
Policy & 
Technology, 
Imperial College 
London 
person (focus 
group) 
11'" May 
2007 
CCA Chris Stubbs Divisional 
Managing Director, 
WSP Energy 
person 
17" May 
2007 
CCA Bryan Bateman CEO The Bryman 
Partnership Ltd. 
Administration of 
CCA for 
Confederation of 
Paper Industries 
phone 
23™ May 
2007 
CCA John Huddlestone Principal 
Consultant, AEA 
Energy & 
Environment 
person 
23™ May 
2007 
CCA Adam Mansell British Apparel and 
Textile 
Confederation 
person 
8 " June 
2007 
CCA Colin West Executive Director 
Maltsters' 
Association of 
Great Britain 
phone 
I f " June 
2007 
CCA David Beardsw/orth Technical Director 
British Ceramic 
Confederation 
person 
4 " July 2007 CCA Roy Wootton General Manager, 
Target 2010 
(Castings 
Technology 
International) 
phone 
4 " July 2007 CCA Chris Leigh Director (Cities 
and Regions) The 
person 
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Climate Group -
seconded from 
Defra 
23™ July 
2007 
CCA Peter Clark Spirits Energy 
Efficiency Co 
phone 
23™ 
November 
2007 
IPPC Paul Pearson UK Leather 
Federation 
person 
2 9 " 
November 
2007 
EU ETS Ian Froggatt Environment 
Manager 
Energy Power 
Resources Limited 
phone 
4'" 
December 
2007 
IPPC Adam Mansell British Apparel and 
Texti le 
Confederation 
person 
5 " 
December 
2007 
IPPC John Donohue and 
Roy Wootton 
Environment 
Manager, Castings 
Technology 
International 
phone 
T 
December 
2007 
IPPC Tim James PPC Policy 
Manager, 
Environment 
Agency 
phone 
T 
December 
2007 
IPPC/EU 
ETS 
Ian McPherson Director 
Environment, 
Health and Safety 
UK Petroleum 
Industry 
Association Ltd 
phone 
13" 
December 
2007 
IPPC/EU 
ETS 
David Beardsworth Technical Director 
British Ceramic 
Confederation 
person 
13" 
December 
2007 
EU ETS Javier de Cendra 
de Larragan 
Researcher 
Metro, University 
of Maastricht 
phone 
17" 
December 
2007 
IPPC/ 
EUETS 
Bryan Bateman CEO The Bryman 
Partnership Ltd. 
Administration of 
CCA for 
Confederation of 
Paper Industries 
phone 
18" 
December 
2007 
CCA Nina Hassall CCA Team 
Climate Energy: 
Business and 
Transport Division 
Defra 
person 
19" 
December 
2007 
CCA/ EU 
ETS 
Michael Grubb Chief Economist, 
The Carbon Trust 
person 
2 0 " 
December 
2007 
EU ETS Ormonde Joel EU Emissions 
Trading Manager, 
Environment 
Agency 
person 
19" March 
2008 
CCA/EU 
ETS 
Paul Ekins Head, 
Environment 
Group 
Policy Studies 
Institute 
person 
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Appendix 4: Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Assessments 
Pollution Prevention and 
Control Regulations 
Climate Change 
Agreements 
Climate Change Levy UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
Year of RIA 2000 2001 2000 2001 2005 
Responsible 
department 
Department for 
Environment, Transport 
and the Regions 
Department for 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
HM Customs & Excise Department for 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Department for 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Purpose of the policy 
instrument 
Regulations to supersede 
current domestic pollution 
controls in Part 1 of 
Environmental Protection 
Act 1990 (namely 
Integrated Pollution 
Control (IPC) and Local Air 
Pollution Control (LAPC)) 
to control pollution to air, 
land and water from 
industrial processes 
To provide 80% discount 
on CCL for energy-
intensive facilities 
participating in a CCA with 
the Secretary of State 
To specifically encourage 
energy efficiency in 
business, agriculture and 
the public sector. 
To reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from these 
sectors 
To provide a framework for 
CCA and other companies 
taking voluntary caps on 
their emissions to iDuy and 
sell emissions allowances. 
To reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from the 
installations covered by the 
Scheme 
Risk assessment No No Yes Yes Yes 
Use of quantitative 
data 
Yes No Yes No Yes 
Type of data 
(Primary, Secondary 
or Estimated) 
Primary - based on 
evidence from IPC regime 
Estimated Estimated carbon savings Estimated Estimated carbon savings 
Consideration of 
alternative policies 
What alternatives 
considered by: 
Instrument type 
Coverage 
Design 
Scope 
Reasons for dismissal 
Limited options to consider 
- not implementing 
regulations not an option 
as required by EU 
No reference to alternative 
policy approaches - CCAs 
identified in CCL policy 
documentation 
No - based on Lord 
Marshall's report 
recommendations of a tax 
for businesses 
No reference to alternative 
policy approaches to the 
approach stated within the 
RIA 
Not for the overall policy 
(i.e. emissions trading 
approach) as 
implementation is 
mandatory across the EU 
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of alternatives 
Consideration of 
alternative 
arrangements within 
proposed policy 
Public consultation only in 
respect to changes with 
negative consequences for 
environment 
Allow flexibility of permit 
reviews where risks 
involved suggest it is 
appropriate - replace 
existing requirement to 
review every 4 years 
Standardised permit forms, 
procedures and conditions 
replacing ad hoc site-by-
site system 
Introduce provisions for 
site remediation 
Extension of regime to 
include 440 sites in IPC but 
outside scope of IPPC or 
exclusion altogether from 
regime 
Charges for permits - likely 
to be in line with existing 
IPC charges 
Whole sites entered into 
CCA without sub-metering. 
Dismissed as this would 
lead to small energy 
intensive activities being 
introduced into non-energy 
intensive sites to obtain the 
80% CCL discount 
None stated None stated - document 
offers justification of the 
UK ETS framework with no 
consideration of 
alternatives 
Consideration of options, 
inter alia, for overall 
national allocation, 
baseline period, allocation 
methodology and new 
market entrants 
Equity/fairness issues 
- business/industry 
Whether it is fair to treat 
440 installations within IPC 
but outside scope of IPPC 
None stated Business energy use 
accounts for 40% of total 
energy use and must be 
addressed 
None stated "EU ETS is centra! to the 
UK's efforts to move 
towards a low carbon 
econom/ 
Equity/fairness issues 
- other sectors 
None stated None stated No plan to introduce 
similar energy tax for 
domestic users based on 
social policy reasons 
None stated None stated - focus on 
equity/fairness towards 
industry 
396 
No tax for road transport 
fuels as sector already 
covered by fiscal strategy 
Impact on innovation None stated None stated No direct reference but 
states that "Business has a 
special role to play as the 
principal source in the 
economic of technological 
innovation" 
None stated Direct references of how 
the Directive is designed to 
encourage the transition to 
a low carbon economy 
Competition 
Assessment including 
OFT filter test 
None stated None stated None stated None stated None stated 
Presentation of 
competition 
assessment 
None stated None stated None stated None stated Yes - competitiveness 
impacts of each option is 
presented 
Consultation vyith OFT 
regarding impact on 
competition 
None stated None stated None stated None stated None stated 
Possible non-
compliance factored 
into the RIA 
None stated None stated None stated None stated Yes 
Consideration of 
enforcement costs 
None stated None stated None stated None stated Costs to installations in 
instance of operator failing 
to meet the requirements 
of the Scheme 
Consideration of ways 
to increase 
compliance 
None stated None stated None stated None stated Sanctions noted above 
Procedures for 
monitoring the policy 
Monitored on ongoing 
basis 
Phasing in of existing 
installations until 2007 
provide opportunity to fine 
tune the regulations in light 
of early experience 
None stated None stated None stated Post-implementation 
review and evaluation of 
Phase 1 to be incorporated 
into development and 
consultation on Phase II 
Time scale for post Formal review of the No - monitoring and No - subject to ministerial None stated None stated 
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implementation 
evaluation 
regulations after 5 years review to be undertaken as 
part of any CCL review 
review 
Contains procedures 
for implementing and 
evaluating the policy 
Review to reappraise 
options and associated 
costs and benefits 
Assessment of costs and 
benefits against stated 
aims and objectives 
None stated None stated None stated None stated 
Consideration of 
impacts on small 
businesses 
Yes - difficult to quantify 
but felt to be not 
significant. Energy 
efficiency and waste 
minimisation would make 
good business sense if 
applied with common 
sense 
Site restoration major area 
for concern due to potential 
high costs associated but 
preparation of site reports 
would be useful when 
selling and buying sites 
Yes - impact of sub-
metering on small bakeries 
Yes - consultation and 
concerns over access to 
ECA to be considered 
when designing the final 
energy efficiency grants 
package 
Yes - administrative costs 
for small businesses my be 
sufficiently high to deter 
participation due to the 
minimum costs for 
verification but the Scheme 
could potentially mitigate 
against this by allowing 
companies to enter as a 
collective (to enable 
pooling of costs and 
exploitation of economies 
of scale) 
Yes - consultation with 
small businesses with 
focus on higher costs and 
options to reduce these 
costs 
Benefits Decision time reduced 
from 4 to 3 months 
Reduced frequency of 
permit reviews for low risk 
activities will reduce cost to 
industry, regulator 
manpower and improve 
stability in operating 
conditions 
Increase frequency of 
permit reviews for high risk 
activities will bring higher 
Scope of CCAs limited to 
less than 10% energy use 
in non-energy intensive 
activities beneficial as 
other sites with more than 
10% energy in non-energy 
intensive uses will be 
encouraged to reduce 
energy consumption by 
application of full rate of 
CCL 
Allowing up to 10% non-
energy intensive activities 
CCL will "help to achieve 
these targets [Kyoto target] 
for greenhouse gas 
emission reductions" 
Employers' NIC reduced 
by 0.3% 
£150 support fund for 
energy efficiency 
measures (Enhance 
Capital Allowances) 
80% CCL discount for CCA 
Providing companies with 
opportunity to perchance 
allowances from 
companies able to deliver 
emission reductions at 
lower cost and vice versa 
Facilitating emission 
reductions from companies 
outside CCAs 
Establishment of the UK as 
a centre for GHG trading 
activity bringing benefits to 
Setting a tight cap will 
encourage a high carbon 
price and a liquid scheme 
If UK is able to reduce 
overall emissions it will 
become a net seller of 
allowances and the 
associated economic 
benefits of selling 
allowances 
Higher profits of non-fossil 
fuel power generators 
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level of environmental 
protection 
Standardised applications 
to reduce effort required for 
applications, lower costs 
and lower charges 
Environmental benefits of 
additional requirement to 
ensure sites are left in 
satisfactory state - polluter 
pays 
Reduced emissions from 
industries new to pollution 
control 
Requirement to address 
energy efficiency will have 
long term benefits to 
industries and will help 
reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions 
to be incorporated in a 
CCA will reduce cost 
burden of sub-metering 
At sites where less than 
90% of energy used in 
energy intensive activities 
the use of sub-metering 
will assist is improving the 
management and control 
of energy sued in energy 
intensive activities 
participants 
Lower CCL rate for LPG 
50% discount for 
horticultural firms for 5 
years to protect 
competitiveness of sector 
5 year exemption for 
natural gas in N Ireland to 
support new gas market 
Expected to be revenue 
neutral for private sector 
the Government, business 
and the City of London Encouragement of fuel 
diversity 
Verification and baselines 
will ensure integrity of the 
Scheme 
New Entrant Reserve for 
Good Quality Combined 
Heat and Power 
Advantages for traders, 
brokers and verifiers 
Quantified carbon 
savings 
None stated None stated Total policy package of 5 
MtC per year by 2010 
Of which at least 1 MtC per 
year by 2010 is attributable 
to the price effect of the 
CCL 
Remaining 4 IVItC per year 
by 2010 attributable to 
exemption for CHP & 
renewables, CCA, ECA 
None stated Overall predicted carbon 
savings not specified 
Secondary benefits None stated None stated The resulting NIC 
reduction "could generate 
None stated As above: brokers, traders 
and verifiers 
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additional employment 
opportunities" 
Schemes to promote 
energy efficiency and 
renewable energy "will 
directly stimulate 
Investment" in low carbon 
technologies 
Revenue None stated None stated £1 billion None stated Dependent on quantity of 
allowances auctioned and 
performance of the market 
Identified costs to 
government 
None stated None stated Recycling of revenue via 
0.3% reduction in 
employers' NIC - revenue 
neutral for government 
£43 million per year In 
Incentive payments plus 
administrative costs: 
£50k to accredit verifiers 
£150-250k to design and 
build trading registry 
£25k to run auction 
Non stated 
Identified financial 
cost to target 
industries 
Application process 
Permit charges 
On-going costs associated 
with compliance with BAT-
energy efficiency 
measures could result in 
pay-back 
Sub-metering for sites with 
more than 10% energy use 
In non-energy Intensive 
activities: £1000-£5000 per 
meter 
Initial start-up costs: 
• Changes to 
administration and 
computing systems 
• Staff training 
• Printing and stationary 
costs 
Continuous compliance 
costs: 
• Record maintenance 
• Completion of 4 CCL 
returns per years 
• Site visits by customs 
officers 
Verification and other 
administration costs, 
purchase of allowances by 
companies unable to 
reduce emissions 
Increased electricity prices 
Permit application 
Monitoring and reporting 
costs 
Verification costs (of 
baselines and annual 
reported emissions) 
New Entrant permit cost 
Quantified cost to 
industry 
Permit application: 
£20,000 to £60,000 
Permit charges: £6000 to 
None stated Energy industry changes to 
billing systems: £24-£40 
million 
None stated Permit application: £1230 -
£5490 
Changes to permits: £240, 
•400 -
£9000 
Permit compliance costs: 
unclear at time of RIA, 
dependent upon BREF 
notes 
Manpower involved in 
permit application: based 
on IPC evidence of 22 
person-weeks 
Cost of Levy payments: 
£405 million 
£240 and £620 
Increase in wholesale cost 
of energy: €8-11 /MWh 
Access to New Entrant 
Reserve: £1030 
Other costs (identify) None stated None stated Service sector: 
£450 million 
Public sector: 
£150 million 
All costs to industry/public 
sector/businesses to be 
balanced by recycling of £1 
billion revenue to result in 
at least no net impact on 
CCL sectors. Service and 
public sector to benefit 
from positive net impact. 
None stated Cost to consumers in 
relation to increased 
energy prices (see above) 
Identification of 
distributional effects 
None stated None stated No - not possible None stated None stated 
Consultation 5 consultations: 
• July 1997 
• Jan 1998 
• Jan 1999 
. Aug 1999 
• April 2000 (brief 
consultation on final 
content of regulations) 
During negotiation of 
agreements in 1999-2000 
3 separate consultations: 
• 1998-prior to 
publication of Lord 
Marshall report 
• 1999 - regarding 
compliance costs to 
business 
. 1999/2000-draft 
legislation 
None stated in RIA Phase 1 consultations: 
• August 2003 
• 2 consultations in 
2004 regarding draft 
Phase 1 NAP 
Identified consultees Industrial sector 
representatives 
Sector associations Energy suppliers, 
customers 
None stated Businesses, NGOs, 
devolved administrations 
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Consideration of 
uncertainty 
Yes - costs and impacts on 
businesses 
None stated Yes None stated Yes 
Overall balance of 
costs and benefits 
Consideration of costs and 
benefits and support from 
consuitees in favour of 
options outlined in the RIA 
lead to recommendation 
that the proposals are 
implemented 
Secretary of State satisfied 
that "the balance between 
cost and benefit is the right 
one in the circumstances" 
Additional costs incurred 
by businesses arising from 
CCL significantly 
outweighed by economic, 
environmental, social and 
health benefits 
Secretary of State satisfied 
that the iDenefits justify the 
costs 
Uncertainties associated 
with the development of a 
new market mean that it is 
not possible to quantify the 
actual costs and benefits of 
the Scheme. It is clear that 
the cost of inaction on 
climate change potentially 
has much greater costs 
than those associated with 
the implementation and 
running of the EU ETS. 
Comments Brief RIA but does attempt 
to deal with significant 
issues such as small 
businesses 
RIA only deals with the 
scope of the eligibility of 
facilities - no general RIA 
for CCAs 
RIA includes elements for 
consideration regarding 
CCAs 
Very brief RIA that does 
not quantify any benefits of 
the Scheme 
Generally a thorough RIA. 
Well laid out in terms of 
options and scenarios. 
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Appendix 5; IPPC activities and PPC activity 
transposition dates 
Annex I Categories of industrial installations referred to in Article 1 of Directive 
96/61/EC Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
1. Energy industries 
1.1. Combust ion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 50 MW 
1.2. Mineral oil and gas refineries 
1.3. Coke ovens 
1.4. Coal gasification and liquefaction plants 
2. Production and processing of metals 
2.1. Metal ore (including sulphide ore) roasting or sintering installations 
2.2. Installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or secondary 
fusion) including continuous casting, with a capacity exceeding 2,5 tonnes per 
hour 
2.3. Installations for the processing of ferrous metals: 
(a) hot-rolling mills with a capacity exceeding 20 tonnes of crude steel 
per hour 
(b) smitheries with hammers the energy of which exceeds 50 kilojoules 
per hammer, where the calorific power used exceeds 20 MW 
(c) application of protective fused metal coats with an input exceeding 2 
tonnes of crude steel per hour 
2.4. Ferrous metal foundries with a production capacity exceeding 20 tonnes 
per day 
2.5. Installations 
(a) for the production of non-ferrous crude metals from ore, concentrates 
or secondary raw materials by metallurgical, chemical or electrolytic 
processes 
(b) for the smelting, including the alloyage, of non-ferrous metals, 
including recovered products, (refining, foundry casting, etc.) with a 
melting capacity exceeding 4 tonnes per day for lead and cadmium or 20 
tonnes per day for all other metals 
2.6. installations for surface treatment of metals and plastic materials using an 
electrolytic or chemical process where the volume of the treatment vats 
exceeds 30 m^ 
3. Mineral industry 
3.1. Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns with a 
production capacity exceeding 500 tonnes per day or lime in rotary kilns with 
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production capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day or in other furnaces with a 
production capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day 
3.2. installations for the production of asbestos and the manufacture of 
asbestos-based products 
3.3. Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fibre with a 
melting capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per day 
3.4. Installations for melting mineral substances including the production of 
mineral fibres with a melting capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per day 
3.5. Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, in particular 
roofing tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware or porcelain, with a 
production capacity exceeding 75 tonnes per day, and/or with a kiln capacity 
exceeding 4 m^ and with a setting density per kiln exceeding 300 kg/m^ 
4. Chemical industry 
Production within the meaning of the categories of activities contained in this section 
means the production on an industrial scale by chemical processing of substances or 
groups of substances listed in Sections 4.1 to 4.6 
4.1. Chemical installations for the production of basic organic chemicals, such 
as: 
(a) simple hydrocarbons (linear or cyclic, saturated or unsaturated, 
aliphatic or aromatic) 
(b) oxygen-containing hydrocarbons such as alcohols, aldehydes, 
ketones, carboxylic acids, esters, acetates, ethers, peroxides, epoxy 
resins 
(c) sulphurous hydrocarbons 
(d) nitrogenous hydrocarbons such as amines, amides, nitrous 
compounds, nitro compounds or nitrate compounds, nitriles, cyanates, 
isocya nates 
(e) phosphorus-containing hydrocarbons 
(f) halogenic hydrocarbons 
(g) organometall ic compounds 
(h) basic plastic materials (polymers synthetic fibers and cellulose-based 
fibers) 
(i) synthetic rubbers 
(j) dyes and pigments 
(k) surface-active agents and surfactants 
4.2. Chemical installations for the production of basic inorganic chemicals, 
such as: 
(a) gases, such as ammonia, chlorine or hydrogen chloride, fluorine or 
hydrogen fluoride, carbon oxides, sulphur compounds, nitrogen oxides, 
hydrogen, sulphur dioxide, carbonyl chloride 
(b) acids, such as chromic acid, hydrofluoric acid, phosphoric acid, nitric 
acid, hydrochloric acid, sulphuric acid, oleum, sulphurous acids 
(c) bases, such as ammonium hydroxide, potassium hydroxide, sodium 
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hydroxide 
(d) salts, such as ammonium chloride, potassium chlorate, potassium 
carbonate, sodium carbonate, perborate, silver nitrate 
(e) non-metals, metal oxides or other inorganic compounds such as 
calcium carbide, silicon, silicon carbide 
4.3. Chemical installations for the production of phosphorous-, nitrogen- or 
potassium-based fertil izers (simple or compound fertilizers) 
4.4. Chemical installations for the production of basic plant health products and 
of biocides 
4.5. Installations using a chemical or biological process for the production of 
basic pharmaceutical products 
4.6. Chemical installations for the production of explosives 
5. Waste management 
Without prejudice of Article 11 of Directive 75/442/EEC or Article 3 of Council 
Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste (2): 
5.1. Installations for the disposal or recovery of hazardous waste as defined in 
the list referred to in Article 1 (4) of Directive 91/689/EEC, as defined in 
Annexes II A and II B (operations R1, R5, R6, R8 and R9) to Directive 
75/442/EEC and in Council Directive 75/439/EEC of 16 June 1975 on the 
disposal of waste oils (3), with a capacity exceeding 10 tonnes per day 
5.2. Installations for the incineration of municipal waste as defined in Council 
Directive 89/369/EEC of 8 June 1989 on the prevention of air pollution from 
new municipal waste incineration plants (4) and Council Directive 89/429/EEC 
of 21 June 1989 on the reduction of air pollution from existing municipal waste-
incineration plants (5) with a capacity exceeding 3 tonnes per hour 
5.3. Installations for the disposal of non-hazardous waste as defined in Annex 
II A to Directive 75/442/EEC under headings D8 and D9, with a capacity 
exceeding 50 tonnes per day 
5.4. Landfills receiving more than 10 tonnes per day or with a total capacity 
exceeding 25 000 tonnes, excluding landfills of inert waste 
6. Other activities 
6.1. Industrial plants for the production of: 
(a) pulp from timber or other fibrous materials 
(b) paper and board with a production capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per 
day 
6.2. Plants for the pre-treatment (operations such as washing, bleaching, 
mercerization) or dyeing of fibres or texti les where the treatment capacity 
exceeds 10 tonnes per day 
6.3. Plants for the tanning of hides and skins where the treatment capacity 
exceeds 12 tonnes of f inished products per day 
6.4. (a) Slaughterhouses with a carcass production capacity greater than 50 
tonnes per day 
(b) Treatment and processing intended for the production of food 
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products from; 
- animal raw materials (other than milt<) with a finished product 
production capacity greater than 75 tonnes per day 
- vegetable raw materials with a f inished product production capacity 
greater than 300 tonnes per day (average value on a quarterly basis) 
(c) Treatment and processing of milk, the quantity of milk received being 
greater than 200 tonnes per day (average value on an annual basis) 
6.5. Installations for the disposal or recycling of animal carcasses and animal 
waste with a treatment capacity exceeding 10 tonnes per day 
6.6. Installations for the intensive rearing of poultry or pigs with more than: 
(a) 40 000 places for poultry 
(b) 2 000 places for production pigs (over 30 kg), or 
(c) 750 places for sows 
6.7. Installations for the surface treatment of substances, objects or products 
using organic solvents, in particular for dressing, printing, coating, degreasing, 
waterproofing, sizing, painting, cleaning or impregnating, with a consumption 
capacity of more than 150 kg per hour or more than 200 tonnes per year 
6.8. Installations for the production of carbon (hard-burnt coal) or 
electrographite by means of incineration or graphitization 
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PPC Regulations: Activity categories and 
implementation dates 
PPC 
ref 
Activity Transition 
deadline 
6.1 Paper, pulp and board February 2001 
2.1 Ferrous metals August 2001 
3.1 Cement and lime August 2001 
2.2 Non-ferrous metals December 2001 
6.3 Tar and bitumen (depending on sub-group) December 2001 
March 2004 
3.3 Glass and glass fibre July 2002 
3.4 Other mineral fibres July 2002 
6.4 Coating, printing and textile treatment July 2002 
6.8 Treatment of animal and vegetable matter and food July 2002 
industries (depending on sub-group) August 2004 
March 2005 
4.1 Organic chemicals (depending on sub-group) March 2003 
August 2003 
March 2006 
August 2006 
3.6 Ceramics March 2004 
5.3 Disposal of waste other than by incineration or landfill March 2004 
(depending on sub-group) August 2004 
August 2005 
5.5 Production of fuel from waste March 2004 
6.2 Carbon activities March 2004 
2.3 Surface treating metals and plastic materials July 2004 
4.2 Inorganic chemicals (depending on sub-group) December 2004 
August 2005 
4.7 Manufacturing involving carbon disulphate or ammonia December 2004 
5.4 Recovery of waste March 2005 
4.3 Chemical fertiliser August 2005 
5.1 Waste incineration August 2005 
1.1 Combustion March 2006 
4.4 Plant health products and biocides March 2006 
4.5 Pharmaceuticals March 2006 
4.6 Explosives March 2006 
1.2 Gasification, liquefaction and refining August 2006 
3.2 Asbestos August 2006 
6.6 Timber August 2006 
6.9 Intensive farming January 2007 
5.2 Landfill March 2007 
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IPPC reference codes used by EPER 
1 Energy industries 
1.1 Combustion installations > 50 MW 
1.2 Mineral oil and gas refineries 
1.3 Coke ovens 
1.4 Coal gasification and liquefaction plants 
2 Production and processing of metals 
2.1/2.2/2.3/2.4/2.5/2.6 Metal industry and metal ore roasting or sintering 
installations, Installations for the production of ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals 
3 Mineral industry 
3.1/3.3/3.4/3.5 Installations for the production of cement klinker (>500t/d), 
lime (>50t/d), glass (>20t/d), mineral substances (>20t/d) or 
ceramic products (>75t/d) 
3.2 Installations for the production of asbestos or asbestos-based 
products 
4 Chemical industry and chemical installations for the 
production of: 
4.1 Basic organic chemicals 
4.2/4.3 Basic inorganic chemicals or fertilisers 
4.4/4 .6 Biocides and explosives 
4.5 Pharmaceutical products 
5 Waste management 
5.1/5.2 Installations for the disposal or recovery of hazardous waste 
(>10t/d) or municipal waste (>3t/h) 
5.3/5.4 Installations for the disposal of non-hazardous waste (>50t/d) 
and landfills (>10t/d) 
6 Other Annex 1 activities 
6.1 Industrial plants for pulp from timber or other fibrous materials 
and paper or board production (>20t/d) 
6.2 Plants for the pre-treatment of fibres or textiles (>10t/d) 
6.3 Plants for tanning of hides and skins (>12t/d) 
6.4 Slaughterhouses (>50t/d), plants for the production of milk 
(>200t/d), other animal raw materials (>75t/d) or vegetable 
raw materials (>300t/d) 
6.5 Installations for the disposal or recycling of animal carcasses 
and animal waste (>10t/d) 
6.6 Installations for poultry (>40000), pigs (>2000) or sows 
(>750) 
6.7 Installations for surface treatment or products using organic 
solvents (>200t/y) 
6.8 Installations for the production of carbon or graphite 
Source: European Environment Agency (2008) 
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Appendix 6: Climate Change Agreement sectors 
Adjustment made in 2004 on subsequent targets (% 
Increase/decrease) 
Sector Type of 
Agreement 
Baseline 
year 
2010 target in 1®* target period 2006 2008 2010 Installations In 
EU ETS 
Aerospace Absolute 
energy 
2001 8.5% 1 1 1 4 
Agricultural 
Supply 
Relative 
energy 
1999 7.1% 3 3.5 4 0 
Aluminium Relative 
carbon 
1990 32.2% 5.6 4.6 5.7 1 
Brewing 
Industry 
Relative 
energy 
1999 11.6% 2 2 3.5 1 
Cathode Ray 
Tubes 
Relative 
energy 
2000 21% Sector withdrew from 
agreement 
Cement Relative 
energy 
1990 25.6% 0 0 1.5 4 
Cementitous 
Slag 
Relative 
energy 
1999 10% 6.1 5 4.3 0 
Ceramics - non 
fletton 
Relative 
energy 
2000, 12.4% 0.5 0.5 1.1 12 
Ceramics -
fletton 
Relative 
energy 
2000 8 1% -11.5 -11.5 -11.5 0 
Ceramics -
refactories 
Relative 
energy 
2000 10.33% 0.5 0.5 1.1 1 
Ceramics - white 
wares 
Relative 
energy 
2000 10.22% 6.7 6.7 6.9 0 
Ceramics -
materials 
Relative 
energy 
2000 10.1% 12.3 12.5 12.7 0 
Chemical 
Industries 
Relative 
energy 
1998 18.3% 3.6 3.5 4 49 
Craft Bakeries Relative 
energy 
1999 9% 18 20 22.1 0 
- 4 0 9 -
Dairy Relative 
energy 
1999 9 ^ % 2.25 3.5 4.5 7 
Egg Products 
(NFU) 
Relative 
energy 
1995-2000 11.5% 32 34.2 36.6 0 
Egg Products 
(BEPA) 
Relative 
energy 
1999 9.3% 11.7 16.1 17.2 0 
Food and Drink Relative 
energy 
1999 8.1% 2 2.5 3 15 
Foundries Relative 
energy 
1999 11% 0 0 0 0 
Glass Relative 
energy 
2000 9 ^ % 1 2 3.5 4 
Gypsum 
Products 
Relative 
energy 
1999 72% 0 0 1 0 
Leather Relative 
energy 
2000 9 ^ % 0 0 10 0 
Lime Relative 
energy 
1999 7.9% 0 -0.48 1.0 3 
Maltings Relative 
energy 
1998 7^% 0.2 0.6 1.1 3 
Metal Packaging Relative 
carbon 
1999 9% 1 1 2 0 
Metal forming Relative 
energy 
1999 7% 16 17.3 20 0 
Mineral Wool Relative 
energy 
2000 14.9% 0 0 1 2 
Motor 
Manufacturers 
and Traders 
Relative 
energy 
1999 15.3% 3 3 4 12 
Non Ferrous Relative 
energy 
1995 14.7% 7.67 688 6.15 1 
Paper Relative 
energy 
1998 24% 2.78 2.21 2.6 2 
Pig Rearing Relative 
energy 
1997 16% 11.3 10.6 11.0 0 
Poultry Meat 
Processing 
Relative 
energy 
1995-2000 12.5% 1.5 2.5 3.9 2 
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Poultry Rearing 
(BPC) 
Relative 
energy 
1999 13.7% 1.6 4,3 6,4 0 
Poultry Rearing 
(NFU) 
Relative 
energy 
1999 13.7% 22,7 22,7 22,7 0 
Printing Relative 
energy 
2000 12% 3 3 4 0 
Red Meat Relative 
energy 
1999 10,8% 0 0 0 0 
Rendering Relative 
energy 
1999 9% 2,5 2,5 2,5 0 
Rubber Tyre 
Manufactures 
Relative 
energy 
1999 10.3% 12,6 12,6 12,6 0 
Semiconductors Relative 
energy 
2000 59% 0 0 0 1 
Spirits Relative 
energy 
1999 4.5% 1 1 2 2 
Steel Absolute 
energy 
1997 11.5% 3,25 1,28 0,22 4 
Supermarkets Absolute 
energy 
1999 4.5% 4 4 6 0 
Surface 
Engineering 
Relative 
energy 
1999 10.3% 10,8 10,7 10.8 0 
Textiles Relative 
energy 
1999 9% 3 3 3 3 
Vehicle Builders 
and Repairers 
Relative 
energy 
2000 10% Sector withdrew from 
agreement 
Wallcoverings Absolute 
energy 
1999 9% 1,48 1,68 1.88 0 
Wood Panel Relative 
energy 
1999 7.3% 1.87 3,92 6.02 4 
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Appendix 7: UK ETS Direct Participants 
United Kingdom Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Direct Participants 
Company name Total value of incentive payments 
A s d a S t o r e s Ltd £ 4 2 6 9 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Barc lays B a n k pic £ 4 6 0 9 0 3 . 3 2 
Batt le M c C a r t h y £ 5 3 7 1 6 9 . 0 5 
Britoll pic £ 1 3 5 8 9 2 2 9 . 5 1 
British A i r w a y s pic £ 6 3 6 5 9 7 3 . 6 0 
British S u g a r pic £ 5 3 3 7 0 0 0 . 0 0 
B u d w e i s e r S t a g Brewing C o m p a n y Ltd £ 2 2 9 7 3 6 . 5 0 
Dalk ia E n e r g y & T e c h n i c a l S e r v i c e s £ 4 9 0 7 9 0 . 5 2 
Ltd 
Da lk ia Utility S e r v i c e s Ltd £ 1 1 9 5 4 8 8 . 0 0 
D a n a Sp ice r E u r o p e Ltd £ 2 6 7 7 0 3 . 9 2 
First H y d r o C o m p a n y £ 1 4 6 0 2 0 3 2 . 0 0 
Ford Motor C o m p a n y Ltd £ 6 3 7 8 2 4 . 8 7 
F o r t u m O & M ( U K ) Ltd £ 3 5 4 2 7 0 . 0 6 
G K N (Un i ted K i n g d o m ) Ltd £ 4 8 5 4 0 0 . 1 5 
Imerys Minera ls Ltd £ 1 4 9 8 4 6 9 . 4 9 
T h e Indesit C o m p a n y £ 2 3 4 7 7 4 . 6 3 
Ineos Fluor Ltd £ 4 2 9 9 6 7 3 9 . 9 5 
Invista Text i les ( U K ) Ltd £ 2 6 2 0 0 9 8 7 . 4 7 
Kirk lees Met ropol i tan Counc i l £ 5 3 0 4 9 . 7 8 
L a f a r g e C e m e n t U K £ 1 2 7 0 8 7 3 1 . 2 5 
L a n d Secur i t ies £ 5 1 0 2 1 . 7 2 
L e n d L e a s e R e a l Es ta te IS Ltd £ 5 2 0 3 5 . 7 5 
M a r k s & S p e n c e r pic £ 1 0 6 2 0 6 . 3 0 
Mitsubishi Corpora t ion ( U K ) pic £ 1 3 3 4 2 . 5 0 
Motoro la £ 2 6 6 8 5 0 . 0 0 
N a t u r a l History M u s e u m T r a d i n g C o £ 4 8 2 4 8 . 4 8 
R h o d i a U K Ltd £ 2 2 8 6 0 2 9 2 . 3 2 
Rolls R o y c e £ 1 0 2 0 3 8 1 . 0 3 
R o y a l O r d n a n c e pic £ 2 9 3 5 3 5 . 0 0 
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She l l U K Ltd £ 2 1 8 4 4 1 8 0 . 8 9 
S o m e r f i e l d S t o r e s Ltd £ 2 6 4 7 1 5 . 2 0 
T e s c o S t o r e s Ltd £ 3 9 4 9 3 8 0 . 0 0 
U K C o a l Min ing Ltd £ 1 4 8 4 8 9 2 1 . 6 2 
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Appendix 8: EL) ETS Activities 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Phase I: Participating sectors and 
number of installations in the United Kingdom 
Sector Number of installations (at end of 2007) 
C e m e n t 15 
C e r a m i c s 1 8 
C h e m i c a l s 6 7 
Eng ineer ing a n d V e h i c l e s 3 5 
Food , Dr ink a n d T o b a c c o 5 9 
G l a s s a n d Minera l W o o l 1 0 
Iron a n d S t e e l 1 2 
L i m e 4 
N o n - f e r r o u s M e t a l s 2 
O f f s h o r e 111 
O t h e r 9 
O t h e r Oi l a n d G a s 3 5 
P o w e r stat ions 1 2 5 
Pulp a n d P a p e r 6 
Ref iner ies 1 2 
S e r v i c e s 2 3 0 
Total 753 
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European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Phase II; Participating sectors and 
number of installations in the United Kingdom 
Sector Number of installations (at end of 2007) 
A l u m i n i u m 1 
C e m e n t 1 5 
C e r a m i c s 7 7 
C h e m i c a l s 9 7 
D o w n s t r e a m G a s 3 4 
F o o d a n d Dr ink 1 2 3 
G l a s s 2 6 
Iron a n d S t e e l 1 4 
L a r g e Electricity P r o d u c e r s 6 2 
L i m e 9 
O f f s h o r e 1 0 8 
O t h e r Electricity P r o d u c e r s 6 6 
O t h e r s A ( G y p s u m , M inera l W o o l 
including R o c k W o o l ) 
1 4 
O t h e r s B ( A e r o s p a c e , Veh ic les , S e m i -
c o n d u c t o r s , W o o d board) 
4 4 
O t h e r s C (Muni t ions, Text i les , 
T o b a c c o , other non-meta l l ic minera ls ) 
16 
Pu lp a n d P a p e r 6 4 
Ref iner ies 1 3 
S e r v i c e s 1 3 8 
Total 922 
- 4 1 5 -
Appendix 9: Summary of Assessments and Evaluations 
Sub-criteria Pollution Prevention and 
Control Regulations 
Climate Change 
Agreements 
UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (Phase I) 
Government-
led/commissioned 
ex post 
evaluation 
Date published (A) 2005-2007 and (B) 2007 n/a 
Conducted by (internal/external) 
Scope 
A: Internal (European 
Commission and Member 
State governments 
B: External (Atkins 
consultants) 
n/a 
A: Proposals to recast 7 
existing EU Directives into 
one 'coherent' Directive 
To Integrate the following 
Directives: 
IPPC, 
Large Combustion Plants, 
Waste Incineration 
Directive, 
Solvents Emissions 
Directive, 
3 Directives relating to 
titanium dioxide 
B: To quantify the costs and 
benefits of IPPC (as 
implemented through the 
PPC Regulations) to 
industry and government in 
the UK 
n/a 
(A) 2004 and (B) 2006 2005 
External 
A: NERA consultants (2004) 
B: Enviros consultants 
(2006) 
External (Ecofys and 
McKlnsey & Company) and 
Internal (European 
Commission DG 
Environment) 
A: To review the 
performance of the Scheme 
during the first two years 
To review market activity 
To evaluate how the 
Scheme has achieved it 3 
primary goals (deliver 
emission reductions, first 
mover advantage, establish 
City of London at 
international centre of 
emissions trading expertise) 
B: To establish which 
features could be carried 
over to a new scheme and 
highlight where 
Improvements could be 
made 
To summarise the 
responses from a survey 
undertaken by McKinsey 
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Consultees 
Key conclusions and 
recommendations 
To identify the regulatory 
burden of the Regulations 
and the impact on small 
businesses 
A: Member States - analysis 
of IPPC implementation 
progress reports 
B: Individual firms 
A; Analysis and results of 
consultation and review 
awaiting publication 
B: Considerable uncertainty 
remains over the costs and 
benefits of IPPC 
Little evidence of the impact 
of IPPC on competition 
IPPC has lead to greater 
resource efficiency 
Most companies believe 
IPPC is more burdensome 
that the previous IPC 
regime 
Smaller companies feel 
most disadvantaged by 
IPPC with larger firms 
benefiting from IPPC when 
trying to access new 
markets 
n/a 
n/a 
To explore any differences 
or similarities between the 
environment in which the 
UK ETS was developed and 
current circumstances 
A: Direct Participants, 
brokers and verifiers 
B: Direct Participants, 
brokers, verifiers, NGOs, 
consultants. Carbon Trust 
A: UK ETS provided good 
experience of verification of 
GHG emissions 
The Registry is transparent 
and easy to use 
Difficult to differentiate 
between emission 
reductions arising directly 
from the Scheme and 
reductions that would have 
happened anyway 
CCA participation made the 
market highly cyclical (ebbs 
and flows in trading) 
The auction did not work 
well (demonstrated by the 
difference between 
incentive price and market 
price) 
In presence of low 
allowance prices companies 
still preferred to abate 
Companies, government 
bodies, industry 
associations, market 
intermediaries and NGOs 
Most stakeholders rank 
long-term topics as the 
most important topics 
(although market 
intermediaries rank short-
term topics as most 
important) 
Long-term development of 
rules has a short-term 
impact and uncertainty is 
seen as one of the biggest 
obstacles to liquidity in the 
market 
Survey responses do not 
provide enough evidence to 
suggest that an alternative 
allocation methodology to 
grandfathering, such as 
benchmarking or 
auctioning, would be any 
less controversial 
However, there is a clear 
divide between industry, 
who prefer benchmarking. 
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Provisions for further review of 
evaluation 
Evidence/documentation relating to 
implementation of 
recommendations 
No 
None 
n/a 
n/a 
emissions rather than 
purchase allowances 
(reasons for which are 
unclear) 
B: UK ETS provided 
valuable experience in 
emissions trading to Direct 
Participants 
Wide range of Direct 
Participants reported 
investments arising from UK 
ETS 
Monitoring, reporting and 
verification costs are 
generally believed to be 
balanced 
The time-scale allowed for 
participants to gain an 
adequate understanding of 
the operation of how the 
Scheme worked 
No 
None 
and governments/NGOs/ 
market intermediaries who 
would prefer auctioning 
Companies found their 
feedback to governments 
on NAPs was 
unsatisfactorily reflected 
into revised Plans. 
Conversely, governments 
found feedback from 
companies difficult to 
incorporate in revised 
Plans. This indicates a clear 
need for trade-offs between 
the two groups 
No 
None 
Other ex post 
evaluation (e.g. 
NAO, Carbon 
Trust) 
Conducted by (internal/external) n/a National Audit Office National Audit Office Carbon Trust 
EU Commission & DG 
Environment 
Purpose of review n/a To review the impact of the 
Climate Change Levy and 
the Climate Change 
Agreements 
To review the performance 
of the UK ETS during the 
first two years of operation 
Carbon Trust (3 ex post 
reviews): 
A: To review the 
competitiveness impact of 
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the EU ETS and to analyse 
options for Phase II 
B: To review the 
implications of the existing 
allocation methodology on 
the creation of a carbon 
price and the incentives for 
investment in low carbon 
technology 
C: To review the impacts of 
EU ETS on profitability and 
trade of EU ETS sectors 
Date n/a August 2007 April 2004 A: June 2006 
B: May 2007 
C: January 2008 
Scope n/a Analysis of the impact of 
CCL and CCAs on energy 
consumption with a view to 
providing guidance on the 
role of the policies in future 
climate policy 
To analyse the performance 
to date and provide 
recommendations regarding 
improvement f the Scheme 
in the last 2.5 years of 
operation 
A; To focus on three areas 
that are of fundamental 
importance to UK and EU 
industry: Phase II 
allocations; profits, costs 
and competitiveness of 
industry; and the design of 
the Scheme post-2012 
B: To analyse the impact of 
Phase II allocations on the 
ability of EU ETS to deliver 
its key objectives: a stable 
carbon price, incentives 
investment in low carbon 
technology and deliver 
emission reductions 
C: To deepen previous 
knowledge of the impacts of 
the EU ETS on 
419 
manufacturing, with 
particular emphasis on the 
impact of carbon prices, 
and the inclusion of all on-
site emissions (from 
processes and other 
activities) on the 
competitiveness and 
profitability of EU ETS 
sectors 
Consultees n/a Industry, sector 
associations. Government 
departments 
Direct Participants, Defra, 
sector associations, expert 
advisory panel, verifiers, 
brokers, Corporation of 
London, US Environmental 
Protection Agency, Chicago 
Climate Exchange, Enviros, 
Ecosecurities, and DG 
Environment 
A: Verified data from 2005 
and studies undertaken by 
Climate Strategies 
B: Data analysis from 
Phase I emissions/prices 
and Phase II allocations 
C: Data from Climate 
Strategies 
Key conclusions n/a CCAs will result in 
significantly fewer 
emissions savings 
compared to initial 
projections 
Many targets are too lenient 
and subsequent efforts by 
Defra to tighten targets are 
disappointing 
A key beneficial outcome of 
CCAs is an improvement 
within managerial 
knowledge and 
understanding of the 
importance of managing 
energy efficiently 
UK ETS is a novel 
instrument 
Wider benefits for UK may 
be less than hoped for 
In some cases Direct 
Participant emissions were 
already below the baseline 
prior to the start of the 
Scheme 
An alternative approach to 
the auction may have been 
more effective 
Only 66% of emission 
reductions from four large 
A: Identification of 7 key 
challenges for Phase II: 
• In the presence of price 
instability companies 
delay investment, 
particularly in low-
carbon technologies 
• Governments should 
not interfere with the 
trading scheme ex post 
in terms of changing 
rules - this increases 
instability, undermines 
any incentive to abate 
emissions and could be 
subject to legal 
challenges 
» Withdrawing 
. 420 
Industry is divided on the 
overall impact and 
implications of the policy 
Direct Participants can be 
attributed to the UK ETS 
allowances from site 
closures created 
perverse incentive for 
firms to keep old, 
inefficient installations 
open. This may be 
prevented by giving 
free allocations to new, 
cleaner installations 
Free allocations may 
lead companies to 
believe high emissions 
will be rewarded in the 
next phase 
The power sector made 
excessive profits in 
Phase I 
Allocating based on 
BAD projections can 
lead to lobbying on 
emission projections 
and provides no 
incentive for other 
sectors (beyond power) 
to abate emissions) 
High levels of CDM and 
Jl projects (and 
subsequent high level 
of credit generation) 
could undermine EU 
ETS prices 
Phase I of the EU ETS 
was fraught with 
difficulties relating to 
allocations, carbon 
price and an 
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insufficient time frame 
to revise Phase II 
NAPs in light of Phase I 
verified data 
Prices may be heavily 
influenced in Phase II 
by CDM/JI credits 
The Commission has 
brought NAPs closer to 
Member State Kyoto 
targets - the 
Commission made a 
significant achievement 
in reducing the 'light 
touch' Plans from 
Germany and several 
other Member States 
The rules of the 
Scheme, particularly 
regarding closures, 
entrants, perverse 
incentives and 
allocations to the 
power sector, threaten 
to undermine the ability 
of EU ETS to provide 
consistent financial 
incentives to invest in 
low carbon technology 
Free allocations have 
led, and will probably 
continue, to provide 
vast financial gains for 
the power sector which 
could be reduced with 
greater use of 
auctioning 
While many NAPs 
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C: 
have improved in terms 
of transparency and 
through increasing use 
of benchmarl<ing and 
auctioning, many still 
reflect Phase I NAPs 
hinting at a degree of 
inertia 
Lack of long-term 
certainty reduces 
incentives for 
investment in low 
carbon technology 
There is a degree of 
regulatory capture as 
industry has 
successfully negotiated 
BAD allocations for 
Phase II - this could be 
reduced through 
auctioning 
Identification of 20 
activities out of 159 that 
face more than 4% 
increase in input costs 
if required to pay full 
cost of carbon 
allowances at 
€20/tC02 
Two sectors are 
particularly vulnerable: 
cement and steel 
If the cement sector 
was required to pay full 
allowance cost this 
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Key recommendations n/a No explicit 
recommendations made 
Future scheme require 
greater technical advice and 
consultation to prevent 
some participants unduly 
benefiting 
Participants should be given 
enough time to prepare for 
would easily surpass 
the existing 
transportation cost 
barrier to imports 
As a major exporter 
steel wfould be most 
exposed if the cost of 
allow/ances/carbon w a^s 
passed on to the price 
of export although this 
sector is already 
feeling the effects of 
relocation of production 
as transport costs 
decrease and carbon 
costs increase 
The overall effect may 
be one of leakage to 
countries with less 
stringent carbon 
policies 
However, both 
industries claim that 
manufacturers would 
pass on very little 
carbon cost as a 
means to maintain 
production in UK, 
reducing the possibility 
of leakage 
A: Recommendations for 
Phase II allocations: 
• Allocate below BAU 
projections, 
considering sector 
exposure to 
competition 
« Benchmarking were 
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future emissions trading 
schemes 
The size of pilot 
programmes should be 
carefully considered - a 
smaller auction may have 
been sufficient to learn 
lessons as lower cost 
Requiring participants to 
provide information on their 
costs could help future 
policy development 
Risk management 
procedures accounting for 
conflicts bet%feen policies 
need to be strengthened 
possible for incumbent 
installations but not for 
new entrants 
Use auctions to 
stabilise carbon price 
and promote transition 
to low carbon economy 
• There needs to be an 
independent authority 
(e.g. the Commission) 
to judge allocations, a 
position much 
strengthened following 
the victory over some 
Member States (e.g. 
Germany) in the wake 
of overly-generous 
NAPs 
• The introduction of 
aviation will prove to be 
beneficial to the 
scheme 
• Allocations based on 
'need' only serves to 
provide short term 
protection to industry 
when it should be 
adjusting to operating 
in a low carbon 
economy 
C: 
No policy recommendations 
as such - the report focuses 
on analysing the impacts of 
auctioned allocation on 
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competitiveness as 
guidance for policy makers 
without providing specific 
policy recommendations 
Further review of evaluation n/a Government (through Defra) 
currently establishing the 
form of post-2013 CCAS 
Final review of the Scheme 
was undertaken in 2006 by 
Enviros 
This final review did not 
evaluate whether the 
recommendations of the 
NAO report had been 
adopted 
All three reports form part of 
a continuing series of EU 
ETS analysis undertaken by 
Carbon Trust 
Evidence/documentation relating to 
implementation of 
recommendations 
n/a n/a Defra negotiated further 
emission reduction 
commitments from 6 large 
players within the UK ETS 
in 2004 following NAO 
criticism 
n/a 
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